High CourtsDivision Bench(2026) 10 KL CK 3779

State Of Kerala vs Samatha M M & Ors.

High Court Of Kerala, Ernakulam · Decided on 27 October 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Raja Vijayaraghavan V, J · K. V. Jayakumar, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
WA No. 2222 of 2026

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Judgment

102 paragraphs · 6,521 words

Raja Vijayaraghavan V, J.

The State has preferred this intra-court appeal challenging the judgment dated 23.10.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.28587 of 2026.

2.

The aforesaid writ petition was filed by the minor child, the 1st respondent herein, represented by her father. The 1st respondent intended to appear for the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) 2027, the entrance examination for admission to the much sought after undergraduate law programmes. The principal prayer in the writ petition was to quash Ext. P8 rejection order, whereby her request for inclusion in the Non-Creamy Layer category and for issuance of a Non-Creamy Layer Certificate was rejected. The petitioner also sought a declaration that her creamy layer status could not be determined solely on the ground that her mother presently holds a Class I/Group A post, without considering the applicable criteria prescribed in Office Memorandum No. 36012/22/93 Estt. (SCT) dated 08.09.1993, issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India.

3.

Since the last date for submitting applications to appear for the entrance examination scheduled to be held on 06.12.2026 was 31.10.2026, and in view of the urgency expressed, with the consent of both sides, we took up the matter for final disposal on the date of admission itself.

4.

We have heard the submissions of Sri P.A. Mohammed Shah, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants and Smt. Parvathy Kottool, the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, who is the 1st respondent herein.

5.

Before adverting to the contentions advanced by the parties, it would be apposite to set out the brief facts that led to the filing of the writ petition:

a. The 1st respondent is a minor. She is a Muslim and belongs to the Mappila community, which is included under the category of “Muslims” in the list of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) notified by the Government of Kerala vide G.O.(P) No. 208/66/Edn. dated 02.05.1966, as subsequently amended.

b. The 1st respondent states that her father was appointed as Assistant Public Prosecutor Grade II at Gram Nyayalaya, Azhutha, Peerumedu, on 31.07.2018, in the pay scale of ₹40,500 to ₹85,000. He was subsequently promoted as Assistant Public Prosecutor Grade I on 27.07.2023, in the pay scale of ₹63,700 to ₹1,23,700, as evidenced by Ext. P2 service certificate produced before this Court in the writ petition.

c. According to the 1st respondent, her mother joined the Kerala State Higher Judicial Service on 16.07.2021 as an Additional District and Sessions Judge and is presently serving as Additional District and Sessions Judge IV, Kollam, when she was 41 years of age. She contends that, prior to her appointment to the Kerala State Higher Judicial Service, her mother was practising as an advocate and that, during the financial year 2019–2020, her gross income was approximately ₹1,20,130, as evidenced by Ext. P4, a copy of her Income Tax Return.

d. In the meantime, Ext. P5 press release was issued by the 5th respondent, inviting applications for CLAT 2027. In order to produce the requisite certificate and claim the benefit of reservation, the 1st respondent submitted Ext. P7 application before the Tahsildar, Kunnamkulam Taluk.

e. The 1st respondent asserts that the Tahsildar rejected her application on the ground that her mother was a directly recruited Class I officer and, therefore, she was not entitled to an OBC Non-Creamy Layer Certificate under Ext. P9, Office Memorandum No. 36012/22/93 Estt. (SCT) dated 08.09.1993, issued by the Government of India (hereinafter referred to as the “1993 Office Memorandum”).

f. According to the 1st respondent, the 1993 Office Memorandum was subsequently clarified by the competent authority through Ext. P10 clarification letter. The said clarification specifically provides that, where the father was directly recruited as a Class III/Group C or Class IV/Group D employee and subsequently entered Class I/Group A service at the age of 40 years or earlier, his sons and daughters shall not be treated as belonging to the creamy layer.

g. The 1st respondent further contends that her mother was practising as an advocate before her appointment to the Kerala State Higher Judicial Service in 2021 and was appointed as an Additional District and Sessions Judge only at the age of 41 years. It is contended that, in view of the specific terms of Ext. P9 Office Memorandum and Ext. P10 clarification, the rejection of Ext. P7 application by the Tahsildar is unsustainable.

