AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Phillips, J.—The question that has been referred for our opinion is whether the word ""acquired"" in the exception to Section 8 of the Madras
Estates Land Act covers a case of ""surrender."" That exception reads as follows:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section where, before or after the commencement of this Act, the kudivaram interest in any land
comprised in an estate falling within Clause (d) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 has been or is acquired by the inamdar, such land shall cease to be
part of the estate.
It is not seriously disputed that the word ""acquired"" in its ordinary sense is wide enough to cover a case of acquisition by surrender or
abandonment as well as any other form of acquisition. It is, however, contended that in this exception the word must be construed in a limited
sense so as to exclude surrender and abandonment, and two grounds are put forward in support of this contention. The first is that, inasmuch as
the exception is an exception to Section 8, the modes of acquisition must be limited to those mentioned in Section 8, Clause (1), namely, "" transfer,
succession or otherwise,"" and it is argued that these words specifically exclude ""surrender"" and ""abandonment."" This was the view taken by
Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in Suryanarayana v. Patanna ILR (1915) Mad. 608 but Spencer, J., did not agree with him. Since then there has been a
conflict of opinion in this Court. Sadasiva Ayyar, J., relied on the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Badan Chandra Das v. Rajeswari Debya
(1905) 2 C.L.J. 570 and Muktakeshi Dasi v. Pulin Behari Singh (1908) 8 C.L.J. 324. The latter purports to follow the decision in the former and
contains the remark-.
In construing words like ''or otherwise'' it has always been held that the matters reserved must be ''ejusdem generis'' and that is very clearly brought
out in the case of Badan Chandra Das v. Rajeswari Debya (1905) 2 C.L.J. 570.
From a perusal of the judgment in Badan Chandra Das v. Rajeswari Debya (1905) 2 C.L.J. 570 it would appear that the head note, which runs
the terms ''transfer, succession or otherwise'' in Section 22"" (equivalent to Section 8(1), Estates Land Act) ""do not mean and include a
''surrender''; the expression ''or otherwise'' as used in the Section means ''or in a similar way''"" is worded in a considerably wider manner than the
language of the judgment. As however one of the Judges in Muhtakeshi Dasi v. Pulin Behari Singh (1908) 8 C.L.J. 324 was a party to the prior
decision, we must take it that that was the meaning of the latter judgment, but it must be observed that the judgment does not expressly lay down
the proposition, which can only be inferred from its general tenor, and there is no argument in the judgment to support such a proposition; similarly
the judgment in the Muhtakeshi Dasi v. Pulin Behari Singh (1908) 8 C.L.J. 324, which purports to follow the former decision, does not contain any
argument. One difficulty in the way of construing ""or otherwise"" as limited to matters ejusdem generis is that it is very difficult to imagine what other
means of acquisition can be referred to which are of the same nature as ""transfer"" and ""succession,"" terms which in themselves are extremely wide.
Even supposing that the exception to the Section must be governed by the first Clause thereof, it does not appear that the word ""acquired"" must be
interpreted in a limited sense, so as to exclude surrender and abandonment. However this may be, I am of opinion that the exception, so called, is
in effect a substantive provision and there is no necessity to qualify its meaning by the preceding Clauses.
The second argument put forward is that the language of Section 6, Clause (2) shows that the legislature intended to exclude ""surrender"" or
abandonment"" from the provisions of the exception to Clause 8. That runs as follows:
Where land held by ryot with a permanent right of occupancy is surrendered or abandoned or save in the cases falling within Sub-section (4) of
Section 8, and the exception to Section 8 conies into the possession of the landholder....
This would seem to draw a distinction between cases of the surrender and abandonment and other eases in which the right of occupancy comes
into the possession of the landholder. The whole of this provision seems somewhat unnecessary in view of Section 6, Clause (1) which in effect
deals with the same subject, but it has possibly been provided ex-abundanti cautela. Whatever the reason for the provision, the language of the
succeeding Section, when it is clear in its terms, must be read as it stands, and should not be interpreted in a strained manner merely in order to
bring it into consonance with a previous Section. There is no ambiguity in the language of the exception to Clause (8) and there is therefore no
reason why in interpreting it reference should be made to Section 6(2). The word ""acquired"" has a very general meaning and would ordinarily
include acquisition by surrender, and the only argument that has been advanced against this proposition is that when a tenancy is surrendered the
tenants'' rights under the lease are not acquired by the landlord, but they merely cease to exist. Here, however, it is not a question of acquiring the
tenancy right, but it is a question of acquiring the kudivaram interest, and that, I take it, means the right of occupancy in the land and not merely
rights under a particular lease. If this argument is rejected, as it must be, we have the word ""acquired"" in its ordinary sense and that is wide enough
to include acquisition by surrender. In this reference, acquisition by abandonment has not been dealt with, but, so far as the case has been argued
before us, it would appear that the two modes of obtaining the kudivaram right, namely, by surrender or abandonment, stand on the same footing.
