State Of Karnataka & Ors. vs Sri Shashikiran G & Ors.

(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH)

At the heart of the present controversy lies a question that must be examined in the broader context of the evolving needs of society, the administration of criminal justice, and the State’s constitutional obligation to maintain an effective and humane custodial system. As society grows and the nature and incidence of crime present ever-evolving challenges, the need for adequate custodial facilities, capable of accommodating persons committed to judicial custody while ensuring security, discipline and dignity, assumes increasing significance. The establishment and expansion of prisons must, therefore, be viewed not merely as an administrative response to the demands of confinement, but as an essential component of the criminal justice system. Modern penology recognises that imprisonment is not confined to retribution alone – it must also create conditions conducive to reformation, rehabilitation and the eventual reintegration of prisoners into society. These objectives cannot be achieved without adequate space and infrastructure for secure accommodation, segregation, healthcare, education, vocational training, psychological support and other rehabilitative measures. The Central Prison at Parappana Agrahara, Bengaluru, being a vital institution in the custodial framework of the State, must be equipped to meet these expanding requirements. The acquisition of additional land for its expansion must accordingly be assessed in the light of the growing needs of society, the imperatives of public safety, and the larger public interest in maintaining a prison system that balances the legitimate demands of custody with the enduring objectives of correction and reformation.

The present appeal has been filed by the Appellant-State, aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dated 02.05.2025 passed in W.P.No.51697/2013 and connected matters, wherein the writ petitions filed by the Respondent-landowners were partly allowed.

The brief facts leading to the present appeal are as follows:

The Respondents are the respective landowners of lands situated in Sy.Nos. 65, 66, 67/2, 68/1, 69, and 71, in total measuring 19 acres 18 guntas situated in Naganathapura Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk (hereinafter referred to as ‘subject lands’).

The Appellant – State issued a notification dated 19.02.1980, proposing to acquire the lands in Sy.No. 65 for the purpose of Central Jail, Bengaluru. The Appellant – State utilised the said notified land for the purpose of providing a road to the new central jail.

Thereafter, a notification dated 09.03.1989 was issued by the Appellant-State, proposing to acquire the remaining extent of lands in the subject lands. This was followed by a Final Declaration dated 24.05.1990 being issued u/s 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1894 Act’). This was challenged by the Respondent-landowners in W.P.No.6153/1990 and connected matter. Subsequently, the Respondent-State withdrew the Final Declaration dated 24.05.1990, and vide order dated 26.08.1992, the writ Court disposed of the Writ Petitions as having become infructuous.

The Appellant – State issued another Preliminary Notification dated 22.12.1998 u/s 4(1) of the 1894 Act notifying the remaining extent of land for the purpose of construction of new Central Jail, Bangalore. Vide order dated 10.06.2001 passed by the Appellant – State under Section 17 of the 1894 Act, the Appellant – State permitted the acquisition of the remaining lands. The said order was challenged in W.P.No.10883/2012, and vide order dated 12.04.2012, a Coordinate Bench of this Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the order dated 20.06.2001, and granted liberty to the State to take action in accordance with law by issuing a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act and granting an opportunity of being heard to the Respondent-landowners.

Thereafter, the Appellant – State issued a Preliminary Notification dated 19.07.2012 under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, proposing to acquire the very same remaining subject lands. The Respondent-landowners filed their objections before the Appellant No.4-Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) on 23.08.2012, and the Appellant No.2 – SLAO passed an order on 25/26.03.2013, explaining the existing condition of the land and requesting to take appropriate decision in the matter. Thereafter, the Appellant – State issued Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act.

Aggrieved by the Preliminary Notification dated 19.07.2012 and Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013, the Respondent-landowners filed W.P.No.51697/2013 and connected matters praying for quashing of the said Notification and Declaration. Vide impugned order dated 02.05.2025, the learned Single Judge partly allowed the batch of writ petitions, quashed the Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 and directed the Appellant – State to take an appropriate decision afresh after taking into consideration the report of the Appellant No.2 – SLAO issued under Section 5A(2) along with the objections filed by the Respondent-landowners under Section 5A(1) as well as the version of the Additional Director General of Police and Inspector General of Prisons as expeditiously as possible.

Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 02.05.2025, the present writ appeal has been filed by the Appellant-State. On 29.07.2026, this Court passed the following interim order with a direction to maintain status quo over the possession, construction, and development over the lands in question:

Sri M N Sudev Hegde, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the Appellants has submitted that the subject notified lands are all required for buffer zone and construction of Prison as required by Rule 876(IV) of Chapter 45 of Prisons Correctional Services Manual, 2021 for the safety and security of the Prisons. There shall be no building or construction upto 200 meters of main wall of Central Prison. It has been further submitted that since the notified lands come within the area of buffer zone and are located within 200 meters of the mail wall, they are inevitably necessary and find their place for acquisition.

Learned Counsels appearing for the respondent-landowners has submitted that the report prepared under Section 5A of the Appellant No.2 – SLAO dated 25/26.03.2013 is against the proposed acquisition of the lands. The said report records the objections raised by the Respondent-landowners and also sets out the observations of the Appellant No.2 – SLAO.

In the light of the pleadings on record, the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, and the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, the following issues arise for our consideration:

We have heard the contentions of the learned Counsels appearing for the parties. Since the issues are inter-linked, our discussion will consider the aforementioned issues together.

Before we go into the averments of the parties with respect to the issues for consideration, it is necessary to take note of the provisions of Sections 5A and 6 of the 1894 Act, which are extracted as hereunder:

It is the contention of the Appellant – State that the procedure as laid down in Section 5A of the 1894 Act was duly followed by considering the objections of the Respondent-landowners. However, it is the contention of the Respondent-landowners that the objections filed before the Appellant No.2 – SLAO during the 5A inquiry proceedings were not objectively considered. The learned Single Judge, in the impugned order, has observed that the Appellant No.2 – SLAO, in his report dated 25.03.2013, has not considered the objection of availability of alternate lands in Devanahalli Taluk as raised by the Respondent-landowners. The question that arises for our consideration is whether the Appellant No.2 – SLAO’s non-consideration of the objection of alternate lands being available, as raised by the Respondent-landowners, would render the report of the SLAO under Section 5A(2) and the subsequent Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 void.

A perusal of the report dated 25.03.2013 prepared under Section 5A(2) of the Act would indicate that the objections were duly considered by the Appellant No.2 – SLAO before making the recommendations. It is also to be noted that the SLAO has considered the objection of the availability of alternate land and has recommended discussions at a high level over the utilisation of the same. Relevant extract of the said order is as follows:

The objection of availability of alternate lands was not only considered by the Appellant No.2 – SLAO but also suggested for discussions at a high level before proceeding with the acquisition of the subject lands since the cost of such acquisition would be saved by utilising the alternate lands. Thus, we find that the observation of the writ Court that there has been no whisper with regard to consideration of the alternative lands is unsustainable and contrary to the material available on record.

Objective Consideration of Objections under Section 5A(2) of the 1894 Act Does Not Require Elaborate Discussion of Each Objection, and the Absence Thereof Does Not, by Itself, Render the SLAO’s Report or the Subsequent Final Declaration Invalid

It is well settled that the Report of the SLAO prepared under Section 5A(2) is to be made after not only giving an opportunity of being heard to the landowners but also considering the objections with due application of mind. However, it is further well settled that the exercise undertaken by the SLAO while considering objections under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is essentially administrative in nature and does not require an adjudication akin to that rendered by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. The statutory requirement is that the objections raised by the persons interested must receive due, fair and objective consideration before the SLAO forms an opinion and submits the report to the appropriate Government. The law does not mandate that each objection must be dealt with separately or answered in an elaborate manner, nor does it require the SLAO to record detailed reasons in the form of a judgment. What is material is that the consideration undertaken is real and substantive, and not merely mechanical or perfunctory. The report, when read as a whole and in the context of the material available on record, must reflect due application of mind to the objections raised and the issues arising therefrom.

