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Judgment
P.V.Kunhikrishnan, J.
These four writ petitions are connected, and therefore, I am disposing of these four writ petitions by a common judgment.
The petitioners in these writ petitions are aggrieved by the conversion fee notices issued by the authorised officers for processing the Form-6 applications submitted by them in accordance with the provisions under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Rules, 2008 (for short, Rules 2008). The petitioners in these writ petitions submit that they need not pay the conversion fee in the light of the decision of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Revenue Divisional Officer v. Dr A.V.Sajeev [2023 (4) KLT 331]. But the Additional Advocate General, Sri. K C Vincent submitted that the dictum laid down by this Court in Dr A.V.Sajeev’s case (supra) will not stand in the light of the observation in paragraph 22 of the decision of the Apex Court in State of Kerala v. Moushmi Ann Jacob [2025 (2) KHC 163]. Therefore, the state's contention is to be considered in detail. First, I will narrate the facts of this case. The same set of facts is narrated in all these cases. For convenience, I will narrate the facts of WP(C) No. 23202/2026.
The petitioner in WP(C) No.23202/2026 submitted a Form-6 application in respect of 7.92 Ares (19.57 cents) of land comprised in Re-Survey No.282/4-2 and 3.90 Ares (9.64 cents) of land comprised in Re-Survey No.282/8 in Block No.9 of Nedumbassery Village, over which he obtained title by virtue of Exts. P1 and P2 sale deeds. It is submitted that the petitioner’s aforesaid property has been lying as dry land for more than four decades, though the property is classified as paddy land in the Basic Tax Register (BTR). For reclassification of the petitioner’s property, the petitioner submitted a Form-6 application before the 1st respondent. By Ext. P5, the 1st respondent, demanded conversion charges for the petitioner’s 7.92 Ares (19.57 cents) of land comprised in Re-Survey No.282/4-2 and 3.90 Ares (9.64 cents) of land comprised in Re-Survey No.282/8. According to the petitioner, this court in Dr A.V. Sajeev’s case (supra) declared that, though a property may lie contiguous and remain as a single plot, but covered by different documents, the benefit of fee exemption would be available to all persons who hold such land, even if the property is covered by separate documents extending to more than 25 cents of land, but the land as per the holding covered by different documents is less than 25 cents, provided that the purchase was before 30.12.2017. It is submitted that, even though the petitioner holds the aforesaid properties by virtue of two title deeds, the 1st respondent has taken into account the whole 11.82 Ares of land contained in the Form 6 application as a single property. It is submitted that, for technical reasons, the petitioners had to submit a single Form 6 application for Exts. P1 and P2 properties. Both the properties covered by Exts. P1 and P2, having an extent below 25 cents under separate title deeds executed prior to 30.12.2017, are entitled to be considered independently and hence, in the light of the dictum laid down by this court in Dr A.V. Sajeev's case (supra), the petitioners need not pay the conversion charges, is the submission. Similar are the contentions of the petitioners in WP(C) Nos. 21774 of 2026, 24282 of 2026 and 19764 of 2026.
Heard Adv. Rinny Stephen Chamaparampil, Adv. Saigi Jacob Palatty and Adv. Vinu Chand. I also heard Additional Advocate General Sri. K. C. Vincent.
The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the points raised in these writ petitions are covered in favor of the petitioners in the light of the dictum laid down by this court in Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra). But the Additional Advocate General relied on Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra), and submitted that, in the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in that judgment in paragraph No.22, the dictum laid down by this court in Dr A.V. Sajeev's case (supra) will not stand. This point is stoutly opposed by the counsel for the petitioners. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the circular referred to in paragraph No.22 of Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra) is already declared as not valid and unconstitutional by a Division Bench of this court in Baby M.K and Others v. District Collector, Ernakulam and Others [2021 (6) KHC 318]. It is also submitted by Adv. Rinny Stephen Chamaparampil, that the judgment in Baby M.K's case (supra) was referred by the single Judge in Dr A.V. Sajeev v. Revenue Divisional Officer/Sub Collector [2023 (5) KHC 245], which resulted in the Division Bench judgment in Dr A.V. Sajeev's case (supra). The counsel submitted that the state deliberately suppressed before the apex court that the circular dated 23.07.2021 is held invalid and unconstitutional by this court. The counsel also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Manipur v. Surjakumar Okram [2022 KHC 6123]. Adv. Rinny Stephen and Adv. Saigi Jacob Palatty submitted that the findings in paragraph No.22 of Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra) are an obiter in the light of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Arun Kumar Aggarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others [2011 KHC 4799], and also in State of Gujarat v. Utility Users' Welfare Association and Others [(2018) 6 SCC 21].
