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Judgment
R. Jayasimha Babu, J.—This petition is directed against an order made on review application filed by the State seeking review of the order
made by the Tribunal on 27.01.1994 on four original applications filed by the first respondent.
The first respondent had entered the Jail Subordinate Service as Carding Master on 20.01.1969 and from the year 1985 he was functioning as
Factory Manager in the selection grade. The Government on 11.06.1990 directed the upgradation of post of Factory Manager to that of
Additional Superintendent of Prisons (Factory), but before that order could be given effect to, that order was directed to be kept in abeyance by a
further order made on 01.10.1990.
Prior to the order of June 1990, a domestic enquiry had been initiated against the respondent in the year 1988 on charges of possessing assets
disproportionate to his known means of income. Five charges were framed against him. The enquiry officer found those charges as having been
proved and submitted his minutes to the Government. On receipt of those minutes, the first respondent was suspended by the Government on
12.12.1991.
The applications filed by the first respondent before the Tribunal were against the order of 01.10.1990 keeping the earlier order of 11.06.1990
upgrading the post in abeyance; against the order of suspension made on 12.12.1991; to quash the minutes of the enquiry officer and with a further
prayer to promote him as a Joint Superintendent of Prisons; and to quash the charges issued to him on 31.12.1990.
The Tribunal by a common order on all those applications granted all the reliefs that were sought by the applicant before it. While so allowing
the matters, the Tribunal observed, inter alia, that no material has been placed by the Investigating authorities to show that the wife of the applicant
did not have sufficient resources to acquire the properties and that there was no material to frame and/or prove the charges pending against the
applicant regarding the acquisition of properties and possession of wealth disproportionate to the known sources of income. The Tribunal also
observed, ""The applicant placed material to show that the properties were purchased by the wife in her name from and out of her resources, and
that she was doing business and the applicant has also got ratification in respect of many items."" The Tribunal directed the absorption of the
applicant before it in the upgraded post in the higher scale of pay without assigning any reason as to why the order keeping the order of
upgradation in abeyance was required to be set aside and as to why the Government was compelled to upgrade the post contrary to the expressed
desire to keep the order of upgradation in abeyance and thereby not upgrade the post.
The review application filed by the Government was for the review of that common order. That review application was filed after a delay of 305
days for which a separate application to condone the delay was filed. The delay was condoned.
In the review application several grounds were urged. The most important being that the findings recorded by the Tribunal regarding the absence
of materials to frame or sustain the charge against the applicant was erroneous as the enquiry report has set out all the relevant materials and that
having regard to the gravity of the charges against the delinquent which charges are found to be proved by the enquiry officer, the minutes of the
enquiry officer could not have been interfered with.
It was also contended in the review application that the direction given by the Tribunal to promote the applicant before it as an Additional
Superintendent was contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court that the Government could be directed to consider a person for
appointment, if he was otherwise entitled to get the same.
In the review application which sets out what had been alleged against the delinquent in the charge memo was set out the details of the
properties which the delinquent had acquired either in his or in the name of his wife and the details as to where the properties are located. The
properties acquired were during the period from 1976 to 1986. Most of the valuable properties were acquired between 1977 and 1986. The
properties so acquired were: a house in Madurai Taluk, the value of which was Rs.73,803/- in 1976; a house in Ooty the value of construction of
which was Rs.59,960/- in the year 1977-78; a substantial house site in Mahagiri village, Madurai Taluk for a sum of Rs.29,544/- on 14.07.1980;
14 cents and 113 sq. ft. of land in Singanallur village, Coimbatore Taluk for Rs.43,583/- on 29.08.1981; 13 cents and 122 sq. ft. of land also in
Singanallur village for a sum of Rs.40,855/- on 15.01.1981; 5 cents and 419 sq. ft. of land in Pullugalam village at Coimbatore for Rs.61,260/- on
04.03.1983; construction of a house at a cost of Rs.3,93,507/- during the year 1984-86; and six cents and 122 sq. ft. at Ramanathapuram village,
Coimbatore for a sum of Rs.1,57,650 on 29.08.1986.
It was also one of the charges against the delinquent that he has failed to give intimation of the purchase of the house at Kurichi, Coimbatore in
the name of the delinquent''s wife on 14.06.1982, the value of the property being Rs.1,18,000/-.
It was also set out that he had failed to obtain permission for maintaining cows in prison quarters and for carrying business of sale of milk.
Though the delinquent had claimed that the properties which stood in the name of his wife were in fact acquisition of his wife from and out of
the earnings from her business, the details of the business carried on by her was not furnished. An order of the Government issued earlier in the
year 1984 regarding the fact that the delinquent had informed the Government about his wife''s desire to start a business in the sale of TV sets was
produced. During the course of hearing it was submitted by Counsel that the wife was carrying on business of pawn broker about which no details
were placed either before the enquiry officer or before the Tribunal.
When the Review application was heard, an objection was raised as to the maintainability of the review application as, according to the
submission made for the delinquent the application had been filed admittedly beyond the period of 30 days, which is the period provided under the
Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1988, and under the said Rules, the Tribunal had no power to condone the delay.
It was also the submission for the delinquent that a single review application could not have been filed against an order made on four Original
Applications even when that order was a common order.
The further submission that had been made for the delinquent was that no ground which can be brought within Order 47 Rule 1, CPC had
been made out, and therefore, the review petition was not maintainable.
The Tribunal while over-ruling the objections regarding the maintainability of the review application has dismissed the same by holding that no
permissible ground for review has been made out. While dismissing the matter, it has gone further and held that the delinquent should not be
prosecuted under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. This court, by an order made on 08.11.2001 on an application filed in this
proceedings has set aside that direction. We are informed that the prosecution has commenced and the trial is in progress.
Mr.Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel for the delinquent at the forefront submitted that under the Administrative Tribunals Act and the
Rules, there is no provision for condonation of delay in filing the review petition and therefore though the Tribunal had condoned the delay that
order was non-est and therefore there was no proper review petition, at all requiring consideration by the Tribunal. It was his submission that
having regard to the language employed in Rule 18 of the Tamilnadu Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1988, that rule is required to be
regarded as having expressly excluded the application of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. The aforesaid Rule 18 reads thus:
S. 18 Review Application to be filed within 30 days - No application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the
date of the order of which the review is sought"".
Counsel emphasised the words ""No application for review shall be entertained"" and the words ""unless it is filed within 30 days"" and submitted
that this being mandatory, it must be understood as having expressly excluded the application of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act and
therefore the requirement of Section 29(2) of that Act was satisfied. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as under :
Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the
Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period is prescribed by the Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
Counsel in this context invited our attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Mohammed Hasnuddin Vs. State of
Maharashtra, , Mangu Ram Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, , Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, , State of Andhra
Pradesh Vs. I. Chandrasekhara Reddy and Others, , Union of India Vs. M/s Popular Construction Co., , Nasiruddin and Others Vs. Sita Ram
Agarwal, , The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Babu Ram Upadhya, , State of Mysore Vs. H. Sanjeeviah, , State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Hind
Stone and Others, .
The principle laid down by the Court in the aforementioned cases is that for the purpose of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act it is not essential
that the special law sets out in so many words that the application of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are excluded. Such exclusion can be
spelt out from the language employed in the relevant provision of the special law in the context of the scheme and the object of the particular
enactment.
The Administrative Tribunals have been created under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. That Act was enacted pursuant to Article 323-
A of the Constitution. Article 323-A of the Constitution which is in part XIVA and which deals with Administrative Tribunals provides that
Parliament may, by law, provide for adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and
conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or local or other
authority within the territory of India or under the control of Government of India or of any Corporation or society owned or controlled by
Government.
Article 323-A(2) provides that a law made under clause (1) of that Article may, inter alia, provide for the procedure (including provisions as to
limitation and the rules of evidence to be followed by the Tribunal).
It has been held by a seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Sampath Kumar vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 386 that the
Tribunals set upon under the Act are intended to take away the jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to such matters and that jurisdiction is
vested in the Tribunal.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, , has held that the orders of the Tribunal
are amenable to correction by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction by a Division Bench by entertaining a petition under Article 226 against
those orders of the Tribunal.
In the Administrative Tribunals Act the provision which deals with Limitation is S. 21. That section reads as under :
S.21 Limitation:
(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application, -
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance,
unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of
six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six
months.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where ---
(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years
immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the
matter to which such order relates; and
(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court.
the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-
section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified
in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1), or as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies
the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.
Sub section (b) to section 21 prescribes a period of six months or one year as the case may be, having regard to the nature of application, as a
period within which the aggrieved person may approach the Tribunal by way of original application. By sub-section 3, the Tribunal is vested with
the power to extend the period, provided sufficient cause is shown for not making the application within that period.
The intention of Parliament was thus not to tie the hands of the Tribunal by preventing it from condoning the delay in deserving cases where the
person applied approaches the Tribunal beyond the period prescribed in the Act. The practical effect of that is the same as that u/s 5 of the
Limitation Act, which also enables a person to apply to the Court even after the period specified for making the application as fixed in the schedule
to the Act is over, leaving the discretion in the Court to condone or not to condone such delay.
Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act deals with procedures and powers of the Tribunal. Sub-section 1 provides ""A Tribunal shall not
be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and
subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules made by the Central Government, the Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own
procedure including the fixing of places and times of its inquiry and deciding whether to sit in public or in private.
Sub-Section (3) of Section 22 provides that
A Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of (discharging its functions under this Act), the same powers as are vested in a civil Court under the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely,
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(d) subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, requisitioning any public record or document or copy of
such record or document from any office;
(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;
(f) reviewing its decisions;
(g) dismissing a representation for default or deciding it ex-parte;
(h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any representation for default or any order passed by it ex parte; and
(i) any other matter which may be prescribed by the Central Government.
Sub-clause (f) clearly sets out the Tribunal''s power to review it''s decisions. This clause does not set out the period of limitation for making the
application for review of the decision. Sub-section (1) of Section 22 empowers the Tribunal to regulate it''s own procedure subject to the
observance of the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of the Act and of any Rules made by the Central Government.
The Rules made by the Central Government with regard to the limitation of the period has already been set out. The Rules do not expressly
state that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will not apply to applications filed for review.
Although ordinarily Rules made by way of subordinate legislation are to be regarded as if they were part of the enactment for certain purposes,
nevertheless while ascertaining the object and scope of the Act, the Rules cannot have a significant role, as the Rules are framed subsequent to the
Parliamentary enactment, and the intention of the Parliament is to be gathered from the provisions enacted by it, rather than by the Rules framed by
the Executive Government after that enactment with a view to carry out the purpose for which the Act has been placed on the statute Book.
For the purpose of determining the intention of Parliament as to whether the Parliament intended exclusion of sections 4 to 24 of the Act in
relation to application for review, it is the provisions of the Act that are meant to be taken note of, and the Rules have to be construed in the light of
the scheme and the object and the purpose of the Act which becomes evident after consideration of the scheme of the Act.
The Administrative Tribunals were constituted by parliament practically as a substitute for the High Court in order to relieve the burden on the
High Court and also to provide a separate/special forum, wherein the grievance of the civil servant can be addressed with expedition and with
minimum amount of procedural niceties. The object was to redress the grievance and not to deny the relief in cases where relief was merited. While
prescribing the period of limitation for approaching the Tribunal, Parliament expressly provided that that period is not to be regarded as so rigid
and inflexible as not to permit the Tribunal to entertain applications beyond the period so fixed, if the Tribunal was of the view that there was
sufficient cause for not approaching the Tribunal within the period of limitation. That power of the Tribunal to condone the delay whenever
sufficient cause is shown is a power given to the Tribunal in the interest of justice. The discretion was entrusted to the Tribunal and not to any other
body.
The Rules framed by the Central Government in order to effectuate the purpose of the Act, while it may enable it to prescribe a period of
limitation for filing a review application, are not intended to and cannot stretch so far as to deprive the Tribunal of the discretion vested in it by
Parliament especially when the general law of limitation which was very much in force at the time the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 was
enacted, provided in Section 29(2) of that Act that unless application of sections 4 to 24 of that Act is excluded, those provisions would be
available in respect of proceedings before the forums that are created under special law or by a general law.
It is therefore, not possible to hold that the period of 30 days fixed as the period within which review application is to be filed before the
Tribunal, excludes completely the discretion of the Tribunal available to it under the scheme of the Act and also available to it u/s 29(2) of the
Limitation Act in cases where the Tribunal is of the view that the cause for the delay in it''s view is sufficient to explain the delay. It is open to the
Tribunal to condone such delay and entertain an application for review.
The view that we have taken promotes the object of the Act, namely to provide an effective judicial forum which will redress the grievance of
the litigants who go before it. The power of review conferred on the Tribunal is of the same character and is of the same width as that of the civil
Court under CPC as is made clear by subsection (3) of 22. That power of review vested in a civil Court is and has always been one which could
be exercised even in cases where the application for review is filed beyond the period specified in Limitation Act, provided the applicant for review
is able to make out sufficient cause for not having made the application within the period prescribed.
The power of the Tribunal under the Act is similar and it too has the power to condone the delay.
The review application filed before the Tribunal is one which was within the Tribunal''s power to entertain after condoning the delay which in
fact it has.
As regards the objection that one single review petition could not have been filed in respect of a common order made in four O.As., that
objection is a technicality which was within the power of the Tribunal to over-rule.
While ordinarily each OA is a separate proceeding, nevertheless in cases where the parties are common to the applications and the relief
sought are all interconnected, and such applications are disposed off by a common order, there is no illegality in the Tribunal entertaining a single
review petition with respect to the common order made on more than one OA. The grounds set out in the review petition would clearly show that
what was sought in the review application was the review of the common order, without reference to any one or more applications.
Coming to the merits of the review petition, as already observed the Tribunal in it''s original order had stated that there was no material before
the enquiry officer with regard to the sustainability of the charge, or the proof thereof. That statement is clearly incorrect as the required materials
were in fact before the enquiry officer, as is borne out on the enquiry report.
It is also the further observation of the Tribunal that there was material placed before the enquiry officer, to show that the wife had acquired all
the properties from and out of her income from several businesses run by her. There was no material, in fact, before the enquiry officer that the
wife was running independent business. There was no material to show what kind of business was being run. There were no statements seting out
the income and expenditure of those business as also of the surplus yielded from those businesses. Some of the Income Tax returns produced and
also receipts regarding payment of tax would show that the amounts paid as Income Tax are small sums varying between Rs.1000/- to
Rs.10,000/-. Had the legitimate income of the wife from the business run by her was as substantial as to permit acquisition of properties of such
high value, tax in a much larger sum could have been paid.
Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC enables the Court to review the order made by it on the grounds set out therein. That provision reads thus:
Order XLVII Rule 1. Application for review of judgment:
(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved ---
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred.
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
and whom from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or
could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the
face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a
review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some
other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to
the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.
The original order may be reviewed, inter alia, when there is some mistake or error on the face of the record or ""for any other sufficient
reasons"".
The sufficiency of the reason is a matter for decision by the forum which made the order. In this case, as has been found, the Tribunal had
assumed existence of materials and had also assumed absence of materials to show that the properties acquired by the delinquent in his own name
or in the name of his wife was not disproportionate to his known source of income, when, in fact, there was material as has been found by the
enquiry officer. The further erroneous statement made by the Tribunal was that the delinquent had shown that all the properties that stood in the
name of wife had, in fact been acquired by her from and out of earnings, as no such material conclusively establishing that claim has been placed
before the enquiry officer.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal ought not to have held that there was no ground for reviewing the order.
We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal and allow the review application. The order made on the original applications on
27.01.1994 is also set aside.
The four Original Applications shall now be considered afresh in accordance with law.
As the matter is an old one, the proceedings having been commenced before the Tribunal in the year 1991, we direct the Tribunal to dispose
off these matters within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
The writ petition is allowed.