6.

It was on the aforesaid assertions that the writ petition was filed, seeking the following reliefs:

i.

Issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records leading to Exhibit P8 rejection order, and pass an appropriate order quashing Exhibit P8 as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the criteria prescribed under Exhibits P9 and P10;

ii.

declare that the determination of the Petitioner's creamy-layer status cannot be made solely on the basis that her mother presently holds a Class I/Group A post, without considering the applicable criteria under Exhibit P9, the clarification contained in Exhibit P10, and the relevant circumstances concerning the mode, stage and age of entry of the Petitioner's mother into Class I/Group A service.

iii.

issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the 7th Respondent to reconsider Exhibit P7 application afresh, in accordance with the criteria prescribed under Office Memorandum No. 36012/22/93-SCT dated 08.09.1993 (Exhibit P9) and Letter No. 36033/5/2004-Estt.(Res.) dated 14.10.2004 (Exhibit P10), within a time frame.

iv.

To issue a direction to the 5 th respondent to permit the Petitioner to claim the applicable SEBC/OBC reservation benefit in CLAT 2027, subject to production of the requisite Non-Creamy Layer Certificate at a later stage, or at the time of admission;

7.

A counter-affidavit was filed by the 7th respondent in the writ petition, controverting the contentions advanced by the 1st respondent. The following contentions were raised.

a. The determination of whether the children of a person fall within the Non-Creamy Layer is required to be made in accordance with the criteria prescribed by the competent authority of the Government of India.

b. The Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 lays down the framework for identifying the creamy layer among the Other Backward Classes and prescribes separate categories and criteria, including those relating to the status of parents holding posts in Government service and those relating to professionals and persons engaged in trade and industry. The various clarifications issued by the competent authority are required to be understood and applied within the framework of the said Office Memorandum. The attempt to rely upon the provisions relating to professionals and their income, so as to displace the specific service status criterion applicable to her mother after direct recruitment to Class I/Group A, cannot be accepted. It is also asserted that the categories prescribed in the Office Memorandum cannot be combined in a manner which renders the specific provision relating to directly recruited Class I/Group A officers redundant.

c. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the Ext.P10 clarification to the Office Memorandum, issued on 14.10.2004, to bring home the point that the circumstances prevailing prior to the entry of the mother into Group A/ Class 1 services are relevant for determining the creamy layer status cannot be accepted. It is stated that the mother of the petitioner was not a Group B/Class II, Group C/Class III or Group D/Class IV Government employee who subsequently entered Group A/Class I service.

d. The rejection of the application was not based on the professional income of the mother alone, nor was the application rejected without consideration of the service history of the parents. The application was examined on the basis of the records obtained through verification, including the service particulars of the parents, and the mother's status as a directly recruited Group A/Class I Officer was found to attract the applicable exclusion.

8.

The learned Single Judge, after consideration of the Office Memorandum as well as the subsequent clarification, came to the conclusion that a bare reading of Category II Service Category A, makes it clear that, if parents, either of whom is a Group A/Class I Officer, the rule would exclude them. The Court also noted that there is no dispute that the 1st respondent's mother is a Group A/Class I Officer. However, the learned Single Judge perused the various other categories, i.e, Category II, Service Category B dealing with Group B/Class II Officers, as well as Ext.P10 clarification, and also the observations made by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the judgment dated 27.11.2018 in W.P.(C) No. 12598 of 2018, and also the judgment dated 21.10.2024 in W.P.(C) No.14557 of 2024 and connected cases, and held that Exts.P9 and Ext.P10 are to be harmoniously read in favour of the 1st respondent, and if the same is not done, that would be a clear case of discrimination. The learned Single Judge took note of the assertion made in the Writ Petition that those individuals who are promoted to the post of District Judge and started their career as Munsiff Magistrate do get the benefit of OBC (NCL) Certificate if they are promoted as District Judge after the age of 40 years. However, the said benefit is denied merely because of the fact that the 1st respondent's mother was directly recruited as Additional District and Sessions Judge. According to the learned Single Judge, this also was a clear case of discrimination. The learned Single Judge went on to add that being a lawyer and receiving direct appointment to a Class I post is not a disadvantage. Holding so, the learned Single Judge held that the 1st respondent is entitled to succeed in the light of Exts. P9, P10 and ordered the quashing of Ext. P8 and the Tahsildar was directed to issue an OBC (NCL) Certificate to the 1st respondent within three working days.

