State Of Telangana vs Dongre Prakash

The present appeal is filed questioning the acquittal recorded by the III Additional District & Sessions Judge, at Asifabad in Criminal Appeal No.58 of 2019 dated 22.08.2019 reversing the judgment of conviction of the Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Asifabad in C.C.No.156 of 2014.

The conviction was recorded by the learned Magistrate for the offences under Section 304-A of IPC and sentenced to simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-. Further, the respondent/accused was also sentenced to pay fine of Rs.500/- under Section 337 of IPC.

Briefly, the case of the prosecution is that the respondent/appellant/accused is RTC driver. On 27.03.2014 while he was driving bus in a rash and negligent manner, dashed the motor cycle of the deceased and the back tyre of the bus ran over the head of the deceased and caused his instantaneous death. The learned Magistrate, having found the respondent/accused guilty, convicted as stated above. However, the appellate Sessions Judge, on appeal by the respondent/accused acquitted the respondent on the following grounds:

i) The deceased was driving his motor cycle with two pillion riders and such triple riding is illegal;

ii) since the deceased came under the rear tyre of the bus, it can be inferred that while triple riding motor cycle, there is a possibility of loosing balance and must have come under the rear tyres of the bus.

iii) The motor cycle driven by the deceased was not subjected to test to ascertain the fitness of the motor cycle.

The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned Sessions Judge had committed grave error in reversing the order of conviction by the learned Magistrate, which was on the basis of reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence placed on record and consequently, the evidence indicates that the respondent/accused was driving the bus in a rash and negligent manner for which reason, the deceased came under the rear tyre of the bus.

As seen from the evidence on record, the pillion riders, who were examined as P.Ws.2 and 3 did not give a detailed version as to how the deceased came under rear wheel of the bus driven by the respondent/accused. Though it is stated that the accident occurred while the respondent/accused tried to overtake the motor cycle, however, unless the exact details of the occurrence is stated, it cannot be inferred that the respondent/accused was driving the bus in a rash and negligent manner nor for the reason of the deceased falling under rear wheel of the bus. Further, the reasoning given by the learned Sessions Judge recording the acquittal are logical and based on inferences drawn from the evidence on record.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishna Nagesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2013) 11 supreme court Cases 688 and also in the case of Guru Dutt Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 6 Supreme Court Cases 116  held that under the Indian criminal jurisprudence, the accused has two fundamental protections available to him in a criminal trial or investigation. Firstly, he is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty and secondly that he is entitled to a fair trial and investigation. Both these facets attain even greater significance where the accused has a judgment of acquittal in his favour. A judgment of acquittal enhances the presumption of innocence of the accused and in some cases, it may even indicate a false implication. But then, this has to be established on record of the Court.

In Guru Dutt Pathak’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC  (Cri) 325] , this Court reiterated the legal position as under : (SCC p. 432, para 42)

‘42. … (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again cautioned the appellate courts that an order of acquittal cannot be reversed only on the ground that two views are possible and further the view favouring the accused if probable, has to be considered.

In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there are no grounds to interfere with the order of the acquittal recorded by the learned Sessions Judge.

For the said reasons, the prosecution/State has not made out a case to reverse the order of acquittal.

In the result, the appeal filed by the State fails and accordingly, the same is dismissed. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stands closed.