State Of Manipur vs P. Shyamsunder Singh

Heard Mr. Lenin Hijam, learned Addl. AG, Manipur appearing for the petitioners and Mr. HS Paonam, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner.

[1] The present review petition has been filed seeking for review of the judgment and order dated 22.01.2021 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 638 of 2021.

[2] The present review petition had been filed only on the ground that the impugned judgment and order dated 21.01.2021 is contrary to the settled law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of "P.K. Sandhu (Mrs) vs. Shiv Raj V. Patil" reported in (1997) 4 SCC 348 and "State of Himachal Pradesh and others vs. Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyavsayik Prishikshan Kendra Sangh" reported in (2011) 6 SCC 597.

[3] In the case of "P.K. Sandhu (Mrs) vs. Shiv Raj V. Patil" (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has at paragraph 9 held as under:-

"9. It is seen that in 1955 Rules, which were framed by the Speaker in consultation with the President by exercising the power under clause (3) of Article 98 of the Constitution of India, Rule 4 contemplates the method or methods by which a post or class of posts may be filled. Since the 1962 Orders are only an outcome of the exercise of the said power, which was further modified by amendment in the Order dated 1-12-1974, the power of modification of the original order was still available to the Speaker and therefore, the deputation of Respondents 5 to 10 was not without any authority of law or in excess of authority. Therefore, they are not void ab initio for issue of a writ of quo warranto. It is not necessary for us to decide the controversy whether the Speaker had power, when services of Respondents 5 to 10 were requisitioned and availed of on transfer basis from the All India Administrative Service for the reason that under the amended Rules, one of the sources of recruitment to the service is transfer. Therefore, the continuance of Respondents 5 to 10 on deputation is in accordance with law and their retention in Lok Sabha Secretariat is valid as they have legal authority to remain in its Services. The further contention that availment of the services of the Secretary-General on contract basis is invalid, is without substance. It is settled legal position that an in- service officer, if taken on contract basis during the period of service, renders service on contract basis and on expiry thereof he gets to his substantive post in the parent Department from where he came to be in the services of the Lok Sabha Secretariat. In the interregnum, he cannot be compelled to lose his lien on the substantive post in the parent Department. Even if the services of an incumbent on superannuation is required in the public interest, the same can be availed on contract basis. Equally, if any other competent officer who on attaining superannuation from any other service was required to be taken in due to exigency of the service, it may be open to the Speaker to avail of services of such an experienced officer on contract basis for a specified period. Thus in either event the option available to the Speaker to avail of the services of an experienced officer as Secretary-General, cannot be assailed as invalid or arbitrary."

[4] In the case of "State of Himachal Pradesh and others vs. Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyavsayik Prishikshan Kendra Sangh" (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has at paragraph 22 held as under:-

"22. With regard to the importance of human resources, especially manpower requirement in various professional and technical fields, the Government is free to frame its policy, alter or modify the same as to the needs of the society. In such matters, the courts cannot interfere lightly as if the Government is unaware of the situation. Apart from these aspects, procedurally also the High Court has committed an error in quashing the Cabinet decision dated 18-7-2009 which was not challenged in the writ petition by raising valid grounds. Further, both parties were not afforded opportunity to put forth their stand as to the subsequent development, namely, the Cabinet decision dated 18-7-2009. For all these reasons, the impugned order of the High Court is to be interfered with. However, we permit the respondent Association or its members to challenge the said decision/order of the Government by way of fresh proceeding, if they so desire."

[5] By relying on the aforesaid Supreme Court judgments, it has been submitted by Mr. Lenin Hijam, learned Addl. AG, Manipur that engagement of a competent officer, who have retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation, on contract basis for a specified period due to exigency of service and in public interest is permissible, even if the relevant recruitment rules does not provide for such contract engagement. The learned Addl. AG further submitted that interfering with the policy decision of the Government taken by the State Cabinet without challenging the cabinet decisions for engagement of the respondent No. 2 on contract basis as Director of Medical and Health Services is also contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Accordingly, it has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the impugned judgment and order dated 22.01.2021 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 638 of 2020 is contrary to the settled law passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases and accordingly, the impugned judgment and order deserved to be set aside.

[6] Mr. HS Paonam, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 submitted that at the time of hearing of the writ petition, the learned Addl. AG appearing for the State Government did not cite the above mentioned two cases and moreover, the said law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

[7] It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel that omission to cite an authority of law is not a ground for reviewing a judgment by contending that there is an error apparent on the face of the record specially when the conducting counsel committed an error in not bringing to the notice of the Court the relevant precedents.

[8] Mr. HS Paonam, learned senior advocate, also submitted that the review petitioners failed to point out any error apparent on the face of the record of the present case and accordingly, such review petition is not maintainable at all. It has also been submitted by the senior counsel that a judgment may be opened to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record and that an error which is not self- evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying this Court to exercise its power of review and that in exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. It has also been contended that review proceedings cannot be equated with an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of order 47 Rule 1 CPC and that in review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.

In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel has relied on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the following cases:-

(1) "Dokka Samuel Vs. Dr. Jacob Lazarus Chelly" reported in (1997) 4 SCC 478 (Para 4):-

"4. It is seen that by an order passed by this Court on 24- 11-1995, liberty was given to the appellant, in the event of the High Court reviewing the order on merits against him, to agitate his rights in this Court. The question is whether the High Court was justified in reviewing the earlier order and reversing the finding recorded by the appellate court. It is not in dispute that the sale deed is for a small sum of Rs 300 and odd and that the property sold commands good market value. The question arises whether the document was a sale deed or is only a document for collateral purpose. The respondent himself in an earlier suit had pleaded that it was an agreement of sale. In view of such an admission, the High Court has wrongly reversed the decree of the appellate court holding the transaction to be a real sale. In the second appeal, the High Court confirmed, in the first instance, the decree of the appellate court. Subsequently, the High Court has reviewed the judgment and reconsidered the matter holding that relevant precedents were not cited. Since this Court had given liberty to raise the questions of reviewability of the judgment of the High Court, the question arises whether the High Court could not have embarked upon appreciation of evidence and considered whether there was an error apparent on the face of the record. It was contended before the learned Single Judge that various decisions were not cited; proper consideration was paid; in fact the sale deed was acted upon; and that there was no proof that the sale was not for valid consideration. The omission to cite an authority of law is not a ground for reviewing the prior judgment saying that there is an error apparent on the face of the record, since the counsel has committed an error in not bringing to the notice of the Court the relevant precedents. In fact, since the respondent had claimed that it is not a sale deed but was executed for collateral purpose, it was for the respondent to establish that the sale was for real consideration and he had a valid sale deed duly executed by the appellant. The High Court wrongly placed the burden on the appellant and reviewed the order and heard the matter on merits. The entire approach of the learned Single Judge is not correct in law."

(2) "Parsion Devi and Others vs. Sumitri Devi and Others" reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715 (Para 9 & 10):-

"9. Under Order 47 rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise;

"10. Considered in the light of the settled position we find that Sharma, J. clearly overstepped the jurisdiction vested in the Court under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. The observations of Sharma, J. that "accordingly, the order in question is reviewed and it is held that the decree in question was of composite nature wherein both mandatory and prohibitory injunctions were provided" and as such the case was covered by Article 182 and not Article 181 cannot be said to fall within the score of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. While passing the impugned order, Sharma, J. found the order in Civil Revision dated 25-4-1989 as an erroneous decision, though without saying so in so many words. Indeed, while passing the impugned order Sharma, J. did record that there was a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record which was not of such a nature, "which had to be detected by a long-drawn process of reasons" and proceeded to set at naught the order of Gupta, J. However, mechanical use of statutorily sanctified phrases cannot detract from the real import of the order passed in exercise of the review jurisdiction. Recourse to review petition in the facts and circumstances of the case was not permissible. The aggrieved judgment-debtors could have approached the higher forum through appropriate proceedings to assail the order of Gupta, J. and get it set aside but it was not open to them to seek a "review" of the order of Gupta, J. on the grounds detailed in the review petition. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the impugned order of Sharma, J. cannot be sustained and we accordingly accept this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 6-3-1997."

(3) "State of West Bengal and Others vs. Kamal Sengupta and Another" reported in (2008) 8 SCC 612 (Para 21 & 22):-

"21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.

The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as a error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22 (3) (f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision." and

(4) "Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and Others" reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 (Para 12-20.2):-

"12. This Court has repeatedly held in various judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. A mere repetition through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. This Court in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib held as under: (SCC p.675, para 1)

"1. Mr Daphtary, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued at length all the points which were urged at the earlier stage when we refused special leave thus making out that a review proceeding virtually amounts to a rehearing. May be, we were not right in refusing special leave in the first round; but, once an order has been passed by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel"s certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge backlog of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."

"13. In a criminal proceeding, review is permissible on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. A review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. In Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, this Court, in paras 8 & 9 held as under: (SCC pp. 171-72)

"8. It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan. For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment: Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.N. Mehta. The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice:

O.N. Mohindroo v. District Judge, Delhi. Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except "where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility": Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib;

"9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal material so assiduously collected and placed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, who has now been entrusted to appear for the respondent, was never brought to our attention when the appeals were heard, we may also examine whether the judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. Such an error exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record."

"14. Review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. This Court, in Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India held as under: (SCC p. 566, para 12)

"12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib this Court observed: (SCC p. 675, para 1)

"1. ..."A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."

"15. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi held as under: ( SCC pp. 718-19, para 7-9)

"7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. this Court opined: (AIR p. 1377, para 11)

"11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an "error apparent on the face of the record". The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an "error apparent on the face of the record", for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error."

"8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

"9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected".A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be"an appeal in disguise". (emphasis in original)

"16. Error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas v. Union of India held as under: (SCC pp. 250-53, para 54, 56 & 58)

"54 Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides:

"1. Application for review of judgment.-

(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved -

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order."