9.

We have heard the submissions advanced by both sides and have gone through the precedents cited, as well as the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rohith Nathan1, which was placed before us. We have also carefully considered the submissions advanced.

10.

Certain undisputed facts require to be stated at the outset. The father of the 1st respondent was appointed as Assistant Public Prosecutor Grade II at Gram Nyayalaya, Azhutha, Peerumedu, on 31.07.2018, in the pay scale of ₹40,500 to ₹85,000. He was promoted as Assistant Public Prosecutor Grade I on 27.07.2023, in the pay scale of ₹63,700 to ₹1,23,700. These facts are evident from Ext. P2 service certificate produced before this Court in the writ petition. No claim for the benefit of reservation was advanced on the basis of the father's service.

11.

The entire controversy revolves around the question whether the mother of the 1st respondent, who joined the Kerala State Higher Judicial Service on 16.07.2021 as an Additional District and Sessions Judge at the age of 41 years, falls within the exclusionary criteria prescribed in the 1993 Office Memorandum. She continues to serve as Additional District and Sessions Judge IV, Kollam, as evidenced by Ext. P3 service certificate. It is also undisputed that, before her appointment as Additional District and Sessions Judge in 2021, the mother of the 1st respondent was practising as an advocate at Thrissur and that her income during the financial year 2019–2020 was approximately ₹1,20,130.

12.

Insofar as the parameters for determining the “creamy layer” group is concerned, it was after the decision in Indra Sawhney and others v. Union of India2 that the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training) issued Office Memorandum dated 8-9-1993 providing for 27% reservation for Other Backward Classes. The 1993 Office Memorandum codified the structural framework. For better appreciation, the 1993 Office Memorandum is reproduced below:

“No. 36012/22/93-Estt. (SCT)

Government of India

Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions

(Department of Personnel & Training)

New Delhi, the 8th September, 1993

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Subject:- Reservation for Other Backward Classes in Civil Posts and Services under the Government of India - Regarding.

The undersigned is directed to refer to this Department’s O. M. No. 36012/31/90-Estt(STCT), dated the 13th August,1990 and 25th September 1991 regarding reservation for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes in Civil Posts and Services under the Govt. of India and to say that following the Supreme Court judgment in the Indra Sawhney and others vs Union of India and others case [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 930 of 1990] the Govt. of India appointed an Expert Committee to recommend the criteria for exclusion of the socially advanced persons/sections from the benefits of reservation for Other Backward Classes in civil posts and services under the Govt. of India.

2.

Consequent to the consideration of the Expert Committee’s recommendations this Department’s Office Memorandum No. 36012/31/90-Estt(SCT), dated 13.8.90 referred to in para(1) above is hereby modified to provide as follows:

(a)

27% (twenty-seven per cent) of the vacancies in civil posts and services under the Government of India, to be filled through direct recruitment, shall be reserved for the Other Backward Classes. Detailed instructions relating to the procedure to be followed for enforcing reservation will be issued separately.

(b)

Candidates belonging to OBCs recruited on the basis of merit in an open competition on the same standards prescribed for the general candidates shall not be adjusted against the reservation quota of 27%.

(c)(i) The aforesaid reservation shall not apply to persons/sections mentioned in Column 3 of the Schedule to this office memorandum.

