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RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith.
The question as to the legality and validity of the judgment passed by the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Original Application No.546/2021 is raised in this writ petition at the behest of State of Maharashtra.
We have heard Mr. Ukey, learned Additional Government Pleader for the petitioners. Despite service of notice, none for the respondent.
Learned Additional Government Pleader for the petitioners submits that despite a specific objection to the maintainability of the Original Application was raised by the State on the ground of delay in filing the Original Application, neither it was considered nor any finding was recorded on it. It is submitted that the issue relating to delay and laches goes to the root of the matter and since the impugned judgment came to be passed without considering the same, it is liable to be quashed and set aside. To substantiate his arguments, he has placed reliance on the reported judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and anr. Vs. Ramesh Krishna Rao Yewale and anr. in Writ Petition No.3056/2022 dated 05/08/2022.
Having heard the learned Additional Government Pleader and having gone through the record, it is evident that the respondent was appointed as a “Talathi” at Dahegaon (Joshi), Parsheoni on 09/12/1983. The Government Resolution providing Higher Pay Scales/Increments to government servants who have completed 12 years of service came into force on 08/06/1985. It is further evident from the record that on 15/01/1997, the claim of the respondent for time-bound benefits was rejected on the ground that his confidential remark was “B Negative”.
The respondent was exempted from qualifying for the examination upon attaining the age of 45, and thereafter, the claim of the respondent for grant of the benefit of the pay scale of a higher post was considered by the District Selection Committee on 01/02/2003 and was denied. Subsequently, it was again rejected on 24/02/2004.
Lastly, on 02/09/2005 first time bound promotion was granted on 01/10/2016, and the respondent was superannuated on 30/04/2016. In the meantime, the respondent raised a challenge to such denial of the time-bound promotional high pay scale before the Scheduled Caste Tribe Commission on 21/11/2013, which came to be rejected on 30/06/2015. Thereafter it was challenged before petitioner No.2, who rejected the challenge on 30/05/2017.
It is evident that after the rejection of the claim made by the respondent on 30/05/2017, the respondent did not take any steps to challenge it within the time period prescribed under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The limitation provided under the Act is one year. In the present matter, the Original Application came to be filed in the year 2021 specifically on 05/07/2021.
The explanation given in the Original Application for such delay was that the representations were made on various dates by respondent. The reference to the representations made in the Original Application, shows that the last representation was made on 05/10/2020, and earlier to the same is dated 21/04/2014. Thus, it is evident that after 2014 for six years no representations was moved by the respondent.
This Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and anr. Vs. Ramesh Krishna Rao Yewale and anr. (supra) has held as under:
“11.At this stage, it would be necessary to refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench in S.S.Rathore (supra). Therein the provisions of Section 20 of the Act of 1985 were considered since the issue pertained to relief sought in a service matter reference was made to Section 20 (2) (b) of the Act of 1985. Thereunder a person is deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the service Rules for seeking redressal of his grievances when no final order is made by the Government or other authority on the representation made by such person on expiry of the period of six months from the date on which the appeal was filed or representation was made is deemed to be the period indicating that all the remedies have been availed. Reference was then made to Section 21 of the Act of 1985 and it was held that when a representation has been made, the cause of action would first accrue when such representation is disposed of. If no order is made on the representation, the right to sue would first accrue on the expiry of six months from the date when such representation was made.
The aforesaid decision thus lays down the law after interpreting the provisions of Sections 20 and 21 of the Act of 1985. On a representation being made and nothing being heard thereon for a period of six months, it is presumed that the cause of action would arise on the expiry of that period of six months.
12.In P.S.Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(1975)1 SCC 152] while considering the aspect of delay and laches in challenging an order of promotion, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a person aggrieved by an order promoting a junior over his head should approach the High Court at least within six months or at the most within a year of such promotion. The High Court could refuse to exercise its extra ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of persons who do not approach expeditiously for relief and put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. Though these observations have been made prior to the Act of 1985 coming into force, the same cannot be ignored.
In Union of India and others vs. A. Durairaj (Dead) by LRs. [(2010) 14 SCC 389] the provisions of Section 21 of the Act of 1985 were considered. It was held that if anyone who feels aggrieved by non-promotion or non-selection should approach the Court/Tribunal as early as possible. If a person having a justifiable grievance allows a matter to become stale and approaches the High Court/Tribunal belatedly, grant of any relief on the basis of such belated application would result in serious administrative complications to the employer. Even if no period of limitation is prescribed, any belated challenge would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.
Yet again in State of Uttaranchal and another vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and others [(2013) 12 SCC 179] it was observed that filing of repeated representations would not save the period of limitation. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and would not even remotely attract the concept of discretion.
Lastly, in Union of India and others vs. C.Girija and others [(2019) 15 SCC 633] it was observed that where inclusion of the name of a candidate in the select panel was issued on 09.01.2001 and the aggrieved candidate filed representation on 25.09.2007 which was after more than six and half years, the mere fact that such representation was replied by the employer on 27.12.2007 would not make a stale claim into a live claim. Filing of representation on 27.09.2007 with regard to selection made in 2001 would not result in wiping out the aspect of delay and laches”
By applying the above referred principles laid down by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, if we revert back to the facts of the present case, it could be revealed that there is no findings recorded by the Tribunal on the point of delay.
In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case to remand the matter back to the Tribunal by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment dated 12/07/2023 passed in Original Application No.546/2021. Accordingly, we partly allow the writ petition.
The judgment dated 12/07/2023 is hereby quashed and set aside.
The matter is referred back to the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur.
The Tribunal shall restore the matter back to its original number and decide the same afresh, taking note of the observations made in this judgment.
The writ petition is disposed of. Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms.