State Of H.P vs Charan Dass And Another

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The present appeal is directed against the jud ment dated 01.05.2014 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PFA) Act. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant/Food Inspector presented a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the PFA Act. It was asserted that Mr L.D. Thakur (PW-1) was posted as a Food Inspector in the local area of MC Shimla, who inspected the premises known as M/S Nafed, Shop No. 9, Panchayat Bhawan, Shimla on 05.12.2005 at about 11:00 A.M. He found that the accused Charan Dass Verma was conducting the business of the Nafed shop. He had 9 X 1 kg Poly packs of Shakkar on the shelf kept for sale to the general public. L.D. Thakur disclosed his identity to the accused and expressed his intention to take the sample of Shakkar for analysis. He served a notice (Ex. P1) upon the accused to this effect. He purchased three packets for ₹ 90/- and obtained a receipt (Ex. P2). He labelled the packets and wrapped them in thick Khakhi paper. A paper slip bearing Sr. No. and code No. S-II/2671 issued and signed by Local (Health) Authority M.C. Shimla was affixed on the packet from bottom to top with gum. The signatures of the accused were taken in such a manner that they appeared on the slip and the wrapper. The packets were fastened with strong thread and sealed with sealing wax. Four seal impressions were put on each packet, and all the knots were covered with seal. Ram Gopal (PW-4) and Charan Dass (PW-3) witnessed the proceedings. A spot memo (Ex. P3) was prepared. Signatures of witnesses and the accused were obtained. One part of the sample and one copy of Form No. 7 in a separate envelope were sent to Public Analyst Kandaghat through Charan Dass. Two parts of the sample, along with two copies of Form No. 7, were deposited with Local Health Auth rity (LHA) Shimla. LHA Shimla was informed about sending the sample vide letter (Ex. P6). Charan Dass deposited the sample with Public Analyst Kandaghat and obtained the receipt (Mark-X). Public Analyst Kandaghat analysed the sample and issued the report (Ex. P7), mentioning that the sample was misbranded because the batch number and month and year up to which the product was best for consumption were not mentioned on the label. Complainant L.D. Thakur produced all the documents before CMO Shimla, along with an application (Ex. P9) for obtaining the written consent. CMO Shimla went through the documents and mentioned on the application, “fit case for prosecution. DA to take dictation. He issued the written consent (Ex. P10). The complainant filed a complaint before the Court and informed LHA about the filing of the complaint. A notice under Section 13(2) of the PFA was served upon the accused.

Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to them for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the FA, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

The complainant examined ive witnesses to prove its case. L.D. Thakur (PW-1) is the complainant. Pardeep Kumar (PW-2) proved the sanction. Charan Dass (PW-3) and Ram Pal (PW-5) a e he witnesses to the taking of sample. Ram Singh (PW-4) proved the service of notice under Section 13(2) pon the accused.

The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of r.P.C., admitted that he was present in the s op No. 9, the Food Inspector had visited the shop and purc ased three packets of Shakkar (Jaggery) for ₹ 90/-. He denied the rest of the complainant’s case. He stated that the stamp used to be put on the packet might have been erased by the moisture. A false case was made against him. Accused Jawahar Lal Negi admitted that Charan Dass Verma was running a shop of Nafed, and he had sold Jaggery to the accused for ₹ 90/-. He claimed that he was innocent, and the stamp, which was used on the packet, might have been erased by the moisture. They examined Charan Dass (DW1) in defence.

Learned Trial Court held that the accused did not dispute the taking of the sample. The samples were properly sealed on the spot, and they were found to be misbranded. The defence taken by the accused that the stamp was erased by the moisture would not help them, because the contents of the label should be indelible. Therefore, the accused were convicted of he commission of an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the PFA and were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine f ₹ 500/- each, and to undergo further simple imprisonment for 15 days in default of payment of the fine.

Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the spot memo did not mention that the batch number, month and year up to which the product was best for consumption were not mentioned on the label. This was essential. The learned Trial Court erred in convicting the accused; hence, the appeal was allowed and the accused were acquitted. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Ganga Ram vs. State of H P , 2011 (2) FAC 76.

Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The report of analysis showed that the batch number and year up to which the product was fit for consumption were not men ioned on the label, and the samples were misbranded. Therefore, it was proved on record that the acc sed had sold a misbranded sample to the complainant. The requirements of Section 16(1)(a)(i) of PFA were duly satisfied; therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.

