Subodh Kumar Sinha vs State Of Bihar & Ors.

Heard learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties.

Since the issue(s) involved in the present writ petitions are common and identical, with the consent of the parties, the same have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.

The petitioners are aggrieved by the part of Memo No.1580 dated 12.11.2024 issued by the Department of Education, Government of Bihar, Patna, whereby, inter alia, it has been held that only those teaching and non-teaching staff of the college in question who were appointed prior to 19.10.1982 would be entitled to grant-in-aid, that too for the period from 09.09.1981 to 19.10.1982.

The petitioners have also sought a declaration from this Court that the college in question had been granted affiliation up to the graduation level in the faculties of Arts, Science and Commerce w.e.f. 09.09.1981. They have further sought a direction upon the respondent authorities, particularly the State of Bihar and its authorities, to make payment of arrears of salary, after granting due promotion in accordance with law, as well as all other admissible dues, including post-retiral benefits, both arrears and current, from the date of accrual of their respective entitlements till the date of payment, along with interest @ 12% per annum.

The college in question was established on 26.01.1979, whereafter a Managing Committee was constituted to look after its affairs. Upon finding that the college fulfilled the requisite conditions, the Managing Committee submitted a proposal under the relevant rules to Magadh University seeking affiliation of the college in the faculties of Science, Arts and Commerce, both at the Intermediate and Degree levels.

Pursuant thereto, the authorities of Magadh University inspected the college and recommended to the State Government grant of affiliation up to the graduation level in all the three faculties, namely, Science, Arts and Commerce, vide Letter No. 1901 dated 04.01.1980.

Thereafter, vide Letter No. 1231 dated 09.09.1981, the State Government, upon the recommendation of Magadh University, granted temporary affiliation to the college in the faculties of Science, Arts and Commerce up to the Intermediate level for the academic session 1980-81 onwards.

In view of the aforesaid development and upon grant of affiliation to the college, the Managing Committee, vide Resolution No. 2 dated 26.09.1981, sanctioned various posts in all the three faculties for both teaching and non-teaching staff. The said resolution has been brought on record as Annexure P-2 to the writ petition(s). By the said resolution, as many as 32 posts of teachers, including the post of Principal, and 26 posts of non-teaching staff were sanctioned.

Upon receipt of the aforesaid resolution dated 26.09.1981, Magadh University accepted the posts created and sanctioned by the Managing Committee of the college and, vide Letter No. 90/GIII dated 26.03.1982, forwarded the same to the State Government for its approval.

Certain queries were thereafter raised by the State Government before the University with regard to the number of students enrolled in the college. The requisite information was duly furnished by the Principal of the college. Consequently, the Inspector of Colleges (Science), Magadh University, vide letter dated 06.08.1982 (Annexure-P/4), forwarded the requisite information to the Deputy Director of Education (Higher Education), Department of Education, Government of Bihar, Patna.

While the matter was pending consideration before the State Government, in the meantime, vide Memo No. 1065 dated 09.12.1982, the Government came out with a resolution relating to the creation of the Intermediate Education Council and the implementation of the policy of “Vitt Rahit Shiksha” (without financial assistance).

The Cabinet of the Government of Bihar also took a decision that no grant-in-aid would be provided in respect of any affiliated college seeking affiliation in a new faculty or any newly established/created college seeking affiliation.

Subsequently, vide Letter No. 131 dated 10.02.1983, the State Government granted affiliation to the college in question up to the Intermediate level w.e.f. 09.09.1981 and further granted affiliation up to the Degree level on 10.02.1983 with effect from the academic session 1980-81.

Thereafter, vide Memo No. 912 dated 24.06.1983, the State Government informed the University and the college in question that it had no objection with regard to the creation of posts of non-teaching staff in the college. The aforesaid communication, according to the petitioners, clearly demonstrates that the 26 posts of non-teaching staff, including the post of Accountant, created by the Managing Committee vide its Resolution dated 26.09.1981, had been accepted by the State Government.

Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to notice the status of the petitioners. The petitioner in CWJC No. 1424 of 2025 claims to be a non-teaching employee of the college, having been appointed against the post of Accountant created by the Managing Committee. The petitioners in CWJC No. 1890 of 2025 are teaching employees of the college. Petitioner No. 1 was appointed as a Lecturer in the Department of Mathematics on 03.02.1983 and, after rendering long years of service, superannuated on 31.10.2023. Petitioner No. 2 was appointed as a Lecturer in the Department of Physics on 10.10.1985 and superannuated on 31.10.2022, whereas Petitioner No. 3 was appointed in the Department of Hindi and joined the college on 02.07.1998 and ultimately superannuated on 31.05.2023.

Adverting to the aforesaid facts, Mr. Chakrapani, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners, primarily submitted that the college in question had already submitted its proposal for creation and sanction of posts on 26.09.1981, pursuant to a valid decision taken by the Managing Committee. Upon receipt of the said resolution, the University, after due consideration and examination, accepted the posts and forwarded the same to the State Government vide Letter No. 90 dated 26.03.1982 for its approval. It is further contended that the action of the State Government in keeping the matter pending, without any justifiable reason, cannot operate to the prejudice of the petitioners. According to him, by necessary implication, the college must be treated as having been granted affiliation from 09.09.1981, i.e. the date on which the State Government granted affiliation to the college up to the Intermediate level.

It is further submitted that the subsequent sanction/approval of the posts by the State Government would demonstrate that the college was, in substance, treated as affiliated up to the graduate level w.e.f. 09.09.1981 itself.

Learned Advocate for the petitioners, referring to Statute 12 of the University Manual, read with the recommendation of the Inter-University Board duly approved by the State Government, submitted that, by necessary implication, the posts in question stood sanctioned on 24.06.1983 with effect from the date on which the proposal had been pending consideration before the State Government, i.e. 06.08.1982. According to him, once the State Government issued the communication dated 24.06.1983, the approval/sanction of the posts related back to the date on which the same had originally been created by the Managing Committee, i.e. 26.09.1981, and accepted by the University on 26.03.1982.

Referring to Clause 3 of Memo No. 1065 dated 09.12.1982, popularly known as the “Vitt Rahit Shiksha Niti”, learned Advocate for the petitioners, submitted that there is no ambiguity in the policy to suggest that the State Government was absolved of all financial liability in respect of posts which had already been sanctioned or were otherwise entitled to financial assistance prior to the coming into force of the said policy.

It is contended that the natural consequence thereof would be that, upon occurrence of a vacancy in the first and second posts so sanctioned or deemed to have been sanctioned, the senior-most incumbent in the concerned cadre would become entitled to the benefit of grant-in-aid, which had earlier been extended to the founder teaching/non-teaching staff.

Learned Advocate for the petitioners, vehemently contended that if the intention of the Government were otherwise, Clause 3 of Memo No. 1065 dated 09.12.1982 would be rendered redundant. According to him, merely because the founder teachers/non-teaching employees subsequently retired, the status of the college could not automatically be altered from that of a deficit-grant college to one wholly disentitled to grant-in-aid. In CWJC No. 1890 of 2025 [Sarbind Kumar and Others v. The State of Bihar & Ors.], it is submitted that the petitioners, having been appointed against the third post of teacher in their respective departments and having rendered long years of service, subsequently became senior/senior-most incumbents and, therefore, became entitled to receive grant-in-aid from the State Government.

Mr. Chakrapani further submitted that once the petitioners became entitled to receive grant-in-aid towards salary, they would automatically become entitled to the benefits contemplated under the notification dated 15.01.2014, whereby the relevant statute was promulgated extending benefits to teaching and non-teaching employees of affiliated colleges receiving grant from the State Government prior to 09.12.1982. According to learned Advocate, for the purpose of pensionary benefits, the period of service of such employees has to be reckoned from the date of their initial appointment and not merely from the date on which they started receiving salary under the grant-in-aid scheme.

Learned Advocate for the petitioners placed reliance upon the decision in the case of Janardan Prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors. [C.W.J.C. No.8120 of 2016], stated to be one of the founder teachers of the college in question, who had approached this Court by filing CWJC No. 8120 of 2016. Vide order dated 27.03.2018, a learned Single Judge of this Court held him entitled to receive grant-in-aid from the State and directed the State Government to release the requisite funds for payment of arrears of salary and other financial benefits.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the State preferred LPA No. 1312 of 2018, which was dismissed by the learned Division Bench vide order dated 27.02.2019, thereby affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 8120 of 2016.

