State of U.P vs Vijay Prakash and Others

Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J—Heard Dr. Madhu Tandon, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Jamal Khan, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. Subject-matter of all the above three noted writ petitions is the impugned common award and as such these writ petitions are being heard together.

After the start of arguments a counter-affidavit dated 15.4.2014 has been filed today after about a year of its swearing and without disclosing that why the counter-affidavit is being filed so belatedly.

The respondent-workmen raised industrial dispute after about 17 years of their alleged disengagement, before the respondent No. 2 who passed the impugned award dated 26.4.2011 in Adjudication Case No. 8 of 2009, Adjudication Case No. 9 of 2009 and Adjudication Case No. 10 of 2009 as under:--

Before the respondent No. 2 the petitioners have clearly stated that the respondent No. 1 was engaged temporarily for a fixed period between 26th January, 1991 to 25th May, 1992 and after expiry of the said period the engagement of the respondent-workmen automatically came to an end. The industrial dispute was raised after about 17 years. The respondent-workmen-stated, before the Labour Court that they were retrenched after giving notice. By the oral evidence also the petitioner tried to establish that the respondent-workmen were engaged on daily wage basis to get done the miscellaneous work in the event of need. However, Presiding Officer, Labour Court passed the impugned award abruptly recording conclusion as aforequoted that the retrenchment of the respondent-workmen on 25.5.1992 is illegal and therefore, they are reinstated in service with full back wages. Thus, the impugned award being without reasons for the conclusions reached, cannot be sustained. Consequently order for payment of back wages can also not be sustained.

Apart from above, the respondent-workmen have not stated that what are the size of their family, how they sustained their family and themselves for such long period of about 20 years without any employment and what were the means of their livelihood. The respondent-workmen have not even stated or led any evidence that they were not engaged in any gainful employment during the long period of about 20 years. These are the relevant factors which should be considered for determination of quantum of back wages to a daily wager in case of his retrenchment in breach of the provisions of section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, if he is found to be entitled for back wages. Presiding Officer, Labour Court granted full back wages without recording any finding or discussion on the relevant factors in the impugned award. Under the circumstances, the grant of back wages by the impugned award is wholly arbitrary and illegal.

There can be no quarrel with the argument of learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 that the scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against an award is limited and the Court cannot go into the questions of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal, which is the final fact finding authority/Court. Interference can be made only if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence. In the case of Management of Madurantakam, Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. S. Viswanathan, AIR 2005 SC 1954 : (2005) 104 FLR 1229 : (2005) 2 JT 481 : (2005) 2 LLJ 1 : (2005) 3 SCC 193 : (2005) SCC(L&S) 372 : (2005) AIRSCW 1418 : (2005) 2 Supreme 128 , Hon''ble Supreme Court held in para 12 as under:

"12. Normally, the Labour Court or the industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final Court of facts in these type of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ Court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ Court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon. A consideration of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge shows that nowhere he has come to the conclusion that the finding of the Labour Court is either perverse or based on no evidence or based on evidence which is not legally acceptable. Learned Single Judge proceeded as if he was sitting in a Court of appeal on facts and item after item of evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry as well as before the Labour Court was reconsidered and findings given by the Labour Court were reversed. We find no justification for such an approach, by the learned Single Judge which only amounts to substitution of his subjective satisfaction in the place of such satisfaction of the Labour Court."

In the case of Hindustan Steels Ltd., Rourkela Vs. A.K. Roy and Others, AIR 1970 SC 1401 : (1970) 20 FLR 234 : (1970) LabIC 1166 : (1970) 1 LLJ 228 : (1969) 3 SCC 513 : (1970) 3 SCR 343 , Hon''ble Supreme Court held in para 16 as under:--

"12. On a consideration of all the circumstances, the present case, in our view, was one such case. The Tribunal exercised its discretion mechanically without weighing the circumstances of the case. That was no exercise of discretion at all. There is ample authority to the effect that if a statutory tribunal exercises its discretion on the basis of irrelevant considerations or without regard to relevant considerations, certiorari may properly issue to quash its order. [See S.A. De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (2nd ed.) 324-325]. One such relevant consideration, the disregard of which would render its order amenable to interference, would be the well-settled principles laid down in decisions binding on the Tribunal to whom the discretion is entrusted. The refusal by the High Court to interfere was equally mechanical and amounted to refusal to exercise, its jurisdiction. Its order, therefore, becomes liable to interference."

(Emphasis supplied by me)

In the case of Omar Salay Mohamed Sait Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, AIR 1959 SC 1238 : (1959) 37 ITR 151 , Hon''ble Supreme Court held in para 42 as under:--

"42. We are aware that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is a fact finding Tribunal and if it arrives at its own conclusions of fact after due consideration of the evidence before it this Court will not interfere. It is necessary, however, that every fact for and against the assessee must have been considered with due care and the Tribunal must have given its finding in a manner which would clearly indicate what were the questions which arose for determination, what was the evidence pro and contra in regard to each one of them and what were was the reached on the evidence on record before it. The conclusions reached by the Tribunal should not be coloured by any irrelevant considerations or matters of prejudice and if there are any circumstances which required to be explained by the assessee, the assessee should be given an opportunity of doing so. On no account whatever should the Tribunal base its findings on suspicions, conjectures or surmises nor should it act on no evidence at all or on improper rejection of material and relevant evidence or partly on evidence and partly on suspicions, conjectures or surmises and if it does anything of the sort, its findings, even though on questions of fact, will be liable to be set aside by this Court."

In the case of Udhavdas Kewalram Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City I, (1967) 66 ITR 462 , Hon''ble Supreme Court held that Tribunal must consider with due care all material facts and record its findings on all contentions raised before it and the relevant law.

