State of Haryana and Another vs Usha Atri and Others

M.M. Kumar, J.—This revision petition filed u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity the Code) is directed against the order dated 11th January, 2001 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Karnal (for brevity the Tribunal) directing the judgment--debtor Petitioners to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,08,272.84P. more alongwith interest @ 12 per cent from 1st October, 2000 up to the date.

Facts necessary for deciding the controversy raised are that the decree holder-Respondents (for brevity, the DH-Respondents) filed a claim petition on 29th May, 1982. The claim petition succeeded and an award was made on 2nd March, 1983 by the Tribunal for payment of an amount of Rs. 90,000. Against the order passed by the Tribunal, the DH-Respondents approached the High Court by filing F.A.O. No. 667 of 1983. The High Court enhanced the amount of compensation,--vide its order dated 29th July, 1987 directing the payment to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000. The decree holder-Respondents still felt dissatisfied and filed and appeal bearing L.P.A. No. 798 of 1987 and the Letters Patent Bench,--vide its order dated 17th August, 1999 further enhanced the compensation to Rs. 2,04,000.

The judgment debtor-Petitioners (for brevity, the JD--Petitioners) deposited total amount of Rs. 1,03,454.03 on 5th January, 1985 and another amount of Rs. 1,12,352.00 on 21st December, 1987.

Feeling dissatisfied with the payment of amount of Rs. 1,03,454.03P. on 5th January, 1985 and Rs. 1,12,352.00 on 21st December, 1987, the DH-Respondents filed an execution application claiming more payment as it was argued that the earlier payment made to him is far less than the awarded amount. On the basis of the arguments that payment of interest cannot be confined to the enhanced amount awarded by the learned Single Judge on 29th July, 1987 and then up to date of the judgment of Letters Patent Bench i.e. 17th August, 1999 the decree-holder Respondent claimed the enhanced amount as awarded by the Letters Patent Bench from the date of the application i.e. 29th May, 1982 alongwith interest. Another argument raised was that the decree holder is entitled to apportion the awarded amount received towards costs, then towards interest and then towards additional amount.

The JD-Petitioners had argued that if the calculation is made as suggested by the DH-Respondents then it would amount to compound interest as interest on interest would be added with the principal amount. This principle according to the JD-Petitioners cannot be followed. Before the executing Court it was argued that apportionment made by the judgment debtor-Petitioners while adjusting the amount already received towards interest and then calculating interest on that amount is absolutely against law. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Prem Nath Kapur and Another Vs. National Fertilizers Corpn. of India Ltd. and Others, . The argument of the JD-Petitioners rejected by the Tribunal was that payment made by the judgment debtor--Petitioners must be adjusted towards the principal amount and not towards interest unless there was an agreement to the contrary in which case decree holder--Respondent would be held entitled to apply the payment made by the judgment debtor--Petitioner towards satisfaction of interest in the first instance. The method of calculation adopted by the JD-Petitioners for calculating the total amount of compensation alongwith interest was not approved by the executing Court and a direction was issued to the JD-Petitioners to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,82,072.84P. more alongwith interest @ 12 per cent p.a. from 1st October, 2000 up to date. Feeling aggrieved, the JD-Petitioners have filed the instant petition challenging the order of the executing Court u/s 115 of the Code.

I have heard Shri N.K. Joshi, learned Assistant Advocate General, Haryana for the judgment debtor-Petitioners and Shri Arvind Attri, decree holder-Respondent No. 2, in person.

The first submission of the learned State counsel is that once the principal amount alongwith interest has been paid after the passing of the award on 2nd March, 1983, the additional amount as directed by the High Court was paid after 29th July, 1987 and further additional amount as awarded by the Letters Patent Bench was deposited after the order dated 17th August, 1999 then the amount cannot be calculated by first taking the principal amount as on the date of the claim petition and then calculating interest on the total awarded amount. According to the learned State counsel such a method would ignore the period for which the payment had already been made by the JD-Petitioners after the award and also after the order of the learned Single Judge. The amount so paid has been utilised by the DH-Respondents. In other words, the learned State counsel has argued that once the original amount as awarded in the award dated 2nd March, 1983 is paid on 5th January, 1985 then merely for the reason that on 17th August, 1999, the L.P.A. Bench had enhanced the amount of award to Rs. 2,04,000 would not mean that the enhanced amount of Rs. 2,04,000 has become available to the DH-Respondents from the date of the claim petition with interest because the amount of the award as well as the amount enhanced by the learned Single Judge stood already paid. He has further argued that interest would be payable only on the enhanced amount awarded. According to the learned Counsel, the decree holder-Respondents are not entitled to apportion the compensation amount already received first towards costs, then towards interest and then for the enhanced additional amount awarded.