Adv. Saigi Jacob Palatty also relied on the judgment of this court in Sumesh U. v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Palakkad [2023 (3) KHC 431] and submitted that the clarification issued on 23.07.2021, which is referred in paragraph No.22 of the Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra), will not stand because the clarifications are not in the form of either a circular or a Government Order and they are only the communications issued by individual officers, apparently, to queries raised with regard to the applicability of exemptions. Hence, it is submitted that the decision of the Division Bench in Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra) will stand. The Additional Advocate General, on the other hand, submitted that the decision in Baby. M.K's case (supra) is pending before the Apex Court, and an interim order has been passed.
This court considered the contentions of the petitioners and the contentions raised by the Additional Advocate General on behalf of the State.
It is an admitted case that the state has not challenged the decisions of the Division Bench in Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra). In Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra), the Division Bench considered the question whether an owner of two different plots of land purchased through separate documents prior to 31.12.2017, is liable to pay the fee for regularisation under Section 27A of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 (for short, Act 2008), for the reason that the plots are lying contiguous, but the total extent of the property together exceeds 25 cents. The Division Bench in the above decision considered this matter in detail in paragraphs Nos 4, 5, and 6. It will be better to extract paragraphs Nos 4, 5, and 6 of the above judgment.
“4.The Government, thereafter, issued an order dated 25.2.2021, exempting land upto 25 cents, from payment of fixed fee as per the schedule. This is seen from Clause - I of the above Government Order. Sensing that there will be a misuse of the order by holder of larger extent of land having more than 25 cents of land, in the same order, the Government stipulated that those land owners who are having larger extent of land of more than 25 cents, after 30.12.2017 will not be entitled to the benefit of Clause - I of the above Government Order for exemption from payment of fees by fragmenting the land with smaller extent to claim the benefit. This is obvious to avoid misuse of the provisions of exemption by bringing down the extent of land to 25 cents of land or lesser to obtain the benefits. Clause - 2 prevents the land owner from claiming benefit of Clause - I by fragmenting the larger extent to get the benefit of Clause - I. Clause - I allows exemption upto 25 cents of land. Though no reference has been made in respect of the total holding of 25 cents of land in Clause - I, it has to be understood with reference to the title claimed by the holder of land with reference to a document. This is exactly the reason that Clause - 2 was incorporated to prevent holders of land based on the title having extent exceeding 25 cents of land may attempt in future to fragment the land to obtain the benefit of Clause - I.
5.If a person, at the time of the Government order dated 25.2.2021 has a different holding in the State in a small plot extending to more than 25 cents of land, they would be entitled to the benefit of the first clause for exemption if the land as per the holding covered by different documents is less than 25 cents. The holding as per the exemption has to be understood, to be qualified with reference to the title deeds of the party, the holder of the land. Though in practice, the property may lie contiguous and remain as a single plot, the benefit of exemption would be available to all such persons who hold the land by separate documents and the extent of land is 25 cents or less provided those purchases were prior to 30.12.2017. We also make it clear that those who are holding land beyond 25 cents of land as on 30.12.2017, based on a single title, will not be entitled for such benefit. The only possible interpretation, according to us, is that holding of the land has to be understood with the title deed of the parties concerned who claimed exemption. If the title deed of such holder of land indicates that the land is less than 25 cents of land, the holding covered by the title deed would be entitled for exemption of the fees. This is so also discernible from the circular issued by the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue Department on 10.12.2021.