The adequacy of consideration by the SLAO, therefore, cannot be judged merely by the length of the report or the extent of discussion devoted to each objection. Brief reasons and concise recommendations would satisfy the requirement of law where they sufficiently indicate that the objections have been considered objectively and that the report has been prepared upon due application of mind. The absence of an elaborate discussion on a particular objection would not, by itself, lead to an inference that such objection was not considered, particularly where the report or the contemporaneous record demonstrates otherwise. At the same time, the requirement of objective consideration cannot be reduced to a mere formality, and a report reflecting a mechanical rejection of objections without due consideration would not meet the statutory mandate. The test, therefore, is whether the report, read as a whole and in the light of the relevant record, demonstrates genuine consideration of the objections and a reasoned formation of opinion, and not whether every objection has been dealt with in exhaustive detail.

In HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. ABHISHEK GUPTA (2024 SCC ONLINE SC 2991), the Supreme Court held that Section 5A mandates a procedure and not a particular outcome, and laid down the procedure as follows:

The learned Single Judge has relied on the decision in RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF HARYANA [(2012) 1 SCC 792] to observe that the report of the SLAO dated 25.03.2013 does not reflect objective consideration of the objections raised. We find the said observation to be unsustainable, inasmuch as it has been already observed that the objections have been duly considered by the SLAO in the report dated 25.03.2013. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision are as follows:

In UNION OF INDIA v. SHIV RAJ [(2014) 6 SCC 564], the Supreme Court held as follows:

In the present case, the report dated 25.03.2013 demonstrates that the objections raised by the Respondent-landowners were considered by the SLAO in the context of the public purpose underlying the proposed acquisition. In particular, the objection regarding the availability of alternative lands at Devanahalli was expressly adverted to, and the SLAO recommended that the feasibility of utilising such lands, having regard to the substantial expenditure involved in the proposed acquisition, be examined at a higher level. The report also referred to the existing constructions on the notified lands, the high-tension power line passing through the same, the land-use classification under the development plan, and the feasibility of maintaining the proposed buffer zone. These observations indicate that the SLAO did not merely record the objections but identified the relevant issues requiring consideration before a final decision was taken by the appropriate Government. In the circumstances, we are unable to sustain the finding of the learned Single Judge that the objections were not objectively considered by the SLAO. The report, when read as a whole and in the context of the material available on record, reflects consideration of the objections raised by the Respondent-landowners.

In WOMEN'S EDUCATION TRUST v. STATE OF HARYANA [(2013) 8 SCC 99], the Supreme Court, while referring to a catena of decisions, articulated the essential principles governing an objective hearing under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court emphasized that Section 5-A embodies the rule of audi alteram partem, ensuring landowners are afforded an effective opportunity to contest compulsory land acquisition before being deprived of their property. It affirmed that an interested person may challenge the acquisition on grounds such as lack of genuine public purpose, mala fides, arbitrariness, or the availability of more suitable alternative lands. In essence, the Supreme Court laid down that the Land Acquisition Collector is duty-bound to objectively consider all objections, apply an independent mind to the record, and submit a reasoned report to the Government. A final declaration under Section 6(1) can only be validly issued if the appropriate Government, upon an objective application of mind to both the objections and the Collector's recommendations, remains satisfied that the acquisition is necessary. The relevant paragraphs are extracted as hereunder:

(emphasis supplied)

The Supreme Court in SAM HIRING CO v. A.R. BHUJBAL [(1996) 8 SCC 18] held as follows:

(emphasis supplied)

The Supreme Court in NHAI V. MADHUKAR KUMAR, (2022) 14 SCC 661, relying on numerous decisions, held as follows:

(emphasis supplied)

Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, provides a statutory safeguard to the persons interested by affording them an opportunity to raise objections against the proposed acquisition and by requiring such objections to be considered before further steps are taken in the acquisition proceedings. The object of the provision is to ensure that the objections receive due and objective consideration and that the decision to proceed with the acquisition is taken after following the prescribed procedure. The provision does not, however, contemplate that every objection raised must necessarily be accepted or that the proceedings must culminate in a decision favourable to the objectors. The procedure laid down in Section 5A does not contemplate for elaborate discussion on each objection to the extent that the objections become the outcome of the inquiry proceedings. All that is required is for the procedure to be duly followed with due application of mind. The right conferred is one of meaningful consideration of the objections in accordance with law, and not a right to secure a particular outcome. Therefore, where the objections have been duly heard and considered, and the report has been prepared upon application of mind to the issues raised, the mere fact that the objections have not been accepted, or that the report does not contain an elaborate discussion of each objection, would not, by itself, constitute a ground to invalidate the acquisition proceedings. What is required to be examined is whether the prescribed procedure has been followed and whether the consideration of the objections is genuine and objective, rather than whether the conclusion reached is one that accords with the preference of the objectors.

In NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. DARSHAN LAL BOHRA (2024 SCC ONLINE SC 1690), the Supreme Court considered the effect of the absence of a formal order dealing with certain objections and emphasised that such an omission must be examined in the context of the applicable statutory provisions and the nature and legal effect of the objection concerned. The decision reinforces the principle that the validity of acquisition proceedings cannot be determined solely by reference to a formal deficiency, without examining whether the statutory requirements have been substantially complied with and whether the omission has a material bearing on the legality of the acquisition. This, however, does not dilute the mandatory obligation to consider objections where the statute so requires. The determinative consideration remains whether the objections have received genuine and objective consideration and whether the decision-making process satisfies the statutory mandate.

The aforesaid principle has also been considered by the Supreme Court in ALOK KOTAHWALA v. JAIPUR METRO RAIL CORPN. LTD., 2026 SCC ONLINE SC 1324 as follows:

The legal position emerging from the aforesaid decisions is that the report prepared under Section 5A(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is not required to contain an elaborate or exhaustive discussion of every objection raised by the landowners, nor is the SLAO expected to record a separate or detailed finding on each contention as though adjudicating a lis in the strict sense. The statutory requirement, however, is not satisfied by a mere recital of the objections or a mechanical recommendation in favour of acquisition. It requires the SLAO to undertake a fair, independent and objective consideration of the objections, having due regard to their nature, substance and relevance to the proposed acquisition, and to indicate, through brief reasons and recommendations, that the material issues raised have received genuine consideration. The report must, therefore, disclose a rational connection between the objections considered, the material available on record and the recommendation ultimately made. Where an objection concerns the very necessity for acquisition, the suitability of the identified lands or the availability of alternative land, the report must demonstrate that the substance of such objection has been examined, even if the SLAO does not accept the landowner’s contention. The adequacy of the report must consequently be assessed on a substantive basis, having regard to its contents and the contemporaneous record, rather than merely by reference to the length or form of the reasons recorded. While brevity, by itself, does not render the report defective, the absence of elaborate reasoning cannot be used to excuse a failure to consider the objections in a meaningful manner. The essential test is whether the report, read as a whole, reflects due application of mind to the objections and furnishes a rational basis for the recommendation made under Section 5A(2) of the Act.

The Report of the SLAO made under Section 5A(2) of the Act is not binding on the State Government in order to issue Final Declaration under Section 6

It is the contention of the learned counsels appearing for the Respondent-landowners that the Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 issued under Section 6(1) of the Act is unsustainable in law inasmuch as there was no prior decision taken by the State to acquire the subject lands, which is a pre-condition for the exercise of power under Section 6(1). The learned Single Judge, in the impugned order, has observed that the recommendations made by the SLAO in the 5A(2) Report dated 25.03.2013 were not considered by the State before issuing the Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013.