On the other hand, Shri Attri appearing in person has argued that the calculations submitted by the decree-holder Respondents are in accordance with the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sukhdev Pershad v. B. Kishanlal and Ors. (1996)1 CCC 320 judgment of the Supreme Court in Mathunni Mathai Vs. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Limited and another, and Kaushnuma Begum and Ors. v. New India Insurance Co Ltd. (2001)2 PLR 334

I have thoughtfully considered the rival contentions raised by both the parties. It would be pertinent to make a reference to various provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity, 1894 Act) and compare them with the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity, 1988 Act). Sections 28 and 34 of 1894 Act and Sections 149, 171 and 172 of 1988 Act are juxta-posed for facility of reference.

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Motor Vehicles Act. 1988

Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation.�If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of (nine per centum) per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court:

Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks.�(1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under Sub-section (3) of Section 147 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment or award in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) for by the policy then notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together, with any amount payable in respect of interest on that sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments.

(Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry.)

(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under Sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal : and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely:

Payment ofinterest.�When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of (nine per centum) per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited.

(a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely:�

(Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.)

(i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle �

(a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or

(b) for organised racing and speed testing, or

(c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or

(d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle ; or

(ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or perosns or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification ; or

(iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion ; or

(b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the nondisclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular.

(3) Where any such judgment as is referred to in Sub-section (1) is obtained from a Court in a reciprocating country and in the case of a foreign judgment is, by virtue of the provisions of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) conclusive as to any matter adjudicated upon by it, the insurer [being an insurer registered under the Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938) and whether or not he is registered under the corresponding law of the reciprocating country] shall be liable to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree in the manner and to the extent specified in Sub-section (1), as if the judgment were given was a Court in India:

Provided that no sum shall be payable by the insurer in respect of any such judgment unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given, the insurer had notice through the court concerned of the bringing of the proceedings and the insurer to whom notice is so given is entitled under the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, to be made a party to the proceedings and to defend the action on grounds similar to those specified in Sub-section (2).

(4) Where a certificate of insurer has been issued under Sub-section (3) of Section 147 to the person by whom a policy has been effected, so much of the policy as purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured thereby by reference to any conditions other than those in Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) shall, as respects such liabilities as are required to be covered by a policy under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147, be of no effect:

Provided that any sum paid by the insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which is covered by the policy by virtue only of this Sub-section shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person.

(5) If the amount which an insurer becomes liable under this section to pay in respect of a liability incurred by a person insured by a policy exceeds the amount for which the insurer would apart from the provisions of this section be liable under the policy in respect of that liability, the insurer shall be entitled to recover the excess from that person.

(6) In this section the expressions "material fact" and "material particular" means, respectively a fact or particular of such a nature as to influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining whether he will take the risk and, if so, at what premium and on what conditions, and the expression ''liability covered by the terms of the policy" means a liability which is covered by the policy or which would be so covered but for the fact that the insurer is entitled to avoid or cancel or has avoided or cancelled the policy.

(7) No insurer to whom the notice referred to in Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment or award as is referred to in Sub-section (1) or in such judgment as is referred to in Sub-section (3) otherwise that in the manner provided for in Sub-section (2) or in the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, as the case may be.

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Award of interest where any claim is allowed.�

Where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compesnation made under this act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be apid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf.

Award of compensatory costs in certain cases.�(1) Any Claims Tribunal adjudicating upon any claim for compensation under this Act, may in any case where it is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that:

(a) the policy of insurance is void on the ground that it was obtained by representation of fact which was false in any material particular, or

(b) any party or insurer has put forward a false or vexations claim or defence, such Tribunal may make an order for the payment, by the party who is guilty of misrepresentation or by whom such claim or defence has been put forward of special costs by way of compensation to the insurer or, as the case may be, to the party against whom such claim or defence has been put forward.

(2) No Claims Tribunal shall pass an order for special costs under Sub-section (1) for any amount exceeding one thousand rupees.

(3) No person or insurer against whom an order has been made under this section shall, by reason thereof be exempted from any criminal liability in respect of such misrepresentation, claim or defence as is referred to in Sub-section (1).

(4) Any amount awarded by way of compensation under this section in respect of any misrepresentation, claim or defence, shall be taken into account in any subsequent suit for damages for compensation in respect of such misrepresentation, claim or defence."

