State of H.P. vs Som Raj & Ors

Scope of interference with an acquittal:

26.

At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater.

27.

In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words:

“25.

Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”

28.

The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence.

29.

In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed:

“75.

The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”

30.

The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses.

31.

In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

32.

The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

33.

Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so.

“12.

On having gone through the record of the case, there is not even an iota of evidence to attract the offence under Section 3(1)(X) of the Act, as the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the complainant was a member of the "Scheduled Caste" community.

13.

Section 2(1)(c) of the Act says that "Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes" shall have meanings assigned to them respectively under clause (24) and clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution. 'Scheduled Caste' under clause (24) means such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, races or tribes as are deemed under Article 341 to be "Scheduled Castes" for the purposes of this Constitution and similarly under clause (25) "Scheduled Tribes" mean as stated in Article 342 of the Constitution of India.

14.

Under Article 341 of the Constitution, a notification is required to be issued by the Central or State Government specifying the castes, races or tribes or part of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purpose of this Constitution be deemed to be "Scheduled Castes" in relation to that State (or Union Territory, as the case may be). However, Parliament by law may include or exclude from the list of "Scheduled Castes" specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.

15.

The notification as required under the above provision of the Constitution has not been produced or proved that the complainant belongs to a caste which is declared to be a "Scheduled Caste" to attract the provisions of this Act. Hence, the charge against the accused persons under the Act is not proved at all.

"FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and High Court of H.P.^{that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due} deliberations and consultations and was then ante-dated to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8."

“12.

Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1].”

“14.

We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version.

15.

In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.”

“Rasikabai says that the "accused" raised their axes and sticks and threatened her when she called out to them, but that again is an all-embracing statement which we are not prepared to take literally in the absence of further particulars. People do not ordinarily act in unison like a Greek chorus, and, quite apart from dishonesty, this is a favourite device with witnesses who are either not mentally alert or are mentally lazy and are given to loose thinking. They are often apt to say "all" even when they only saw "some" because they are too lazy, mentally, to differentiate. Unless, therefore, a witness particularises when there are several accused, it is ordinarily unsafe to accept omnibus inclusions like this at their face value.”

43.

It is true that law mandates notice to the informant/complainant where the Magistrate contemplates accepting the final report. On receipt of notice, the informant may address the court, ventilating his objections to the final report. This he usually does in the form of the protest petition. In Mahabir Prasad Agarwala v. State [Mahabir Prasad Agarwala v. State, 1957 SCC OnLine Ori 5: AIR 1958 Ori 11], a learned Judge of the High Court of Orissa took the view that a protest petition is in the nature of a complaint and should be examined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVI of the Criminal Procedure Code. We, however, also noticed that in Qasim v. State [Qasim v. State, 1984 SCC OnLine All 260: 1984 Cri LJ 1677], a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, inter alia, held as follows: (Qasim case [Qasim v. State, 1984 SCC OnLine All 260: 1984 Cri LJ 1677], SCC OnLine All para 6)

“6.

… In Abhinandan Jha [Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117: 1968 Cri LJ 97 : (1967) 3 SCR 668] also what was observed was “it is not very clear as to whether the Magistrate has chosen to treat the protest petition as complaint”. This observation would not mean that every protest petition must necessarily be treated as a complaint whether it satisfies the conditions of the complaint or not. A private complaint is to contain a complete list of witnesses to be examined. A further examination of the complainant is made under Section 200 CrPC. If the Magistrate did not treat the protest petition as a complaint, the protest petition not satisfying all the conditions of a complaint to his mind, it would not mean that the case has become a complaint case. In fact, in the majority of cases, when a final report is submitted, the Magistrate has to simply consider whether, on the materials in the case diary, no case is made out to accept the final report or whether the case diary discloses a prima facie case to take cognisance. The protest petition in such situation simply serves the purpose of drawing the Magistrate's attention to the materials in the case diary and invites a careful scrutiny and exercise of the mind by the Magistrate, so it cannot be held that simply because there is a protest petition the case is to become a complaint case.” (emphasis supplied)

44.

We may also notice that in Veerappa v. Bhimareddappa [Veerappa v. Bhimareddappa, 2001 SCC OnLine Kar 447: 2002 Cri LJ 2150], the High Court of Karnataka observed as follows: (SCC OnLine Kar para 9)

“9.

From the above, the position that emerges is this: Where initially the complainant has not filed any complaint before the Magistrate under Section 200 CrPC, but, has approached the police only and where the police after investigation have filed the ‘B’ report, if the complainant wants to protest, he is thereby inviting the Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC on a complaint. If it were to be so, the protest petition that he files shall have to satisfy the requirements of a complaint as defined in Section 2(d) CrPC, and that should contain facts that constitute an offence, for which the learned Magistrate is taking cognisance under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC. Instead, if it is to be simply styled as a protest petition without containing all those necessary particulars that a normal complaint has to contain, then it cannot be construed as a complaint for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 CrPC.”

45.

“Complaint” is defined in Section 2(d) of the Code as follows:

“2.

(d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.

Explanation. —A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant;”

46.

If a protest petition fulfils the requirements of a complaint, the Magistrate may treat the protest petition as a complaint and deal with the same as required under Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. In this case, in fact, there is no list of witnesses as such in the protest petition. The prayer in the protest petition is to set aside the final report and to allow the application against the final report. While we are not suggesting that the form must entirely be decisive of the question whether it amounts to a complaint or is liable to be treated as a complaint, we would think that essentially, the protest petition in this case is a summing up of the objections of the second respondent against the final report.