The State thereafter preferred SLP(C) No. 12333 of 2019 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which came to be dismissed on 09.08.2023. The review petition preferred thereafter was also dismissed on 23.04.2024. It is stated that the State subsequently preferred a curative petition, which too came to be dismissed.

It is further argued that, despite the order passed by the learned Single Judge having attained finality after affirmation by the learned Division Bench and dismissal of the proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the benefit was not extended to similarly situated employees until contempt petition was filed by Janardan Prasad Singh, whereupon the requisite benefits were ultimately granted to him. However, by the impugned order dated 12.11.2024, the Education Department has held that the college in question is entitled to grant-in-aid only in respect of those teaching and non-teaching employees who were appointed prior to 19.10.1982, and that too only for the period from 09.09.1981 to 19.10.1982.

It is lastly submitted that, even prior to issuance of the impugned order, the Principal of the college, aggrieved by the action of the respondents, had preferred CWJC No. 1329 of 2019 in a representative capacity on behalf of the non-teaching employees of the college, seeking similar relief. In view of the subsequent developments, especially the outcome of the impugned order and its cascading effect, the petitioners, having lost all hope of securing appropriate relief from the authorities, were constrained to approach this Court by filing the present writ petitions. It is, therefore, contended that the action of the respondent authorities in adopting a dual standard in the case of the college in question vis-à-vis other similarly situated colleges is arbitrary, discriminatory and illegal and amounts to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Once the State Government has extended the benefit to Janardan Prasad Singh, who was also appointed as a founder teacher of the college, denial of the same benefit to the present petitioners, who claim to be similarly situated, is wholly unsustainable in law.

Per contra, learned Advocate appearing for the State, while narrating the factual background and the litigation relating to Janardan Prasad Singh, submitted that the impugned Memo No. 1580 dated 12.11.2024 specifically records that the benefit granted pursuant thereto shall not be treated as a precedent. It is further submitted that, by the said order, the college in question has been directed to be treated as a deficit-grant college only for the period from 09.09.1981, i.e. the date of its Intermediate-level affiliation, to 19.10.1982. The order passed in CWJC No. 8120 of 2016, which gave rise to the subsequent proceedings, was primarily founded on the premise that similarly situated colleges were receiving deficit grant, despite the categorical stand of the State Government that no similarly situated college was receiving such grant. According to the learned Advocate, the scheme of deficit grant stood discontinued w.e.f. 19.10.1982 upon coming into force of the policy of “Vitt Rahit Shiksha”.

Learned Advocate for the State, referring to the Government Resolution contained in Memo No. 1065 dated 09.12.1982 submitted that, after coming into force of the said resolution, affiliation at the Intermediate level was to be granted by the Intermediate Education Council. More importantly, Clause 3 thereof specifically provides that any financial implication arising out of grant of new affiliation in any stream and sanction of new teaching/non-teaching posts would not be borne by the State Government.

So far as the college in question is concerned, learned Advocate for the State submitted that the posts of teaching and non-teaching staff were created after the relevant policy decision and, therefore, in terms of Clause 3 of the resolution dated 09.12.1982, the State Government could not be saddled with any financial liability in respect of such posts. It is further submitted that the college in question was subsequently granted permanent affiliation for imparting education at the B.A. (Honours), B.Com. (Honours) and B.Sc. (Honours) levels with effect from the academic session 1999-2000 vide letter dated 10.09.2008. The said communication, according to the State, categorically records that such affiliation was granted under the “Vitt Rahit” (without financial assistance) category. Consequently, conversion of the said affiliation into a “Vitt Sahit” (with financial assistance) category would be contrary to the governing policy and the applicable law. It is further argued that, after protracted litigation and upon remand by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the issue relating to grant of deficit grant stood settled by the judgment dated 19.04.2018 passed in LPA No. 430 of 2014, State of Bihar v. Parvati Kumari and Others. By the said judgment, the learned Division Bench set aside the order of the learned Single Judge, whereby it had been held that the college could not be deprived of the benefit of grant-in-aid merely because similar benefits had been extended to other colleges. The learned Division Bench specifically rejected the contention based upon Article 14 of the Constitution, holding, in substance, that a claim founded upon parity cannot be sustained where the alleged benefit itself had been extended contrary to the governing policy decision of the Government and on a pick-and-choose basis.