A perusal of the p1 acquisition of land and 1988 Act revisions of 1894 Act concerning concerning accidents claims wouldshow that both are entirely different in their nature, content and language. Under the 1894 Act, comprehensive guidance has been provided by the legislature u/s 28. In cases where the Court has taken the view that Collector ought to have awarded more compensation then on the enhanced amount the Collector is under obligation to pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment to Court. The proviso added to Section 28 takes care of a situation where the enhanced amount or part thereof is paid in the Court after the expiry of period of one year from the date on which possession is taken. In such like case, interest is payable at the rate of 15% per annum on the amount paid after one year. Similar provision is made u/s 34. However, u/s 177 of 1988 Act, no such statutory provision has been made and the same has been left to the discretion of the Tribunal. Interest payable is simple interest and from such a date not earlier than the date of making the claim. u/s 149 of 1988 Act the duty of the insurer to satisfy the judgment and award has been emphasised. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned State counsel in Prem Nath Kapur''s case (supra) would not have any application because that judgment concerns the Act 1894. The other judgment in the case of HUDA v. Devinder Kaur 2001(3) PLR 876 would also not be applicable as it also arises from the Act 1894.

In order to ascertain the method of apportionment of the payment made, the general principles enshrined under Order XXI, Rule 1 of the Code have to be considered. The provision of order XXI Rule 1 of the Code reads as under:

ORDER XXI

EXECUTION OF DECREES AND ORDERS

Payment under decree

Modes of paying money under decree.--(1) All money, payable under a decree shall be paid as follows, namely:

(a) by deposit into the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, or sent to that Court by postal money order or through a bank ; or

(b) out of Court, to the decree-holder by postal money order or through a bank or by any other mode wherein payment is evidenced in writing ; or

(c) otherwise, as the Court which made the decree, directs.

(2) Where any payment is made under Clause (a) or Clause (c) of Sub-rule (1), the judgment-debtor shall give notice thereof to the decree-holder either through the court or directly to him by registered post, acknowledgement due.

(3) Where money is paid by postal money order or through a bank under Clause (a) of Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1), the money order or payment through bank, as the case may be, shall accurately state the following perticulars, namely:

(a) the number of original suit ;

(b) the names of the parties or where there are more than two Plaintiffs or more than two Defendants, as the case may be, the names of the first two Plaintiffs and the first two Defendants ;

(c) how the money remitted is to be adjusted, that is to say, whether it is towards the principal, interest or costs ;

(d) the number of the execution case of the Court, where such case is pending ; and

(e) the name and address of the payer.

(4) On any amount paid under Clause (a) or Clause (c) of Sub-rule (1), interest, if any, shall cease to run from the date of service of the notice referred to in Sub-rule (2).

(5) On any amount paid under Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1), interest, if any, shall cease to run from the date of such payment:

Provided that, where the decree-holder refuses to accept the postal money order or payment through a bank, interest shall cease to run from the date on which the money was tendered to him, or where he avoids acceptance of postal money order or payment through bank, interest shall cease to run from the date on which the money would have been tendered to him in the ordinary course of business of the postal authorities or the bank, as the case may be.

A perusal of Rule 1 of Order XXI of the Code would show that if the amount payable by the JD-Petitioners has already been paid out of the Court then it is required to be mentioned inter-alia as to how the money remitted is to be adjusted i.e. whether the amount is to be applied towards the principal, interest or costs. It is further made clear by Sub-rule 4 of Rule 1 of Order XXI of the Code that interest on any amount paid shall cease to run from the date of such payment. A perusal of the calculation sheet prepared by the JD-Petitioners shows that an amount of Rs. 1, 03, 454. 30Ps. was deposited on 29th January, 1984 by bank draft as the award was announced by the Tribunal on 2nd March, 1983 for an amount of Rs. 90,000 awarding interest at the rate of 6% from the date of claim petition i.e. 15th June, 1982 till the date of payment. The aforementioned amount represented principal sum of Rs. 90,000 plus interest Rs. 13,152.30 (at the rate of Rs. 6% from 15th June, 1982 to 19th November, 1984) and costs Rs. 302. The amount of compensation was enhanced to Rs. 1,50,000 on 29th July, 1987 by learned Single Judge in FAO No. 467 of 1983. Further amount of Rs. 1,12,351.80 was paid on 21st December, 1987. The break up of the amount is as under:

