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Judgment
Date : 06-08-2026 The present application has been filed by the petitioner-informant under Section 483(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), for cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to the opposite party no.2, namely, Ganesh Prasad, by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 06.12.2022 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No.21616 of 2022, in connection with Saran Mahila P.S. Case No. 48 of 2021, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 307, 313, 376, 511, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The principal ground urged in support of the application is that the liberty of the opposite party no.2 was secured upon a condition offered by him and accepted by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, namely, that he would deposit a sum of Rs.4,000/- per month in the bank account of the petitioner, who is the wife of the opposite party no.2, by way of interim maintenance, and that he has, from the very inception, failed to perform that condition.
The petitioner is the informant of the aforesaid case and the legally wedded wife of the opposite party no.2. The prosecution case, as set out in the written complaint of the petitioner addressed to the Officer-in-Charge, Mahila Police Station, Chapra, is that she was married to the opposite party no.2 on 26.11.2015 according to Hindu rites and rituals. In the said marriage, her father gave a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- in cash and gold and silver ornaments valued at about Rs. 10,00,000/-. Subsequently, one son was born of the wedlock, who lives with the petitioner. After the marriage, the opposite party no.2 took the petitioner to Bokaro in the State of Jharkhand, where the couple resided in the Government Quarter.
It is alleged in the written complaint that the opposite party no. 2, his father Kapildeo Mahali, his mother Shobha Devi @ Champa Devi and his brother Deepak Kumar persistently assaulted and tormented the petitioner for a dowry demand of a four-wheeler Alto car. It is further alleged that the accused persons would taunt the petitioner that they would continue to treat her badly until their demands for dowry were met. It is further alleged that her mother-in-law harassed her at several times It is furthermore alleged that the petitioner was repeatedly slapped and beaten and was driven out of the house. It is also alleged that no care was taken of her medical needs, and that the panchayats and compromises held from time to time brought about no change in the conduct of the accused persons. The petitioner has further alleged that her brother-in-law, Deepak Kumar attempted to establish physical relations with her, and that she was assaulted by all of them whenever she resisted. The petitioner has also alleged that her father-in-law held out threats to her life and the opposite party no.2 caused her pregnancy to be terminated by administering medicines to her against her will, and that on the last occasion he seized her and pressed upon her lower abdomen, in consequence whereof she lost a foetus of two months. On 09.06.2021 the accused persons brought her to village Maksudpur, Police Station Jalalpur, District Saran, abandoned her there and took away all her gold and silver ornaments.
On the basis of the said written complaint, Saran Mahila P.S. Case No.48 of 2021 came to be registered against the four named accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 307, 313, 376, 511, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Apprehending arrest, the accused persons approached this Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 69919 of 2021, titled as ‘Kapil Deo Mahali & Ors vs. State of Bihar’ which was filed by Kapil Deo Mahali, Deepak Kumar and Shobha Devi and in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 21616 of 2022, titled as ‘Ganesh Prasad vs State of Bihar’ which was filed by the opposite party no.2, Ganesh Prasad. Both the applications were heard together and were disposed of by a common order dated 06.12.2022 passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. On the prayer of the learned counsel appearing for the accused persons, the application of Shobha Devi was dismissed as withdrawn, and the remaining accused persons were granted the privilege of anticipatory bail.
The order dated 06.12.2022, insofar as it is material for the present purpose, reads as under:-
"Learned Counsel for the informant prayed for some maintenance for survival of the informant as she is a housewife and she is not able to maintain herself.
In alternative, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, on instructions, submits that petitioner namely, Ganesh Prasad (in Cr. Misc. No. 21616 of 2022) is ready to give rupee four thousand per month from this month, subject to furnishing bank account number by the informant to the petitioner.