6.In the light of the above, we hold as follows: The holders of the land who purchased the land prior to 30.12.2017 by different documents and the land is less than 25 cents of land, that land would be qualified for exemption as per the Government Order dated 25.2.2021. We make it clear that the benefit of exemption is only to such holders of the land whose land even though lying contiguous but purchased or obtained by different title deeds, not having more than 25 cents, alone would be entitled to the benefit of exemption. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. However, we grant one month time from today to the appellants to comply with the order.”
In the above judgment, the Division Bench of this court declared that if the holders of land who purchased the land prior to 30.12.2017 by different documents, and the land covered by each of those documents is less than 25 cents of land, that land would be qualified for exemption, as per the Government Order dated 25.02.2021. The Division Bench also makes it clear that the benefit of exemption is only to such holders of land, whose land, even though lying contiguous, but purchased or obtained by different deeds not having more than 25 cents, alone will be entitled to the benefit of exemption from the conversion fee.
The important point to be decided in this case is whether the above dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this court in Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra) will stand in the light of paragraph No.22 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra). It will be beneficial to extract paragraph No.22 of Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra).
“22.The subsequent clarification dated 23 July 2021 also reiterated this position. The relevant extract of the clarification reads as under : -
"Applications received as in the name of the same person as on 30/12/2017 for the properties which are either in the same survey number without the same survey number lying as a single unit covered by different documents can be considered as single application or separate applications. But, if the total extent exceeds 25 cents, the exempted benefit cannot be allowed. An affidavit has to be submitted along with the application submitted by the applicant swearing that the property which is sought to be changed by its category is less than 25 cents in its extent.
As per the conditions currently stipulated in rules, the applications received for category change the extent of property which comes up to 50 cents applications can be received in Form 6 and property which exceeds 50 cents can be received in Form 7 which is appended to the rules."
As can be seen from the above extract, the competent authority has found it fit to provide that as on the cut off date properties, with or without the same survey number, lying as a single unit but covered by different documents can be considered. However, it is again clarified that if the total exceeds 25 cents then the benefit of the exemption cannot be allowed. It is clear from this that the exemption is only intended for lands up to 25 cents because, had it not been so, the second part of the clarification, as aforesaid, would be rendered otiose."
As I said earlier, it is an admitted fact that the state has not challenged the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this court in Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra), which was a judgment dated 27.02.2023 in W.A. No.352 of 2023. Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra) was delivered by the Apex Court on 20.02.2025.
First of all, the state has not brought to the notice of the Apex Court about the dictum laid down by this Court in Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra) while arguing Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra).
In addition to all these, in paragraph No.2 of Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra), it is clearly stated that the issue before the Apex Court is the construction of a notification exempting the payment of fee upon the reclamation of land originally reflected in the records of the state as paddy in accordance with the Act, 2008. The question that arises before the Apex Court is whether the conversion fee payable by a person is to be calculated for the portion of land that is in excess of 25 cents, because that much land is exempted. In paragraph No.13 of Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra), the Apex Court clearly stated that the issue analysed by the Apex Court is the interpretation of a Government notification dated 25.02.2021 in the Act, 2008. The second sentence in paragraph No. 13 of Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra) clearly states that the Apex Court has restricted its observation to the interpretation of the Government notification dated 25.02.2021. In addition to that, in paragraph No. 17 of the judgment in Moushmi Ann Jacob's case (supra), the Apex Court stated that the Court is interpreting the notification dated 25.02.2021, especially clauses 1 and 3. Thereafter, the Apex Court, considering the dictum laid down in other cases, observed that the State has sought to create two separate classes: one of people having land of 25 cents or less, and the second, of people having land in excess of 25 cents. Therefore, the Apex Court observed that the decision of the High Court to the effect that the conversion fee payable by a person is to be calculated for the portion of that land that is in excess of 25 cents is unsustainable. Thereafter, in paragraph 22 of the judgment, the Apex Court relied on a circular dated 23.07.2021 and made an observation that if the total extent of land exceeds 25 cents, the benefit of exemption cannot be allowed. The Apex Court also observed that it is clear from the circular dated 23.07.2021 that the exemption is intended only for lands up to 25 cents, because, had it not been so, the second part of the circular's clarification would be rendered otiose.