From a plain reading of the language of Section 5A(2) of the 1894 Act, it is clear that the language of the Section stipulates the Collector/SLAO to, upon considering the objections of the landowners, make a report in respect of the notified lands, containing the recommendations on the objections along with the record of proceedings, for the ultimate decision of the Government. The recommendations made by the SLAO are not binding on the State and are neither decisive of the subsequent acquisition proceedings nor on the decision of the State as per the Final Declaration under Section 6.

The proposition of law that recommendations made by administrative bodies are not binding on the Courts or on the State, unless the language of the provision says otherwise, is beyond dispute. The decision of the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) or Collector, which is that of a quasi-judicial authority arrived at by quasi-judicial methods, may turn out to be final unless the appropriate government chooses to interfere suo motu or on application. (See SHYAM NANDAN PRASAD v. STATE OF BIHAR [(1993) 4 SCC 255]). Although the report submitted after a Section 5A inquiry cannot be left out of consideration and must be actively reviewed by the appropriate government before making a public purpose declaration under Section 6, the final findings contained therein ultimately remain strictly non-binding on the government. (See UNION OF INDIA v. MUKESH HANS [(2004) 8 SCC 14]). Though not bound by the recommendation of the Collector, the Government has to consider the records, apply its mind and, thereafter, form an opinion as to the imperative for issuing a declaration under Section 6. Since affectation of a landowner's property right is involved and the LA Act being an expropriatory legislation, the Courts are cautioned to strictly construe the provisions thereof. (See ALOK KOTAHWALA (Supra)). In HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (Supra), the Supreme Court elaborately discussed the same as follows:

Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, the mere circumstance that the SLAO, in the report dated 25.03.2013, made certain recommendations or expressed reservations regarding the proposed acquisition would not, by itself, render the Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 issued under Section 6(1) of the Act invalid. The report under Section 5A(2) is recommendatory in nature, and the ultimate decision as to whether the acquisition should proceed rests with the State Government, which is required to independently examine the report, the objections raised by the landowners and the relevant material on record, and thereafter form its own opinion regarding the necessity of the acquisition for the public purpose in question. The State Government is, therefore, not bound to accept the recommendations of the SLAO in their entirety, nor does a recommendation warranting further examination or high-level consideration necessarily operate as a bar to the issuance of the Final Declaration. What the law mandates is that the State Government must apply its independent mind to the relevant material and arrive at a decision on lawful and relevant considerations. In the present case, the proposed acquisition is intended for the expansion of the Central Prison at Parappana Agrahara, Bengaluru, a purpose involving significant considerations of custodial security, prison administration and public safety. The importance of such a public purpose does not dispense with the requirement of independent consideration by the State Government.

We are, therefore, of the considered view that the report submitted by the SLAO under Section 5A(2) of the Act, though an essential component of the statutory scheme and a material consideration for the State Government, is not binding upon the Government in determining whether a declaration under Section 6(1) should be issued. The State Government may differ from the recommendations contained therein, provided such departure is founded upon an independent application of mind to the relevant record and a bona fide assessment of the public purpose sought to be achieved. The absence of concurrence with the SLAO's recommendations does not, in itself, vitiate the acquisition.

The Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 issued under Section 6 of the Act is not required to contain reasons or be preceded by a separate formal governmental decision

It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-landowners that the Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 issued under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is unsustainable in law, as the State Government had neither taken a prior decision to acquire the subject lands nor recorded reasons demonstrating its independent consideration of the report submitted by the SLAO under Section 5A(2) of the Act. The contention, in substance, is that the absence of a separate governmental decision preceding the issuance of the Final Declaration, coupled with the absence of reasons expressly set out in the declaration itself, renders the acquisition proceedings invalid.

A plain reading of Section 6 of the Act, particularly Section 6(1), indicates that the statutory requirement is that the appropriate Government must, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5A(2), form the requisite opinion that the particular land is needed for a public purpose and make a declaration to that effect. The provision does not prescribe that such opinion must necessarily be embodied in a separate, antecedent order or formal resolution distinct from the declaration itself. Nor does it require that the reasons forming the basis of the Government's satisfaction must be reproduced in the text of the Final Declaration. The statutory emphasis is on the formation of the requisite opinion by the appropriate Government, upon consideration of the relevant material, and the issuance of a declaration in the manner prescribed by law. The absence of a separately documented prior decision or of an elaborate statement of reasons in the declaration cannot, by itself, be equated with the absence of the requisite governmental satisfaction.