(ii)

The rule of exclusion will not apply to persons working as artisans or engaged in hereditary occupations, callings. A list of such occupations, callings will be issued separately by the Ministry of Welfare.

(d)

The OBCs for the purpose of the aforesaid reservation would comprise, in the first phase, the castes and communities which are common to both the report of the Mandal Commission and the State Government's Lists. A list of such castes and communities is being issued separately by the Ministry of Welfare.

(e)

The aforesaid reservation shall take immediate effect. However, this will not apply to vacancies where the recruitment process has already been initiated prior to the issue of this order.

(i)

Similar instructions in respect of public sector undertaking and financial institutions including public sector banks will be issued by the Department of Public Enterprises and by the Ministry of Finance, respectively, effective from the date of this Office Memorandum.

sd/- (Smt Sarita Prasad) Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India ( emphasis supplied)

13.

The relevant clauses of the schedule attached to the 1993 Office Memorandum are extracted below for easy reference.

II

SERVICE CATEGORY

A. Group A/Class I officers of the All India Central and State Services (Direct Recruits).

Son(s) and daughter(s) of

(a) parents, both of whom are Class I officers;

(b) parents, either of whom is a Class I officer;

(c) Parents, both of whom are Class I officers, but one of them dies or suffers permanent incapacitation.

(d) Parents, either of whom is a Class I officer and such parent dies or suffers permanent incapacitation and before such death or such incapacitation has had the benefit of employment in any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank, etc. for a period of not less than 5 years.

(e) Parents, both of whom are Class I officers die or suffer permanent incapacitation and before such death or such incapacitation of the both, either of them has had the benefit of employment in any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank, etc. for a period of not less than 5 years.

Provided that the rule of exclusion shall not apply in the following cases:

(a) Sons and daughters of parents either of whom or both of whom are Class I officers and such parent(s) dies/die or suffer permanent incapacitation.

(b) A lady belonging to OBC category has got married to a Class I officer, and may herself like to apply for a job.

CNR : KLHC010813002026

WA No. 2222 of 2026 14 2026:KER:82291

B. Group B/Class II officers of the Central and State Services (Direct Recruitment)

Son(s) and daughter(s) of

(a) Parents both of whom are Class II officers.

(b) Parents of whom only the husband is a Class II officer and he gets into Class I at the age of 40 or earlier.

(c) Parents, both of whom are Class II officers and one of them dies or suffers permanent incapacitation and either one of them has had the benefit of employment in any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank, etc. for a period of not less than 5 years before such death or permanent incapacitation;

(d) parents of whom the husband is a Class I officer (direct recruit or pre- forty promoted) and the wife is a Class II officer and the wife dies; or suffers permanent incapacitation; and

(e) parents, of whom the wife is a Class I officer (Direct Recruit or pre-forty promoted) and the husband is a Class II officer and the husband dies or suffers permanent incapacitation

Provided that the rule of exclusion shall not apply in the following cases:

Sons and daughters of

(a) Parents both of whom are Class II officers and one of them dies or suffers permanent incapacitation.

(b) Parents, both of whom are Class II officers and both of them die or suffer permanent incapacitation, even though either of them has had the benefit of employment in any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank, etc. for a period of not less than 5 years before their death or permanent incapacitation.

14.

In Rohith Nathan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the legal framework governing the exclusion of the 'creamy layer' from the benefits of reservation for Other Backward Classes. The Court held that the doctrine of exclusion of the creamy layer, crystallised in Indra Sawhney (supra), constitutes the constitutional foundation of the Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993. The said Office Memorandum was issued to operationalise the constitutional mandate by identifying the socially advanced sections within the Other Backward Classes who would not be entitled to the benefits of reservation. The criteria prescribed therein are not merely indicative guidelines, but constitute the framework within which the determination of creamy layer status is required to be made.

15.

