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Judgment
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 14.09.2012 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 1, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304A of IPC and Sections 177, 181, 184 and 194 of the MV Act. It was asserted that the informant, Mamta Devi (PW1) and Parameshwari Devi (PW5) were going to their home on 19.12.2006. They saw a tractor going from Kadoha towards the village, which was transporting sand and iron bars. Accused Rakshapal Singh was driving the tractor. Abhishek was travelling in the tractor. Abhishek fell near Lehad at about 05:15 p.m. due to the negligence of Rakshapal. His head was crushed on the spot. The accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused in driving the tractor. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW12/A) was recorded in the police station. HC Shakti Chand (PW16) went to the spot for verification. He recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW1/A) and sent it to the police station where FIR (Ext.PW16/A) was registered. Dharam Pal (PW11) took the photographs (Ext.P1 to Ext.P9) whose negatives are (Ext.P15 to Ext.P23) of the spot. He also took the photographs (Ext.P10 to Ext.P14) whose negatives are (Ext.P24 to Ext.P28) of the dead body. HC Shakti Chand (PW16) conducted the inquest on the dead body and prepared the reports (Ext.PW16/C and Ext/PW16/D). He filed an application for the post-mortem examination of Abhishek. Dr Amita Mahajan (PW4) conducted the post-mortem examination and found that the cause of death was shock and haemorrhage due to the crushed head injury that could have been caused in a roadside accident. She issued the report (Ext.PW4/A). HC Shakti Chand prepared the site plan (Ext.PW16/E). He seized the tractor and its documents vide memos (Ext.PW7/A and Ext.PW14/A). Suresh Kumar (PW13) examined the tractor and found that there was no defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW13/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC and Section 184 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
The prosecution examined sixteen witnesses to prove its case. Mamta Devi (PW1) is the informant. Nitish Kumar (PW2), Tara Chand (PW3), Parmeshwari Devi (PW5), Aditya Thakur (PW6), Ranjit Singh (PW7), and Kishan Chand (PW8) are the witnesses to the incident. Dr Amita Mahajan (PW4) conducted the postmortem examination of the child. Kishan Chand (PW8) and Nanak Chand (PW15) did not support the prosecution case. Ashok Kumar (PW9) was called to the spot after the accident. Mast Ram (PW10) and Satpal (PW14) witnessed the recovery. Dharam Pal (PW11) took the photographs. HHC Pawan Kumar (PW12) proved the entry in the daily diary. Suresh Kumar (PW13) conducted the mechanical examination of the tractor. HC Shakti Chand (PW16) investigated the matter.
The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that he was driving the tractor. He claimed that Abhishek was not travelling in the tractor and he was not crushed under the tyres of the tractor. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.
Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The photographs did not support the prosecution version. The manner of the accident was not clear from the evidence and the photographs. The mere fact that the death of one person was caused is not sufficient to convict the accused. The prosecution was required to prove the negligence, and a general statement that the tractor was being driven at a high speed and in a negligent manner was not sufficient to convict the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused.
Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The prosecution witnesses have consistently stated that the accused was driving the tractor in a rash and negligent manner. He had permitted Abhishek to board the tractor. Abhishek fell and sustained injuries. The prosecution case could not have been doubted because two witnesses had not supported the prosecution case. The learned Trial Court had erred in holding that the position of the spot was changed before taking the photographs or preparing the site plan. The medical evidence proved that the cause of death was a crushed injury which could have been caused in a roadside accident, which proved the prosecution’s case. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Arun Kaushal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the statements of the witnesses and was influenced by the blood stains found on the tractor. The witnesses had consistently stated that the accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused and the high speed of the tractor. The learned Trial Court had taken a view that could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
Mr Arun Kaushal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars. Two independent witnesses had not supported the prosecution version. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed:
Scope of interference with an acquittal:
26.At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater.
27.In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words:
“25.Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”
The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence.
In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed:
“75.The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”
The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses.
In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.
The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.
Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so.
