State of Haryana vs Smt. Veenanand Kishore

K.C. Puri, J.—Veena Nand Kishore Plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration to the effect that decision of Defendant No. 2 communicated,--vide letter dated 15th November, 1995 was illegal, arbitrary, unjust, discriminatory and therefore, not binding on her rights.

The Plaintiff filed the suit on the averments that she was married to Nand Kishore who was lastly posted as Lt. Col. in the Indian Army and lost his life on 13th June, 1982 in an accident and, thus, she became a widow in the prime of her life and came to reside at Faridabad and took up a job of a teacher in Apeejay School, Faridabad. The Central as well State Governments took up a joint venture to provide relief and rehabilitation to the widows and dependents of the ex-servicemen who die on duty and for that purpose, the Director General, Resettlement, Ministry of Defence, Government has set up Kandriya Sainik Board which works under the direct control and supervision of the Ministry of Defence and that the State Government has constituted Boards known as Rajya Sainik Board at the State level and Zila Sainik Board at the District level. A post of Assistant Project Officer and Clerk in the Zila Sainik Board was created. She applied for the same and was appointed in the pay scale of Rs. 2000--3200,-- vide appointment letter dated 1st December, 1989. Right from the day of her appointment, she was working efficiently, diligently and has rendered more than five years of service with an unblemished record. Vide letter dated 15th November, 1995, the Defendant No. 2 communicated to the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Collector, Faridabad the decision to abolish the post of Assistant Project Officer in Zila Sainik Board. The Plaintiff challenged the said decision on various grounds.

Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 repudiated the averments of the Plaintiff. Besides taking some preliminary objections, they pleaded that the post of Assistant Project Officer was created only when the work could not be managed with the existing staff of Zila Sainik Board and extension was granted to the said post from time to time on yearly basis. The suit was barred by the rule of estoppel as the government had the right to abolish the post as per existing circumstances. It was, however, admitted that PEXSEM Scheme was still in operation and that the Plaintiff had served for more than five years and there was nothing on record against her.

On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:

(1) Whether the impugned order dated 15th November, 1995 is illegal, arbitrary etc. as alleged ? OPP

(2) Whether the suit is bad for want of notice u/s 80 CPC, as alleged ? OPD

(3) Whether the suit is bad for mis joinder and non joinder of parties, as alleged ? OPD

(4) Relief.

The trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant. As a result thereof, the suit of the Plaintiff was decreed,--vide judgment and decree dated 26th April, 1996.

The State of Haryana filed an appeal which was dismissed by the then Additional District Judge, Faridabad,--vide judgment and decree dated 21st April, 1998.

Feeling dis-satisfied with the said judgment and decree, the State of Haryana, Defendant has filed the instant appeal in this Court.

The Plaintiff filed another suit for declaration to the effect that the order of termination of her services,--vide memo dated 15th July, 1998 was illegal, arbitrary, mala fide and not binding on her and to the effect that she continues to be in service of Zila Sainik Board, Faridabad and was entitled to entire salary, emoluments, perks, increments and all other service benefits from the date of termination till the order of reinstatement and for permanent injunction.

The said suit was also resisted by the Defendants.

The trial Court framed seven issues. After giving findings on different issues, the learned trial Court,--vide judgment and decree dated 6th November, 2004 decreed the suit of the Plaintiff.

The Defendants of that suit filed an appeal which was accepted by the then Additional District Judge, Faridabad,--vide judgment and decree dated 25th March, 2005 and the suit of the Plaintiff was dismissed.

Feeling aggrieved, the Plaintiff has filed Regular Second Appeal No. 1423 of 2005 in this Court.

(13) The Plaintiff also filed COCP No. 419 of 2004 u/s 2(b) read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for initiating contempt proceedings against the Respondents A.N. Mathur, Chief Secretary, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh, Brig. Sher Singh, Secretary, Rajya Sainik Board, Sector 12, Panchkula and Maj. R.K. Sharma, Secretary, Zila Sainik Board, Sector 16, Faridabad.

Since common questions of fact and law are involved in all these three cases, by consent of learned Counsel appearing on both sides, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. However, facts are being extracted from Regular Second Appeal No. 2693 of 1998.

I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case.

