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Judgment
S.S. Shinde, J.—This appeal is filed by the Appellant/State challenging the judgment and order dated 11th March, 1999 passed by the Court of Special Judge at Latur in E. C. Act Case No. 16 of 1991. The Respondents herein who are original accused, came to be prosecuted for contravention of Clause 18 punishable u/s 26 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1987 r/w Section 3 and Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
Briefly stated, the complainant''s case is that, on 10th September, 1990 one Dr. B. V. Tote, a medical practitioner of Udgir, visited his office and gave a written complaint alleging that on 09.09.1990 amount of Rs. 7.00 was obtained excessively from his patient by name Ravindra Biradar resident of Dighol, Tq. Nilanga, in respect of six Ledermycin300 tablets sold to him by M/s. Shrinivas Medical Stores, Udgir, under a cash memo No. 87996. While submitting such written complaint, Dr. Tote also filed copy of cash memo and copy of medical prescription. Consequently, on 14.09.1990 complainant Shri B. R. Masal visited the medical shop of accused and carried out inspection. During course of the inspection, it was found that as per prescription of Dr. Mrs. S. B. Tote, Dental Practitioner, Udgir, three drugs were sold to Shri Ravindra Biradar. It was revealed that six tablets of Ledermycin300 mg from Batch No. 208 were sold at price of Rs. 2010 ps. Considering the prescribed price, it was found that overcharging of Rs. 6/ was approximately made by the said medical stores. Duplicate copy of cash memo No. 87996, dated 991990, was verified from the cashmemo book. An inspection report was then prepared and copy thereof was given to accused No. 2Laxminarayan. Certain further enquiry was made regarding the then prevailing price of Ledermycin300 tablets. It was revealed that the tablets were from Batch No. 208 and were purchased by M/s. Shriram Medical Stores, Latur, as per invoice No. 140801, dated 19.07.1990, from manufacturer, i. e. Cyanamid India Ltd., Bombay. The enquiry further disclosed that a stock of the tablets came to be purchased by M/s Sangmeshwar Enterprises, Udgir, from M/s. Shriram Medical Stores, Latur, as per Invoice No. 790, dated 01.08.1990. It was further revealed that M/s Sangameshwar Enterprises, Udgir, made such purchase as per undercutting terms of business (subpurchasership). The accused had purchased stock of Ledermycin300 tablets from said M/s Sangameshwar Enterprises, Udgir. Thus, after thorough enquiry, complainant Shri B. R. Masal lodged the complaint.
Particulars of the offence were explained to both the accused as shown below Exh. 144. They entered plea of not guilty. Their defence is one of total denial as regards intentional excessive charging of the medicines. Accused No. 1 Sow. Ushatai states that she has no direct knowledge regarding the sale transaction. She denied that she was concerned with actual sale of the medicines. She was only a name lender and was not concerned with the sale transactions. Hence, she states that she has no knowledge as to whether the Ledermycin tablets were sold at excessive prices. In other words, she states that she has not committed any offence and there was no mensrea on her part.
Defence of accused No. 2Laxminarayan is that though he is the qualified person for said medical shop, yet he has not entered into sale transaction in question. He states that one servant of the medical shop had overcharged the tablets in his absence. His version is that he had asked customer, by name Ravindra Biradar, to bring original medical bill and obtain refund of the excess amount. He submits that it was just due to mistake of the servant, who was dealing in the business in his absence that the overcharging was made. Hence, he also denied truth into the charge.
On the basis of pleadings of the parties, evidence and documents brought on record by the parties, the necessary points for determination were framed by the Special Court which are as under:
POINTS FINDINGS
Does the prosecution prove that the accused or any of them sold six Ledermycin300 tablets from Yes. Batch 208 to P.W.Ravindra Biradar by excessively charging the same ?
Does the prosecution prove that accused intentionally overcharged approximately Rs. 6/ for six Ledermycin300 tablets from Batch No. 208 as per cash memo No. 87996, dated 991990, and Yes thereby committed contravention of Clause 18 of the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1987 ? Yes.
Does the prosecution prove that accused No. 1 Sow. Ushatai is vicariously liable for the criminal act ? Yes.