In paragraph No. 59 of Rohith Nathan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the Schedule appended to the 1993 Office Memorandum enumerates specific categories for exclusion and gives effect to the status-based criteria prescribed therein, while also providing for a residual income and wealth test under Category VI. It is evident that the scheme contemplates distinct and independent criteria for determining exclusion from the benefits of reservation. The applicability of a particular criterion must be determined with reference to the category under which the individual concerned falls. The various categories cannot be indiscriminately combined, nor can a criterion applicable to one category be extended to another in a manner that alters the scheme of exclusion laid down in the Office Memorandum.

16.

A perusal of the Schedule appended to the 1993 Office Memorandum would reveal that Category II, dealing with service status, classifies Government servants into distinct subcategories, namely, Category II A, relating to directly recruited Class I/Group A officers, and Category II B, relating to directly recruited Class II/Group B officers. The distinction between these categories is material and has a direct bearing on the determination of creamy layer status.

17.

Under Category II A, the children of parents, either of whom is a Class I/Group A officer, fall within the specified exclusionary category, subject to the exceptions expressly provided in the Schedule. Category II B, on the other hand, prescribes separate conditions for determining the creamy layer status of children whose parents hold Class II/Group B posts. In particular, clause (b) of Category II B deals with the situation in which only the husband is a Class II officer and enters Class I/Group A service at the age of 40 years or earlier.

18.

The express provision of different criteria for these categories indicates that the nature of the post held by the parent and the manner in which the parent entered the relevant service category are material considerations under the scheme. In other words, the provisions relating to Class II/Group B officers cannot, therefore, be applied indiscriminately to persons whose parents fall within Class I/Group A service. Any interpretation that disregards this distinction would defeat the purpose of prescribing separate categories and would render the specific conditions contained in the Schedule ineffective.

19.

A plain reading of the 1993 Office Memorandum makes it clear that the children of persons holding Class I/Group A posts in the civil services of the Central and State Governments are subject to exclusion in accordance with the criteria prescribed under Category II A of the Schedule. Clause (b) expressly refers to parents, either of whom is a Class I officer. The provision is framed in terms of the status of the parent and does not, in itself, make the application of the exclusionary criterion dependent upon the parent's having entered service through promotion or direct recruitment from a particular lower category. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between the general exclusionary criterion applicable to Class I/Group A officers and the specific conditions prescribed for other service categories. Where the parent falls within a category expressly covered by the Schedule, the determination must ordinarily be made by applying the criterion prescribed for that category, subject to any applicable exception. The circumstances that may be relevant under a different category cannot, merely on grounds of perceived similarity or hardship, be imported into the category governing the case at hand. Such an approach would amount to introducing a qualification that is not contained in the applicable provision.

20.

In 2004, Ext. P10 letter of clarification was issued to address certain practical questions that had arisen in the implementation of the 1993 Office Memorandum. The learned Single Judge placed considerable reliance on this clarification in granting relief to the 1st respondent. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the precise scope of the clarification and the circumstances to which it applies.

4.

Following questions have been raised from time to time about the application of the above provisions to determine creamy layer:-

(v)

Will the sons and daughters of parents of whose husband is directly recruited Class III / Group 'C' or Class IV / Group 'D' employee and he gets into Class I /Group 'A' at the age of 40 or earlier be treated to be falling in creamy layer?

The answer to the same is clarified as under:

In regard to Clause (v) of Para.4, it is clarified that the sons and daughters of parents of whom only the husband is a directly recruited Class II / Group 'B' officer who gets into Class I / Group 'A' at the age of 40 or earlier are treated to be in creamy layer. If the father is directly recruited Class III / Group 'C' or Class IV / Group 'D' employee and he gets into Class I / Group 'A' at the age of 40 or earlier, his sons and daughters shall not be treated to be falling in creamy layer.

21.

Question No. 4(v) of Ext. P10 specifically raises the issue whether the sons and daughters of parents where the husband was directly recruited as a Class III/Group C or Class IV/Group D employee and subsequently entered Class I/Group A service at the age of 40 years or earlier, would be treated as belonging to the creamy layer. The answer distinguishes between two situations. Where the husband was directly recruited as a Class II/Group B officer and subsequently entered Class I/Group A service at the age of 40 years or earlier, the children are treated as belonging to the creamy layer. Conversely, where the father was directly recruited as a Class III/Group C or Class IV/Group D employee and subsequently entered Class I/Group A service at the age of 40 years or earlier, the children shall not be treated as belonging to the creamy layer.