So far as C.O.C.P. No. 419 of 2004 u/s 2(b) read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for initiating contempt proceedings is concerned, Smt. Veena Nand Kishore has received an amount of Rs. 7,60781 after deducting income tax of Rs. 40,000,--vide cheque No. 096535, dated 20th April, 2004 against her monthly pay and allowances from 16th July, 1998 to 31st March, 2004 as ordered in Regular Second Appeal No. 2693 of 1998. So, the order of the High Court stands complied with. Otherwise also, no arguments have been addressed on the C.O.C.R and as such the same stands dismissed.

First of all, I shall take up Regular Second Appeal No. 2693 of 1998.

Mr. Sindhu, DAG has submitted that the following substantial questions of law have arisen:

(1) Whether both the Courts below could ignore the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 17496 of 1995 Ombir Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors. and in Civil Writ Petition No. 17437 of 1995 titled Ris. Maj. Balbir Singh Dhanda (Retd.) v. Union of India and Ors. in which the order of termination of Assistant Project Officers including that of Plaintiff dated 15th November, 1995 was not set aside ?

(2) Whether the Plaintiff has got any right to remain in service after 15th November, 1995 or at the most after 31st March, 1996 when the PEXSEM Scheme lapsed ?

Learned Counsel of the State has submitted that it is an admitted case of the parties that the Plaintiff Ombir Singh and Major Balbir Singh were appointed as Assistant Project Officers under PEXSEM Scheme. The said scheme was controlled and supervised by the Director General of Re-settlement under the Ministry of Defence, through Rajya Sainik Board. The said scheme was sponsored and implemented by the Central Government with the assistance of State Government. The said scheme was extended on year to year basis. Secretary, Rajya Sainik board,--vide letter No. 35/5/PEX/94-95/113, dated 15th November, 1995 abolished the post of Assistant Project Officer at Bhiwani, Jind and Faridaad. The Plaintiff was working an Assistant Project Officer at Faridabad whereas two other persons were appointed as Assistant project Officers in Bhiwani and Jind. Later two Assistant Project Officers challenged the said order by filing Civil Writ Petition Nos. 17496 of 1995 titled Ombir Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors. and 17437 of 1995 titled Ris. Maj. Balbir Singh Dhanda (Retd.) v. Union of India and Ors.. These writ petitions were diposed off,--vide judgments dated 1st December, 1995 and 22nd January, 1996 respectively directing the State Government to consider their cases for absorption within six months but not granting any relief regarding setting aside the order dated 15th November, 1995. Veena Nand Kishore, Plaintiff filed civil suit for declaration and injunction on 25th November, 1995, challenging the order dated 15th November, 1995. Both these orders dated 1st December, 1995 and 22nd January, 1996 were placed on the file of trial Court as well as first Appellate Court. In the grounds of appeal also, it was pleaded that since Division Benches of Punjab and Haryana High Court has dismissed both Civil Writ Petition Nos. 17496 of 1995 and 17437 of 1995, referred to above, as such the first Appellate Court cannot hold the order dated 15th November, 1995 as illegal. Both the Courts below have declared order dated 15th November, 1995 illegal on the ground that the same had been passed by Secretary, Zila Parishad, Haryana without the permission of the State Government. It is submitted that permission of the State Government was obtained prior to the passing of the order dated 15th November, 1995. Moreover, since the Division Benches of our own High Court have ultimately held the order dated 15th November, 1995 as legal and as such the first Appellate Court should have accepted the appeal of the Appellant and set aside the judgment dated 6th November, 2004 passed by the trial Court.

It is further submitted that even according to the document Exhibit P5, produced by the Plaintiff herself, PEXSEM Scheme was extended up to 31st March, 1996. There is not a single document on the file to warrant conclusion that after 31st March, 1996, the scheme under which the Plaintiff and other two Assistant project Officers were appointed was extended by any competent authority. The appointment letter, Exhibit P-l, clearly shows that the Plaintiff had been appointed as Assistant project Officer in Zila Sainik board, Faridabad in PEXSEM Scheme on temporary basis. Since the scheme was not extended after 31st March, 1996, the trial Court should have dismissed the suit of the Plaintiff on that sole ground. The point of discrimination was raised by the Plaintiff before both the Courts below, but that did not find favour with the trial Court as well as first Appellate Court. That being a finding of fact, cannot be interfered with in the Regular Second Appeal. Prayer has been made for acceptance of appeal and for setting aside the judgments of both the Courts below and for dismissing the suit of the Plaintiff.