On the aforesaid grounds, learned Advocate for the State submitted that the petitioners cannot claim grant-in-aid merely on the basis of the benefit allegedly extended to Janardan Prasad Singh, particularly when the State Government has consistently maintained that the policy of “Vitt Rahit Shiksha” discontinued the deficit-grant regime w.e.f. 19.10.1982 and expressly excluded financial liability in respect of subsequent affiliations and newly sanctioned posts.

This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties and has perused the pleadings as well as the documents brought on record.

The controversy involved in the present writ petitions essentially revolves around the entitlement of the petitioners to grant-in-aid from the State Government in respect of the posts against which they came to be appointed in the college in question.

The admitted sequence of events assumes significance. The college was established on 26.01.1979. The Managing Committee thereafter proceeded to obtain affiliation for the college in the faculties of Arts, Science and Commerce. The State Government, upon the recommendation of Magadh University, granted temporary affiliation up to the Intermediate level vide Letter No. 1231 dated 09.09.1981. Subsequent thereto, the Managing Committee had, vide Resolution No. 2 dated 26.09.1981, created 32 teaching posts, including the post of Principal, and 26 non-teaching posts.

The proposal relating to the aforesaid posts was thereafter considered by the University and forwarded to the State Government vide Letter No. 90/GIII dated 26.03.1982. The requisite information sought by the State Government was also furnished and the matter remained under consideration before the competent authority.

It is thereafter that the Government Resolution contained in Memo No. 1065 dated 09.12.1982 came into existence, introducing the policy of “Vitt Rahit Shiksha”. Clause 3 of the said resolution assumes considerable significance, inasmuch as it provided that the financial implication arising out of new affiliation in any stream and sanction of new teaching/non-teaching posts would not be borne by the State Government.

The question, therefore, is not merely as to when the Managing Committee created the posts, but as to whether, prior to the coming into force of the aforesaid policy, those posts had acquired such legal status as would fasten financial liability upon the State Government.

In the considered opinion of this Court, creation of a post by the Managing Committee, acceptance of such creation by the University, and actual sanction of the post by the competent authority are matters which cannot be treated as interchangeable. An institution may create posts for its own administrative and academic requirements; however, the same does not, by itself, impose a financial obligation upon the State unless the competent authority, in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions and Government policy, has sanctioned such posts with corresponding financial liability.

It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain the precise legal effect of the communication dated 24.06.1983 issued by the State Government, whereby no objection was communicated with regard to creation of the non-teaching posts in the college.

The expression “no objection” cannot, in the absence of anything more, be automatically equated with a positive sanction carrying recurring financial liability upon the State Government. Whether the said communication, read with the earlier resolution of the Managing Committee and the University's recommendation, had the effect of recognising the posts with financial liability from an anterior date is a question which has to be determined from the statutory scheme and the documents forming part of the record.

Equally, the subsequent grant of affiliation up to the Degree level with effect from the academic session 1980-81 cannot, by itself, be construed as an automatic grant of financial assistance to all employees appointed in the institution. Affiliation and grant-in-aid operate in different fields and the existence of one does not necessarily establish the existence of the other.

The subsequent permanent affiliation granted to the college for B.A. (Honours), B.Com. (Honours) and B.Sc. (Honours) with effect from the academic session 1999-2000, stated to have been granted under the “Vitt Rahit” category, is also a relevant circumstance which the competent authority is required to take into consideration while examining the claim of the petitioners.

The petitioners, however, have raised a somewhat different contention. Their case is that the posts against which they were appointed were not fresh posts created after the policy decision dated 09.12.1982; rather, according to them, the posts had already been created by the Managing Committee on 26.09.1981, accepted by the University and forwarded to the State Government for approval on 26.03.1982. Their submission, therefore, is that their subsequent appointment against such posts cannot be treated on the same footing as an appointment against a post newly created after the coming into force of the “Vitt Rahit” policy.