Balance amount 60,000-00

Interest on 60,000 39,471-80

@12% (15-6-82 to 7-12-87) Interest on 90,000 13,152-30

@ 6% (15-6-82 to 19-11-84) Awarded amount balance Cost 60,000-00 29-70

Total 1,12,653-80

Less cost already paid Net amount payable 302-00 1,12,351-80

Similarly after the amount was enhanced by the Letters Patent Bench on 17th August, 1999 to Rs. 2,04,000 with 12% interest an amount of Rs. 1,72,184 was deposited on 19th September, 2000 by bank draft as the balance amount. The amount of Rs. 1,72,184 has been calculated in the following manner:

Amount awarded 2,04,000-00

Less amount already paid 1,50,000-00

Net amount payable 54,000-00

Interest on 54,000 @12% (15-6-82 to 5-9-2000) 1,18,184-00

Net amount enhanced 54,000-00

Net amount payable 1,72,184-00

The principle followed by the JD-Petitioners in making payment to the DH-Respondent is that the amount paid is applied first towards principal, then towards interest and thereafter towards cost. However, this has been disputed by the DH-Respondent by arguing that the amount paid has to be applied first towards cost, then interest and then to principal. The provisions of Sub-rule 5 of the Rule 1 of Order XXI of the Code provides that if the amount is paid, interest shall cease to run from the date of such payment. This principle has been approved in Mathunni Mathai v. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. (supra). Interpreting the provisions of Sub-rule 4 and 5, their Lordships have observed as under:

The words of the section are clear. It has been construed broadly by the courts. The right of the creditor was further explained judicially in Rai Bahadur Seth Nemichand v. Seth Radha Kishen AIR 1922 PC 26 and it was held that the creditor was not bound to accept a payment on condition of the judgment-debtor. For the decrees passed by courts, the provision was made in unamended Order XXI, Rule 1 prior to 1976 and it was provided that the amount be deposited in the court whose duty it was to execute the decree. It was further provided by Sub-rule (2) that where any payment was made under Clause (a) Sub-rule (1) notice of such payment was to be given to the decree-holder. It was this rule which was construed in Meghraj and Others Vs. Mst. Bayabai and Others, . The Court held that even though the judgment-debtor while depositing decretal amount from time to time stated that payments were being made towards the principal due but in absence of any evidence that the decree-holder was informed about the nature of deposit of the decree-holder appropriated it towards the principal, the ordinary rule applied and the payments by the judgment-debtor could be appropriated towards interest and cost as held in Meka Venkatadri Appa Rao Bahadur Zamindar Garu v. Raja Parthasarathy Appa Rao Bahadur Zamindar Garu AIR 1922 PC 233. It may now be seen if the principle laid down in this decision stands diluted by amendment of Rule 1. The relevant portion of the amended rule reads as under:

Order XXI, Rule 1, Modes of paying money under decree.--(1) All money, payable under a decree shall be paid as follows, namely:

(a) by deposit into the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, or sent to that Court by postal money order to through a bank ; or

(b) out of Court, to the decree-holder by postal money order or through a bank or by any other mode wherein payment is evidenced in writing ; or

(c) otherwise, as the Court which made the decree, directs.

(2) Where any payment is made under Clause (a) or Clause (c) of Sub-rule (1), the judgment-debtor shall give notice thereof to the decree-holder either through the Court or directly to him by registered post, acknowledgement due.

(3) * * *

(4) On any amount paid under Clause (a) or Clause (c) of Sub-rule (1), interest, if any, shall cease to run from the date of service of the notice referred to in Sub-rule (2).

The amended Sub-rule (2) removes the doubt if there was any that the judgment-debtor is not absolved of the obligation of informing the decree-holder by written notice even in respect of deposit in court either directly or by registered post. The purpsoe of addition of the expression "either through court directly or by registered post acknowledgement due" is that the judgment-debtor should not only give notice of payment but he must ensure that the decree-holder has been served with the notice. The ratio laid down in Maghraj''s case (supra) applied now with greater rigour. The reason for the rule both in the unamended and amended provision appears to be that if the judgment-debtor intends that the running of interest should cease then he must intimate in writing and ensure that it is served on the decree-holder. Sub-rules (4) and (5) added in 1976 to protect the judgment-debtor provide for cessation of interest from the date of deposit or payment. But the cessation of interest under Sub-rule (4) takes place not by payment alone but from the date of service of the notice referred to in Sub-rule (2). It is not necessary for purposes of this case to decide whether the creditor was bound to appropriate the amount towards principal once it was deposited in court and intimation of the deposit was served on the decree-holder as it does not appear that the Respondent ever served any notice on the Appellant about the deposit. It is true that the amount was deposited in January, 1988. But in the absence of any intimation as required by Sub-rule (2) and indication of manner of appropriation, the payment could not be deemed to have been appropriated towards principal unless the decree-holder admits it to be so. The reasoning of the High Court that since the deposit was made in pursuance of order of this Court it would be deemed that the deposit was towards principal does not appear to be correct. Actually, there was no direction to deposit. The court only granted an interim order in respect of escalation. Therefore, the judgment-debtor was bound to deposit the decretal amount in accordance with law. And that is provided for by Order XXI, Rule 1 of the CPC Code. But mere deposit in absence of any notice and intimation that it was being deposited towards principal, it was for the decree-holder to appropriate it towards the dues. That is that was laid down in Meghraj''s case (supra).

