State of West Bengal vs Mangal Chandra Burman

Bijayesh Mukherji, J.—The question raised upon this Rule under Article 227 of the Constitution is whether or not certain plots of land having bamboo clumps thereupon can be regarded as an agricultural land within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (b) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (1 of 1954).

The Revenue Officer u/s 44(2a) holds ex parte that such land does constitute very much agricultural land. The Appellate Judge on appeal holds just the opposite. Hence this Rule under Article 227 of the Constitution at the instance of the State of West Bengal.

Now, what is a bamboo? What exactly is its meaning? The dictionary meaning of the word is that it is a gigantic tropical and sub-tropical grass with hollow-joined woody stem. Such meaning of the word ''bamboo'' does not appear to be in the realm of controversy.

The question, therefore, is: Can land having bamboo clumps upon it be regarded as agricultural land? Section 2(b) defines agricultural land as under:

''Agricultural land'' means land ordinarily used for purposes of agriculture or horticulture and includes such land, notwithstanding that it may be lying fallow for the time being.

The plain meaning of ''horticulture'' is the art of gardening. No One, in his sense, I imagine, will ever elevate bamboo clumps to the height of gardening. So, horticulture it cannot be.

Then remains ''agriculture''. The plain meaning of the word is the art of practice of cultivating the land. Going by such plain meaning, can it be said that the land upon which bamboo dumps stand has to be cultivated? The answer, from the common know ledge everybody has, will necessarily be: it may be cultivated or it may not be. As is well-known, if some bamboo cuttings are implanted, bamboos grow and grow both vertically and horizontally. When the extension is horizontal, the bamboo cuttings implanted on certain land may encroach upon neighbouring lands as well. Will the owners of those lands be regarded as having cultivated them with a view to growing bamboo clumps? The answer cannot be in doubt. So far as they are concerned, the bamboo clumps have had for them a spontaneous growth without any effort on their part.

So, what the facts are has got to be known. Unfortunately, however, nothing of the kind is known upon the whole of the record. The Revenue Officer exercises his own judgment and records the land here with the bamboo clumps as agricultural land. On this consideration alone, the finding of the Revenue Officer cannot stand. It is well-known that a finding which rests on no evidence is a finding which militates against the principles of natural justice and must have to be upset. Authorities on the point are ample and clear. See, for example, Liquidators of Pursai Ltd. v. Commissioner of income tax (1954) S.C.J. 294 and Lalchand Bhagat Ambica Ram Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa, .

Reference has been made on behalf of the Petitioner to the case of Commissioner of income tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Raja Benoy Kumar Saha Roy (1957) S.C.J. 740. There Bhagwati, J., speaking for the Court, reviews all the authorities from Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan ILR (1901) Mad. 421 right up to VIKRAM DEO VARMA, MAHARAJA OF JEYPORE Vs. COMMISSIONER OF Income Tax, BIHAR AND ORISSA., and lays down the law in the line of the Privy Council decision in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of income tax, U.P., Ajmer and Ajmer-Merwara (1948) L.R. 75 IndAp 268 that two elements must be there in order to make the use of land for the purpose of agriculture. One element is that some measure of cultivation of land must have to be there. The other element is that some expenditure of skill and labour upon such land must be there too. Upon the whole of the record, do I find anything of the kind? The bamboos in the clump might have grown of their own, or they might not have. That needs evidence. But no such evidence is forthcoming here. And then skill in growing bamboos? It does not look so obvious. In sum, there must be two kinds of operations, basic operations and subsequent operations, before it can be found that the land is agricultural. After all, the etymological meaning of ''agriculture'' is this: ''ager'' which means a field and ''culture'' which means cultivation, as pointed out by his Lordship in this very case. The field is there no doubt. There can be no running away from that. But, has there been cultivation? Has there been tilling? No answer can be returned upon the whole of the record.

If in a case there are subsequent operations only without, however, the basic operations of tilling or cultivating or making the land fit for growing the thing needed, that will not make the land agricultural. That is also an approach to be found in this case. In the case in hand, upon all I see and upon the whole of the record, I cannot translate that. To call the land agricultural without knowing these elements is to do something which runs counter to the principles of natural justice.

In course of the discussion at the bar, when I speak out my kind in the above manner, Mr. Chakravartti, appearing for the Petitioner, invites me to send the case back on remand for adequate evidence. I regret my inability to do so. The Revenue Officer started the proceeding in July 1963. We are now in May 1968. Another July is in sight. For this paltry matter, I cannot bring myself to hold that a remit is justified. The more so, as the very connotation of the word ''agriculture'' makes it plain that the land where bamboo clumps grow cannot be regarded as agricultural land within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act as a matter of course.

In the result, I discharge the Rule.

This is a fit matter where neither party should be awarded costs. I direct so.