The learned Counsel for the Appellant has further submitted that the Plaintiff has drawn the salary up to August, 2004 under the order of the Hon''ble High Court. The Plaintiff is liable to refund the said amount. Otherwise also, after 2004, the Plaintiff went abroad many times and in the last two years, she has not worked with the Appellant.

In reply to the above submissions, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff has supported the judgments of both the Courts below. It is submitted that both the Courts below have returned concurrent finding that no permission of the State Government was obtained before abolishing the post on 15th November, 1995. That being a finding of fact, cannot be interfered with. So far as the submission made by the State counsel that both the Courts below could not decree the suit of the Plaintiff on account of Civil Writ Petition Nos. 17496 of 1995 and 17437 of 1995 is concerned, the Plaintiff was not a party in those writ petitions and as such decision in those writ petitions is not binding on the Plaintiff. It is further submitted that in the said writ petitions, it was not adjudicated upon that order dated 15th November, 1995,--vide which the services of the Plaintiff and other two Assistant Project Officers at Bhiwani and Jind were terminated was passed prior to the obtaining of permission of the State Government. Admittedly, the posts of Assistant Project Officers at Faridabad, Bhiwani and Jind were created by the State Government and only the State Government can abolish the said posts.

So far as the submission made by Mr. Sindhu to the effect the since PEXSEM Scheme has lapsed on 31st March, 1996 is concerned, that submission also cannot be accepted. Since the termination order dated 15th November, 1995 is bad and as such the Plaintiff would be deemed to be in service till her retirement which is due in the month of April, 2008. The Appellant has not allowed the Plaintiff to work after 2006 and she is entitled to the salary till her retirement with all consequential benefits till April, 2008. It is further submitted that although both the Courts below have not accepted the plea of Plaintiff regarding discrimination but the fact remains that the Division Benches of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 17496 of 1995 and 17437 of 1995 have ordered the State Government to consider the case of Petitioner Ombir Singh and Ris. Maj. Balbir Singh Dhanda, respectively for their appointment/absorption with the State Government. Ombir Singh has been absorbed in the Agriculture Department. So, the Plaintiff has been discriminated. Therefore, the findings of both the Courts below that there is no discrimination are liable to be set aside.

It is further submitted that the State of Haryana filed SLP in the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India challenging the order of the High Court of payment of dues to the Plaintiff. In that petition, the State of Haryana has taken the plea that the judgments of both the Courts below are faulty on the ground that both of them have not taken into consideration the orders dated 1st December, 1995 and 22nd January, 1996 passed in Civil Writ petition Nos. 17496 of 1995 and 17437 of 1995 but their plea did not find favour. So, the Appellant cannot raise the same point again.

It is further submitted that the department/State of Haryana is deadly against the Appellant. Not only she had been harassed but her services were again terminated on 15th July, 1998 on the ground that PEXSEM Scheme has lapsed in the year 1996. That order, according to the Appellant, has been passed after obtaining permission of the Government. The Plaintiff has challenged the said order in the second suit. That suit was decreed by the trial Court but the first Appellate Court accepted the appeal of the Appellant and the Plaintiff has filed Regular Second Appeal No. 1423 of 2005.

The learned Counsel for the Respondent has relied upon the following authorities:

(1) Avtar Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Ors. 1998 (3) SLR 646

(2) Dr. K. K. Chakrabarti v. West Bengal Electronics Industry Department Corporation Limited and Ors. 1996 (8) SLR 122

(3) Union of India and Ors. v. Subir Kukharji and Ors. 1998 (2) SLR 718

(4) State of Punjab and Ors. v. Gursharan Singh and Ors. 1997(1) SLR 138

(5) Anup Singh, Head Draftsman, Zila Parishad v. The State of Haryana and Ors. 1969 S.L.R. 850

(6) Yogender Prasad v. State of Manipur, 2000 (5) SLR 213

(7) Vishvanath Vairupathi Kittur v. State of Gujarat and Anr. 1978(1) SLR 431 (8) Dr. Prem Behari Lal Saxena Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another,

(9) State of Haryana Vs. Shri Des Raj Sangar and Another,

I have carefully considered the submissions made by both sides and have gone through the record of the case.