In the changed circumstance, learned counsel for the informant admits that he shall provide bank account number of the informant to the petitioner namely, Ganesh Prasad (in Cr. Misc. No. 21616 of 2022) within a period of one week from today. On receipt of the bank account number of the informant, the petitioner, namely, Ganesh Prasad (in Cr. Misc. No. 21616 of 2022) shall deposit Rs 4,000/ (Four Thousand) in every month commencing from December as maintenance in the account furnished by the informant.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above, this Court is inclined to enlarge the petitioners on bail, except petitioner No. 3, in Cr. Misc. No. 69919 of 2021, namely, Shobha Devi. The petitioners are directed to surrender in the Court below within a period of four weeks from today and in the event of their arrest or surrender in connection with Saran Mahila P.S. Case No. 48 of 2021 they will be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned S.D.J.M, Chapra, Saran subject to the conditions as laid down under section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C.
The bail bond of the petitioner namely, Ganesh Prasad (in Cr. Misc. No. 21616 of 2022) shall be accepted by the learned court below on showing receipt of deposit of Rs. 4,000/- (for the month of December) by the petitioner, namely, Ganesh Prasad (in Cr. Misc. No. 21616 of 2022) in the account of the informant.
The aforesaid payment will be subject to any order passed in the maintenance case for final settlement." (emphasis supplied)
In the meantime, charges were framed and the case was fixed for evidence. Having received no redress and no further payment in the face of the growing unpaid arrears, the petitioner filed the present application.
Adverting to the aforesaid order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that four features of that aforesaid order deserve particular notice. Firstly, the undertaking to pay Rs.4,000/- per month did not originate with the Court. It was volunteered by the opposite party no.2 himself, through his learned counsel, on instructions, and was offered expressly as an alternative to the contest on merits. Secondly, the Co-ordinate Bench granted bail in the changed circumstance brought about by that offer, so that the offer formed the very consideration for the liberty conferred by the aforesaid order. Thirdly, the condition was not left as a pious exhortation. The acceptance of the bail bond of the opposite party no.2 by the learned Court below was itself made contingent upon his producing the receipt of the deposit for the month of December, which, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, demonstrates that the Co-ordinate Bench treated the deposit as a pre-condition of the enlargement and not as an incidental direction. Fourthly, the arrangement was expressly interim in character, the payment having been made subject to any order passed in the maintenance case for final settlement.
It is the categorical submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that immediately after the passing of the order dated 06.12.2022 the petitioner furnished her bank account details to the opposite party no.2 and the opposite party no.2 has altogether credited a sum of about Rs.34,000/- alone until the filing of the present application, as is borne out by the bank statement annexed as Annexure P/3.
It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner did not remain idle. Adverting to the order dated 06.07.2023 passed by the learned trial Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on 06.07.2023 the petitioner had moved the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Saran at Chapra by way of an application stating that the opposite party no.2 was granted conditional bail on the term that he was to pay Rs.4,000/- per month to her in accordance with the direction of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, and that a sum of about Rs.20,000/- had by then fallen into arrears. The petitioner moved the same Court again on 07.03.2024, but no further payment flowed from the opposite party no.2. The learned counsel points out that on both occasions, the grievance of the petitioner was reduced to a mere recital in the order sheet and no order whatsoever was passed upon it. It is emphasized by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, worse still, on 07.03.2024 the learned Court below, on the very same date on which the petitioner complained of the default, allowed the prayer of the opposite party no.2 to continue on the earlier bail without adverting at all to the default of which it had just been apprised. It is, therefore, the submission of the learned counsel that the petitioner duly availed her remedies against the lackadaisical and defiant attitude of the opposite party no. 2, yet her grievance was merely reduced to a noting in the order sheets of the learned Trial Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits that the petitioner has no source of income of her own and that she has been driven back to her paternal house in order to survive. It is emphasised that the petitioner is left to bring up a school-going minor son without even a rupee from the opposite party no.2. The expenses of the child rise with every passing year, while the sum of Rs. 4,000/- per month fixed as far back as December 2022 has remained largely unpaid. It is submitted that due to non-payment of maintenance amount, the petitioner and her minor son, stand on the verge of destitution and are in dire need of the rightful maintenance which the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had secured to them.
