State of H.P. vs Smt. Lalita Tegtra

Dev Darshan Sud, J.—The State is aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rohru, District Shimla acquitting the Respondent for offences under Sections 379 and 170 of the Indian Penal Code.

The prosecution case is that on 1.8.2001, the Block Primary Education Officer, Rohru made a complaint to the Station House Officer, Police Station Sadar, Rohru alleging that the Respondent herein who was working as a J.B.T., Govt. Primary School (Girls) Rohru had been frequently entering his office since 23.10.2000. She was absenting herself from duties from that very day. It was alleged that she had taken away the stamp of the office and had refused to return it and was purportedly using it for writing mail/documents affixing this seal on them purporting to act under the authority of this office. It is alleged that she also tampered with the official dispatch register and that she is in possession of teachers'' attendance register of the Govt. Primary School, Mehandli from 6.5.2000. The case set up by the Respondent was one of denial.

On the material on record, the trial Court formulated two points for adjudication namely, that as to whether on 6.5.2000 and 7.6.2001 the Respondent had stolen the official stamp and the attendance register of the office of Block Primary Education Officer (hereinafter referred to ''B.P.E.O.'') and secondly whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that on 23.10.2000 the accused impersonated herself as B.P.E.O. by addressing communication/mail to the higher authorities. On both the points on the evidence on record, the learned trial Court found against the prosecution. The State is now in appeal.

A number of submissions have been made by the learned Additional Advocate General on the state of the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court. Submission made on behalf of the State is that the learned Court below has been in error in ignoring the link evidence on the record to establish the commission of offence u/s 170 and 379 I.P.C. which were proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

I have heard learned Additional Advocate General as also learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent.

PW1 Durga Chand who was the B.P.E.O. states that the Respondent was posted as J.B.T. at Government Primary School (girls), Rohru and that she was visited his office on 23.10.2000 without any order of any department etc. He says that she went to the Government Primary School, Mehandli without the order of any authority and stole the attendance register. Not only that, she had gone to the extent of stealing the rubber stamp of this officer. He says that communications Ext.P2, P3 and P4, in which the Respondent was impersonating herself to be B.P.E.O., have in fact, been signed by her.

Learned Additional Advocate General submits that taking this into consideration, there can be no doubt that the writing of the Respondent having been identified on the letters, she is guilty of the offences as charged. I cannot accept this submission. Merely saying that the document/letter/register has been signed by her was not sufficient to have fastened any criminality. Rather, once she had denied this writing in her statement u/s 313 Code of Criminal Procedure this writing not having been admitted during the evidence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to have proved her hand writing in accordance with law. This Court need not delve into this aspect as to how that could be done. The very foundation of the case set up by the prosecution that the Respondent was impersonating herself as B.P.E.O is not established from the record.

PW2 Raj Kumar, who worked as Clerk in the office of B.P.E.O. states that the Respondent was visiting this office without any reasonable cause and she writes letters to the "Higher Authorities" by signing under the colour of office of the B.P.E.O. He says that the hand writing in the dispatch register Ext.P1 at page-242 serial No. 44/2001 is in the hand writing of the Respondent. This fact again cannot be accepted as imputing/establishing any criminality on the Respondent. If she was visiting in his office without any official work, that is no offence. It is a public office which is accessible to all and merely because if some person visits it is not by itself an act which is criminal in nature. However, under what circumstances this was being urged as a fact to convict the Respondent is not clear.

To similar effect is the evidence of the other witnesses, namely PW3 Onkar Chand, PW4 Suresh Kumar and PW5 Thakur Sain.

So far as the attendance register is concerned, it is clear in evidence that the place where it was kept, was accessible to two persons, namely the Respondent and PW5 Thakur Sain. In these circumstances to say that it was the Respondent who had the exclusive custody of the register cannot be accepted.

Having given my careful and anxious consideration to the material on record, I cannot disagree with the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court. It is by now well settled that in appeal, if two views are possible, the one favouring the accused should and ought to be accepted unless there is some glaring perversity in the appreciation of evidence which I do not find on the record. The appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds furnished by the Respondent are discharged.