22.

The above clarification thus addresses a specific factual situation in which a person initially enters Government service in a lower category and subsequently enters Class I/Group A service. It recognises a distinction between such a person and one who was directly recruited to Class II/Group B service and thereafter entered Class I/Group A service at the age of 40 years or earlier. The clarification cannot be read as laying down a general principle that the age at which a parent enters Class I/Group A service is, by itself, decisive in every case involving a parent who holds such a post.

23.

The distinction drawn in Ext. P10 is significant. The clarification does not dispense with the service category-based criteria prescribed in the 1993 Office Memorandum, nor does it provide that every person who enters Class I/Group A service after the age of 40 years must necessarily be treated as belonging to the Non-Creamy Layer. Its scope is confined to the particular circumstances addressed therein, namely, the subsequent entry into Class I/Group A service of a person initially recruited to Class III/Group C or Class IV/Group D service. The clarification must, therefore, be read in the context of the question to which it responds. It cannot be applied merely because the parent concerned entered Class I/Group A service at an age exceeding 40 years. The clarification does not expressly address the case of a practising advocate who is directly recruited to a Class I/Group A post in judicial service at the age of 41 years. Such a person does not fall within the service categories expressly referred to in Question No. 4(v), and the circumstances of such appointment cannot be equated with the subsequent entry into Class I/Group A service of a Government servant initially recruited to Class III/Group C or Class IV/Group D service.

24.

In the present case, the mother of the 1st respondent was practising as an advocate before her appointment as an Additional District and Sessions Judge in 2021. She was not a Government employee initially recruited to Class III/Group C or Class IV/Group D service who subsequently entered Class I/Group A service. Nor is it the case of the 1st respondent that her mother falls within the category of a directly recruited Class II/Group B officer contemplated by the clarification. The factual basis on which Ext. P10 operates is, therefore, absent in the case on hand.

25.

In the said circumstances, the 1st respondent cannot claim the benefit of Ext. P10 merely for the reason that her mother entered Class I/Group A service at the age of 41 years. The relevant consideration is not the age of entry into Class I/Group A service in isolation, but whether the circumstances of the parent's service fall within the category addressed by the clarification.

26.

The learned Single Judge, while recognising that the mother of the 1st respondent was a Class I/Group A officer, proceeded to read Exts. P9 and P10 harmoniously so as to extend the benefit of the clarification to the 1st respondent. In our considered view, such an exercise cannot be carried out when the factual circumstances of the case do not fall within the class of persons to whom the clarification applies. The principle of harmonious construction cannot be invoked to extend the scope of a clarification beyond its express terms or to create an exception to the governing Office Memorandum where no such exception has been prescribed. The learned Single Judge, therefore, erred in concluding that a harmonious reading of Exts. P9 and P10 required the benefit of the clarification to be extended to the 1st respondent.

27.

In Rohith Nathan (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered whether the clarificatory letter dated 14.10.2004 could have an overriding or superseding effect over the Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993. The Hon'ble Court examined the legal relationship between the original Office Memorandum, which prescribes the criteria for exclusion from the benefits of reservation for OBCs, and the subsequent clarification issued to explain the application of those criteria. In paragraph No. 66 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the 1993 Office Memorandum expressly identifies categories of persons, including the sons and daughters of those holding Class I/Group A or Class II/Group B posts in the civil services of the Central and State Governments, who are subject to exclusion in accordance with the prescribed criteria. The Court emphasised that the subsequent clarificatory letter must be understood within the framework of the Office Memorandum and cannot be construed as displacing or overriding its substantive provisions. The Hon'ble Court further reiterated the well-established principle that a mere Government letter cannot override, overrule or supersede an executive instruction or Office Memorandum issued in exercise of executive power under Article 162 (sic) of the Constitution. A clarification may explain the meaning and application of an existing provision, resolve an ambiguity or address practical difficulties encountered in implementation. It cannot, however, be interpreted as altering the substantive policy embodied in the original instrument or as creating an independent basis for determining eligibility that is inconsistent with the governing framework.

