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Judgment
sentence, dated 08.02.2019, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1st, Lakhisarai, in Sessions Trial No. 681 of 2008, arising out of Surajgarha P.S. Case No. 140 of 2007, whereby and whereunder the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. He has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- under Section 302 IPC, with further rigorous imprisonment for three months in default thereof, and rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs. 5,000/- under Section 27 of the Arms Act, with further rigorous imprisonment for two months in default thereof. Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently.
The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 19.05.2007 at about 11:30 A.M., the informant Rabindra Kumar Rai was proceeding with his father Ram Lakhan Rai. Near the house of Shravan Kumar Rai, they noticed a heated exchange between the appellant Sudhir Rai and Sachin Poddar. The appellant allegedly took out a pistol from his waist and threatened Sachin Poddar. Ram Lakhan Rai intervened to pacify the dispute, whereupon the appellant fired upon him, causing firearm injury in the right panjra/rib-cage region. The injured was taken to Surajgarha Hospital and thereafter referred to P.M.C.H., Patna, where he died during treatment on 24.05.2007.
It is further the prosecution case that after the firing, the appellant attempted to flee, whereupon the villagers apprehended him and snatched the pistol and empty cartridge from him. The firearm and cartridge were thereafter produced before the police. On the basis of the written information, Surajgarha P.S. Case No. 140 of 2007 was initially registered under Section 307 IPC and Sections 25(1-B)(a), 26 and 27 of the Arms Act. After the death of Ram Lakhan Rai at P.M.C.H., Section 302 IPC was added. Charge-sheet was thereafter submitted and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions.
The prosecution examined twelve witnesses. PW-2 Sital Rai, PW-3 Kajoma Devi, PW-4 Sachin Poddar, PW-5 Ishwar Rai and PW-6 Rabindra Kumar Rai are the material witnesses regarding the occurrence. PW-3, wife of the deceased, stated that her husband was attempting to pacify the dispute between the appellant and Sachin Poddar when the appellant fired upon him. PW-6, the informant and son of the deceased, also attributed the firing to the appellant and specifically stated that the appellant had no enmity with his father, whereas he was inimical to Sachin Poddar on account of a previous Mukhiya election. PW-1, PW-5 and PW-7 came to the place after hearing the firing and saw the injured and the apprehended appellant. PW-8 Dr. Arbind Kumar Singh conducted the post-mortem examination on 24.05.2007. PW-9 and PW-10 are witnesses to the seizure. PW-11 produced the country-made pistol and empty cartridge before the Court, while PW-12 Arbind Kumar Singh is the Investigating Officer.
PW-8 found an entry wound over the front of the abdomen and, on dissection, a metallic object resembling a bullet embedded in the rectum wall, which was removed and handed over to the police. The cause of death was opined to be abdominal injury and infection caused by firearm. The post-mortem report was marked as Exhibit-3.
The learned trial Court, upon consideration of the evidence, found the appellant guilty under Sections 302 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act. The learned Court, however, found that the country-made pistol and empty cartridge had not been recovered from the conscious possession of the appellant, as the same had been produced before the police by the villagers, and accordingly acquitted him of the charges under Sections 25(1-B) and 26 of the Arms Act.
Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the occurrence arose out of the quarrel between the appellant and Sachin Poddar and that the deceased intervened only to pacify the dispute. It is submitted that there was no previous enmity between the appellant and the deceased and, therefore, there was no intention to cause his death. It has further been submitted that the firearm was not recovered from the conscious possession of the appellant and that the conviction under Section 302 IPC is not sustainable. The alternative submission is that the case would fall under Section 304 Part II IPC.
Learned counsel for the State has opposed the appeal. He has submitted that the eyewitnesses have consistently attributed the firing to the appellant and that the ocular evidence is corroborated by the medical evidence. It is further submitted that the appellant fired upon a person who had merely intervened to pacify the quarrel and, therefore, the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court calls for no interference.
