AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Order
The State of Rajasthan has preferred the present special appeal under Rule 134 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952 questioning the legality and correctness of the judgment dated 07.04.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, wherein the writ petition preferred by the writ petitioner-respondent herein has been allowed and the impugned order dated 07.06.2024 has been quashed and set aside and the State of Rajasthan has been directed to issue appointment letter to the petitioner on the post of Primary School Teacher (General/Special Education)(Level-1, Class I to V) within a period of 30 days from the date of his approaching the respondents with a web-print of the said order.
The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual background.
An advertisement dated 16.12.2022 was issued for the post of Primary School Teacher (General/Special Education)(Level-1, Class I to V). The writ petitioner applied for the said post and cleared the written examination and his name finds place in the list of provisionally selected candidates and he was allowed to participate in the process of document verification.
Thereafter, the State of Rajasthan issued an order dated 31.07.2023 containing the list of finally selected candidates, in which the name of writ petitioner stood at Sr.No.5339 and also the writ petitioner was included in the list of candidates called for counselling, wherein his name stood at Serial No.295.
However, the petitioner was not issued the appointment letter on account of a criminal case pending against him for offences under Sections 199, 200, 466, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, from which, the petitioner was acquitted by the judgment dated 07.07.2023 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, No.2, Jalore and the same was affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jalore in the appeal preferred by the State while extending the benefit of doubt. Thereafter, the State Government passed an order dated 07.06.2024 that on account of a criminal case, though, he has acquitted, he is not entitled for order of appointment. Aggrieved by the said order, the writ petitioner preferred a writ petition.
The learned Single Judge, by the impugned order dated 07.04.2025, allowed the writ petition and quashed the order dated 07.06.2024 and directed the respondents to issue appointment letter to the petitioner for the post of Primary School Teacher (General/Special Education)(Level-1, Class I to V) within a period of 30 days after approaching the competent authority.
Mr. Ayush Gehlot, learned counsel for the appellants submit that the respondent writ petitioner was charged for the serious offences under Sections 199, 200, 466, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and these offences are involving moral turpitude as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Jagjit Singh; (2013) 10 SCC 686. It is also submitted that the case of the respondent writ petitioner has to be considered in light of Circular dated 04.12.2019 and the order dated 07.06.2024. The administrative suitability and the criminal culpability operate in different spheres in light of the paragraph No.38.4.3 of the case of Avatar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.; (2016) 8 SCC 471 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Administration & Ors. Vs. Sushil Kumar; (1997) SCC (L&S)492, wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“Verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though the respondent was found physically fit, passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected, on account of his antecedent record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint a person of such record as a Constable in the disciplined force. The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. The Tribunal, therefore, was wholly unjustified in giving the direction for reconsideration of his case. Though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences.” Therefore, the learned Single Judge ought not to have interfered with the order dated 07.06.2024 and as such, the order of learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside.
Learned counsel for the respondent writ petitioner submits that the writ petition has rightly been allowed by learned Single Judge.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered the rival submissions made hereinabove and perused the material available on record.
Admittedly, the petitioner was selected for the post of Primary School Teacher (General/Special Education)(Level-1, Class I to V), but he could not be granted appointment to the said post and was declined appointment vide order dated 07.06.2024 on the ground that he has been acquitted from the criminal charges by extending the benefit of doubt by order dated 07.07.2023, for offences under Sections 199, 200, 466, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
As held by Supreme Court in the cases of Jagjit Singh (supra), the offences under Sections 420/471 of the IPC have a harmful effect on the public and threaten the well-being of the society and these offences fall under the category of offences involving moral turpitude. The writ petitioner was though acquitted but on the basis of the benefit of doubt. Therefore, in that view of the matter, the case of the writ petitioner has to be considered in light of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Avatar Singh (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 38.4.3, held as under:-
“38.4.3.If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.”