Under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order 40 Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter.

"56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.

"58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words "any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule" as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius. Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, it was held: (AIR p. 244, para 23) "23. ...[I]t is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? The learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated.

Mr Pathak for the first respondent contended on the strength of certain observations of Chagla, C.J. in - Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self- evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case."

Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order 40 of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance."

"17. In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to re- appreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This Court, in Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. held as under: (SCC p. 656, para 10)

"10. ....In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible.The learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise."

"18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., held as under: (SCC pp. 504- 505, para 11-12)

"11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.

When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of "second innings" which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted."

"19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.

Summary of the Principles:

"20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: "20.1. When the review will be maintainable:-

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.

"20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:-

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."

[9] On perusal of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of "P.K. Sandhu (Mrs) vs. Shiv Raj V. Patil" (Supra) relied on by the petitioner, it is clearly revealed that in exercise of the power under clause (3) of article 98 of the constitution of India, the President of India framed a rule called the Lok Sabha Secretariat (recruitment and conditions of service) rules, 1955. Sub Rules (2) of Rule 4 of the said rules empowers the speaker by order to specify the method or methods by which post or classes of post may be filled up, determined the proportioned of vacancies to be filled up by such method and in case of recruitment by promotion, specified the class of officers who, and the conditions subject to which they, shall be eligible for such promotion from time to time. On the direction of the Honb'le Apex Court, the speaker amended the said rules and issued an order called the Lok Sabha Secretariat (methods of recruitment and eligibility conditions for appointment) amendment order, 1996. Under the said amended rules/order, the method of recruitment, eligibility conditions for appointment to the posts of Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and Secretary-General in the Lok Sabha Secretariat were prescribed as indicated in the schedule attached thereto. Under the said schedule the method of recruitment and eligibility for appointment to the post of Secretary has been prescribed as under:-

"6. For the post of Secretary, it has been mentioned as under:-

"By selection by the Speaker in consultation with the Leader of the House and the Leader of the Opposition from amongst those who have made their mark by long years of service in Parliament or State Legislatures or the Civil Service, appointment being by any of the methods of recruitment, viz., promotion, deputation, contract, as may be considered appropriate on each occasion."

[10] In view of the method of recruitment for the post of Secretary as prescribed under the scheduled of the said amended rules/order of 1996, which also includes recruitment on contract basis, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in paragraph 9 as under:-

"The further contention that availment of the services of the Secretary-General on contract basis is invalid, is without substance. It is settled legal position that an in-service officer, if taken on contract basis during the period of service, renders service on contract basis and on expiry thereof he gets to his substantive post in the parent Department from where he came to be in the services of the Lok Sabha Secretariat. In the interregnum, he cannot be compelled to lose his lien on the substantive post in the parent Department. Even if the services of an incumbent on superannuation is required in the public interest, the same can be availed on contract basis. Equally, if any other competent officer who on attaining superannuation from any other service was required to be taken in due to exigency of the service, it may be open to the Speaker to avail of services of such an experienced officer on contract basis for a specified period. Thus in either event the option available to the Speaker to avail of the services of an experienced officer as Secretary-General, cannot be assailed as invalid or arbitrary."

[11] On consideration of the above judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in its entirety, I am of the considered view that as the rules empowers the speaker to appoint the Secretary General by way of promotion, deputation or contract, as may be considered appropriate on each occasion, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the speaker can avail the service of a retired experienced officer as Secretary General on contract basis.

[12] Accordingly, in my humble opinion, the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said case is not applicable in the present case inasmuch as, there is no provision under the Recruitment Rules for the post of Director of Medical & Health Services for engagement/appointment of an incumbent as Director of Medical and Health Services on contract basis after the incumbent had retired from the service on attaining the age of superannuation. Moreover, FR 56 (d) prohibits such engagement.

[13] So far as the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph 22 in the case of "State of Himachal Pradesh and others vs. Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyavsayik Prishikshan Kendra Sangh" (supra) and relied on by the counsel for the petitioner is concerned, I am of the considered view that the said ratio laid down in that case is not applicable for the simple reason that this Court never interfered or set aside the decision taken by the State Cabinet.

[14] Since the present review petition had been filed only on the ground that the impugned judgment and order has been passed contrary to the settled law passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court and as the learned counsel for the review petitioner has failed to point out any error apparent on the face of the record and also keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (1) "Dokka Samuel Vs. Dr. Jacob Lazarus Chelly" (Supra) (2) "Parsion Devi and Others vs. Sumitri Devi and Others" (Supra) (3) "State of West Bengal and Others vs. Kamal Sengupta and Another" (Supra) (4) "Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and Others" (Supra), this Court finds no ground or justification for reviewing the impugned judgment and order as prayed for by the review petitioners. Accordingly, the review petition is dismissed as being devoid of merit.

Parties are directed to bear their own costs.