State Of Punjab & Ors. vs Suman Bala & Anr.

Kirti Singh, J.

The present writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the State of Punjab assailing the Award dated 20.06.2000 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bathinda, in Reference No.164 of 1994. By the impugned Award, the reference was answered in favour of respondent No.1-workwoman and she was directed to be reinstated in service with continuity of service, though without back wages, subject to her reporting for duty within 30 days of publication of the Award.

As per the pleaded case of respondent No.1, she he had been engaged as a Clerk with the management with effect from 04.08.1980 at a monthly emolument of Rs.1,700/- and had continued to work till her services were terminated with effect from 18.08.1987. She pleaded that she had completed more than 240 days of continuous service in the preceding calendar year and that her services were terminated without notice, enquiry or payment of retrenchment compensation. It was further her case that a junior workwoman, namely, Neelam Rani, had been retained in service in violation of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Her demand notice dated 26.08.1993 ultimately culminated in a reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act. The management resisted the claim. Its pleaded case was that respondent No.1 had been engaged only against leave vacancies through successive make-shift arrangements, each not exceeding 89 days, and that the last such engagement ran from 22.06.1987 to 18.09.1987, whereafter it came to an automatic end. It was further pleaded that, on a period-wise computation of the days worked, respondent No.1 had never completed 240 days of service in any calendar year. It was also pleaded that there was substantial delay in raising the dispute and that the claim was barred by the earlier Civil Writ Petition No.3304 of 1989, which had been withdrawn on 18.11.1992. As regards Neelam Rani, the management's stand, reiterated in the replication dated 20.12.2001 filed in the present proceedings, was that she had first been appointed on 01.10.1986, within the aforesaid gap in respondent No.1's engagement, and that she too had been engaged only on successive short-term spells.

Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned Labour Court held that the Limitation Act, 1963 had no application to a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, though the delay could be taken into consideration while moulding the relief. On the effect of the earlier writ petition, the Labour Court held that its withdrawal on 18.11.1992, without any adjudication on merits, did not operate as res judicata. On the question of completion of 240 days and the date and legality of termination, the Labour Court found that the management had failed to substantiate its assertion through documentary evidence and accepted the testimony of respondent No.1 regarding her continuous service. It accordingly held that she had completed 240 days of service, that her services had been terminated on 18.08.1987 and not 18.09.1987, and that the termination was unjustified, inter alia, on account of the retention of Neelam Rani, whom it understood, on the basis of MW-1's admission, to have been recruited only on 29.06.1987. In view of the delay in raising the dispute, back wages were declined, but reinstatement with continuity of service was directed.

Learned counsel for the petitioner-State has assailed the Award primarily on four grounds. Firstly, it is submitted that the claim was highly belated and that the delay was sufficient to disentitle respondent No.1 to relief. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon the judgment in Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department, SLP(C) No.27080 of 2015, decided on 07.09.2015. Secondly, it is contended that the Labour Court failed to appreciate Annexure P-6, which sets out the period-wise calculation of the days allegedly worked by respondent No.1 and according to which she did not complete 240 days in any calendar year. Thirdly, it is contended that the present claim stood barred by the earlier Civil Writ Petition No.3304 of 1989. Fourthly, it is submitted, on the strength of the affidavit dated 24.10.2025 filed pursuant to order dated 02.07.2025, together with a period-wise chart of Neelam Rani's own engagement and the replication dated 20.12.2001, that Neelam Rani was herself engaged only on successive short-term spells commencing 01.10.1986, a date falling within the gap in respondent No.1's own service, and therefore could not be treated as a junior retained in preference to respondent No.1.

Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 has supported the Award. It has been submitted that Annexure P-6 is merely a chart prepared by the management and appended to its pleadings, which was never proved through a witness competent to speak to the underlying attendance or appointment record, and that its production before this Court cannot cure the evidentiary deficiency before the Labour Court. On the earlier writ petition, it is submitted that the same sought regularisation of service and was withdrawn without any adjudication on merits, whereas the present proceedings arise out of the alleged illegal termination of service. As regards Neelam Rani, it has been submitted that the material concerning her own periods of engagement was never placed before the Labour Court and cannot be used in supervisory jurisdiction to disturb a finding of fact based on the record as it then stood, including the admission of MW-1.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The scope of interference by this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, with an Award passed by the Labour Court is well settled and circumscribed. This Court does not sit in appeal over findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and would not ordinarily re-appreciate the evidence merely because another view may be possible. Interference is warranted where a finding is shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

The objections raised by the petitioners, when examined in the aforesaid parameters, essentially seek reconsideration of the factual findings recorded by the Labour Court with regard to the period of respondent No.1's engagement and the circumstances in which Neelam Rani continued in service. The question, therefore, is not whether this Court may, upon an independent appreciation of the evidence, arrive at another possible conclusion, but whether the findings recorded by the Labour Court are such that they cannot reasonably be sustained on the material available before it.