But I am surprised to see that the State has not brought to the notice of the Apex Court that the circular dated 23.07.2021 was already declared unconstitutional by a Division Bench of this Court in Baby M.K.’s case (supra), which was a judgment dated 25.10.2021. It will be better to extract the relevant portion of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Baby M.K.’s case:
“13.Taking into account the well settled proposition discussed above, we have no hesitation to hold that the Circular issued by the State Government dated 23.7.2021, fixing the cut off date of 25.2.2021 is not binding on this Court. However, learned Senior Government Pleader has addressed an argument that the cut off date fixed is a reasonable classification made but we are unable to agree with the said contention for the reason that, even an application filed prior to the cut off date of 25.2.2021 and subsequent to the said cut off date would be considered by the statutory authority even at a later point of time and in that process two different set of orders would be passed on similar or rather typical matters. When the issue is considered from that angle, according to us, there is no object sought to be achieved by making such a cut off date. When the State Government intended to classify and exclude farmers holding up to 25 cents of unnotified paddy land from the payment of fee/charge for reclamation and utilisation of the same for other purposes other than paddy cultivation, such farmers constitute a class by themselves thus precluding the State from further re-classifying the homogeneous class of the same nature merely because the applications are submitted on different dates, which according to us would be nothing but an unreasonable and arbitrary classification, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. At this juncture we are reminded of the basic principles enunciated by the honourable apex court in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution of India that, all persons and things similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed, and equality before the law means amongst the equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered, and that the like should be treated alike. It is also well settled in law that a classification to be valid must be reasonable and must rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing reasonable and just relation to the needs in respect of which the classification is made i.e., the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. Which thus means, in the instant case there is no object sought to be achieved by differentiating the class of owners of land upto 25 cents on the basis of the date of the application submitted by them before the very same statutory authority. If such an interpretation is made to the Rules, the purpose sought to be achieved by the State Government by granting exemption from payment of fee to the owners of the paddy field up to 25 cents would be lost, or rather defeat the said purpose. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the action of the State Government making an interpretation to the already constituted rules by issuing a circular directing the officers of the State to discharge their functions in a particular manner can never be sustained, being violative of all canons of law and beyond the comprehension of the Constitutional mandates. As we have pointed out above, interpretation of the laws is the exclusive domain and sphere of the courts which can never be tinkered by the legislature and the executive, by virtue of the principles of separation of powers envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, to be followed scrupulously by all in order to sustain the basic tenets and characteristic spirit of the democratic ethos manifested by the Constitution of India. That is to say, even though the legislature makes the law, the courts alone are vested with powers to interpret, administer and decide the exactitude of the laws, and definitely not the legislature and the executive.
14.Taking into account the aforesaid legal and factual circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the circular dated 23.7.2021 is also an unconstitutional one for the fundamental reason that, it is an in road into the powers exercised by this Court on the principles of separation of powers, and further that, by introducing the circular, the State Government has attempted to interpret the Schedule to the Rules, which by itself is a rule, and for that matter the entire contents of the circular insofar as it is violative of the provisions of the Act 2008 and the Rules 2008 is impermissible in law.”
(underline supplied)
I am forced to say that the State suppressed the above judgment before the Apex Court while arguing Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra). The Apex Court, in Surjakumar’s case (supra), considered the legal position when a statute is declared unconstitutional by a court of law. It will be better to extract paragraph 23 of the above judgment:
“23.The principles that can be deduced from the law laid down by this Court, as referred to above, are:
i.A statute which is made by a competent legislature is valid till it is declared unconstitutional by a court of law. ii. After declaration of a statute as unconstitutional by a court of law, it is non est for all purposes.
iii.In declaration of the law, the doctrine of prospective overruling can be applied by this Court to save past transactions under earlier decisions superseded or statutes held unconstitutional.
iv.Relief can be moulded by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution, notwithstanding the declaration of a statute as unconstitutional.
Therefore, it is clear that there is no question of repeal of a statute which has been declared as unconstitutional by a Court. The very declaration by a Court that a statute is unconstitutional obliterates the statute entirely as though it had never been passed. The consequences of declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute have to be dealt with only by the Court.”
At this stage, the Additional Advocate General submitted that the judgment in Baby M.K.’s case (supra) is already challenged before the Apex Court and an interim order has been passed by the Apex Court. Even if there is a stay order from the Apex Court on the Division Bench judgment that declares a circular unconstitutional and invalid, the Single Judge of the High Court is bound by the judgment of the Division Bench. This point is considered by this court in Travancore Devaswom Board and Others v. D. Sreekumar [2021 KHC 349], the relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder:
“21.So it can be seen that the stay order granted by the Apex Court in the above case confined to the limited extent as against the enforcement and implementation of the directions and orders passed by the Full Bench of this Court in the said judgment in Chandran's case supra. It is by now well established by series of rulings including that rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Abdu Rahiman v. District Collector, Malappuram [2009 (4) KHC 283: 2009 (4) KLT 485: ILR 2009 (4) Ker. 513] that wherein it has been held in para No.5 & 8 thereof that the learned Single Judge of the High Court should not have ignored the two decisions rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court on the ground that appeal has been filed against one of the said decisions of the Division Bench before the Apex Court and there was a stay against him and that even when a decision of Division Bench of the High Court is stayed by the Apex Court, the learned Single Judge is bound to follow the decision of the Division Bench, as it continues to be a binding precedent for them. The interim order of stay only relieves the parties concerned from the liability to obey and comply the directions in the judgment under appeal. It has also been further held therein that when the Court declares a law, many people will be regulating their affairs according to it and unless there is a compelling ground, a precedent should not be upset so lightly and in hierarchical system of Courts as held by the Apex Court, there should be someone who should say the last word and when the last word is said, the same should be followed by everyone in the lower tiers and that in view of the abovesaid position the learned Single Judge in that case should have followed the decisions of the Division Bench cited therein, etc.” (Underline supplied) Therefore, the contention raised by the Additional Advocate General that the decision in Baby M.K.’s case (supra) is stayed by the Apex Court will not stand.
In addition to that, the Apex Court only considered a clarification issued by the Government on 23.07.2021, as a passing observation, without knowing the fact that the same was declared unconstitutional by the High Court. There is no finding by the apex court on whether such clarification is in the proper form or acceptable, as the question had never arisen before the court for adjudication. Moreover, the state suppressed before the apex court about the decision in Baby M.K.’s case (supra), in which the Government's clarification dated 23.07.2021 was held unconstitutional. This Court, in Sumesh U.’s case (supra), observed that the clarifications are not in the form of either a circular or a Government Order, and they are only communications issued by individual officers apparently to queries raised with regard to the applicability of the exemption. The said communications are not orders issued by the Government. On that ground also, the circular dated 23.07.2021 will not stand.
Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, the issue decided by the Apex Court in Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra) is regarding the interpretation of the Government notification dated 25.02.2021. In paragraph 13 of the judgment in Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case, the Apex Court clearly stated that the Court restricts its observations only to the interpretation thereof. It is further clear from paragraph 17 of the judgment in Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case also. The Apex Court, in Arun Kumar Aggarwal’s case (supra), considered the scope of mere observation or obiter dictum in the order of the court. It will be better to extract the relevant portion of Arun Kumar Aggarwal’s case (supra):
“31.In view of above, it is well settled that obiter dictum is a mere observation or remark made by the court by way of aside while deciding the actual issue before it. The mere casual statement or observation which is not relevant, pertinent or essential to decide the issue in hand does not form the part of the judgment of the Court and have no authoritative value. The expression of the personal view or opinion of the Judge is just a casual remark made whilst deviating from answering the actual issues pending before the Court. These casual remarks are considered or treated as beyond the ambit of the authoritative or operative part of the judgment.”