It is next submitted that the payment of Rs. 4,000/- per month was not a collateral direction but the pre-condition on which the privilege of bail was conferred upon the opposite party no. 2. Further, learned counsel places reliance upon the very language of the order dated 06.12.2022, by which the acceptance of the bail bond was made dependent upon proof of the first deposit, to submit that the opposite party no.2 obtained his liberty on a promise which he never intended to keep.
It is further submitted that the default is not an isolated lapse but an unbroken course of conduct running over nearly four years. Against a total liability of Rs.1,80,000/-accruing between December, 2022 and August, 2026, the opposite party no.2 has paid only about Rs.34,000/- alone, leaving arrears of about Rs. 1,46,000/-. Learned counsel submits that the opposite party no.2 has thus enjoyed the concession of bail for the entire period while withholding the consideration for which it was granted.
Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the conduct of the opposite party no.2 before the learned Trial Court tells the same story, inasmuch as, he absented himself from the trial to the point that his bond was forfeited and a non-bailable warrant of arrest was issued against him. He came before the Court only when that coercive process was set in motion.
The learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State does not dispute the factual position emerging from the record. He submits that the offences alleged are grave and serious in nature.
Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has been heard at length. He does not dispute that the maintenance amount has not been paid. His submissions are threefold. Firstly, he submits that the opposite party no. 2 is a man of limited means and has been unable to raise the amount. Secondly, he submits that no misuse of the liberty of bail, in the sense of tampering with the evidence or intimidation of the witnesses, is alleged against the opposite party no.2, and that the threshold of very cogent and overwhelming circumstances laid down in Dolat Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana, reported as (1995) 1 SCC 349, is therefore not satisfied. Thirdly, he submits that a Court exercising bail jurisdiction is not to act as a recovery agent, and that the default in a monetary condition cannot by itself sustain an order of cancellation.
I have considered the rival submissions of the parties and perused the materials on record.
During the pendency of the present application, this Court passed the following order on 22.01.2026:-
"Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State.
2.Issue notice to opposite party no.2 by ordinary as well as speed post with A/D for which requisites etc. must be filed within one week.
3.In the meantime, call for a report from the Court of learned A.D.J.-I, Saran at Chapra in connection with Mahila P.S. Case No.48 of 2021 with regard to the present stage of the case.
4.Re-list on 26.02.2026 under the appropriate heading."
In compliance with the said order, the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Saran at Chapra submitted his report which states, in substance, that Sessions Trial No.630 of 2024, arising out of Mahila P.S. Case No. 48 of 2021, is pending for appearance. Charges were framed on 03.12.2024 against all the three accused persons, namely, (1) Ganesh Prasad, (2) Deepak Kumar and (3) Kapildeo Mahali, and the case was fixed for evidence. On 21.08.2025, the prosecution produced the witness Dinesh Prasad, but there was no representation on behalf of any of the three accused persons, whereupon the Trial Court passed an order forfeiting the bonds of all the three accused persons and directing the issuance of non-bailable warrants of arrest. Thereafter, non-bailable warrants were issued against all the three accused persons. After the issuance of the non-bailable warrants, the accused Ganesh Prasad and Kapildeo Mahali appeared before the Court. Further, for securing the presence of the remaining absent accused Deepak Kumar, an order under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was passed against him.
The matter thereafter came up before this Court on 16.07.2026, when the following order came to be passed:-
"Heard the parties.
2.Learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 submits that the parties are trying to settle the dispute amicably.
3.In view of the above, list this case after one week to enable the parties to seek instructions in the matter."
On the next date, that is, 23.07.2026, this Court passed the following order:-
"Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Jharkhandi Upadhyay, the learned APP for the State, and the learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2.
2.List this case after two weeks under the heading “For Orders.”