The present appeal is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The informant had specifically stated in her statement (Ext.PW1/A) that she saw the accused driving the tractor and Abhishek travelling in the tractor. She deposed this fact while appearing as (PW1). Parmeshwari Devi (PW5) also stated that Abhishek was travelling in the tractor. Neither of them mentioned that any other person was also travelling in the tractor besides Abhishek.
Aditya Thakur (PW6), on the other hand, stated that a tractor being driven by Rakashpal Singh came to the spot. He, Nitish, Jyoti and Abhishek boarded the tractor. The tractor suffered a jolt, and Abhishek fell. Nitish and Akshay shouted. The head of Abhishek was crushed under the tyres of the tractor.
The statement of this witness is not as per the prosecution version. The prosecution had never asserted that many children were travelling in the tractor; rather, it was stated that Abhishek alone was travelling in the tractor. Therefore, the testimony of this witness is not acceptable.
Nitish Kumar (PW2) stated that no child had boarded the tractor. Abhishek ran after the tractor. He caught hold of the tractor, but slipped and fell. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he denied the prosecution's case that Abhishek was travelling on the tractor. He denied that he was making a false statement to save the accused. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. Thus, this witness has not supported the prosecution case.
Ranjit Singh (PW7) stated that 4-5 children were running after the tractor. He asked them not to run after the tractor. Abhishek tried to board the tractor. His hand slipped, and he fell. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that Abhishek was travelling in the tractor and slipped from the tractor. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. Thus, this witness has also not supported the prosecution’s version.
Tara Chand (PW3) stated that he heard some noise and went to the spot. He saw that Mamta Devi was bringing the child who had sustained an injury to the head. He specifically stated in his cross-examination that he had not seen the child crushed under the tyres of the tractor and had only seen Mamta Devi bringing the child. The statement of this witness shows that he was not an eyewitness and no advantage can be derived from his testimony.
Mamta Devi (PW1) stated that the tractor suffered a jolt and the child was crushed under the tyre. She saw the child and found that his head was crushed.
Parameshwari Devi (PW5) stated that Abhishek was travelling on the tractor. The tractor suffered a jolt, and Abhishek fell. His head was crushed under the tyres of the tractor. She stated in her cross-examination that the distance between Bazaar and the place of accident was huge and could be covered in half an hour. They had reached the spot after 10-15 minutes.
It was specifically stated in the statement (Ext.PW1/A) that Mamta Devi (PW1) and Parameshwari Devi (PW5) were returning to their home from Kadoha Bazaar when they saw the accused driving the tractor. It means that they were away from the place of the accident and not at the place of the accident. Parameshwari Devi (PW5) stated that the distance between Bazaar and the place of the accident can be covered within 30 minutes, which shows that they could not have witnessed the accident. This is also corroborated by the statement of Parmeshwari Devi in her cross-examination that she had reached the spot after about 10-15 minutes. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that Mamta Devi and Parmeshwari could not be called to be the eyewitnesses.
There is no other eyewitness to the accident.
Thus, different versions were projected before the Court. First, that Abhishek was travelling in the tractor and the tractor suffered a jolt, which was the initial version. Second, it was projected by Aditya Thakur (PW6) that many children had boarded the tractor, out of whom only Abhishek had fallen. Third, by the hostile witnesses Ranjit Singh (PW7) and Nitish Kumar (PW2), that Abhishek had tried to board the tractor. His hand slipped, and he fell. Therefore, the exact manner of the accident was not clearly proved on record, and the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that the prosecution version was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
It was submitted that the prosecution witnesses had consistently stated that the accused was negligently driving the tractor at a high speed, which is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed:
“Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.”
This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, wherein it was held:
“Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.”
This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal, 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: -
“It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.”
This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: -
“Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.”
Thus, the accused cannot be held liable because witnesses had stated that he was driving the vehicle at high speed without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care.
It was submitted that witnesses have deposed about the negligence of the accused and the learned trial Court erred in ignoring the statements of the prosecution witnesses. This submission will not help the prosecution. A witness can only depose about the facts that had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595:
“It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.”
Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held:
“It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn based on evidence led before the Court.”
Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements that the accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused.
Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.
No other point was urged.
In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.