We have considered the submissions and examined the evidence on record.
From the evidence of the material eyewitnesses, there is no reason to doubt that the appellant fired the shot, which struck Ram Lakhan Rai. The occurrence is also corroborated by the medical evidence. The firearm injury found upon the deceased and the subsequent death during treatment establish the nexus between the occurrence and the death. The learned trial Court was, therefore, justified in holding that the appellant was the person who fired upon the deceased.
The question, however, is whether the proved facts establish the requisite intention for an offence under Section 302 IPC.
The circumstances in which the occurrence took place assume significance. The prosecution version itself shows that the initial altercation was between the appellant and Sachin Poddar. The appellant had allegedly taken out the pistol in that context. Ram Lakhan Rai intervened and attempted to pacify the dispute. PW-3 has stated that her deceased husband was pacifying the scuffle when the appellant fired upon him. PW-6, the informant and son of the deceased, has specifically admitted that the appellant had no enmity with his father, whereas he was inimical to Sachin Poddar because of a previous Mukhiya election.
Thus, the deceased was not the person with whom the appellant was initially engaged in the dispute. He entered the scene as a person attempting to intervene and pacify the quarrel. There is no evidence of any prior enmity between the appellant and the deceased. The firing was undoubtedly a conscious and deliberate act; nevertheless, the surrounding circumstances do not satisfactorily establish that the appellant had formed the intention to cause the death of Ram Lakhan Rai.
The learned trial Court has principally proceeded on the basis that immediately after the deceased intervened, the appellant took out the pistol and fired upon him and, therefore, the act was intentional. We are unable to accept the mere fact that the firing was intentional, necessarily establishes the specific intention to cause the death of the deceased required for Section 302 IPC. The mental element has to be gathered from the entire circumstances of the occurrence.
At the same time, the appellant had used a firearm and fired it at the deceased. Such an act necessarily carries with it the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. Therefore, while the evidence establishes the appellant’s culpable act resulting in the death of Ram Lakhan Rai, the circumstances proved on record, particularly the sudden quarrel, intervention of the deceased, absence of previous enmity between the appellant and the deceased, and the fact that the original dispute was with Sachin Poddar, persuade us to hold that the case is one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder falling under Section 304 Part II IPC.
The distinction between culpable homicide punishable under Part I and Part II of Section 304 IPC rests upon the presence or absence of the requisite intention. In Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2024) 14 SCC 286. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering an occurrence arising out of a sudden fight, held that although the accused had knowledge that his act could result in death, there was no intention to cause death, and accordingly altered the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 25 of the aforesaid judgement observed as hereunder:
“25.The facts of the present case, as we have already discussed above, by and large reflect the same situation, nature of crime as well as the act of the accused and the consequences of his action. We are inclined to accept the arguments raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Mr Sudhanshu S. Choudhari that under the present circumstances it would indeed be a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as given in Section 304 Part II inasmuch as, though the accused had knowledge of the consequences of the act he was committing, yet there was no intention to cause death.”
The factual circumstances also bear resemblance to Jhaptu Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 410, where the deceased had intervened to pacify an altercation and the accused fired a single fatal gunshot. The Hon’ble Supreme Court found absence of prior intention to kill and altered the conviction under Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC. The said decision is relevant to the assessment of the circumstances surrounding the occurrence, though the ultimate classification therein was under Part I of Section 304 IPC. In paragraph 7 of Jhaptu Ram (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:
“7.We have considered the matter, undoubtedly, it was a case wherein the deceased and his mother Bhagti Devi (PW 1) had been called to intervene and pacify the matter. It is also clear from the evidence on record that an altercation took place between the appellant and the deceased. There is no iota of evidence to show that there was any prior intention of the appellant to kill the deceased. As per the medical and ocular evidence, there was only gunshot fired by the appellant which proved to be fatal for the deceased. More so, the prosecution failed to marshal any evidence to show that the gun was in his hand when the deceased entered his house. In such peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we agree with the submissions advanced by Shri Sreyas, learned counsel for the appellant.”
