State Of Odisha & Ors. vs Sri Rangadhar Paikaray & Ors.

“15.

In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals.

17.

Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd. [LR (1899) 2 Ch 629, 673] observed, though in a different context:

“Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them.”

In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite some time for the government to realise that the law officers failed that trust.”

“29.

Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an „explanation‟ and an „excuse‟. An „explanation‟ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an „explanation‟ from an „excuse‟. Although people tend to see „explanation‟ and „excuse‟ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. An „excuse‟ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an „excuse‟ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.”

“7.

At the very outset, we must keep in mind the well-nigh principle governing the field of condonation of delay that the length of delay is immaterial, but what is central to, is the sufficiency of the cause pleaded and proved by the appellant. The delay of a longer period deserves condonation on a proper explanation having offered and the delay of a shorter period may not be condoned in absence thereof. We are, thus, not trammelled with the period of delay in the respective appeals, but we confined our scrutiny to the pleadings and the explanations so offered within the four corners of the expression “sufficient cause” being the corner stone of determining the cause in pursuit of condoning the delay.

8.

In W.A. No.303 of 2026 and W.A. No.57 of 2026, the State has put emphasis on the observations made in paragraph—41 of a judgment rendered by the apex Court in Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through Legal Representatives and others v. Union of India and another reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531, wherein it is held that certain hidden forces are prevalent in the functioning of the various departments of the State in presenting the appeal within the period of limitation and, therefore, a pragmatic view is a need of an hour in balancing the competing interests.

The inspiration appears to have been drawn from the above observation that in all situations and circumstances, the Court must take into account the complexities in working of the departments as the official entrusted in this regard does not have any personal interest and, therefore, the State should be treated differently than of an individual in a case relating to the condonation of delay. The Sheo Raj Singh (supra) case originated from the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in condoning the delay of 479 days in presentation of an appeal against a decision of a Reference Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

9.

In order to consider the discretion having exercised by the High Court in condoning the delay, the apex Court sought to create a distinction between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. While embarking his journey from such peripheral, the “explanation” was explained that a thing designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something, which would help to clarify the circumstances of a particular event and permit the person to point out that something, which happened, is not his fault. On the other hand, the word “excuse” was explained to the circumstances offered by a person to deny responsibility and the consequences when under attack. It is, thus, primarily a shield.”

“12.

However, in a subsequent decision rendered in Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal, reported in (2024) 7 SCC 433, the Three-Judge Bench of the apex Court was considering the contention raised by the Government entities that a certain amount of leeway be given in this regard for condonation of delay. The Three-Judge Bench took note of the various judgments rendered at an earlier point of time including the Sheo Raj Singh (supra) and held that the Government cannot stand on a different pedestal than of an individual in relation to a condonation of delay in the following:

“54.

It seems to us that acceding to the appellants' request on the aforesaid account would also have undesirable consequences. If delay were to be condoned merely on the basis of a broad general assertion of bureaucratic indifference, without requiring demonstration of bona fides or an act of mala fides on the part of specific individuals, it would create an artificial distinction between the private parties and the Government entities vis-à-vis the law of limitation. This would not be in conformity with the spirit of equality before law as guaranteed under our Constitution. Allowing such latitude would further distort incentives for the Government and encourage more laxity by the bureaucracy in its general functioning, thereby undermining quality governance.”

“13.

In a recent decision rendered in State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191, the apex Court held as under:

17.

Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India14 authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other decisions following the same while not interfering with an order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought to be drawn between an „explanation‟ and an „excuse‟ that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a different approach has to be adopted while this Court is considering an application for condonation of delay in presentation of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined.

xxx xxx xxx

19.

Reading Ramegowda (supra)and Amateur Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no visible support for such optimism and the Court's patience having been tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the Government. 20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha four months after expiry of the period of limitation. 21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has been set up.”

“14.

What, thus, emerged from the decisions referred to above that the Court should not mechanically condone the delay simply because the appellant is a Government entity. Even, in case of an appeal filed by the Government entities, the application seeking condonation of delay must demonstrate the circumstances, which occasioned the delay in preferring an appeal beyond the period of limitation and such circumstances must show the bona fides and diligences in pursuing the matter. The Government or Government entities cannot be treated differently nor to be accorded greater latitude while considering an application for condonation of delay simpliciter on the account of administrative exigencies. The explanation offered for delay in preferring an appeal must have a reasonable nexus to a bona fide attempt having made and steps having taken in promptitude. The Government cannot claim condonation of delay as a matter of right nor be put in a higher position than of an individual. It would corrode the concept of equality in law in the event the Government is treated differently than of an individual. The reliance upon a judgment of the apex Court rendered in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) in all conceivable situations appears to be misplaced, which is also highlighted in Tejpal‟s case in holding that the Sheo Raj Singh‟s case was considering twin situations, namely, (i) its constraints while sitting in an appeal over a discretionary order; and (ii) itself considering the application for condonation of delay.

15.

We have noticed in a recent time that the application for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal without any proper explanation is solely founded upon an observation made in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) without having any parity on facts. It is a trite law that the judgment rendered by the Courts and the observations made therein are to be read in conjunction with the facts involved in the instant case as a little difference in facts or an existence of an additional fact may invite diametrically opposite decision. It is a duty of the Court to look upon the facts pleaded by a litigant seeking condonation of delay and in the event, it is found that there is a complete lack of bona fide and/or diligence in pursuing the matter, it hardly opens a door of the room for the Courts to condone the delay.”

“18.

However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder:

1.

We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for the Revenue.

2.

This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out in petitioner's own words:

“(g)

The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file. (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”

3.

This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest.

4.

The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time”.

(emphasis ours)

“14.5.

This Court is apprised of the fact that a “Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Ensuring Timely Filing of Affidavits in Courts and Tribunals” has been issued by the Government of Odisha in Law Department vide Notification No.8292─IV/2 LR-210/26/L., dated 10.06.20263 in consequence of Order dated 24th March, 2026 passed in CONTC No 1011 of 2026 arising out of WP(C) No 18177 of 2025 taking into account the casual approach adopted by the State Authorities in filing affidavits/instructions resulting in unwarranted delays in disposal of Court Cases. It is also noticed that though the State Litigation Policy was formulated in the State during 2011 to reduce the State litigations basing on the National Litigation Policy as per recommendation of the 13th Finance Commission, in its place a new State Litigation Policy4 has been formulated to minimize the litigations against/by the State and streamlining consideration of the grievances to prevent avoidable litigations keeping in view the Order dated 3rd October, 2023 passed by this Court in WPC (PIL) No.28053 of 2023 and the Guidelines of the National Litigation Policy”