The aforesaid position finds support in HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD. v. DARIUS SHAPUR CHENAI [(2005) 7 SCC 627], wherein the Supreme Court clarified that a declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act need not, on its face, contain the reasons forming the basis of the Government’s satisfaction. The Court, however, underscored that the consideration of the landowner’s objections and the Government’s decision thereupon must precede the issuance of the declaration. The absence of reasons in the declaration itself is, therefore, distinct from the absence of application of mind by the State Government. While the former does not, by itself, invalidate the declaration, the latter may render the decision-making process vulnerable to judicial review. The relevant records must consequently disclose that the State Government considered the report submitted under Section 5A(2), together with the objections and the material accompanying it, and independently formed the requisite opinion that the land was needed for a public purpose. The Court observed as under:

The principle emerging from the decision, read in the context of the judgment as a whole, is that the declaration need not recite the reasons for the Government’s satisfaction, but the requisite governmental decision must precede its issuance.

In view of the aforesaid legal position, the contention of the respondent-landowners requires to be examined by distinguishing between the absence of a separate formal order and the absence of a prior decision by the State Government. Section 6 of the Act does not prescribe that the Government’s decision must necessarily take the form of a separately published order or resolution preceding the Final Declaration. Nevertheless, the statutory requirement that the Government consider the report and form the requisite opinion before issuing the declaration cannot be dispensed with. Thus, the mere fact that the Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 does not itself disclose the reasons for the decision, or that no separate formal order has been produced, would not, by itself, establish illegality. The decisive consideration is whether the contemporaneous official record demonstrates that the State Government duly considered the relevant material and arrived at the requisite satisfaction before issuing the declaration. If such prior consideration and decision are borne out by the record, the declaration cannot be invalidated merely for want of an express recital of reasons or a separate formal order. Conversely, if the record establishes that the declaration was issued without the requisite prior governmental consideration, the defect would go to the root of the statutory process and cannot be cured merely by relying upon the existence of a public purpose.

It is well settled by a catena of decisions that the ultimate goal of acquisition of lands, which implies deprivation of individuals’ right to their property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, must be for a broader public purpose. While the definition of ‘public purpose’ includes construction of a jail, such acquisition can be made only by strictly following the mandate of the said Act (See DEV SHARAN & OTHERS v. STATE OF U.P. [(2011) 4 SCC 769]). Since we are of the view that the procedure as laid down in the 1894 Act has been duly followed by the State Authorities, we now turn towards the primacy of interests of the landowners over the genuine public purpose of expansion of Prison or vice-versa.

The principle of eminent domain recognises the sovereign power of the State to acquire private property for a legitimate public purpose with just compensation paid and subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations governing the exercise of such power. Though the right to property is constitutionally protected under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, it does not confer an absolute immunity against compulsory acquisition authorised by law. The doctrine rests on the premise that, in an appropriate case, the interests of an individual may have to yield to the larger interests of the community. Such power, however, is not absolute or arbitrary. Its exercise must be founded upon a genuine public purpose, supported by the authority of law, and in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the applicable statute. The principle of eminent domain thus seeks to reconcile the protection of individual proprietary rights with the legitimate requirements of society, ensuring that neither public interest is frustrated by an inflexible insistence on private ownership nor private rights are sacrificed to an arbitrary or unlawful exercise of State power in a colourable manner.

It is equally well settled that where the acquisition of private property is supported by a genuine public purpose and is undertaken in accordance with the authority of law, the interests of individual landowners cannot ordinarily prevail merely by virtue of their proprietary rights over the larger interests of the public. The determination of public purpose necessarily involves consideration of the collective needs of society, which may, in appropriate circumstances, assume primacy over individual claims. The State, in exercising its power of compulsory acquisition, is therefore required to maintain a fair balance between the rights of landowners and the demands of public interest. While the right to property cannot be rendered illusory, neither can it be construed as an absolute right to resist every lawful acquisition.