The distinction between intention and knowledge in determining whether an offence falls under Section 302 or Section 304 Part II IPC has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anbazhagan v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC
The Court has explained that where there is no guilty intention but the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue, the offence falls under the second part of Section 304 IPC. The Court has further held that, in a case of a single injury, the circumstances preceding and attending the occurrence, including the absence of premeditation and the fact that the act occurred in a sudden fight or quarrel, are relevant in determining whether the accused possessed guilty intention or guilty knowledge. In paragraph 66 of Anbazhagan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as hereunder:
“66.Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:-
(1)When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate:'A' is bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.
(2)Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3)To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is 'guilty intention,' whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is 'guilty knowledge'.
(4)Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
(5)Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases :
(i)when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6)The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7)The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8)The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.
(9)Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10)When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.
(11)Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.
(12)In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.”
The factual circumstances in the present case also find close resemblance with the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Shyam Naresh & Anr. v. State of U.P., reported in 2025:AHC:106362-DB, wherein, arising out of a sudden altercation, the deceased was shot with a country-made pistol and the Court, after considering the absence of premeditation and intention to kill, modified the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC. The Court also noticed Jhaptu Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [(2014) 12 SCC 410], where the deceased had intervened to pacify an altercation and the accused had fired a single fatal shot; the conviction was altered from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I.
The aforesaid principles, when applied to the facts of the present case, support the conclusion already arrived at in the preceding paragraphs. The initial quarrel was between the appellant and Sachin Poddar; the deceased intervened to pacify the dispute; there is no established previous enmity between the appellant and the deceased; and the firing occurred in the course of the said altercation. The act of firing was conscious and deliberate, but the evidence does not satisfactorily establish the intention to cause the death of Ram Lakhan Rai. The appellant, however, must be attributed with the knowledge that firing a firearm at a person was likely to cause death. The offence, therefore, falls under Section 304 Part II IPC.
Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is altered to one under Section 304 Part II IPC.
So far as the conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act is concerned, the evidence shows that the country-made pistol and empty cartridge were produced before the police by the villagers after the appellant had been apprehended. The Investigating Officer himself admitted that there was no recovery of the firearm from the possession of the appellant. The learned trial Court, on this basis, had already acquitted the appellant of the charges under Sections 25(1-B) and 26 of the Arms Act.
However, the ocular evidence consistently establishes that the appellant used the firearm during the occurrence. The evidence of PW-3 and PW-6, in particular, attributes the firing to the appellant, while PW-11 proved production of the country-made pistol and empty cartridge and PW-12 proved the seizure proceedings, the conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act, therefore, calls for no interference.
Coming to the question of sentence, the appellant was in custody from 19.05.2007 to 28.08.2009 and thereafter from 04.02.2019, i.e., the date of conviction. The application for suspension of sentence records that, at the time of its filing, he had undergone more than seven years and eleven months of incarceration.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the occurrence, the absence of established previous enmity between the appellant and the deceased, and the finding that the offence falls under Section 304 Part II IPC, we are of the view that a sentence of ten years’ rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice.
Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant Sudhir Rai @ Sudhir Mahto under Section 302 IPC is altered to conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC and he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years. The conviction and sentence under Section 27 of the Arms Act are maintained. Both the sentences shall run concurrently.
The period already undergone by the appellant in custody shall be set off in accordance with law. If, upon such adjustment, the appellant has already undergone the sentence imposed by this Court and is not required in any other case, he shall be released forthwith.
The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed.
(Bibek Chaudhuri, J)
Rana Vikram Singh, J.: I agree.
(Rana Vikram Singh, J) skm/-
| AFR/NAFR | NAFR |
| CAV DATE | 07.08.2026 |
| Uploading Date | 17.08.2026 |
| Transmission Date | 17.08.2026 |