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Judgment
Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties.
The present petition challenges order dated 30.01.2026, passed by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Nagpur which is at Annexure-Q (page 146). By way of the said order, respondent No.1 has issued certain directions on an application made by respondent No.2 under Rule 25(2)(v)(a) and (b) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules, 1971.
Before proceeding on merits the learned D.S.G.I. appearing for respondent No.1 has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition on the ground of an alternate statutory remedy. He points me out that Rule 25 is framed in pursuance to statutory provisions under Section 12, and Section 15 which makes an order passed under Section 12 appealable before such authority who is to be a person nominated in that behalf by the appropriate Government. In other words, it is the preliminary objection of the learned D.S.G.I. that in view of an available alternate statutory remedy the present petition would not be maintainable. He also points me out that nothing has been placed, pleaded or brought on record to support the contention that there is any infringement of fundamental rights, that principles of natural justice have been violated, or that the order is without jurisdiction which would clothe the petitioner with a right to file a writ petition before this Court as per the three grounds enunciated in the celebrated judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors, reported in AIR 1999 S.C.22. It is, therefore, his submission in view of the said fact and in view of the absence of these three ingredients, this Court would be loath to interfere in writ jurisdiction.
Mr. U.J. Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2, also raised a preliminary objection regarding the locus of the petitioner to file the petition. By pointing me out the operative part of the order at page 155, he rightly submits that the petitioner herein i.e. principal employer, is only directed to ensure that the due payment is made to the members of respondent No.2-Union, and the said payment is to be made by the contractors. He also rightly points me out that the said contractors were in fact parties before respondent No.1, and for reasons best known to the petitioner he has chosen not to implead them as party respondents.
Countering the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 and the learned D.S.G.I. for respondent No.1, learned counsel Mr. S.C. Mehadia for the petitioner submits in his fair-mindedness that the contractors are not added and, therefore, seeks leave to add the same in the present petition.
As far as the objection raised by the learned D.S.G.I. regarding maintainability of the petition is concerned, Mr. S.C. Mehadia, learned counsel tries to decipher the provisions of Section 12 and Rule 25 and submits that only when an order is passed under Section 12, an appeal lie under Section 15. He further submits that in the earlier rounds of litigation, no such objections were taken, and therefore it would not lie in the mouth of a statutory authority to raise such a preliminary objection.
Rival contentions fall for my consideration. As can be seen from the earlier orders of this Court, when the matter was remanded twice for decision to respondent No.1, the said objection was not taken. However, that does not mean that the said objection cannot be taken, more so when the said objection is borne out of statutory provisions and more particularly, there is nothing to point out in the petition that there are those three contingencies enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment of Whirlpool Corporation, (supra) wherein this Court in spite of there being an an alternate remedy, can entertain writ petition.
True it is that the rule of existence of an alternate remedy is a rule of practice and not a rule of law. But as a matter of practice, when there is an efficacious alternate remedy, this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, would be reluctant to interfere except where there is a violation of fundamental rights, violation of principles of natural justice and the order being without jurisdiction. If, even in the presence of an alternate efficacious remedy, courts exercising writ jurisdiction start entertaining writ petitions, that would, in my considered opinion, not be proper. In that view of the matter, the preliminary objection raised by the learned D.S.G.I. is upheld, and the petition is held to be not maintainable before this Court for want of alternate remedy.
Mr. S.C. Mehadia, learned counsel for the petitioner points me out that there was an ad-interim order granted by this Court on 02.04.2026 directing that no coercive action be taken against the petitioner based on the impugned order. Since the said order is in operation for more than six months, it would be in the fitness of things to extend the said ad-interim order for a further period of one month from today, looking to the fact that the petitioner before this Court is a Public Sector Undertaking.
The petitioner is, therefore, relegated to the available alternate statutory remedy by filing an appeal under Section 15 before the appropriate appellate authority. As stated by the learned D.S.G.I., the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) would be the appropriate authority before whom an appeal can be filed under Section 15. The petitioner is relegated to file an appeal before the said authority and is also at liberty to seek extension of the interim order before the appellate authority during the pendency of the appeal.
Needless to mention that this Court has not commented upon the merits of the matter, and it is for the appellate authority to decide the same in accordance with law. Looking to the fact that the present writ petition was pending before this Court, the petitioner is also granted liberty to file an application for condonation of delay before the appellate authority and the said appellate authority would decide in accordance with law in the backdrop of the facts that the petition was pending before this Court and it was filed on 23.3.2026 and is being disposed today. All rival contentions on merits are kept open.
At this juncture, Mr. U.J. Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2, submits that the members of the respondent No.2-Union are litigating the same since 2017, and therefore it would be in fitness of things to direct the Appellate Authority to decide the same in accordance with law in a particular time frame. The request seems to be reasonable.
The appellate authority is directed to decide the same in accordance with law within a period of six months from the date of the first hearing of the matter.
With the aforesaid directions, the writ petition is disposed of.