The aforesaid contention cannot be rejected merely by referring to the dates of individual appointments of the petitioners. At the same time, acceptance of such contention cannot also be automatic. The decisive question would be whether the posts against which the petitioners were appointed had, before 09.12.1982, acquired the requisite statutory and administrative sanction so as to carry financial liability upon the State Government.

It is in this context that the impugned Memo No. 1580 dated 12.11.2024 requires examination. The said memo proceeds on the basis that only those teaching and non-teaching employees who were appointed prior to 19.10.1982 would be entitled to grant-in-aid and that too for the period from 09.09.1981 to 19.10.1982.

In the opinion of this Court, such an approach does not sufficiently address the foundational issue raised by the petitioners. If the posts themselves had already acquired the status of sanctioned posts carrying State financial liability prior to the relevant cut-off date, the mere fact that a particular incumbent was appointed against such post at a subsequent point of time may not, by itself, conclude the issue. Conversely, if the posts were not sanctioned in a manner creating financial liability upon the State prior to the cut-off date, a subsequent appointment against such posts cannot create a liability which the Government policy expressly excluded.

The competent authority was, therefore, required to examine the status of the posts first and thereafter determine the consequence of the subsequent appointments made against such posts. The impugned order, however, does not appear to have undertaken this exercise in the manner required.

Now coming to the reliance placed by the petitioners upon the judgment rendered in the case of Janardan Prasad Singh (supra).

It is not disputed that Janardan Prasad Singh had approached this Court claiming grant-in-aid and the learned Single Judge, vide order dated 27.03.2018, granted relief in his favour. The said order was affirmed in LPA No. 1312 of 2018 vide order dated 27.02.2019. The subsequent challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court also failed and the proceedings thereafter, as stated before this Court, culminated in dismissal of the review as well as the curative petition.

The aforesaid judgment, therefore, has attained finality insofar as the rights and relief of the said petitioner are concerned. The State Government cannot, in the present proceedings, reopen or question the relief which has attained finality in favour of Janardan Prasad Singh.

However, the consequence of such finality requires to be properly understood. The judgment in the case of Janardan Prasad Singh cannot be read as creating an independent and unlimited source of financial liability upon the State Government in respect of every employee subsequently appointed in the college.

A judgment rendered in an individual service claim necessarily operates upon the facts and legal foundation of that case. The dismissal of the challenge thereto may bring finality to the relief granted to that individual, but it does not, without more, convert the individual relief into a general statutory or governmental scheme applicable to all persons who may subsequently claim parity.

Article 14 of the Constitution undoubtedly mandates equal treatment of persons similarly situated. But similarity for the purpose of Article 14 has to be established both factually and legally. Mere employment in the same college or appointment against a post which is alleged to be similar would not, by itself, establish such legal identity.

At the same time, the State Government cannot ignore a final judicial determination where a subsequent claimant establishes that the factual and legal foundation of his claim is substantially identical to that which was accepted in the earlier case.

The appropriate course, therefore, is neither to mechanically extend the benefit of Janardan Prasad Singh to every subsequent employee nor to treat the said judgment as wholly irrelevant. What is required is an examination of the precise basis upon which the earlier benefit was granted and whether the present petitioners stand on the same legal footing.

Such an approach is particularly necessary in the present case because the petitioners were appointed on different dates, namely, 03.02.1983, 10.10.1985 and 02.07.1998. Their individual appointments were thus made after the policy contained in Memo No. 1065 dated 09.12.1982 had come into force.

Consequently, the petitioners cannot claim grant-in-aid merely because one of the employees of the college, namely Janardan Prasad Singh, succeeded in earlier litigation. They must establish that their appointments were against posts which had already acquired the requisite legal status and State financial sanction before the operation of the “Vitt Rahit” policy.

At the same time, the fact that the appointments were made after 09.12.1982 cannot, by itself, be treated as conclusive against the petitioners if the posts themselves had already been sanctioned and carried financial liability upon the State prior thereto.

The State has relied upon the decision rendered in LPA No. 430 of 2014, The State of Bihar & Anr. v. Parvati Kumari and Others, to contend that a benefit extended contrary to Government policy to some persons cannot furnish a basis for claiming the same benefit under Article 14.

There can be no dispute with the general proposition that Article 14 does not contemplate negative equality. An illegality or an erroneous benefit granted to one person cannot ordinarily be demanded as a matter of right by another merely on the ground of parity.