The aforementioned judgment has been over ruled in Prem Nath Kapur''s case (supra) with regard to its applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 of the Code to the cases arising out of 1894 Act because Order XXI Rule 1 of the code is inconsistent with the express opinion contained in Sections 28 and 34 of 1894 Act. The judgment in Mathunni Mathai''s case (supra) has further been explained in the case of M/s. Industrial Credit and Development Syndicate Now Called I.C.D.S. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Smithaben H. Patel and Others, . The view taken is that the payment has to be adjusted according to the terms of the decree if any. However, in the absence of such directions adjustment has to be made subject to an agreement to the contrary between the parties firstly, towards payment of principal amount, then interest and thereafter towards cost. In this regard, the observations of their Lordships read as under:

In view of what has been noticed hereinabove we hold that the general rule of appropriation of payments towards a decretal amount is that such an amount is to be adjusted firstly, strictly in accordance with the directions contained in the decree and in the absence of such directions payment of the principal amount. Such a principle is, however, subject to one exception, i.e., that the parties may agree to the adjustment of the payment in any other manner despite the decree. As and when such an agreement is pleaded, the onus of proving is always upon the person pleading the . agreement contrary to the general rule or the terms of the decree schedule. The provisions of Sections 59 to 61 of the Contract Act are applicable in cases where a debtor owes several distinct debts to one person and do. not deal with cases in which the principal and interest are due on a single debt.

Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur Vs. Smt. Poonam Pahwa and others, upholding the contention that the principle laid down in Order XXI Rule 1 of the Code would apply to the Tribunals. In this regard, the observations of their Lordships read as under:

It appears to us that the provisons of Order XXI Rule 1 are not in any way inconsistent with the provisions for awarding just and fair compensation in Motor Accident Claims. The real purpose of awarding just and fair compensation to the victim of the accident or the legal heirs of such victim will be fulfilled by applying the principle of Order XXI Rule 1 CPC so that the awardee is not deprived of the opportunity of gainfully utilising the amount under the award for want of notice about the deposit made by judgment debtor resulting in the sum remaining unutilised. In our view, therefore, there is no difficulty to apply the underlying principles under Order XXI Rule 1 CPC in executing the award of compensation passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the Tribunal must be held to be competent to invoke the beneficial provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 CPC Code.

After the amendment of Order XXI Rule 1 in 1976, there is no scope for any controversy as to the liability of the judgment debtor when the decretal amount is deposited in Court but the notice of such deposit is not given to the decree holder. It is imperative that the judgment debtor has to give notice to the decree holder about deposit for the decretal amount. Since motor accident in the instant ease, had taken place on 7th May, 1983, Order XXI Rule 1 being a procedural law, amended provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable even if the accident had taken place prior to 1976 because such amendment of procedural law is retrospective in its operation.

When the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned judgments are applied to the facts of the instant case it becomes evident that the revision petition deserves to succeed. It is apparent that after the award was passed on 2nd March, 1983 for a sum of Rs. 90,000, the payment was made on 29th January, 1984. Similarly after the enhancement was ordered by the learned Single Judge, payment was made on 29th July, 1987 and similarly after the decision was rendered by the Letters Patent Bench on 17th August, 1999 the amount was paid on 19th September, 2000. No grievance has been made showing non-compliance of any provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 of the Code. However, the argument raised by the DH-Respondent is that the amount paid should first be appropriated to interest, then costs and thereafter principal. If aforesaid principle is applied in the present case, it would result into undersirable results because once the amount has been paid at the various stages in accordance with the decree as stood at that stage then re-calculation of interest would omit the benefit of payment towards interest made to the DH-Respondent paid earlier. Therefore, it would amount to calculating interest over interest. The revision petition is thus, liable to be accepted.

For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition succeeds and the same is allowed.