State Of Gujarat vs Ketankumar Gunvantbhai Patel & Anr.

Since identical issues of law and fact arise for consideration in the present appeals, and the appeals involve common questions for determination, they are being heard and decided together by this common judgment.

The Criminal Appeal No.731 of 2012 is filed by the State of Gujarat and Criminal Appeal No.1359 of 2012 is filed by the original complainant under the provisions of Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the same impugned judgment and order dated 13.03.2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Surat (hereinafter be referred to as the “Trial Court”) in Sessions Case No.77 of 2007, whereby the Trial Court has acquitted the respondents accused from the charges under Sections 306, 498A and 114 of the India Penal Code (hereinafter be referred to as the “IPC”).

The facts giving rise to present appeals are that the complainant- Rakeshkumar Parbhubhai Patel, lodged a complaint at Rander Police Station, Surat, bearing C.R. No.132/2006, for the offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 306 and 114 of the IPC, stating, inter alia, that about one and a half years prior to the incident, his sister, namely Manishaben, was married to respondent-accused and was residing with him in a joint family along with respondent-accused No.2, who was her mother-in-law. After some time, the matrimonial life of Manishaben did not remain cordial, as the accused persons subjected her to mental and physical harassment, and respondent -accused - husband also used to beat her.

On the day of the incident, i.e. on 15.04.2006 at about 8:40 hours, the accused persons did not permit Manishaben to attend her sister's marriage and subjected her to mental and physical harassment by taunting her. Due to the continuous harassment and ill-treatment meted out to her by the accused persons, Manishaben could not tolerate the same and committed suicide by hanging herself in toilet. It is, therefore, alleged that the accused persons abetted and thereby committed the offence of abetment of suicide, punishable under Sections 498(A), 306 and 114 of the IPC. Hence, the complaint was lodged against the accused persons.

On the basis of the said complaint, investigation was initiated. Upon completion of a thorough investigation, as sufficient evidence was found against the respondents-accused, a charge-sheet was filed before the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Surat. Since the offences alleged against the accused persons were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, in accordance with Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Learned Magistrate was pleased to commit the case to the Court of Sessions. Thereafter, the case was transferred and placed for trial before the Trial Court and was numbered as Sessions Case No.77 of 2007.

Thereafter, charge was framed at Exhibit 12 against the accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 306 and 114 of the IPC. The accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried.

In support of its case the prosecution led oral as well as documentary evidence which reads as under:-

As referred above, the prosecution examined 13 witnesses and produced 13 documentary exhibits on record. At the conclusion of the trial and after hearing both the sides and after evaluating the evidence placed on record the Trial Court vide order dated 13.03.2012 passed in Sessions Case No. 77 of 2007 has acquitted the respondents accused persons from the offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 306 and 114 of the IPC.

Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of Trial Court dated 13.03.2012 passed in Sessions Case No. 77 of 2007 the State has preferred Criminal Appeal No.731 of 2012 and the original complainant -Rakeshkumar Parbhubhai Patel has filed Criminal Appeal No.1359 of 2012.

Heard Ms. Jyoti Bhatt, learned APP for the appellate-State in Criminal Appeal No.731 of 2012, Ms. Archana Acharya, learned counsel for the appellant-original complainant in Criminal Appeal No.1359 of 2012 and Mr. Hardik Shah learned counsel for the respondents accused in both the appeals.

Learned APP and learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Trial Court while by passing the impugned judgement and order of acquittal has committed serious error of law and on facts both.

It is submitted that the prosecution has duly proved the charge against the respondents-accused with regard to the cruelty and harassment meted out to the deceased, Manishaben. However, the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the said facts in their true and proper perspective while passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

It is further contended that the marriage between the accused and the deceased subsisted for less than seven years and, therefore, the Trial Court ought to have drawn the statutory presumptions against the accused as contemplated under Sections 113-A and 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the Trial Court failed to draw such presumptions against the accused as provided under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.

It is further contended that respondent No.2 in Criminal Appeal No.791 of 2012, who is also respondent No.3 in Criminal Appeal No.1359 of 2012, was serving in the Police Department. It is therefore submitted that, under the influence of the said respondent-accused, the Investigating Officer did not conduct the investigation in its true and proper manner. Thus, the investigation was faulty and the said aspect was not properly appreciated or considered by the Trial Court.

In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is submitted that both the appeals deserve to be allowed and the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside.