28.

The distinction between clarification and amendment is material. Where a subsequent instruction merely explains the manner in which an existing criterion is to be applied, it remains within the permissible scope of clarification. If, however, it is construed as introducing a new substantive condition, enlarging an exception or altering the class of persons covered by the original provision, it would cease to be merely explanatory in nature. The 2004 letter must, therefore, be construed in a manner that gives effect to its clarificatory purpose without permitting it to dilute or displace the substantive criteria prescribed in the 1993 Office Memorandum.

29.

Consequently, Ext.P10 cannot be relied upon in isolation to create an exception in favour of a person who does not fall within the category addressed by the clarification. Any interpretation that treats the clarification as an independent source of entitlement, divorced from the scheme of the 1993 Office Memorandum, would be contrary to the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rohith Nathan (supra).

30.

The question that the Tahsildar, the 7th respondent in the writ petition, was required to consider upon receipt of the application was whether the 1st respondent fell within any of the exclusionary categories specified in the Schedule to the 1993 Office Memorandum. The determination had to be made by examining the service status of the parents and applying the criterion relevant to the category in which the parent concerned fell. The authority was not required to determine eligibility by applying a criterion drawn from a different service category or by extending the scope of a clarification beyond the circumstances contemplated therein.

31.

The authority was therefore justified in examining the application with reference to the exclusionary criterion applicable to Class I/Group A officers. The mother's professional income during the financial year 2019–2020 does not, by itself, displace the specific service status criterion applicable to her. The question is not whether the income earned by the mother before entering judicial service was low, but whether the 1st respondent falls within an exclusionary category under the governing Office Memorandum. Where the applicable service category prescribes a distinct criterion, that criterion must be applied in accordance with its terms.

32.

We have no doubt in our mind that the reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on the judgments rendered by the Delhi High Court was misplaced. Those decisions concerned factual circumstances in which the persons concerned were entitled to rely upon the clarification contained in the 2004 letter. The mother of the 1st respondent, however, does not fall within the category of persons to whom that clarification applies. The decisions relied upon by the learned Single Judge are, therefore, distinguishable on facts and cannot be treated as authority for extending the clarification to a case that falls outside its express scope.

33.

The contention that the 1st respondent has been discriminated against merely because her mother was directly recruited as an Additional District and Sessions Judge, whereas persons who entered judicial service as Munsiff Magistrates and were subsequently promoted to the post of District Judge may, in certain circumstances, obtain Non Creamy Layer Certificates, cannot be accepted without examining the governing criteria applicable to each category. The principle of equality does not require persons falling within materially different service categories to be treated identically, irrespective of the distinctions expressly recognised under the applicable policy. In any event, a perusal of the writ petition and the reliefs sought therein would reveal that the 1st respondent's case was founded on the interpretation and implementation of Exts. P9 and P10. She had not raised any contention that the criteria prescribed therein were discriminatory or unconstitutional. No challenge was mounted against the validity of Ext. P9 or any of the criteria prescribed therein. In the absence of such a challenge, the learned Single Judge could not have proceeded to extend the benefit of Ext. P10 to the 1st respondent on the premise that any other interpretation of Exts. P9 and P10 would result in discrimination. The issue that arose for consideration was confined to the applicability of the existing criteria and the scope of the clarification contained in Ext. P10, and not the constitutional validity of the classification embodied in Ext. P9.

34.

The 1993 Office Memorandum must be construed in the light of the constitutional objective underlying Article 16(4), which is to secure adequate representation for genuinely backward classes while excluding those who fall within the prescribed creamy layer criteria. The exclusion is an integral part of the reservation framework and is intended to ensure that the benefits reach those for whom the constitutional guarantee is designed. The courts must, therefore, apply the prescribed criteria faithfully and cannot enlarge an exception beyond its intended scope merely on the ground that a different interpretation may appear more beneficial to an individual claimant.

