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Judgment
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24.02.2014, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Class Court No. 1 Una, District Una, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act read with Rules 11 and 20 of the HP Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978 (Transit Rules). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act, read with Rules 11 and 20 of Transit Rules and Sections 207 and 180 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that HC Moti Lal (PW5), Constable Maya Machhinder (PW4) and Constable Baldev Raj had set up a Naka at Nalwadi Chowk on 16.09.2003. A three-wheeler bearing registration No. HP-20A-9409 came from Una at about 03:45 a.m. The police stopped the three-wheeler and found timber of different sizes in it. The driver identified himself as Mohan Lal (accused). The police demanded the permit/license for transporting the timber, but he could not produce any documents for transporting wood, documents of the three-wheeler and his driving license. The police found 100 pieces of different sizes of timber. They also found 50 pieces of fuel wood. HC Moti Lal (PW5) wrote a rukka (Ext.PW4/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW4/B) was registered. HC Moti Lal (PW5) seized the timber, fuel wood and three-wheeler vide memo (Ext. PW1/A). He investigated the matter and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW5/A). He filed an application (Ext.PW5/D) for obtaining the value of the timber. Mehar Chand (PW2) issued the report (Ext. PW2/A) mentioning the value of the fuel wood and the timber. The challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation.
The Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act read with Rules 11 and 20 of Transit Rules, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
The prosecution examined 10 witnesses to prove its case. Prem Chand (PW1) did not support the prosecution case. Mehar Chand (PW2) issued the certificate regarding the value. Tilak Raj, Patwari (PW3), mentioned that the timber was apprehended in Patwar Circle, Dhaneta. Maya Machinder (PW4) is a witness to the recovery. Moti Lal (PW5) investigated the matter and effected the recovery. Kishore Kumar (PW6) measured the timber. Kishore (PW7) issued the letter regarding the valuation of the timber. Jagdish Chand (PW8), Ramesh Chand (PW9) and Kashmir Singh (PW10) proved the record.
The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He claimed that the witnesses had deposed falsely against him and he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.
Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the timber was being transported from one patwar circle to another. The offence punishable under Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act is non-cognizable, and the police could not have filed the charge sheet before the Court. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused.
Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the statements of the witnesses corroborated each other, and it was duly proved that the accused was transporting the timber without any valid documents in violation of Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act, read with Rules 11 and 20 of the Transit Rules. The learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the timber was apprehended at 03:30 a.m. and it was not possible to associate any independent witness. The wood was seized in Patwar Circle, Dhaneta, which is 35 kms from Mehatpur. Therefore, it was proved that the timber was being transported from one patwar circle to another. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Ms Anjali Soni Verma, learned counsel for the respondent.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State submitted that this Court has held in State of H.P. Vs. Prem Chand, reference in Crl. Appeal No.220 of 2014, decided on 05.01.2026, that the offences punishable under Section 42 of the Forest Act are cognisable. It was duly proved by the statement of Tilak Raj, Patwari (PW3), that the timber was apprehended in Patwar Circle, Dhaneta, which is a different patwar circle from Nalwadi and Mehatpur. The prosecution version that the timber was being transported from one patwar circle to another was duly proved by the testimony of this witness, and the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
Ms Anjali Soni Verma, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the prosecution had failed to prove that the timber was being transported from one patwar circle to another. Mehatpur, Nalwadi and Dhaneta fall within different patwar circles cannot lead to an inference that the timber was being transported from one patwar circle to another. The timber was not produced before the Court, and the prosecution version could not have been relied upon in the absence of the primary evidence. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. She relied upon the judgments in State of H.P. Vs. Surinder Kumar & ors. 2026:HHC:13584, Pawan Kumar & ors. Vs. State of H.P., Cr. Appeal No. 442 of 2019, decided on 6.3.2019 and State of H.P. Vs. Damodar 2008:HHC:124 in support of her submissions.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed:
Scope of interference with an acquittal:
26.At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater.
27.In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words:
“25.Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”
28.The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence.
In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed:
“75.The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”
The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses.
In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.
The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.
Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so.
The present appeal is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Learned Trial Court held that the police could not have filed the charge sheet, since the offence punishable under Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act was non-cognizable. This was not correct. A Division Bench of this Court held in Prem Chand (supra) that the offence punishable under Section 42 of the Forest Act read with Rules 11 and 20 of Transit Rules, 1978 is a cognizable offence. The judgment in State of H.P. Vs. Sat Pal Singh alias Satta, Latest HLJ 2009 HP 732 was overruled. Therefore, the first ground recorded by the learned Trial Court for recording the acquittal of the accused that the police could not have filed the charge sheet is not sustainable.
This Court held in State of H.P. Vs. Gurpal Ram 2007 CrLJ 4732 that Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act require that timber be transported from one revenue estate to another. It was observed:
“8……Even there is not even an iota of evidence to show that the timber in question was being transported from one revenue estate to another revenue estate, in absence of which the violation of Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act read with Rule 11 of the Rules aforesaid is not made out…..”
A similar view was taken in Damodar (supra), wherein it was observed:
The Prosecution did not produce any witness to prove that the said tree was felled from the government forest to prove the offence of theft. In so far as the transporting of this timber by the respondent is concerned, the Investigating Officer has intercepted this tractor at Chitrokhari Chowk, Sundernagar. There is no evidence to prove the breach of transit rules framed under Sections 41 and 42 of the Forest Act to the effect that the timber was transported from one revenue estate to another revenue estate. The First Appellate Court had taken cognisance of this fact and found that there was nothing to suggest that the place of lifting of timber and the recovery of the said timber were situated in different estates. Even to this effect, there was no investigation conducted by the Investigating Officer.
In the present case, Tilak Raj (PW3) stated that the timber was apprehended in Patwar Circle, Dhaneta. Nalwadi, Dhaneta and Mehatpur fall within the jurisdiction of different tehsils. His testimony only proves that the place of apprehension of the timber was located in a different Patwar Circle. However, there is no evidence that the timber was brought from Patwar Circle, Mehatpur or Nalwadi. Hence, his testimony does not establish that the timber was being transported from one revenue estate to another.
Maya Machinder (PW4) identified two sample pieces (Ext. P1 and Ext.P2) as part of the pieces recovered by the police. Moti Lal (PW-5) did not identify any timber as the one recovered from the spot. Therefore, there is force in the submission of learned counsel for the respondent/accused that the timber was not produced before the Court and the prosecution case would become doubtful. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2019) 4 SCC 182: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 39: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 359 that when the seized wood and the vehicle were not produced, and only one sample was produced, the accused cannot be convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 379 of the IPC and Section 42 of the Forest Act. It was observed at page 183: -
“4.We have heard the learned counsel for the respondent in opposition to the appeal and considered the nature of the evidence available. Non-production of the seized wood and the vehicle, the primary evidence of the offence, renders the prosecution's case fragile and unsustainable. Mere production of the seizure memo does not tantamount to the production of the seized wood and the lorry. Unless the seized wood was produced, mere production of a sample, and there is no material in support that the sample was out of the same 22 logs, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the appellants.”
Therefore, in view of the binding precedent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the prosecution's case would become doubtful because of the non-production of the case property before the Court.
Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in acquitting the accused. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence produced before the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused while deciding an appeal against the acquittal.
No other point was urged.
In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment.