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Judgment
Abdul Hadi, J.—The defendants are the appellants. The suit filed by the respondent, who is the Secretary and Correspondent of Sourashtra
Middle School, Nilakottai is for a declaration that the respondent''s school is a minority school as per the provisions of Act 29 of 1974, viz., the
Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 and Rules framed thereunder and for consequential permanent injunction
restraining the defendant from enforcing certain specific provisions of the above said Act and Rules, on the respondent''s school. The Trial Court
granted only the above said declaration prayed for, but dismissed the suit with reference to the above said injunction relief prayed for. As against
the said decision of the Trial Court, there were two appeals, viz., A. S. Nos. 207 and 208/1980 before the lower appellate court one by the
defendants State of Tamil Nadu and its authorities and the other by the plaintiff. The 1st appeal by the defendants is against the declaration granted
and the other appeal by the plaintiff is against the refusal of the in Junction relief. The lower appellate court, which heard the said two appeals
together, dismissed both the appeals. As against the dismissal of AS. No. 207/1980 filed by the defendants, this Second Appeal has been
preferred and in this Second Appeal, the Cross Objection has been filed by the plaintiff seeking the above said injunction relief. Quite similar to the
question involved in this second appeal, there were also two other second appeals, viz., S.A. Nos. 15 and 25 of 1981. There also, the question
was whether the institutions therein were minority institutions, entitled to the benefits of the protection under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India
and for consequential injunction. There also, as in the present case, the question was, whether the institution in question was founded by a linguistic
minority, viz., the Sourashtra Community. Those Second appeals were disposed of by judgment dated 14.3.1988. The learned Additional
Government Pleader fairly represents that the said decision would govern the present case also and that accordingly this second appeal also may
be dismissed. Therefore, pursuant to the said representation and after going through the said judgment dated 14.3.1988, this second appeal is
dismissed.
In so far as the above said Cross Objection in this second appeal is concerned the learned counsel for the Cross Objector points out that the
Court below has erred in stating that it is only the High Court, that can decide as to whether any one of the impugned provisions of this Act would
violate the constitutional rights guaranteed to the minority institution. On that reasoning, the lower appellate Court has refused the injunction relief.
The injunction that is prayed for is to restrain the defendants from enforcing certain specified provisions of the above said Act and Rules, since
they are said to violate the Constitutional rights guaranteed under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India. It is not correct to say that only the High
Court can decide such a question. S. 113 of the CPC also gives an indication in this aspect. The Proviso therein says that when such validity
question arises, the subordinate Court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons there for and refer the same for the opinion of the
High Court, if in its opinion, the relevant Act or Rule is invalid, out has not been so declared by the High Court to which that court is subordinate,
or by the Supreme Court. It has also been held in M. Subbaraja Mudaliar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Another, that such a reference
could be made only after the Court records its prima facie finding that the impugned Act or Rule is bad. Further, where the above said High Court
or the Supreme Court had already declared an Act or Rule as invalid or inoperative, there is no bar for the subordinate Court, to apply the said
decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court to the case in hand before it. So, the lower appellate court is clearly in error in having proceeded
on the footing that there is a complete bar for the Subordinate Courts to go into such a question.
However, whether really the application of the above said specified provisions will be consequential to the declarative decree that has been
granted, has not been found by the Courts below. At any rate, I do not think it is necessary to decide that question since an injunction could be
granted generally as a consequence of the declaration decree granted. Accordingly, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the consequential
permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men and officers from enforcing any statutory provision which would affect the plaintiffs
School''s character as a minority institution. Therefore, the Cross Objection is partly allowed, granting the permanent injunction, only as indicated
above. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs, both in the second appeal and in the Cross Objection.