The governing principle is that individual rights must be respected and protected within the framework of law but may yield where their exercise conflicts with a legitimate public purpose pursued through a lawful and constitutionally permissible process. Land acquired for development are intended to subserve a wider public interest, and the narrow interest of the individual landowner must yield to the larger public interest. (See DILIPSINGH NARAYANRAO BORAWAKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & OTHERS, W.P.NO.2295/2012 DECIDED BY THE BOMBAY HIGH COURT ON 05.07.2019). The Supreme Court has consistently emphasised that, while exercising judicial discretion in matters concerning land acquisition, constitutional courts must undertake a careful balancing of public interest against private interest, bearing in mind the consequences that may ensue from the interruption or annulment of projects undertaken for the larger benefit of society. Projects serving an important public purpose ought not to be frustrated or brought to a standstill on account of individual claims, particularly where substantial progress has already been achieved and the consequences of setting aside the acquisition would adversely affect the larger public interest. The mere fact that an individual landowner may have an interest in a relatively small portion of the acquired land would not, by itself, justify invalidating the acquisition of the land required for the project as a whole. Where the acquisition is otherwise lawful and the project serves a genuine public purpose, the interests of the individual landowner must be weighed against the wider public consequences of interfering with its implementation. Further, every procedural irregularity or minor discrepancy in the acquisition process does not necessarily warrant the annulment of the entire acquisition. The nature, gravity and legal effect of the alleged irregularity must be examined in the context of the statutory scheme and the prejudice, if any, caused thereby. The governing principle is that judicial intervention must be informed by the demands of justice and the larger public interest, without compromising mandatory statutory safeguards or permitting unlawful deprivation of private property. (See RAMNIKLAL N. BHUTTA AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS (AIR 1997 SC 1236) and PRATIBHA NEMA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS (AIR 2003 SC 3140)

The right of a landowner to object to the proposed acquisition of his property, though an important statutory safeguard, is neither absolute nor unlimited. It must be understood in the context of the larger constitutional principle that the exercise of the State’s power of eminent domain, when founded upon a genuine public purpose and exercised in accordance with law, may prevail over individual proprietary interests. The object of the provision is to afford the landowner a meaningful opportunity to place his objections before the competent authority and to enable the latter to objectively consider whether the proposed acquisition ought to proceed. It is not to confer upon the landowner a right to veto the acquisition or to dictate the choice of land to be acquired by the State. The objections must, therefore, bear a rational nexus to the proposed acquisition and address legally relevant considerations, such as the absence of a genuine public purpose, the unsuitability of the land for the intended purpose, the availability of a legally relevant alternative, excessive or disproportionate acquisition, colourable exercise of power, mala fides, or the infliction of disproportionate hardship. While such objections must receive fair and objective consideration, the mere assertion of an individual preference or proprietary claim cannot, by itself, override the legitimate requirements of the community. The governing principle is that private interests must be duly considered and protected within the framework of law, but must ultimately subserve the larger public purpose where the acquisition is lawful, necessary and justified. Conversely, the invocation of public interest cannot dispense with the State’s obligation to comply with mandatory statutory safeguards [See STATE OF HARYANA v. VINOD OIL & GENERAL MILLS [(2014) 15 SCC 410], ALOK KOTAHWALA (Supra) and HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (Supra)].

Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, we are of the considered view that the public purpose underlying the proposed acquisition, namely, the expansion of the Central Prison at Parappana Agrahara, Bengaluru, warrants due weight in determining the competing claims of public and private interest. The establishment and expansion of prison infrastructure constitute an important responsibility of the State, extending beyond the mere provision of accommodation for inmates to encompass custodial security, effective prison administration, segregation of inmates, adequate supporting facilities and the maintenance of a secure environment. The requirement of additional land for these purposes must be assessed in the context of the overall functional requirements of the institution and its long-term operational needs, rather than being confined to the existing structures within the prison premises. In such matters, the State is required to be afforded due latitude in assessing the land and infrastructure necessary to discharge its public obligations, provided that the decision is founded upon a genuine public purpose and is not vitiated by arbitrariness or illegality. The objections of the landowners, though entitled to fair and objective consideration, cannot be elevated into an absolute right to prevent an acquisition that is otherwise justified by the legitimate requirements of prison administration and public safety. The right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India protects the individual against deprivation except by authority of law. It does not confer an unqualified right to resist every acquisition undertaken in accordance with law.

The principle of eminent domain, therefore, requires that the individual interests of landowners be balanced against the larger public interest sought to be achieved through the acquisition. Where the acquisition is directed towards a genuine public purpose of considerable importance, and the prescribed statutory procedure has been duly followed, the balance must ordinarily tilt in favour of facilitating the public purpose rather than frustrating it on the basis of individual proprietary claims alone. The objections concerning the suitability of the land, the availability of alternatives or the hardship occasioned by acquisition must undoubtedly be examined. However, unless such objections establish a legally sustainable ground for interference, they cannot displace the State's decision to acquire land required for a legitimate public purpose. The law does not require the State to abandon a necessary public project merely because its implementation entails the deprivation of private property, provided such deprivation is authorised by law and the safeguards available to the landowners are respected.

Before we conclude, we would like to cite the decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in UNION OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, ESTATE MANAGEMENT UNIT (DRDO) V. STATE OF KARNATAKA & OTHERS (W.A. NO. 2121 OF 2015 & CONNECTED MATTERS, DECIDED ON 21.09.2026) wherein this Court elaborately discussed on the issues of law concerned in this appeal as follows:

In view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 issued under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, cannot be held to be invalid merely because it does not disclose the reasons underlying the Government’s satisfaction or because a separate formal order recording the decision to proceed with the acquisition has not been issued. The requirement of law is that the appropriate Government, after considering the report submitted under Section 5A(2) of the Act, must form its opinion that the lands are needed for a public purpose before issuing the declaration. As held by the Supreme Court in HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. V. DARIUS SHAPUR CHENAI [(2005) 7 SCC 627], the declaration under Section 6 need not itself contain the reasons for such satisfaction. However, the absence of reasons in the declaration cannot be equated with the absence of the requisite decision by the Government, which must precede the issuance of the declaration.

Applying the aforesaid principle, the contention of the respondent-landowners that the Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 is unsustainable for want of a separate prior governmental decision or for failure to record reasons in the declaration itself cannot be accepted on those grounds alone. The report dated 25.03.2013 submitted by the SLAO, the objections raised by the landowners and the relevant material concerning the proposed acquisition were required to be considered by the State Government before arriving at its decision. The recommendations of the SLAO, being recommendatory in nature, did not bind the Government, which was competent to take an independent view on the necessity of the acquisition. The Government could, therefore, differ from the recommendations made in the report, provided that it had considered the relevant material and formed the requisite opinion on lawful grounds. The absence of a separate formal order or an express recital of reasons in the Final Declaration does not, by itself, establish that the State Government failed to apply its mind to the matter.

We are, therefore, of the considered view that the acquisition of the notified lands for the expansion of the existing Central Prison serves a bona fide public purpose and cannot be set aside merely on account of hyper-technicalities in the procedure, in the absence of any established violation of a mandatory statutory requirement.

In view of the aforesaid, the writ appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 02.05.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.51697/2013 and connected matters is hereby set aside. The State and the concerned authorities shall take necessary steps to address the existence of RCC buildings, residential layouts, engineering workshops and developed sites on the subject notified lands, as referred to by Appellant No. 2– SLAO in the report dated 25.03.2013, in accordance with law.

Pending IAs, if any, do not survive for consideration and, accordingly, they stand disposed of.