An order without valid reasons cannot be sustained. To give reasons is the rule of natural justice. Highlighting this rule, Hon''ble Supreme Court held in the case of The Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall Vs. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and Others, AIR 2010 SC 1285 : (2010) 2 JT 566 : (2010) 2 SCALE 739 : (2010) 3 SCC 732 : (2010) 4 SCR 190 : (2010) 3 UJ 1540 as under:

"31. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of an order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration justice-delivery system, to make known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of principles of natural justice. The giving of reasons for a decision is an essential attribute of judicial and judicious disposal of a matter before Courts, and which is the only indication to know about the manner and quality of exercise undertaken, as also the fact that the Court concerned had really applied its mind." [Vide State of Orissa Vs. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004 SC 1794 : (2004) CriLJ 1385 : (2004) 3 CTC 374 : (2004) 2 JT 172 : (2004) 2 SCALE 202 : (2004) 5 SCC 568 : (2004) 2 SCR 68 : (2004) AIRSCW 751 : (2004) 1 Supreme 947 , and State of Rajasthan Vs. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) CriLJ 3842 : (2004) 5 JT 388 : (2004) 5 SCALE 86 : (2004) 5 SCC 573 : (2004) SCC(L&S) 1078 : (2004) 2 SCR 480 Supp : (2004) 2 UJ 1118 : (2004) AIRSCW 4321 : (2004) AIRSCW 5560 : (2004) 6 Supreme 669 : (2004) 3 Supreme 404 .

Reason is the heart-beat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, it becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. Absence of reasons renders the order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. [Vide Raj Kishore Jha Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 2003 SC 4664 : (2003) CriLJ 5040 : (2003) 2 JT 354 Supp : (2003) 8 SCALE 271 : (2003) 11 SCC 519 : (2003) 4 SCR 208 Supp : (2003) AIRSCW 5095 : (2003) AIRSCW 5095 : (2003) 7 Supreme 152 : (2003) 7 Supreme 152 , Vishnu Dev Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2008) 1 CLT 568 : (2008) 116 FLR 835 : (2008) 1 SCALE 655 : (2008) 3 SCC 172 : (2008) 1 SCC(L&S) 596 : (2008) AIRSCW 794 : (2008) 1 Supreme 696 , Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Rourkela-I Circle and Others, (2008) 10 SCALE 223 : (2008) 9 SCC 407 : (2008) 2 UJ 894 : (2008) 16 VST 181 , State of Uttaranchal and Another Vs. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi, AIR 2008 SC 2026 : (2008) 118 FLR 18 : (2008) 4 JT 303 : (2008) 2 LLJ 874 : (2008) 4 SCALE 22 : (2008) 11 SCC 205 : (2008) 2 SCC(L&S) 1093 : (2008) AIRSCW 2684 : (2008) 2 Supreme 527 , U.P.S.R.T.C. Vs. Jagdish Prasad Gupta, AIR 2009 SC 2328 : (2009) 122 FLR 734 : (2009) 7 JT 69 : (2009) 3 LLJ 203 : (2009) 5 SCALE 319 : (2009) 12 SCC 609 : (2010) 1 SCC(L&S) 156 : (2009) 5 SCR 1153 : (2009) 3 SLR 584 , Ram Phal Vs. The State of Haryana and Others, (2009) 121 FLR 735 : (2009) 2 SCALE 285 : (2009) 3 SCC 258 : (2009) 1 SCC(L&S) 645 : (2009) AIRSCW 5076 , Mohammed Yusuf Vs. Faij Mohammad and Others, (2009) 1 SCALE 71 : (2009) 3 SCC 513 , and State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sh. Sada Ram and Another, (2009) 2 CTC 655 : (2009) 4 JT 165 : (2009) 3 SCALE 842 : (2009) 4 SCC 422 ]

Thus, it is evident that the recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person 23 who is adversely affected may know, as why his application has been rejected."

(Emphasis supplied by me)

Non-recording of reasons, non-consideration of admissible evidence or consideration of inadmissible evidence renders the order to be unsustainable. Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandna Impex Pvt. Limited Vs. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi, (2011) 186 ECR 153 : (2011) 269 ELT 433 : (2011) 8 JT 10 : (2011) 3 RCR(Civil) 843 : (2011) 7 SCALE 291 : (2011) 7 SCC 289 held as under:

"8. Having bestowed our anxious consideration on the facts at hand, we are of the opinion that there is some merit in the submission of learned Counsel for the appellant that while dealing with an appeal under section 130 of the Act, the High Court should have examined each question formulated in the appeal with reference to the material taken into consideration by the Tribunal in support of its finding thereon and given its reasons for holding that question is not a substantial question of law. It needs to be emphasised that every litigant, who approaches the Court for relief is entitled to know the reason for acceptance or rejection of his prayer, particularly when either of the parties to the lis has a right of further appeal. Unless the litigant is made aware of the reasons which weighed with the Court in denying him the relief prayed for, the remedy of appeal will not be meaningful. It is that reasoning, which can be subjected to examination at the higher forums. In State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar this Court, while reiterating that reason is the heart beat of every conclusion and without the same, it becomes lifeless, observed thus:

"8. ......Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made;......."

(Emphasis supplied by me)

No finding has been recorded in the impugned award either with respect to notice of retrenchment as admitted by the respondent-workmen themselves or on the point of completion of continuous service of 240 days by them in any calendar year.

In view of the above discussions, the impugned award cannot be sustained and is, therefore, set aside. In result, writ petitions succeed and are hereby allowed. The impugned award dated 26.4.2011 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.P. Firozabad in Adjudication Case No. 08 of 2009, Adjudication Case No. 09 of 2009 and Adjudication Case No. 10 of 2009 are hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back to the concerned Labour Court for decision afresh in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.