How a ratio of a decision is to be taken is also considered by the Apex Court in Utility Users’ Welfare Association’s case (supra), the relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder:
“ 101. It is undoubtedly true that the question which the Court was seized of, related to the interpretation of S.86 of the said Act and certain other matters, which are not connected with the controversy herein. Thus, the issue arises, whether the observations made, albeit to be construed as advisory or suggestive qua the appointment of a Chairman and a Member are to be treated as ratio decidendi or obiter dicta.
102.In order to determine this aspect, one of the well - established tests is "The Inversion Test" propounded inter alia by Eugene Wambaugh, a Professor at The Harvard Law School, who published a classic text book called "The Study of Cases" (Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1892)) in the year 1892. This text book propounded inter alia what is known as the "Wambaugh Test" or "The Inversion Test" as the means of judicial interpretation. "The Inversion Test" is used to identify the ratio decidendi in any judgment. The central idea, in the words of Professor Wambaugh, is as under:
"In order to make the test, let him first frame carefully the supposed proposition of law. Let him then insert in the proposition a word reversing its meaning. Let him then inquire whether, if the court had conceived this new proposition to be good, and had it in mind, the decision could have been the same. If the answer be affirmative, then, however excellent the original proposition may be, the case is not a precedent for that proposition, but if the answer be negative the case is a precedent for the original proposition and possibly for other propositions also.(Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1892) at pg. 17)"
103.In order to test whether a particular proposition of law is to be treated as the ratio decidendi of the case, the proposition is to be inversed, i.e., to remove from the text of the judgment as if it did not exist. If the conclusion of the case would still have been the same even without examining the proposition, then it cannot be regarded as the ratio decidendi of the case. This test has been followed to imply that the ratio decidendi is what is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case. "In order that an opinion may have the weight of a precedent", according to John Chipman Grey (Another distinguished jurist who served as a Professor of Law at The Harvard Law School), "it must be an opinion, the formation of which, is necessary for the decision of a particular case."
On a perusal of paragraphs 13 and 17 of Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra), it is clear that the Apex Court was interpreting the Government notification dated 25.02.2021, and therefore, the observation in paragraph 22 of the judgment is to be treated as obiter dictum or a mere observation by the Apex Court. Moreover, the notification relied on in paragraph 22 of Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra) has already been declared invalid and unconstitutional by this Court in Baby M.K.’s case (supra). Therefore, the observation in paragraph 22 is not binding on this Court.
At this stage, the Additional Advocate General submitted that if the dictum laid down by this Court in Dr A.V.Sajeev’s case (supra) is accepted, there are chances of misuse of the same. The Additional Advocate General pointed out one example and submitted that if a person had transferred his property through ten separate documents to ten individuals before 30.12.2017, and a real estate owner purchased the said property for converting the same and for construction purposes, he would be entitled to the benefit of exemption from payment of the conversion fee. I cannot agree with the above contention of the Additional Advocate General. First of all, the State has not challenged the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra). In addition, even if the contention of the Additional Advocate General is accepted, the real estate owner may not know at the time of purchasing the property from the ten owners that the Government will subsequently impose a conversion fee. There is no such case for the government either. In such circumstances, that point will not stand either. In addition to this, the Additional Advocate General also took me through the schedule of the Rules 2008 and tried to convince this Court that the dictum in Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra) will not stand. As I said earlier, Dr A.V.Sajeev's case is a decision of the Division Bench of this Court, binding on this Court. This Court has already said that, in Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra), the observation in paragraph 22 is only a passing one and an obiter dictum. In addition to that, this Court also observed that the circular relied on in paragraph 22 of Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra) is already declared as invalid and unconstitutional by the Division Bench of this Court in Baby M.K’s case (supra). Therefore, the contention raised by the Additional Advocate General cannot be accepted. Therefore, the contention raised by the State based on Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra) is not sustainable, and the dictum laid down by this Court in Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra) is still the law.