The question referred must therefore be answered in the affirmative and the civil revision petition will be remitted to the Division Bench for
disposal accordingly.
Krishnan, J.
The question raised in this reference is whether exception to Section 8 of the Madras Estates Land Act covers a case of ""surrender"" or not. It
has been answered in the affirmative by Miller, Oldfield and Spencer, JJ., in Ponnusamy Padayachi v. Karuppudayan ILR 1915 Mad. 848,
Suryanarayana v. Patanna ILR (1915) Mad., 608, and S.A. No. 1241 of 1919, respectively, but in the negative by Sadasiva Ayyar, Seshagiri
Ayyar and Napier, JJ., in Suryanarayana v. Patanna ILR (1915) Mad., 608, Venkata Sastrulu v. Sitaramudu ILR (1915) Mad. 891, and
Zamindar of Nuzvid v. Lakshminarayana ILR 9192 Mad. 39 respectively. It is on account of this direct conflict of opinion that the matter is
referred to the Full Bench and we have to decide it on the Section of the Act.
The word ""acquired"" in the exception, which is the word to be construed, it cannot be denied, is of wide enough import to include all cases of
acquisition, by surrender, abandonment or otherwise. The word is defined in Murray''s Oxford Dictionary as meaning ""to gain, to obtain, to get as
one''s own, to gain the ownership of, to come into possession of."" Is there any reason then why it should be restricted or out down in its meaning in
the exception? The object of the exception is clearly to exempt inamdars as distinguished from zamindars from the applicability of Clauses (1) and
(3) of Section 8. There is nothing in the policy of the Act so far as I can see, nor in the language of the exception to restrict the exemption to cases
other than those of surrender and abandonment.
It is, however, contended that there are words in Section 8(1) and in Section 6(2) which necessitate that we should construe the word
acquired"" in the exception as not including cases of surrender and abandonment. It is first argued that the word ""otherwise"" in Clause (1) of
Section 8 must be read ""ejusdem generis"" with the preceding words ""transfer or succession"" and that so read it will not include cases of surrender
or abandonment. It is then argued that as the exception in Section 8 is an exception to Clause (1) it should also be read as not including such cases
when the Clause itself does not include them. The whole of this argument turns upon reading ""otherwise"" as governed by the rule of ""ejusdem
generis."" The word is wide enough to include all cases of the interest of the landholder and of the occupancy ryot becoming united in the same
person. To read it as ""ejusdem generis"" with transfer and succession thus excluding cases of surrender and abandonment will lead to the result that
the prohibition in it against a landholder holding the land as a ryot will not be applicable to cases where he obtains the ryoti interest by surrender or
abandonment even when the landholder is a zamindar. This is clearly incorrect, for Clause (4) shows in what case alone an exception is allowed in
the case of zamindars.
As my learned brother Phillips, J., observes in his judgment, which I have had the advantage of reading, if the word ""otherwise"" is limited to
matters ""ejusdem generis "" with transfer and succession, it is difficult to see to what case it can possibly refer. The learned vakil for the Appellant
suggested that it might refer to cases of acquisition of title by prescription, but they are no more ejusdem generis with transfer and succession than
surrender can be said to be. I think the argument based on the language of Section 8(1) is erroneous.
The more difficult point is the one raised on the language of Section (6), Clause (2). That language, it is argued, suggests that the exception to
Section 8 does not apply to cases of surrender or abandonment but only to cases where the landholder comes into possession of the land in some
other manner as the saving Clause which refers to the exception is not applied to cases of surrender or abandonment in the Clause. If we read the
exception to apply to cases of surrender or abandonment as well, it is argued that there will be a conflict between it and Clause (2). On the other
hand if we are to restrict the exception as contended for we will have to read into it the words ""otherwise than by surrender or abandonment"" after
the word ""acquired""; there is no warrant for doing this. The words ""and the exception to Section 8"" in Clause 2 seem to be quite superfluous as by
the exception to Section 8 itself such cases are taken entirely out of the Act. It seems to me that 6(2) is not intended in any way to govern the
exception to Section 8 or to control its general language and that if there is any conflict, the exception which refers to inamdars only must be taken
to override the general provision in Section 6, Clause (2) which refers to landholders generally and not vice versa.
In the view I take, I see no difference between cases of surrender and of abandonment. I agree that our answer to the reference should be that
the case of ""surrender"" is within the exception to Section 8.
Ramnsam, J.
I agree.