However, before applying the said principle, the authority must determine whether the earlier benefit was, in fact, an illegal or unauthorised benefit granted contrary to the governing policy, or whether it flowed from a distinct factual and legal position concerning the status of the institution or the posts involved.

In the present case, the impugned order does not disclose any detailed consideration of this aspect. It merely proceeds to restrict the benefit by reference to the date of appointment and the period between 09.09.1981 and 19.10.1982.

Such a mechanical approach cannot be sustained when the petitioners have specifically relied upon the creation of posts in 1981, the University's acceptance thereof in 1982, the subsequent communication of the State Government dated 24.06.1983 and the final judicial determination rendered in the case of Janardan Prasad Singh (supra).

The authority must examine the cumulative effect of these circumstances before recording a conclusion on the petitioners' entitlement.

On consideration of the entire matter, this Court is of the view that the impugned Memo No. 1580 dated 12.11.2024 cannot be sustained to the extent it determines the claim of the present petitioners solely on the basis of the dates of their individual appointments.

The relevant test is whether the posts against which the petitioners were appointed had acquired, before the coming into force of the policy contained in Memo No. 1065 dated 09.12.1982, the requisite sanction and status carrying financial liability upon the State Government.

If the answer is in the affirmative, the subsequent appointment against such an already sanctioned post would require examination on a different footing from an appointment against a post newly created after the policy came into force.

If, on the other hand, the posts had not acquired such sanction or State financial backing before the cut-off date, the petitioners cannot claim grant-in-aid merely because the Managing Committee had earlier created the posts or the University had forwarded a proposal for approval.

The judgment in the case of Janardan Prasad Singh (supra) shall be considered by the competent authority only for the purpose of determining whether the legal and factual foundation thereof applies to the present petitioners. It shall not be treated as conferring an automatic right of grant-in-aid upon all employees of the college appointed subsequently.

This Court further hold that the State Government is entitled to rely upon the policy contained in Memo No. 1065 dated 09.12.1982 and the principle enunciated in Parvati Kumari (supra). However, such reliance must follow a proper determination of the status of the concerned posts and the precise legal basis of the earlier benefit granted to Janardan Prasad Singh (supra).

This Court is conscious that an interpretation which automatically extends the benefit of the earlier judgment to every subsequent employee of the college may have consequences far beyond the individual claims before us and may impose financial liability upon the State Government in respect of persons who were not parties to the earlier litigation.

Such an enlargement of the earlier judgment is neither warranted nor permissible merely on the ground of parity. The relief granted herein, therefore, must necessarily remain confined to examination of the individual claims of the present petitioners on the basis of the legal status of the posts against which they were appointed.

For the reasons aforesaid, Memo No. 1580 dated 12.11.2024, insofar as it determines the entitlement of the present petitioners without undertaking the aforesaid examination, is hereby set aside to that limited extent.

The matter is remitted to the competent authority of the Department of Education, Government of Bihar, for fresh consideration of the individual claims of the petitioners.

While reconsidering the matter, the competent authority shall examine, in particular:

The competent authority shall pass a reasoned and speaking order dealing with each of the aforesaid aspects and shall consider the claim of each petitioner independently.

The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.

In the event the competent authority, upon such reconsideration, finds any of the petitioners entitled to grant-in-aid, the consequential claims relating to arrears of salary, promotion, pensionary/post-retiral benefits and other admissible dues shall also be considered in accordance with law.

It is made clear that this Court has not, by the present order, declared any general right of grant-in-aid in favour of the present petitioners or any other employee of the college. The ultimate entitlement of the petitioners is left open for determination by the competent authority in accordance with law.

It is further made clear that the judgment rendered in the case of Janardan Prasad Singh (supra) shall not, merely by reason of its finality, be treated as creating an automatic or general entitlement in favour of all teaching or non-teaching employees of the college who were appointed subsequent thereto.

The decision taken pursuant to the present order shall be confined to the individual claims of the petitioners and shall not be treated as a precedent for granting financial assistance to other employees or institutions unless their entitlement independently follows from the applicable statutory provisions, Government policy and the facts of their respective cases.

The writ petitions stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

There shall be no order as to cost(s).