A careful perusal of the paragraph 38.4.3 reveals that the acquittal has already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offences of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedent and may take appropriate decision at to continuance of the employee. In the present case, admittedly, the writ petitioner has been acquitted in a case involving offences under Sections 199, 200, 466, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, though are offences involving moral turpitude, and even if it is not a clean acquittal, despite that the employer was, therefore, required to consider all the relevant facts and antecedent of the petitioner and should have taken an appropriate decision. The decision so taken by the employer, however, has to be considered in accordance with circular dated 04.12.2019.
In the earlier recruitment pursuant to an advertisement dated 12.04.2018, the applications were invited for the post of Rajasthan Primary and Upper Primary School Teacher, in which, the writ petitioner furnished incorrect details regarding his marks in the application form relating to the marks obtained in the Rajasthan Eligibility Examination for Teachers (written) and allegedly uploaded the fabricated marks-sheet of the REET Examination from the mobile phone of the writ petitioner. The said details were verified and they were found to be incorrect. As a consequence, criminal proceedings were initiated which ultimately ended in acquittal.
The question before this Court was whether the judgment of acquittal was a clear case of acquittal or it was a case of acquittal based on the benefit of doubt only. The operative portion of the judgment of acquittal refers to acquittal by extending the benefit of doubt. The acquittal can be said to be on a benefit of doubt if the evidence on record is either wholly not reliable but partly reliable and partly unreliable. If it is a case of wholly reliable evidence, the conviction can be recorded and if it is wholly unreliable evidence, it is a clear case of acquittal. Removable doubt stems from insufficient evidence. If it is a case of doubtful evidence and if the acquittal is recorded, it is a case of extending the benefit of doubt. The extension of benefit of doubt for acquitting the accused would arise in a situation when there is an evidence and such evidence accords some doubt against the accused, pointing out his involvement for the charged offences.
Anyhow, on closely scrutinising the judgment of acquittal, the case of the prosecution was that the writ petitioner/ respondent herein uploaded the application form with incorrect details regarding the marks obtained in the REET examination and also uploaded the fabricated marks-sheet from the mobile phone of the writ petitioner.
In order to fix the involvement of the petitioner for the charged offences, the prosecution was required to establish two parts. The first part related to uploading of the incorrect application form detailing incorrect marks obtained in REET and also uploading of the fabricated marks-sheet, the second part, which is important, is that the writ petitioner/respondent herein uploaded such incorrect application details and fabricated marks-sheet from the mobile phone of the petitioner himself.
The prosecution agency seized the mobile phone of the petitioner and no incriminating evidence was found therein. The prosecution also failed to establish that the uploaded IP Address of the application form and fabricated marks-sheet were related to the petitioner’s mobile internet. The evidence, at the most, points out the uploading of the application form with wrong details of marks and uploading of the fabricated marks-sheet. That evidence only makes out ingredient of offence.
The core evidence would be that the petitioner has uploaded the application form and fabricated marks-sheet from the mobile with IP Address belonging to the petitioner’s mobile. Absolutely, no evidence in this regard was found. This means that it is a clear case of no evidence.
So far as the uploaded such a data is concerned, it could be anyone. The prosecution was required to prove not only the ingredients of offence but also most importantly required to establish that it was the petitioner, who uploaded such information. In the entire judgment of acquittal, there was no such evidence. Thus, it is a clear case of acquittal for no evidence that the offence has been committed by petitioner.
The burden to prove the case always lies with the prosecution, which failed to discharge the same, resulting in acquittal. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it is a clear case of acquittal for lack of evidence and not on account of reasonable doubt.
The petitioner is an aspirant for the post of Primary Teacher. He has faced trial for nearly five years without there being any evidence pointing out his involvement in uploading such wrong data.
Considering the above facts and circumstances, in our considered opinion, the learned Single Judge was absolutely justified in directing the respondents to issue the final appointment order. We do not find any merit in this appeal.
We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere in the matter and, accordingly, the instant special appeal stands dismissed.