State of Punjab through Government Food Inspector vs Dalip Singh

S.S. Dewan, J

The trial Court found the respondent to have committed an offence under Section 16 (1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short, the Act) and convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for nine months and a fine of Rs. 1000/ or in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. On appeal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the accused on the sole ground that the mandatory provisions of Section 13 (2) of the Act had not been complied with. Thus, the above appeal came to be filed.

During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the State pointed out that there is a conflict of decisions of this Court on the question whether. Section 13 (2) of the Act is mandatory or directory. In State of Haryana v. Joginder Singh 1983(1) F.A.C. 80 and State of Haryana v. Hari Chand 1983(1) F.A.C. 274, the Division Benches expressed the view that the provisions of Section 13 (2) of the Act are mandatory. A contrary view was taken by a Division Bench in State of Haryana vs Amar Nath 1983 (1) F.A.C. 234 wherein the Judges have expressed the view that Section 13 (2) of the Act is not mandatory.

To have an authoritative decision about the mandatory or directory nature of Section 13 (2) of the Act, the Division Bench to which I was also a party referred this case to a larger Bench on June, 5, 1986, in case Criminal Appeal No. 66DBA of 1982 State of Punjab v. Deboo. On December 15, 1988 the Full Bench while considering the question whether Section 13 (2) of the Act is mandatory or directory has observed as under :

"Thus in our considered view, both the requirements of section 13 (2) of the Act i.e. the sending of the report of the Public Analyst and drawal of specific attention of the accused to this right, are mandatory and noncompliance of both or compliance of one and not the other, would in both events be fatal to the prosecution. So this part of section 13 (2) of the Act, we hold as mandatory, noncompliance of which and in any event uphill the commencement of effective Court proceedings would vitiate the proceedings. The other parts of the provision where time schedule is laid or prescribed, or expedition expected, we hold as directory fatal to the prosecution only if material prejudice can be shown to have been caused to the accused by delayed compliance or observance thereof and in that sense noncompliance.

In the above view of the settled legal position that noncompliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 13 (2) of the Act vitiate the proceedings and there being no dispute with regard to the fact that in this case mandatory provisions of Section 13 (2) of the Act have not been followed, the order of acquittal is not liable to be interfered with.

In the result, the State appeal is dismissed.