Admittedly, the Plaintiff was appointed as Assistant Project Officer under the PEXSEM Scheme on temporary basis and the Plaintiff has herself produced her appointment letter, as Exhibit P-1. In that letter, it has been mentioned that the Plaintiff has been appointed on temporary basis for PEXSEM Scheme. It is also not disputed that the said scheme was extended from time to time and the last extension to the said scheme was for the year 1995-96 as is clear from the letter, Exhibit P-4. Exhibit P-5, letter relied upon by the Plaintiff also states the fact that the President has extended PEXSEM Scheme from 1st April, 1995 to 31st March, 1996. The cost of the scheme was to be shared by the Central Government and the State Government in the ratio of 50:50 as per Clause 4 of letter dated 5th July, 1995, Annexure P-5. Exhibit P-6 is the letter from the Secretary, Rajya Sainik board, Haryana addressed to the Deputy Commissioners Bhiwani, Jind and Faridabad, abolishing the posts of Assistant Project Officers in the Zila Sainik boards at three stations with immediate effect in public interest. There is no other document on the file to warrant conclusion that after 31st March, 1996, there was any extension in the PEXSEM Scheme. Both the Courts below have returned finding that since the State Government has not abolished the post of Assistant Project Officer, as such the Secretary, Rajya Sainik Board, Haryana was not competent to abolish the post. Therefore, the order dated 15th November, 1995 was illegal and void.

The stand of the Appellant is that said order dated 15th November, 1995 has been passed with prior approval of the Government. However, leaving apart the said controversy, both he Courts below have committed an error by not taking into account the judgments in Civil Writ petition No. 17496 of 1995 Ombir Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors. and Civil Writ Petition No. 17437 of 1995 Ris. Maj. Balbir Singh Dhanda (Retd.) v. Union of India and Ors. decided on 1st December, 1995 and 22nd January, 1996 respectively. In both these Civil Writ Petitions, Petitioner Ombir Singh and Petitioner Ris Major Balbir Singh Dhanda have challenged order dated 15th November, 1995,--vide which the posts of Assistant Project Officers held by those Petitioners and the Plaintiff were abolished and the Division Benches dismissed the writ petitions with liberty to the Petitioners of both the cases to move the Government for their absorption on the equivalent posts but it was made clear that was not a direction to the authorities to absorb the Petitioner of those cases. So, once the same order,--vide which the services of the Plaintiff were terminated was up-held by the Division Benches of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, both the Courts below have committed an illegality by ignoring the same. From the perusal of the file of the trial Court, it is revealed that the photostat copy of civil Writ Petition No. 17496 of 1995 has been placed on the file. Both the Courts below should have considered those judgments. Both the Courts below have committed an illegality in not even discussing both these Civil Writ Petitions although the copies of the same were on the file of the trial Court as well as Appellate Court.

The subsequent events have also to be taken into account while deciding the case. Even according to the Plaintiff, there is no extension of PEXSEM Scheme after 31st March, 1996. The counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondent could not point out to any document on the file to show that the PEXSEM Scheme was extended after 31st March, 1996. In the worst circumstances, ever if the order dated 15th November, 1995 was not to be held valid by the trial Court (which is absolutely wrong, as discussed above), in that case also, both the Courts below could not decree the suit of the Plaintiff when the scheme had lapsed after 31st March, 1996. In these circumstances, the Plaintiff, at the most, could remain in service upto 31st March, 1996 and not thereafter.

So far as submission made by the counsel for the Plaintiff to the effect that the Plaintiff has been discriminated, inasmuch as Ombir Singh has been absorbed in another department is concerned, there is definite finding of both the Courts below that the Plaintiff has failed to prove discrimination. That being a finding of fact, cannot be challenged in Regular Second Appeal. Otherwise also, the Plaintiff has not filed any separate appeal challenging those findings. No doubt, the Plaintiff/ Respondent can argue that point to support the judgments of both the Courts below, but, as discussed above, since there is concurrent finding of fact, as such the same cannot be interfered with in the Regular Second Appeal as the High Court has been debarred u/s 100 CPC to decide the question of fact, unless the same is result of mis-reading the evidence or mis-interpreting the same. There is nothing on the file that the said finding is by mis-reading or mis-interpreting the evidence and the documents on the file. No order of appointment of Ombir Singh has been placed in the trial Court file of this RSA, although the same has been placed on another RSA No. 1423 of 2005. From the perusal of that order, it is revealed that Ombir Singh has not been absorbed in the Sainik Board Department but has been appointed in Agriculture Department. It is not clear whether said Ombir Singh was senior or junior to the Plaintiff. Otherwise also, there is no document on the file that the Plaintiff approached the State for her absorption on the termination of her services on 15th November, 1995 and even after 15th July, 1998. The Plaintiff could only raise grievance in case she had approached the authorities after accepting her termination and in case her junior had been absorbed and she had been left out, but, the counsel for the Plaintiff was fair enough to concede that the Plaintiff has never approached the State of Haryana for her absorption.

The other submission made by the counsel for the Appellant to the effect that the Plaintiff has also pleaded before the Apex Court that Civil Writ Petition Nos. 17496 of 1995 titled Ombir Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors. and 17437 of 1995 titled Ris. Maj. Balbir Singh Dhanda v. Union of India and Ors., have not been considered by both the Courts below and on that count the stay order in favour of the Plaintiff should be vacated and that on that count the Plaintiff cannot raise that point in the present appeal.

The said submission is without any legal force. The point before the Apex Court was whether to continue the stay in favour of the Plaintiff or not. The Apex Court has not decided the other point in its order dated 6th March, 1998. So, the above-said submissions are also devoid of any legal force.

So far as authorities reported as Avtar Singh and others, Subir Mukharji and others, Gursharan Singh and others, (supra) are concerned, these relate to absorption but since the Plaintiff has never applied for absorption as such these authorities are not helpful to the Plaintiff.

So far as K. K. Chakrabarti''s case (supra) is concerned, that authority is hardly applicable to the facts of the present case. The Plaintiff has failed to prove any mala fide on the part of the Appellant.

Authorities reported as Anup Singh (supra) and Yogender Prasad (supra) also relate to absorption but since the Plaintiff has not applied for absorption, as such the Plaintiff cannot have any benefit of the said authorities. Authority in Vishvanath Vairupathi Kittur''s case (supra) relates to abolition of permanent posts. In the present case, the Plaintiff was working on temporary post on temporary basis which was extended from time to time. In authority in Prem Beharr Lal Saxena''s case (surpa), it has been held that opportunity must be given to show cause against the abolition, but, in the present case, the post was for a fixed period up to 31st March, 1996 and thereafter the Plaintiff has got no right to remain in service. The Plaintiff knew the fact that she was on temporary basis on a temporary post which was extended from time to time. Authority in Des Raj Sangar''s case (supra), is distinguishable as in that case it was proved that the post was abolished mala fide.

The counsel for the Appellant has submitted that the salary paid to the Plaintiff be ordered to be refunded by the Plaintiff.

I have carefully considered the said submission but that plea cannot be accepted. Once the Plaintiff has worked with the Defendant, the Defendant/Appellant is bound to comply with the order of this Court as up-held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court. The Plaintiff is entitled to the salary for the period for which she has worked.

The other submission made by the counsel for the Appellant to the effect that the Plaintiff remained in foreign country and for that period, the Plaintiff cannot claim salary for tnat period and that after August, 2006, the Plaintiff has not joined with the Appellant and on that count, the Plaintiff is not entitled for salary for that period is concerned, in this regard, it is observed that the Plaintiff shall be entitled to salary for the period for which she has actually worked and not for the period for which she has not worked because her termination order has been held valid.

In view of above discussion, the points for determination stand determined in favour of the Appellant and against the Plaintiff. Consequently, the findings on issue No. 1 stand reversed and this issue stand determined in favour of the Appellant. Resultantly, this Regular Second Appeal No. 2693 of 1998 stands accepted. The judgments and decrees of both the Courts below stand set aside and the suit of the Plaintiff for declaration and injunction stands dismissed. However, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

So far as Regular Second Appeal No. 1423 of 2005 preferred by the Plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 25th March, 2005 passed by Shri R. S. Virk, the then Additional District Judge, Faridabad,--vide which the judgment and decree dated 6th November, 2004 by Mrs. Anita Dahiya, Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Faridabad have been set aside is concerned, that appeal has become infructuous because her previous termination order on the basis of abolition of post on 15th November, 1995 has been held valid. However, for academic discussion, since the Plaintiff/Appellant has raised number of substantial questions of law, as such the same are being answered hereinafter.

The Plaintiff/Appellant has raised the following questions of law, which according to the counsel for the Appellant, are substantial questions of law:

(i) Whether an employee whose services are terminated by way of discrimination etc., can seek redressal of his grievance by filing a suit for declaration with consequential reliefs ?

(ii) Whether the jurisdiction u/s 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in such like matters is to be availed as an ordinary rung of litigation and invocation of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India is exceptional and discretionary remedy ?

(iii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the post of Appellant which was abolished in November 15,1995 for which the State was defending its action before the Hon''ble High Court could again be abolished. In other words, an already abolished post could not be abolished again ?

(iv) Whether the abolition of the post in the facts and circumstances with retrospective effect is an abuse of the executive power of the State because the action was to bypass the effect of the decree of the Civil Court dated April 16, 1996 and affirmed in appeal dated April 21,1998?

(v) Whether the Respondent was obliged to give one month''s notice to the Appellant before taking action of terminating her service ?

(vi) Whether the Appellant had been discriminated in the public employment because the Appellant has been shown the exit door in service whereas Shri Ombir Singh has been retained by the State thereby infringing the right of the Appellant to hold a post. Since the Appellant''s fundamental right under Article 16 of the Constitution stood violated in the facts of the present case, therefore, it amounted to infringement of civil right, therefore, civil court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the matter and suit was rightly decreed by the court of first instance ?

So far as questions of law Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, in this regard, there is no dispute with the proposition of law and that an employee can approach Civil Court u/s 9 CPC and also invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but the Civil Court as well as High Court has to determine the fact whether the termination order is illegal or discriminatory. As discussed above, order dated 15th July, 1998 again terminating the services of the Plaintiff cannot be said to be illegal, in any manner. In the previous suit, the Civil Court has held that since the permission of the State Government has not been obtained, on that count, the abolition of posts,--vide order dated 15th November, 1995 is illegal. The scheme has lapsed on 31st March, 1996. So, the passing of second order dated 15th July, 1998 after specifically taking permission of the Government cannot be said to be, in any way, mala fide. Once the employee has been given employment on a specific scheme and that scheme lapsed on 31st March, 1996 and the employee is on temporary post under that scheme, the employee has got no legal right to remain in service after the lapse of said scheme. In the present case also, the Plaintiff could not place any document on the file from which it could be concluded that PEXSEM Scheme was extended after 31st March, 1996.

So far as fourth question of law is concerned, the same is not a question of law. The post has not been abolished for the second time,--vide order dated 15th July, 1998 but it has been made clear that the scheme has not been extended after 31st March, 1996. So, it is not the case of abolition of post on 15th July, 1998. In fact, the scheme lapsed after 31st March, 1996.

So far as fifth question of law is concerned, after the lapse of the scheme, there was no need to give notice of termination as scheme has lapsed on 31st March, 1996.

As regards sixth question is concerned, that is not a question of law but is a question of fact. The said point has been discussed in the fore-going para of the judgment. There is no discrimination against the Plaintiff.

In authority reported as Shri Ramendra Kishore Biswas Vs. The State of Tripura and Others, it has been held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction u/s 9 of CPC. There is no dispute with that proposition of law.

Authority reported as Inder Sain Bakshi Vs. Union of India, also relates to jurisdiction u/s 9 CPC.

Authority reported as The State of Bihar Vs. Abdul Majid, relates to jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of service matter.

So, there is no dispute with that propositions of law laid down in these rulings but the fact remains that the employee has to prove the fact that his termination order is illegal. The Plaintiff has failed to prove the said fact.

In view of above discussion, RSA No. 1423 of 2005 titled as Smt. Veena Nand Kishore v. The State of Haryana and Ors. is without any legal force and the same stands dismissed, as having become infructuous as well as on merits also.