Before parting, I am forced to say that the contention raised by the Additional Advocate General on behalf of the state is strange. In litigation, the state should act as a ‘role model litigant’. The state, suppressed before the Supreme Court, that the clarification dated 23.07.2021, relied on by the apex court in Paragraph 22 of the judgment in Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra), was declared unconstitutional by this court in Baby M.K’s case (supra). Now, the State is arguing before this court that Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra) will not stand, based on Paragraph 22 of the judgment in Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra), and is demanding a huge conversion fee from the petitioners. In these cases, the total conversion fee demanded from the petitioners together will exceed 40 lakhs. The state cannot act like the character of Shylock in Shakespeare's play, ‘The Merchant of Venice’. The State can collect a conversion fee only in accordance with law and in accordance with the dictum laid down by this court in Dr A.V.Sajeev's case. There cannot be any unjust enrichment to the state without the backing of law for demanding a conversion fee. The State, as a litigant, shall not be merely an adversary to win cases. It is a public authority owing a duty of fairness to the court, the opposite party, and the rule of law. Private parties, understandably, litigate in their own interests. The state, however, acts through public power and public funds. Its ultimate obligation is to do justice according to the law. The observation in Paragraph 22 of the judgment in Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra) is made by the apex court because the state suppressed the decision in Baby M.K’s case (supra) while arguing the case. I can understand if, at that time, the state submitted to the apex court that the appeal is pending against the decision in Baby M.K.’s case (supra) and that an interim order has been passed; hence, the apex court made the above observation. No such argument is seen in the judgment. Moreover, this court has already found in paragraph 16 of this judgment that the dictum in Baby M.K.’s case (supra) will stand even if it is challenged and an interim order is issued. The state now relies on Paragraph 22 of the judgment in Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra) to collect the conversion fee from the petitioners, which is a passing observation, and that was also made by the apex court because the state suppressed the decision in Baby M.K’s case (supra). In other words, the state now relies on Paragraph 22 of the judgment in Moushmi Ann Jacob’s case (supra) to argue that Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra) will not stand because of that observation by the apex court, and therefore, the conversion fee is to be paid by the petitioners. This is nothing but unfairness on the part of the state. This is a case in which this court has to mulct the state with heavy costs. But I restrain myself from doing that because the cost should also come from the pockets of taxpayers, the citizens. This court expects that the state will serve as a role model litigant in the future. I leave it there.
The upshot of the above discussion is that the prayers in these writ petitions are to be allowed. There is no dispute that, in all these cases, the petitioners obtained property through different documents, and the properties covered by those documents are below 25 cents, and the dictum in Dr A.V.Sajeev's case (supra) is applicable. Hence, the impugned orders are to be set aside. Therefore, these writ petitions are allowed, with the following directions:
In W.P.(C) No.23202/2026, Ext.P5 is set aside. The 1st respondent is directed to process the Ext. P4 Form-6 application without insisting on the conversion fee, if it is otherwise in order, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
In W.P.(C) No.21774/2026, Ext.P8 is set aside. The 1st respondent is directed to process the Ext.P7 Form-6 application without insisting on the conversion fee, if it is otherwise in order, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
In W.P.(C) No.19764/2026, Ext.P16 is set aside. The 2nd respondent/authorised officer is directed to process the Ext.P14 Form-6 application without insisting on the conversion fee, if it is otherwise in order, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
In W.P.(C) No.24282/2026, Ext.P5 is set aside. The 1st respondent is directed to process the Ext. P4 Form-6 application without insisting on the conversion fee, if it is otherwise in order, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 24282 OF 2026
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 THE TRUE COPY OF THE SALE DEED NO.10552/2007 DATED 04.09.2007
Exhibit P2 THE TRUE COPY OF THE SALE DEED NO.3067/1999 DATED 30.06.1999
Exhibit P3 THE TRUE COPY OF THE LAND TAX RECEIPT EVIDENCING PAYMENT OF LAND TAX IN RESPECT OF THE ABOVE SAID PROPERTY DATED 04.06.2026
Exhibit P4 THE TRUE COPY OF THE SAID FORM 6 APPLICATION NO. 11/2025/238224 DATED 20.11.2025
Exhibit P5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE SAID DEMAND NOTICE NO.3309/2026 DATED 12.07.2026