The challenge based upon delay does not merit acceptance. It is undisputed that respondent No.1's services came to an end in 1987 and that she issued the demand notice only on 26.08.1993. The delay is undoubtedly substantial and is a circumstance which cannot be ignored. However, the Limitation Act, 1963 does not prescribe a period of limitation for a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Delay is, therefore, relevant principally while considering whether the dispute should result in relief and, if so, the nature and extent thereof

In the present case, the Labour Court was conscious of the delay and expressly took the same into consideration while moulding the relief. It declined back wages, although it otherwise found the termination unjustified. The delay relied upon by the petitioners, at its highest, was about seven years, whereas the case relied upon by learned State counsel concerned a materially longer period of unexplained inaction. Further, respondent No.1 did not remain wholly inactive, having issued a demand notice and thereafter pursued the statutory reference machinery. In these circumstances, the Labour Court's conclusion that the delay did not render the reference itself incompetent does not disclose any perversity or error of law warranting interference.

The reliance placed by learned State counsel on Prabhakar (supra) does not assist the petitioners. There, the workman raised no notice, protest, or demand for over fourteen years, offered no explanation the Labour Court itself was willing to accept, and the Management had specifically pleaded that the reference was incompetent for want of an existing dispute. On those facts, the Supreme Court held the dispute had gone stale, leaving the Government without jurisdiction to refer it. The judgment is equally clear, however, that where a workman shows the dispute stayed alive by demand, protest, or continued pursuit of the grievance: delay does not void the reference; it is instead a factor going to relief, which may be moulded by declining or reducing back wages or substituting compensation for reinstatement. Respondent No.1's case falls in that latter class: the delay here, at its highest, is about seven years ie. less than half that in Prabhakar and she was not silent, having served a demand notice dated 26.08.1993 and pursued the statutory reference to conclusion. Nor is the competency of the reference itself under challenge here, as it was there. On Prabhakar's own test, the Labour Court's course, treating the dispute as alive and moulding relief through denial of back wages was correct.

The plea founded upon Civil Writ Petition No.3304 of 1989 also does not merit acceptance. The said writ petition had been filed by respondent No.1 seeking regularisation of her service, whereas the present proceedings arise from the alleged illegal termination of her service and seek adjudication of the consequences flowing therefrom. More importantly, the earlier writ petition was withdrawn on 18.11.1992 without any adjudication on the merits of the termination now under consideration. There is, therefore, no adjudication in the earlier proceedings which could operate as a determination of the legality of the termination dated 18.08.1987. The mere fact that respondent No.1 had earlier approached this Court for a different relief and thereafter withdrew those proceedings cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, furnish a basis for non-suiting her in the subsequent industrial reference.

The next challenge relates to the finding that respondent No.1 had completed 240 days of service. The petitioners rely upon Annexure P-6, which contains a year-wise computation of the days allegedly worked by respondent No.1 and, according to the management, shows that she did not complete 240 days in any calendar year. The affidavit dated 24.10.2025, filed pursuant to order dated 02.07.2025, further records that the period-wise details had been furnished before the Assistant Labour Commissioner as well as the learned Labour Court and refers to the replication dated 20.12.2001, wherein the department asserted that the original record had also been produced before the Labour Court. Thus, the issue is not whether the said material was available, but whether its alleged non-consideration warrants interference with the finding recorded by the Labour Court. The Award shows that the Labour Court accepted the testimony of respondent No.1 regarding her continuous service and, upon appreciation of the material before it, held that she had completed 240 days. Even if the computation relied upon by the petitioners is taken into consideration, this Court, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, would not substitute its own assessment of the evidence merely because another view is possible. The finding, therefore, cannot be said to be so perverse or unsupported by the material on record as to warrant interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

There is, however, an independent basis on which the Award can be sustained. The Labour Court did not rest its conclusion solely on the alleged completion of 240 days; it also found the termination to be in breach of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act on the ground that Neelam Rani, a junior workwoman, had been retained in service. The requirement of 240 days, which is relevant to the protection available under Section 25-F, cannot by itself render a claim under Sections 25-G and 25-H untenable where the requisite factual foundation for invoking those provisions is otherwise established. In the present case, the finding regarding retention was not based merely on the statement of respondent No.1, but also on the admission of MW-1, as recorded in the Award, that Neelam Rani had been recruited on 29.06.1987. On the material before it, the Labour Court found that respondent No.1 was in service at the relevant time and that a junior workwoman had consequently been retained. Thus, even if the petitioners' objection regarding completion of 240 days is accepted, it would not, by itself, warrant interference with the independent finding of violation of Sections 25-G and 25-H.

This Court would, in any event, endorse the principle emerging from three decisions on the point. In Ramesh Chander v. State of Haryana and others, CWP No.3175 of 1991, decided on 29.08.2008, retention of junior employees after a senior workman's retrenchment, without any explanation from the management, was held to violate Sections 25-G and 25-H irrespective of the senior's own 240 day count, since that requirement belongs to Section 25 F alone. In Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhatinda, 2001(1) SCT 98, following the Division Bench in Baljit Singh v. State of Haryana, breach of the "last come first go" principle in Section 25-G was held to offend the constitutional equality clause and to apply even where the workman has not completed 240 days. And in Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam Construction and another v. Jarnail Singh and another, CWP-18134-2002 decided on 15.11.2002, a management's unexplained failure to produce service records within its own custody was held to justify an adverse inference that the best evidence was being withheld, with an averment made by the workman in his statement of claim and repeated on oath, if not specifically controverted, treated as admitted. These principles apply with equal force to the facts at hand.

No doubt, the petitioners have placed on record an affidavit dated 24.10.2025, sworn by Er. Vishwajeet Singh Siag, Executive Engineer, Provincial Division, PWD B&R, Ferozepur, pursuant to order dated 02.07.2025. The affidavit, along with the accompanying record, indicates that Neelam Rani was also engaged through successive short-term spells, commencing from 01.10.1986, followed by further spells from 30.12.1986, 31.03.1987 and 29.06.1987. The material further indicates that, according to the management, respondent No.1 was not in service between 21.01.1986 and 20.03.1987. Thus, Neelam Rani's initial engagement on 01.10.1986 falls within the said period.

The aforesaid material, in the form in which it has now been placed before this Court, was not before the Labour Court and cannot be utilised in these proceedings to re-appreciate the evidence or to substitute a fresh factual finding for that recorded by the Labour Court. The finding has to be examined on the basis of the material which was before the fact-finding authority. At the same time, the subsequent material cannot be wholly disregarded while moulding the relief, particularly when it bears upon the circumstances in which Neelam Rani came to be engaged and retained and when the original relief of reinstatement has, by reason of subsequent events, become incapable of implementation.

The question of relief is, in any event, materially affected by subsequent events. The operation of the Award was stayed by this Court on 28.03.2001 subject to compliance with Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thereafter, by order dated 04.07.2002, respondent No.1 was held entitled to salary from the petitioner-State with effect from April, 2001, together with arrears and continuing monthly payments.

Pursuant to order dated 16.07.2026, the petitioner-State placed on record an affidavit dated 05.08.2026 regarding compliance with the order dated 04.07.2002, recording payment of Rs.16,866/- towards pay and allowances for the period from 01.04.2001 to 30.09.2002 and further payment of Rs.937/- per month to respondent No.1 up to December, 2016. Respondent No.1 has since attained the age of superannuation and retired in December, 2016. Consequently, the original direction of reinstatement made by the Labour Court in the year 2000 has become incapable of implementation. The subsequent superannuation does not, however, efface the finding regarding the illegality of the termination; it only necessitates moulding of the relief, since the particular relief of actual reinstatement can no longer be granted. The question, therefore, is as to the appropriate consequential relief to which respondent No.1 may now be entitled in the circumstances of the case.

Having considered the matter in its entirety, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the Award, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, to the extent it holds the termination of respondent No.1 to be unjustified. The findings recorded by the Labour Court cannot be said to be so perverse or unsupported by the material before it as to warrant interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

At the same time, the relief originally granted by the Labour Court has to be considered in the light of the subsequent events. Respondent No.1 has attained the age of superannuation and retired in December, 2016. Actual reinstatement, therefore, is no longer capable of implementation. While moulding the relief, this Court has taken into consideration the substantial delay in raising the dispute, the fact that the Labour Court itself declined back wages on that account, the fuller material subsequently placed on record regarding the intermittent engagement of Neelam Rani, the payments already received by respondent No.1 pursuant to the orders passed under Section 17-B of the Act and her eventual superannuation.

In these peculiar facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the ends of justice would be met by moulding the relief of reinstatement into a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand only) in lieu thereof. The said amount is being awarded as a substitute for the relief of reinstatement, which has become incapable of implementation, and shall not be construed as back wages, which had expressly been declined by the Labour Court.

The petitioner-State shall pay the aforesaid amount of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand only) to respondent No.1 within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The aforesaid amount shall be over and above the amounts already paid to respondent No.1 under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There shall be no recovery of any amount already paid to respondent No.1 pursuant to the orders passed under Section 17-B.

Consequently, the finding of the learned Labour Court regarding the termination of respondent No.1 is maintained. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service is, however, modified and substituted by lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-, in view of the subsequent superannuation of respondent No.1.

The writ petition is accordingly disposed of in the above terms. The Award dated 20.06.2000 shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent.

Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.