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Judgment
Aiyling, J.—I think it is quite clear that the attachment of the property directed in the Magistrate''s order dated the 2nd November 1909, is under Clause 4 of Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, and not u/s 146. This is obvious from the fact that no enquiry u/s 145 regarding possession had been even commenced at the time of attachment.
Viewed as an order u/s 145 Clause (4), it appears to be perfectly legal, as it contains in itself every thing required to satisfy the requirements of Clause (1) of the same section. I find no ground for interfering with the attachment.
The appointment of a Receiver, however, appears to be ultra vires. The only section authorising such a step is Clause (2) of Section 146, Section 146 authorises attachment in certain cases after conclusion of the possession enquiry and there is no such attachment here. I cannot accept the suggestion of respondent''s Vakil that this Clause (2) is intended to apply to attachments under the preceding section also. If it were so, it would have been put in the shape of a separate section instead of a mere clause of Section 146.
The appointment of a Receiver must, therefore, be set aside as ultra vires, the attachment being affirmed.