3.On the next date of hearing, O.P. No. 2 shall produce a demand draft towards the balance amount of the maintenance dues, failing which, this Court will proceed to cancel the bail granted to O.P. No. 2."
However, the opposite party no.2 has failed to bring the demand draft as directed by this Court. On the contrary, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2, upon instructions, has candidly stated before this Court that the opposite party no. 2 is not paying the maintenance amount to the petitioner. The factum of non-payment therefore rests upon an admission and requires no proof.
The question that falls for determination is a narrow one. It is whether the sustained and admitted failure of an accused to perform a maintenance condition, which he himself offered and upon which he obtained the privilege of anticipatory bail, furnishes a ground for cancellation of that bail under Section 483(3) of the BNSS.
Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be apposite to notice the settled law governing the subject. In Dolat Ram (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the standard in the following words:-
"4.Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial…"
From the perusal of the afore-quoted decision it is clear, that the cancellation is not to be confined to cases of tampering with the evidence or the intimidation of witnesses. It names, as an independent head, the abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. An accused who takes the benefit of a concession and repudiates the burden which alone made that concession possible abuses it in the plainest sense of the term.
The illustrative circumstances in which an order granting bail may be interfered with were enumerated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P. & Anr., reported as (2022) 8 SCC 559, as under:-
"33.It is no doubt true that cancellation of bail cannot be limited to the occurrence of supervening circumstances. This Court certainly has inherent powers and discretion to cancel the bail of an accused even in the absence of supervening circumstances. Following are the illustrative circumstances where the bail can be cancelled:-
33.1.Where the court granting bail takes into account irrelevant material of substantial nature and not trivial nature while ignoring relevant material on record.
33.2.Where the court granting bail overlooks the influential position of the accused in comparison to the victim of abuse or the witnesses especially when there is prima facie misuse of position and power over the victim.
33.3.Where the past criminal record and conduct of the accused is completely ignored while granting bail.
33.4.Where bail has been granted on untenable grounds.
33.5.Where serious discrepancies are found in the order granting bail thereby causing prejudice to justice.
33.6.Where the grant of bail was not appropriate in the first place given the very serious nature of the charges against the accused which disentitles him for bail and thus cannot be justified.
33.7.When the order granting bail is apparently whimsical, capricious and perverse in the facts of the given case."
The distinction between the cancellation of bail on account of supervening circumstances and the annulment of an order granting bail which is itself unjustified was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. & Anr., reported as (2014) 16 SCC 508, in the following words:-
"12.We have referred to certain principles to be kept in mind while granting bail, as has been laid down by this Court from time to time. It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it is granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation have occurred is in a different compartment altogether than an order granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors which should have been taken into consideration while dealing with the application for bail and have not been taken note of, or bail is founded on irrelevant considerations, indisputably the superior court can set aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case belongs to a different category and is in a separate realm. While dealing with a case of second nature, the Court does not dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or the supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently. It, on the contrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness of the order passed by the Court.” (emphasis supplied).
The position was reiterated in Ajwar v. Waseem & Anr., reported as (2024) 10 SCC 768, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"27.It is equally well settled that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P v. State of M.P. (2022) 15 SCC 211 decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) CrPC in the following words : (SCC p. 224, para 24)
“24.As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 . To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.”
Considerations for setting aside bail orders.
28.The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused, ought to be avoided. Suffice it is to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused.
29.In Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439 CrPC is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding an application for bail. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect due application of judicial mind following well-established principles of law. In ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338; Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat (2008) 13 SCC 584.” (Emphasis supplied).
The entire jurisprudence on the subject was surveyed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702 = 2025 INSC 979, wherein the two distinct categories were set out as under:-
“18.Let us now examine the jurisprudence on when bail may be annulled or cancelled. Two distinct categories have emerged in this regard:
(A)Annulment of Bail due to legal infirmity in the order; and
(B)Cancellation of Bail, i.e., revocation of bail due to post-grant misconduct or supervening circumstances.
(B) Cancellation of bail
18.10.As per Halsbury's Laws of England, the grant of bail does not set the accused at liberty in the absolute sense but merely shifts custody from the State to the sureties. Consequently, cancellation of bail entails an assessment of whether the accused has abused the liberty so conferred.” (emphasis supplied)
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri Darshan (Supra) had succinctly explained that where cancellation, properly so called, is sought, the enquiry is directed to the question whether the accused has abused the liberty conferred upon him by the order granting bail.
The proposition that a breach of the conditions of bail is a self-standing ground of cancellation is placed beyond argument as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Himanshu Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported as (2024) 4 SCC 222, wherein it has been held that the considerations governing the cancellation of bail are materially different from those governing its refusal. Cancellation is warranted where the accused misuses his liberty, breaches the conditions imposed upon him, or where the order granting bail is itself illegal or perverse.
From the aforequoted judgments the following propositions emerge. Firstly, the cancellation of bail for supervening reasons requires cogent and overwhelming circumstances, and the illustrative grounds include the evasion of the due course of justice and the abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. Secondly, the breach of a condition upon which bail was granted is itself a recognized species of such abuse and does not need to be accompanied by tampering with the evidence or the intimidation of witnesses. Thirdly, the annulment of a bail order which is illegal or perverse rests on a separate footing altogether and requires no supervening conduct at all. The present application is founded upon the first two of these propositions and falls to be examined accordingly.
The precise question of the breach of a monetary condition of bail has engaged the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent past. In Gajanan Dattatray Gore v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1571 = 2025 INSC 913, an accused obtained regular bail upon an affidavit-cum-undertaking to deposit a sum of Rs.25 lakhs and never deposited it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the direction requiring him to surrender, and laid down the following prospective direction:-
"19.By this order, we make it clear and that too in the form of directions that henceforth no Trial Court or any of the High Courts shall pass any order of grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on any undertaking that the accused might be ready to furnish for the purpose of obtaining appropriate reliefs."
What flows from the afore-quoted decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gajanan Dattatray Gore (supra) is that, while forbidding the practice for the future, nevertheless sustained the revocation of the liberty of the accused who had broken his word. The breach of an undertaking on the faith of which liberty was obtained was treated as an abuse of the process of the Court. Pertinently, the condition was voluntarily conceded by the opposite party no. 2 and the larger purpose was to ensure the prevention of destitution of the petitioner-wife.
To the same effect in Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors., reported as 2026 SCC OnLine SC 521 = 2026 INSC 310, decided on 02.04.2026, wherein bail granted upon conditions requiring the settlement of the claims of allottees and the deposit of a sum of money was cancelled upon a finding of blatant non-compliance, and the accused was directed to surrender. The principle underlying both decisions is that the Court, having parted with the custody of an accused upon a stipulation, is not powerless when the stipulation is dishonoured.
Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has pressed the line of authority which holds that a Court exercising bail jurisdiction is not to act as a recovery agent. The first of those decisions is Munish Bhasin & Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., reported as (2009) 4 SCC 45, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that while exercising the discretion to release an accused under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. neither the High Court nor the Court of Session would be justified in imposing freakish conditions. It was accordingly held that it was not open to the Court, having found a case for anticipatory bail in a proceeding under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, to direct the accused to pay a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- towards past maintenance and Rs.12,500/- per month towards future maintenance. The second is Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported as (2013) 15 SCC 570, wherein a condition requiring the accused to place a fixed deposit of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- in the name of the complainant was held to be onerous and unreasonable. The third is Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., reported as (2021) 2 SCC 779, wherein it was held that by imposing a condition of deposit of Rs.41,00,000/- the High Court had, in an application for pre-arrest bail, virtually issued directions in the nature of recovery in a civil suit. Reliance was finally placed upon the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Apruva Kirti Mehta v. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 15402-15403 of 2024), reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 336 wherein it was observed as under:-
"8.That apart, the direction for payment was in the teeth of a plethora of decisions of this Court. We can profitably refer to a few of them, viz. Ramesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 7 SCC 461; St. George Dsouza v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1940 and Dilip Singh v. State of M.P. (2021) 2 SCC 779. Having regard to the principles of law laid down in the said decisions, inter alia, to the effect that the courts, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/pre-arrest bail, are not expected to act as recovery agents for realization of dues of the complainant from the accused, the High Court should have independently applied its mind and arrived at a conclusion as to whether a case for grant of bail, on settled parameters, had been made out or not irrespective of whatever statement was made on behalf of the appellant before the Sessions Judge."
This Court has given anxious consideration to that submission and finds that the authorities relied upon have no application to the facts of the present case, for the reasons which follow.
In the first place, every one of those decisions was concerned with a condition imposed by the Court upon an unwilling accused. In the present case, the Co-ordinate Bench imposed nothing. The offer of Rs. 4,000/- per month came from the opposite party no. 2 himself, through his own counsel and upon his own instructions, and it was made in the alternative to a contest on the merits. The Court did no more than record the offer and hold him to it. An accused who secures his liberty upon a promise cannot be heard, four years later, to say that the Court ought never to have accepted the promise. He is not permitted to approbate and reprobate, retaining the benefit of the order while repudiating the burden which alone earned it.
In the present case, the sum in question is only a meager amount of Rs. 4,000/- per month for a wife and a minor child for their sustenance and to ensure that they do not fall into destitution. That is not an onerous condition by any standard known to this Court. It is a sum barely sufficient to keep a woman and her son from want, and the opposite party no. 2 himself thought it within his means when he offered it before the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court.
In the third place, and most fundamentally, the payment directed here is not the realisation of a private or commercial debt. In Dilip Singh (supra), Sumit Mehta (supra) and in Apruva Kirti Mehta (supra), the sum directed to be deposited was the very money which the complainant claimed from the accused in the transaction forming the subject matter of the offence, so that the bail Court was being turned into an executing Court for a civil claim. Here the payment answers a duty which the law casts upon the opposite party no. 2 independently of any order of any court, namely, the duty of a husband to maintain his wife and his minor child. A direction to pay interim maintenance to a wife who is unable to maintain herself is not the recovery of a debt. It is the enforcement of an obligation of status, and its object is not to compensate the petitioner but to keep her and her child from destitution.
In the fourth place, the Co-ordinate Bench was careful not to trench upon the jurisdiction of the maintenance court. The order dated 06.12.2022 records in terms that the payment will be subject to any order passed in the maintenance case for final settlement. The arrangement was therefore patently interim and yielded to the decision of the competent forum, that is the competent family Court. The vice identified in Munish Bhasin (supra), namely, the usurpation by the bail Court of a question belonging to the maintenance court, is simply absent.
In the last place, the order dated 06.12.2022 has never been challenged by the opposite party no.2. He did not carry it in appeal or apply for its modification. He accepted the liberty which it gave him and lived upon it for close to four years. An order which binds the parties and has attained finality cannot be resisted collaterally, at such a belated stage, upon a plea that it ought not to have been passed at all.
It is also necessary to say something upon the interest which the condition was designed to protect, because that interest supplies the measure of the gravity of the breach. The obligation to maintain a wife who is unable to maintain herself is not a matter of private arrangement. In Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal & Ors., reported as (1978) 4 SCC 70, the Hon’ble Supreme Court described the provision for maintenance as a measure of social justice specially enacted to protect women and children, falling within the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India.
In Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, reported as (2008) 2 SCC 316, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the object of such proceedings in the following words:-
"6.The object of the maintenance proceedings is not to punish a person for his past neglect, but to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can provide support to those who are unable to support themselves and who have a moral claim to support. The phrase “unable to maintain herself” in the instant case would mean that means available to the deserted wife while she was living with her husband and would not take within itself the efforts made by the wife after desertion to survive somehow. Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice and is specially enacted to protect women and children and as noted by this Court in Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal [(1978) 4 SCC 70 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 508 : AIR 1978 SC 1807] falls within constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It is meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. It gives effect to fundamental rights and natural duties of a man to maintain his wife, children and parents when they are unable to maintain themselves. The aforesaid position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat [(2005) 3 SCC 636 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 787 : (2005) 2 Supreme 503] ."
The same principle was restated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha & Anr., reported as (2021) 2 SCC 324, wherein it was observed that the object of maintenance proceedings is not to punish a person for his past neglect, but to prevent vagrancy and destitution of a deserted wife by providing her food, clothing and shelter by a speedy remedy.
In Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena & Ors., reported as (2015) 6 SCC 353, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the sufferings of a woman driven out of the matrimonial home and observed as under:-
"2.Be it ingeminated that Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”) was conceived to ameliorate the agony, anguish, financial suffering of a woman who left her matrimonial home for the reasons provided in the provision so that some suitable arrangements can be made by the court and she can sustain herself and also her children if they are with her. The concept of sustenance does not necessarily mean to lead the life of an animal, feel like an unperson to be thrown away from grace and roam for her basic maintenance somewhere else. She is entitled in law to lead a life in the similar manner as she would have lived in the house of her husband. That is where the status and strata come into play, and that is where the obligations of the husband, in case of a wife, become a prominent one. In a proceeding of this nature, the husband cannot take subterfuges to deprive her of the benefit of living with dignity. Regard being had to the solemn pledge at the time of marriage and also in consonance with the statutory law that governs the field, it is the obligation of the husband to see that the wife does not become a destitute, a beggar. A situation is not to be maladroitly created whereunder she is compelled to resign to her fate and think of life “dust unto dust”. It is totally impermissible. In fact, it is the sacrosanct duty to render the financial support even if the husband is required to earn money with physical labour, if he is able-bodied. There is no escape route unless there is an order from the court that the wife is not entitled to get maintenance from the husband on any legally permissible grounds."
In Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan, reported as (2015) 5 SCC 705, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised that an application for maintenance has to be disposed of at the earliest, that the wife is entitled to live with the dignity she would have enjoyed in her matrimonial home, and that she cannot be compelled to become a destitute or a beggar. To the same effect in Anju Garg & Anr. v. Deepak Kumar Garg, reported as 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1363, it has been held that an able-bodied husband is required to earn money even by physical labour and cannot avoid his obligation to maintain his wife and minor child except upon the grounds permitted by the statute.
Read together, these decisions establish that the sum of Rs. 4,000/- per month was not a windfall conferred upon the petitioner. It was the bare floor beneath which the law does not permit a wife and a minor child to be allowed to fall. The breach of such a condition is therefore not a technical default. It carries a consequence which the law regards as grave, namely, the destitution of a woman and her minor child.
Turning to the facts, it is clear that the opposite party no. 02 was directed to pay the interim maintenance from the month of December 2022 and has run for forty-five months up to and including the month of August 2026. At the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per month the total liability comes to Rs.1,80,000/-. Against that sum the opposite party no. 2 has, upon the petitioner’s own showing supported by her bank statement, paid about Rs.34,000/- alone. The arrears therefore stand at about Rs.1,46,000/-. No payment whatsoever appears to have been made since the filing of the present application.
The growth of the default is documented at every stage by the record of the Courts below. The default is thus neither an isolated lapse nor a temporary embarrassment. It is a continuous and widening failure over a period of nearly four years, in which the opposite party no.2 has retained his liberty in full while performing less than one-fifth of the obligation which secured it.
The plea of poverty advanced on behalf of the opposite party no.2 does not detain this Court. Not a single document has been filed to establish his income, his assets or his inability to pay. He is an able-bodied man. Pertinently, the opposite party no. 02 offered this very sum to this Court in December 2022 as being within his capacity. He has never once returned to this Court, or approached the learned Trial Court, to seek a reduction or a deferment on the ground of changed circumstances. A plea of inability which is raised for the first time in answer to a cancellation application, and which is unsupported by any material, is an afterthought.
