Sugrabai vs Bahadur Singh

K.L. Shrivastava, J.—This miscellaneous appeal u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 is directed against the award made by the Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Mandsaur in Claim Case No. 38 of 1982.

Circumstances giving rise to this petition are these. According to the appellant her deceased husband Noor Mohammad aged 56 years was involved in a jeep accident on 19-1-82 and sustained injuries. He succumbed to the same on 4-2-82. The jeep belongs to the Government of Madhya Pradesh. According to the applicant, the accident was due to the negligence of the respondent No. 1 BahaJursingh who was driving the accident jeep.

In the claim petition it was stated that the jeep had dashed against Noor Mohammad from behind. A claim for Rs. 50,000/- was laid.

Respondents contested the claim petition denying the averments made therein.

At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal dismissed the application on the ground that it has not been proved that the accident was occasioned due to rash or negligent act on the part of the respondent No. 1.

The contention of the appellant''s learned Counsel is that on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the claim ought to have been allowed.

The point for consideration is whether the appeal deserves to be admitted.

Section 92-A of the Act providing for liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the basis of no fault liability was inserted by Act No. 47/1982 with effect from 1-10-1982 and is not attracted in the instant case.

Now as to the question of negligence.

In an action for negligence, the legal burden of proving negligence rests on the claimant. But barring exceptional cases, it might not be possible for the claimant to know what precisely led to the accident. It may peculiarly be within the means of knowledge of the driver or the owner. This hardhip to the claimant is sought to be avoided by the application of the maxim res ipsa loquitur. It is not a principle of liability but a rule of evidence. The principle is that there are certain happenings which do not occur normally, unless there is negligence. Therefore, in a case of such happenings the claimant is entitled to rely as evidence of negligence upon the mere happening of such accident. The general purport of the words ''res ipsa loquitur'' is that the ''accident speaks for itself or ''tells its own story''. This is a principle which in reality belongs to the law of torts and is not applicable to criminal prosecution. The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur depends upon the nature of the accident and the surrounding circumstances. Where there is evidence to show as to how the accident happened there the question of applying the rule of res ipsa loquitur does not arise. Where the principle of res ipsa loquitur is attracted the burden shifts to the respondent and the initial onus has to be on the driver/owner to prove that he had not been negligent. When prima facie negligence of the driver is established under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is incumbent on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle not merely to say that he had acted carefully but to rebut that presumption by proving that there was no negligence on his part.

The only eye-witness account of the occurrence in this case consists of the evidence of the driver. According to him he was not negligent and the deceased had himself collided with the back portion of the jeep.

On the material on record there is no occasion for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

As a result of what has been stated above, as negligence on the part of the driver is not proved, it has to be held that the claim petition was rightly dismissed.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed summarily without notice to the non-applicants.