I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Surender Thakur, learned counsel for the respondents/accused.

Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the evidence. It was rightly held that the ink used for mentioning the batch number, year and the date before which the product was fit for consumption should be indelible, and the defence taken by the accused that the details were erased due to moisture was of no consequence. Learned Appellate Court did not advert to this aspect and set aside a well-reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate C urt be set aside, while the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be restored.

Mr Surender Thaku , learned counsel for the respondent/accused, s bmitted that the learned Appellate Court had relied up n the judgment of this Court, and there is no infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omits to consider the material evidence and takes a view that no reasonable person would have taken based on the evidence on record. It was observed:

“11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal p siti n with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal f the accused recorded by the trial court.

This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)

“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42)

‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law.

(3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and c mpelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are m re in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed, and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748, this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)

… 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumpti n of innocence.

8.2. The appellate c urt, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate he oral and documentary evidence;

8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High C urt nly if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

A similar view was taken in Bhupatbhai Bachubhai havda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523, wherein it was observed: -

“6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the evidence. After re-appreciating the evidence, the first question that needs to be answered by the Appellate Court is whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a plausible view that could have been taken based on the evidence on record. Perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that this question has not been adverted to. The Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal only on the ground that another view is possible. In other words, the judgment of acquittal must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate Court records such a finding, no interference can be made with the order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the well-settled principle that an order of acquittal further strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused. After having perused the judgment, we find that the High Court has not addressed itself to the main question.”

The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The accused did not dispute in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the accused Charan Dass was present in the shop as an assistant and he had sold three packets of Shakkar (Jaggery) to the complainant.

The learned Appellate Court held that the Food Inspector did not mention in the panchnama prepared by him that the labels did not contain the batch number and month, and year up to which the product was best for consumption, which was essential before punishing a person for selling a misbranded food article. This finding was as per the judgment of this Court in Ganga Ram (supra), wherein it was observed:

“7. On the second submission, which is based on the judgment in Kulbir Sharma’s case (supra), it is urged that in the panchnama which is prepared, there is no mention regarding any sample, etc, and there has been a violation of the provisions. In other words, his submission is that Panchnama Ext. P3 does not state that the packet of Sewian does not conform to the requirement of branding under the Act. All that I need to say is that at that particular point in time, the Food Inspector had inspected the business premises of the accused, where he associated one Inder Vir, son of Jeet Ram, PW4 and had seized only three samples of Sewian, which were then taken for analysis. In Kulbir Sharma’s case, this Court held:

“The second point which makes the case of the prosecution doubtful is that the notice Exhibit P1 was given by he Food Inspector to pick up the sample of ‘Haldi Gulal’ (Haldi Powder) for which he paid Rs. 18/- vide eceipt Exhibit-P2. Whereas in the Panchnama Exhibit P3, the Food Inspector has mentioned that he had taken the sample of Haldi Powder (three packets). The sample of Haldi was f und in c nformity with the prescribed standard except that nothing was mentioned on the packet; thus, it was alleged to be ‘misbranded’. It is worth noting that the Food Inspector, while packing up the sample, did not mention in Panchnama that nothing was mentioned on the label of the packet, as opined by the Public Analyst, nor did he state so in the Court that the label on the package of Haldi was not in accordance with the Act and rules prescribed thereunder. Therefore, in these circumstances, in my opinion, the allegation of misbranding also stands not proved. As far as the next allegation with respect to selling of the food articles without a food license is concerned, the Food Inspector in his statement did not utter even a single sentence that the accused was selling the food articles without a license. In the absence of it, his admission in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. carries no value as since the prosecution also failed to discharge its initial onus.”

This judgment is binding upon this Court. It was essential for the Food Inspector to mention in the panchnama that the packet of shakkar did not mention the lot number, batch number and best before, in the absence of which the accused could not be punished. The submission that the defence of the accused was improbable would not help the State because the prosecuti n has to stand on its own legs, and it cannot take any advantage of the weakness of the defence.

The learned Trial Court did not have the benefit of the judgment passed by this Court, and the learned Appellate ourt had rightly reversed the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court.

Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view and no interference is required with it, while deciding an appeal against the acquittal.

In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- each with one surety each of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondents on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme C urt.

Record of learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith along with a copy of the judgment.