Whether the accused have proved defence regarding mistake committed by servant of the medical shop and have substantiated plea in this behalf ? No.
What offence, if any, is proved and against whom ?
Offence punishable punishable under Clause 26 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1987 punishable u/s 3 r.w. Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the E. C. Act is proved against both the accused.
After elaborate discussion and considering the legal provisions and in particular the provision of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order 1987 and also the provisions of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955, the Special Court in para 26 reached to the conclusion that it is proved beyond reasonable realm of doubt that there is excessive billing in respect of six Ledermycin300 tablets to P.W.Ravindra Biradar. Para 26 of the judgment of the Special Court reads thus:
All said and done, it is proved beyond reasonable realm of doubt that there is excessive billing in respect of six Ledermycin300 tablets to P.w. Ravindra Biradar. The prosecution has proved that the formulation was sold for excessive price and thereby the accused have contravened Clause 18 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1987.
The Special Court further in para 28 of the judgment has held thus:
Considering the foregoing discussion, I have no hesitation in holding that both the accused are guilty for offence punishable under Clause 26 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1987 r.w. Section 3 and Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Hence I convict them.
Therefore, on the basis of evidence brought on record and after appreciating the rival contentions in para 28, the Special Court held that, both the accused are guilty of the offence punishable under Clause 26 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1987 r/w. Section 3 and Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
However, the Special Court in para 29 has observed that, Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act provide for minimum sentence for a term which shall not be less than three months. The term of imprisonment may extend to seven years and fine. The Special Court observed that, "clinching question is as to whether such a sever punishment is called for in view of the facts of the present case." It appears that, the Special Court has considered the judgment in case of State Vs. Dindayal Agarwala and Others, and observed, "Meansrea is not an ingredient to constitute an offence u/s ec. 7 of the Act."
In para 29 and 30, the Special Court has considered the facts of this case and reached to the conclusion that the accused deserve benefit of probation u/s 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In para 29 the Special Court observed thus:
The present case is of unique nature. The accused are facing prosecution since 1991. They are coming to the Court for last 9 years. The delay is not attributable to them. The customer, i. e., P.w. Ravindra, gave repeated applications for withdrawal of his complaint. Admittedly, similar complaints were allowed to be withdrawn in case of other medical shopkeepers and only administrative action was taken against them. One cannot overlook the fact that there was single instance of excessive charging. It is quite probable that accused No. 2 Laxminarayan had kept signed cash memos and some servant used the same. It is also probable that he committed error in calculating the price of the six Lendermycin300 tablets. The human error is also probable in the course of business when there was rush of customers and P.w. Ravindra himself was demanding delivery at the earliest. This fact is also admitted by P.w. Ravindra. He was not declared hostile. Therefore, these circumstances go to show that the offence is committed without real intention to recover excessive price. I mean to say that this is not a glaring example of black-marketing .This is first instance and no other repetition is alleged.
On perusal of para 29 and 30 of the judgment impugned in this appeal, it clearly emerges that, the Special Court in the given set of facts has considered various factors that, this is a first offence by the accused, the accused have already suffered loss of reputation, loss of a part of business due to pendency of the present case before the Special Court, inconvenience in attending the Court for approximately 8 years and also other factors and extended the benefit of provisions of Section 360 of the Cr. P. C. to the Respondents/accused.
Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the Appellant/State has vehemently argued that, considering the nature of offence, the Special Court ought not to have given benefit of Section 360 of the Cr. P. C. to the Respondents/accused. It is further submitted that, the offences committed by the Respondents are not only antisocial, but also affecting public at large. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor further submitted that, the Respondents/accused should have been convicted by imposing sentence for the offences for which they were tried and convicted. The sympathy which is shown by the Special Court to the Respondents would encourage black marketing and would affect the public at large. Therefore, the Special Court ought not to have granted benefit of Section 360 of the Cr. P. C. to the Respondents/accused.
