State of Punjab vs Gurnam Kaur and another

G.C. Mital, J.—The facts of the present case are that in the year 1955 acquisition was made by the State under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in regard to a large chunk of land situate in village Lehal, Tehsil and District Patiala, for setting up the Teachers Training Institute. The claimants were paid their compensation by the Land Acquisition Collector, which was accepted under protest and thereafter, the claimants sought references under section 18 of the Act. The references came before the district Court and the compensation was enhanced. On the compensation awarded by the District Court the claimants were satisfied as they did not come to this Court in appeal for claiming further enhancement. After the compensation was paid by the Collector, the State took over the possession of the land in dispute and constructed the institute. Long thereafter on 2721969, Smt. Gurnam Kaur, one of the landowners whose 27 Bighas and 7 Biswas of land was acquired under the aforesaid proceedings and who had also got the enhancement made through the District Court, filed a civil suit to challenge the proceedings taken by the Collector under section 7 onwards of the Act on the ground that the officer, who conducted those proceedings, had not been empowered to do the functions of the Collector under those provisions because no such powers were conferred on him under section 3(c) of the Act. On this basis, it was sought to be argued that the entire proceedings regarding issue of notice under section 9; the award of compensation under section 11; the deposit of compensation by him under section 12 and the taking of possession under section 16 of the Act, are wholly null and void and should be set aside. The trial Court decreed the suit for possession of 27 Bighas and 7 Biswas of land which decree was affirmed by the lower Appellate Court. This is a second appeal by the State of Punjab.

Shri D.S. Brar, appearing for the State, has raised a point of importance to the effect that once the plaintiffs got the compensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Collector, it should have been deemed that they had waived their right to challenge that matter when they sought reference under section 18 of the Act, which reference was allowed by the District Court. It is further argued that the acquisition proceedings had concluded beyond three years prior to the filing of the suit and, therefore, there was no limitation available to the plaintiffs to come to the Court. Both these points were put to the counsel for the plaintiffsrespondents. In reply to the first point, he has placed reliance on Smt. Chan Kaur v. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi and others, 1965 P.L.R. 616, a Single Bench decision wherein it was held that if the proceedings taken under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act are void, the filing of reference application under section 18 of the Act and the order of enhancement of compensation, would not stand in the way of the claimant to challenge the acquisition proceedings. As regards the point of limitation, since the orders passed by the officer under sections 7 to 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, were not passed by a person who was duly authorised to act as a Collector under section 3(c) of the Act, they should be considered to be void and once the orders are void, no limitation would be applicable in the case.

After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that both the points raised on behalf of the State deserve to prevail.

Shri K.C. Puri, Advocate, appearing for the plaintiffs, has fairly conceded that it is true that his clients had received the compensation which was fixed by the officer and that they sought reference under section 18 of the Act in which enhancement was made by the District Court and the enhanced compensation has also been received by them. On these facts, the only inference that can legitimately be drawn in law, is that the plaintiffs waived all points which may have been available to them to challenge the acquisition proceedings from the stage of issue of notification under section 6 of the Act. It has been ruled by the highest Court that a party is entitled to waive all possible points except those provided by Part III of the Constitution, namely, the fundamental rights. The points which the plaintiffs have waived in this case, do not relate to fundamental rights. If this is permitted to be done at such a belated stage, there will not only be great loss to the Government but also to the public at large because the building of the institute which has been constructed for the training of the teachers, may have to be demolished to restore possession to the plaintiffs. It was stated at one time on behalf of the plaintiffs that their part of the land does not fall under the building, but is under the lawns of the building. If the lawns are to be taken away, that can be done after demolition of the boundary wall etc. which also would entail large expenses for the reconstruction thereof. May be, that the plaintiff''s land is in front of the institute and if they are allowed to cultivate or run the dairy farm in front of the institute, the entire public purpose will go waste. Accordingly, I uphold the first objection raised on behalf of the State that the plaintiffs have waived the points and even if it is assumed that the officer, who conducted the proceedings and determined the compensation under sections 7 to 17 of the Act was not authorised the matter cannot be agitated at such a belated stage as the plaintiffs have waived those points.

The Single Bench decision relied upon by the plaintiffs in Smt. Chan Kaur''s case (supra) no longer holds good in view of the Division Bench decision in Avtar Singh v. Punjab State and others, A.I.R. 1982 Punjab and Haryana 294 : 1985 RRR 463. In Avtar Singh''s case (supra), it was ruled that even if some part of the acquisition proceedings is defective and in case the claimant challenges the enhancement made after seeking reference under section 18 of the Act, he cannot be allowed to challenge the acquisition proceedings. In the present case, the acquisition proceedings under sections 4 and 6 of the Act were not challenged in the suit and the challenge was to the proceedings taken by an officer from the stage of section 7 till section 17 of the Act.

Coming to the point of limitation, it is true that if a void order is passed and it is not given effect to, the aggrieved party would be entitled to wait till that is given effect to, and the starting point of limitation would be when the order is given effect to. Once a void order is given effect and the aggrieved party is dispossessed, that would furnish the starting point of limitation and the outer limitation in this case would be three years. Accordingly no help can be derived by the plaintiffs from Smt. Chan Kaur''s case (supra).

Shri K.C. Puri has placed reliance on Article 65 of the Limitation Act and urged that it is for the State to prove that the suit is beyond limitation meaning thereby that it was for the State to establish that they had prescribed title by adverse possession. Article 65 of the Limitation Act would not be attracted to the facts of the present case because acquisition was made by the State for a public purpose validly under sections 4 and 6 of the Act. Some proceedings after the issuance of notification under section 6 of the Act were challenged and those could be challenged only within a maximum period of limitation of three years as held above. The findings of the Courts below in this behalf are reversed.

For the reasons recorded above, the appeal is allowed, the judgments and decrees of the two Courts below are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.