The conduct of the opposite party no. 2 in the trial itself removes any lingering doubt. The report of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Saran at Chapra discloses that although charges were framed on 03.12.2024, the trial could not proceed. On 21.08.2025 the prosecution produced its witness, but there was no appearance on behalf of any of the accused persons. The bonds of all the three accused persons were consequently forfeited and non-bailable warrants of arrest were issued. It was only after the coercive process was set in motion that the opposite party no.2 came before the learned Trial Court. Such conduct falls squarely within the head of evasion of the due course of justice identified in Dolat Ram (supra). It is not to the credit of the opposite party no.2 that a witness of the prosecution was made to attend the Court and return unexamined.
The conduct of the opposite party no.2 before this Court has been also noted. On 16.07.2026, his learned counsel represented that the parties were trying to settle the dispute amicably, and this Court adjourned the matter for a week for that purpose. On 23.07.2026, this Court gave him the clearest possible warning. He was directed to produce a demand draft for the balance maintenance dues on the next date, and the order recorded in terms that upon his failure this Court would proceed to cancel his bail. He has allowed two further weeks to pass and has produced nothing. On the material now before this Court, the submission of an amicable settlement was a device to buy time.
Upon a conspectus of the entire matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the opposite party no. 2 has abused the concession of bail granted to him by the order dated 06.12.2022, within the meaning of Dolat Ram (supra). The opposite party no. 02 obtained his liberty upon an offer made through his own counsel and on his own instructions. He has withheld the performance of that offer for nearly four years, and in the meanwhile, absented himself from his trial to the point of forfeiture of his bond and the issuance of a non-bailable warrant. The opposite party no. 02 has, through his own counsel and upon instructions, admitted before this Court that he is not paying the maintenance at all. Cogent and overwhelming circumstances for cancellation are therefore not merely present but abundant. To allow the opposite party no.2 to retain his liberty in these circumstances would be to hold that an order of this Court may be disobeyed with impunity, and it would leave the petitioner and her minor son to the very destitution which the condition was designed to prevent.
In the result, the present application is allowed. The anticipatory bail granted to the opposite party no. 2, Ganesh Prasad, by the order dated 06.12.2022 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 21616 of 2022, in connection with Saran Mahila P.S. Case No. 48 of 2021, is hereby cancelled. The bail bonds furnished by him in pursuance of the said order also stand cancelled.
The opposite party no. 2 shall surrender before the learned Trial Court within a period of four weeks from today. Upon his failure to do so, the Superintendent of Police, Saran shall take all necessary steps to secure his arrest and to produce him before the learned Trial Court.
The learned Trial Court is directed to proceed with Sessions Trial No. 630 of 2024 and to conclude the same as expeditiously as possible. The learned Trial Court shall also take all steps in accordance with law to secure the presence of the absconding accused Deepak Kumar, against whom a proclamation under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has already been issued on 09.02.2026.
Before parting with the record, this Court considers it necessary to observe that the Courts below must deal with an application which complains of the breach of a condition imposed by this Court while granting bail, and must not content themselves with placing such an application on the record. A condition of this Court loses all meaning if the court which is required to supervise its performance treats a complaint of its breach as a matter of routine noting. Had the applications of the petitioner dated 06.07.2023 and 07.03.2024 been dealt with when they were made, the arrears would not have been allowed to swell to their present figure.
Let a copy of this judgment be communicated forthwith to the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Saran and to the Superintendent of Police, Saran, by fax or by electronic mail, for immediate compliance.
It is made abundantly clear that the observations made hereinabove are confined to the consideration of the present application and shall not be construed as an expression of any opinion upon the merits of the case, which shall be decided by the learned Trial Court uninfluenced by the same.