State of Punjab vs Inderjit Singh

G.R. Majithia, J.—The State has come up in appeal against the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court which on appeal reversed that of the trial Judge and granted a declaration to she plaintiff-respondent that his reversion from the post of Assistant Sub Inspector to that of Head Constable was illegal.

The matrix of case is as under :

The respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) was appointed as a Constable on May 23,1951 He was promoted as a Head Constable on September 25, 1956 and confirmed as such on June 9, 1972. He was promoted as Assistant Sub-inspector in the year 1976. A charge sheet dated April 25, 1979 was served upon him. He filed his reply. The Enquiry Officer submitted his final report on June 16, 1979. As a result thereof, show cause notice dated June 22,, 1979 was issued to him. After considering his reply, he was reverted to the post of Head Constable vide order dated July 10, 1979. He challenged the reversion order in appeal. The appeal was rejected by the Deputy Inspector General of Police vide order dated February 4, 1980. The plaintiff challenged the order of reversion principally on two grounds namely (i) the order of reversion was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police who was not the competent authority to appoint biro, the Superintendent of Police was the competent authority to appoint him as Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, and (ii) Rule 16.38 of the Police Rules was violated inasmuch as the District Magistrate while permitting that departmental enquiry be conducted against the plaintiff did not record his finding for not ordering judicial prosecution against him.

The trial Judge negatived the contentions. On appeal the first Appellate Court quashed the order of reversion on both the grounds on which it was challenged.

The appellate Judge is in error in holding that the order of reversion was passed by an authority other than the one competent to appoint the plaintiff against the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. The Appellate Judge held that the plaintiff was appointed as Office Assistant Sub Inspector of Police by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the order of reversion was passed by the Superintendent of Police and under these circumstances, the order was invalid. Since the order of promotion was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, he was the only competent authority to revert the platinum. In support of its consclusion, the learned Appellate Judge relied upon the case in Man Singh Assistant Sub-Inspector v. The State of Punjab and Ors.. 1973 (1) S. L. R. 365. There is no dispute that under the statutory Rules the competent authority to appoint the plaintiff as Assistant Sub- Inspector of Police was Superintendent of Police. The authority who was competent to promote and appoint the plaintiff as Assistant Sub- Inspector of Police was competent to revert him. The mere fact that approval for appointment as Officiating Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, was accorded by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, will not make him the appointing authority. The judgment reported in Man Singh''s case (supra) has no bearing on the facts of the instant case. In that case, what was submitted was that Superintendent of Police was competent to appoint an Officiating Assistant Sub Inspector of Police if the vacancy was for a period of less than eight months duration. If the vacancy was of a longer duration then the Deputy Inspector General of the Range was competent to appoint an Officiating Assistant-Sub Inspector of Police It was on those premises that the learned Single Judge has held that the delinquent official was appointed as Assistant Inspector of Police by the Deputy Inspector of Police of the Range and his dismissal from service by the Superintendent of Police was by an authority lower than the one competent to appoint him.

The plaintiff was reverted by the Competent authority and no fault can be found with the order on this ground. However, on the second point the plaintiff is on a firm footing. Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules reads as under :-

"1681-Criminal offences by Police officers and strictures by Courts-procedure regarding :-

(1) Immediate information shall be given to the District Magistrate of any complaint received by Superintendent of Police, which indicates the commission by a police officer of a criminal offence in connection with his official relations with the public. The District Magistrate will decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a Police Officer, or made over to a selected Magistrate having 1st Class powers.

(2) When investigation of such a complaint establishes a prima facie case, a judicial prosecution shall normally follow:

the matter shall be desposed of departmentally only if the District Magistrate so orders for reasons to be, recorded. When it is decided to proceed departmentally, the procedure prescribed in Rule 16.24 shall be followed. An officer found guilty of a charge of nature referred to in this rule shall ordinarily be dismissed."

Sub Rule (2) of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules, envisages that when on investigation it is found that a complaint against the delinquent official prima facie establishes the case, a judicial prosecution shall be the normal rule and if in a given case the district Magistrate orders departmental enquiry against the delinquent official, he must record reasons for following that course. In the instant case corruption charges were levelled against the plaintiff and, therefore, judicial prosecution should have been ordered against him after registration of the criminal case. If the District Magistrate found that the delinquent official could be suitably dealt with in the departmental enquiry then he should have recorded reasons for adopting the later course. In the instant case, from the file it does not transpire that the District Magistrate applied his mind as is enjoined by the Rules and gave reasons for not resorting to judicial prosecution. I do not find any infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the learned Appellate Judge on this aspect of the matter.

The appeal is dismissed. However, no order as to costs.