35.

In Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. State of Bihar and Others3, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised the need to exclude the creamy layer to ensure that the benefits of reservation reach the most deserving sections of the backward classes. The Court observed in paragraph 3 of the judgment as follows:

"3.

The protective discrimination in the shape of job reservations under Article 16(4) has to be programmed in such a manner that the most deserving section of the backward class is benefited. Means test by which “creamy layer” is excluded, ensures such a result. The process of identifying backward class cannot be perfected to the extent that every member of the said class is equally backward. There are bound to be disparities in the class itself. Some of the members of the class may have individually crossed the barriers of backwardness but while identifying the class they may have come within the collectivity. It is often seen that comparatively rich persons in the backward class are able to move in the society without being discriminated socially. The members of the backward class are differentiated into superior and inferior. The discrimination which was practised on them by the higher class is in turn practised by the affluent members of the backward class on the poorer members of the same class. The benefits of social privileges like job reservations are mostly chewed up by the richer or more affluent sections of the backward class and the poorer and the really backward sections among them keep on getting poorer and more backward. It is only at the lowest level of the backward class where the standards of deprivation and the extent of backwardness may be uniform. The jobs are so very few in comparison to the population of the backward classes that it is difficult to give them adequate representation in the State services. It is, therefore, necessary that the benefit of the reservation must reach the poorer and the weakest section of the backward class. Economic ceiling to cut off the backward class for the purpose of job reservations is necessary to benefit the needy sections of the class. The means test is, therefore, imperative to skim off the affluent section of the backward class."

36.

The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court underline the constitutional rationale for identifying and excluding the creamy layer. The reservation policy is not intended to extend an undifferentiated benefit to every member of a backward class, irrespective of the person's circumstances. Rather, it seeks to ensure that the benefits reach those who continue to suffer from social and educational backwardness and who require the protective measures contemplated by the Constitution. At the same time, the objective of excluding the creamy layer must be implemented through the criteria prescribed by the competent authority. The constitutional purpose cannot be used to disregard the terms of the governing Office Memorandum or to substitute a different test for the one prescribed therein. The judicial function is to interpret and apply the policy in accordance with its terms and constitutional purpose, not to introduce exceptions or conditions that the policy itself does not recognise.

37.

Though we are conscious of the fact that the issue concerns the future of a young child, sympathy, however genuine, cannot justify a departure from the criteria prescribed by law. Extending the benefit of reservation to a person who does not satisfy the prescribed conditions would be at the cost of another more deserving child who is entitled to claim that benefit in accordance with the governing norms. The equitable considerations arising from the circumstances of an individual case cannot prevail over the lawful and consistent application of the reservation policy.

38.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that Exts. P9 and P10 had to be harmoniously construed in a manner that extended the benefit of the 2004 clarification to the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent does not fall within the categories specifically contemplated by Ext. P10, and there is no basis for extending the benefit of that clarification to her by treating her mother's direct appointment to a Class I/Group A post as equivalent to the subsequent promotion of a Government servant initially recruited to Class III/Group C or Class IV/Group D service. The learned Single Judge also erred in treating the difference between direct recruitment to judicial service and promotion from a lower judicial post as sufficient, by itself, to establish discrimination. The entitlement to a Non Creamy Layer Certificate must be determined by applying the criteria prescribed in the governing Office Memorandum.

39.

In that view of the matter, the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside. The rejection of the 1st respondent's application for an OBC Non Creamy Layer Certificate by the 7th respondent, the Tahsildar, is upheld. The writ petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought in the writ petition.

This Writ Appeal is allowed.

Footnotes

  1. 1.[(2026) 6 SCC 1]
  2. 2.1992 Supp (3) SCC 217
  3. 3.[(1995) 5 SCC 403]