On the other hand, counsel appearing for the original accused/Respondents submits that, the order passed by the Special Court granting benefit to both the accused u/s 360 of the Cr. P. C. has been acted upon. The bond of good behaviour which was executed for two years has been satisfactorily completed and said period of two years is already over. There is no any further offence or instance subsequent to the impugned judgment which is registered against the Respondents. Therefore, according to the counsel for the Respondents/accused, since the order passed by the Special Court is implemented/executed and pursuant to it the Respondents have completed the period mentioned in the bond of good behaviour for two years, therefore, no further adjudication of this appeal is necessary. In support of his contention, learned Counsel invited my attention to the provisions of Section 360 of the Cr. P. C. and further various judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court. Those are as under:
I. N.M. Parthasarathy Vs. The State of by S.P.E., .
II. Ved Prakash Vs. State of Haryana, .
III. A.P. Raju versus State of Orissa, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 385 .
IV. Keshav Sitaram Sali Vs. State of Maharashtra, .
V. Dilbag Singh Vs. State of Punjab, .
Upon hearing learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the Appellant/State and learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondents/accused, I am of the considered opinion that, Special Court has rightly exercised the discretion and extended the benefit of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Respondents i. e. original accused. The provision of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads thus:
Order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition: (1) When any person not under twentyone years of age is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or when any person under twentyone years of age or any woman is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, if it appears to the Court before which he is convicted, regard being had to the age, character or antecedents of the offender, and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period (not exceeding three years) as the Court may direct and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that where any first offender is convicted by a Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered by the High Court, and the Magistrate is of opinion that the powers conferred by this section should be exercised, he shall record his opinion to that effect, and submit the proceedings to a Magistrate of the first class, forwarding the accused to, or taking bail for his appearance before, such Magistrate, who shall dispose of the case in the manner provided by subsection (2).
Therefore, from perusal of the provisions of Section 360 of the Cr. P. C. it is clear that, when a person not under twenty one years of age is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or when any person under twentyone years of age or any woman is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, if it appears to the Court before which he is convicted, regard being had to the age, character or antecedents of the offender, and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period (not exceeding three years) as the Court may direct and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
Upon perusal of para 29 of the impugned judgment, it clearly appears that, the Special Court has considered various aspects of the matter. Firstly, customer i. e. P. W. Ravindra Biradar gave repeated applications for withdrawal of his complaint. Admittedly, similar complaints were allowed to be withdrawn in case of other medical shopkeepers and only administrative action was taken against them. Secondly, there was single instance of excessive charging. Thirdly, it is quite probable that the accused No. 2 Laxminarayan had kept signed cash memos and some servant used the same. Fourthly, it is also probable that the servant committed error in calculating the price of the six Ledermycin300 tablets. The human error is also probable in the course of business, when there was rush of customers and P.W. Ravindra was demanding the delivery early. This fact is also admitted by P.W. Ravindra. He was not declared hostile. Therefore, the Special Court reached to the conclusion that, the offence is committed without real intention to recover excessive price. The Court further observed that, ''I mean to say that this is not a glaring example of blackmarketing''. The Special Court has recorded, ''this is first instance and no other repetition is alleged'' (emphasis supplied).
The Special Court has further discussed in para 30 that, the harsh sentence to the accused is uncalled for. They have already suffered loss of reputation, loss of a part of business due to pendency of the case and inconvenience in attending the Court for approximately 8 years. Therefore, the Special Court has made applicable provisions of Section 360 of Code of Criminal Procedure and granted benefit to the Respondents.
As stated by the learned Counsel for the Respondents/accused, in pursuant to the order passed by the Special Court, the Respondents/accused did enter into the bound of good behaviour for two years and that period has been satisfactorily completed by the Respondents/accused. Therefore, taking into consideration the provisions of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also various judgments pronounced by the Supreme Court on the subject, which are cited by the counsel for the Respondents, I am of the opinion that, the Special Court has taken a correct and possible view on the strength of material which was brought before it and keeping in mind the most important aspect of the matter that, this is the only offence registered against the accused/Respondents. The Special Court has rightly given benefit of Section 360 of the Cr. P. C. to the Respondents herein. Therefore, no interference is warranted. Judgment and order of the Special Court stands confirmed. The appeal is devoid of any merits, same stands dismissed.