It is submitted that the Trial Court ought to have properly appreciated the evidence of PW-3 Azambhai Yusufbhai, examined at Exh. 48; PW-4 Dahyabhai Dalpatbhai Vasiya, examined at Exh. 50; PW-7 Nareshbhai Chhotubhai Patel, examined at Exh. 58; PW-8 Dharmeshbhai Bhagwanbhai Patel, examined at Exh. 63; PW-9 Jayeshbhai Dhansukhbhai, examined at Exh. 64; PW-10 Jashvantbhai Chunilalbhai Patel, examined at Exh. 65; and PW-11 Prahladbhai Zinabhai Rathod, examined at Exh. 66. It is submitted that these witnesses have substantially supported the case of the prosecution as narrated by the complainant in her complaint, produced at Exh. 32. It is further submitted that, in their respective depositions, they have stated that the accused subjected the deceased Manishaben to physical and mental harassment.

It is submitted that the Trial Court has committed a grave error in disbelieving the evidence of PW-5 Prabhubhai Laxmanbhai Patel, father of the deceased, examined at Exh. 53, and PW-6 Padamaben Prabhubhai Patel, mother of the deceased, examined at Exh. 57. It is submitted that both these witnesses are the parents of the deceased and are natural and trustworthy witnesses. It is further submitted that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the deceased was residing in the house of the accused and that the prosecution case relates to offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the evidence of the parents of the deceased could not have been discarded merely on the ground of their relationship with the deceased. It is submitted that from the evidence of the parents read with the other oral and documentary evidence, the prosecution has sufficiently established the prosecution case however, by disbelieving and discarding their evidence without proper appreciation, the Trial Court has committed a grave error, resulting in miscarriage of justice. Hence, the impugned judgment and order of acquittal deserves to be quashed and set aside.

It is submitted that the Trial Court has committed a grave error in disbelieving the evidence of PW-1 Dr. Gaurang Somabhai Solanki, examined at Exh. 19. It is submitted that the said witness had produced the Post-Mortem Note and clearly opined that the deceased died due to hanging. It is further submitted that the Doctor had stated that, prior to the suicide, the deceased had sustained injuries and had been subjected to physical assault. This evidence supports the prosecution case that the deceased was subjected to physical and mental harassment by the accused, which ultimately led her to commit suicide. It is submitted that the Trial Court ought to have properly appreciated this medical evidence in conjunction with the other oral and documentary evidence available on record. Having failed to do so, the Trial Court has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order deserves to be quashed and set aside by this Hon'ble Court.

It is submitted that the Trial Court ought to have properly appreciated the contents of the Panchnama of the scene of offence produced at Exh. 49, the Inquest Panchnama produced at Exh. 51, and the FSL Reports produced at Exhs. 70 and 71. It is submitted that the aforesaid documentary evidence, coupled with the evidence of the Investigating Officer, clearly establishes the circumstances surrounding the death of the deceased in the house of the accused. It is further submitted that the evidence on record supports the prosecution case that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused, which led to her committing suicide. However, the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate this material aspect of the case. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of acquittal is contrary to the evidence on record and deserves to be quashed and set aside by this Court.

It is submitted that the Trial Court ought to have appreciated that the accused subjected the deceased to continuous physical and mental harassment and cruelty and, as a result thereof, she was unable to tolerate the same. It is submitted that the conduct of the accused and the circumstances clearly indicate that the deceased was instigated and driven to commit suicide. Thus, the ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A read with Sections 306 and 114 of the IPC were made out against the accused. However, the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate this material aspect of the matter. It is submitted that the prosecution examined sufficient oral evidence in support of its case and also produced ample documentary evidence on record. It is submitted that the oral as well as documentary evidence, when considered cumulatively, supports the prosecution case. However, the Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence available on record in its true and proper perspective and thereby arrived at an erroneous conclusion.

It is submitted that the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material evidence available on record. It is submitted that the reasons assigned in the impugned judgment are erroneous, perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. It is further submitted that there were cogent and reliable circumstances and evidence supporting the prosecution case and establishing the charges against the accused. The findings recorded by the Trial Court are therefore unsustainable in law and on facts. Hence, the impugned judgment and order of acquittal deserves to be quashed and set aside by this Hon'ble Court. It is submitted that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence of Nareshbhai Chhotubhai Patel, examined at Exh. 58, in its true and proper perspective. It is submitted that this witness has clearly supported the case of the prosecution. However, the Trial Court erroneously failed to give due consideration to his deposition. It is submitted that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence of Dharmeshbhai Bhagwanbhai Patel, examined at Exh. 63, in its true and proper perspective. It is submitted that this witness has clearly stated in his deposition that, when he had gone to the house of respondent Nos. 2 and 3, he found their behaviour to be abnormal. It is submitted that this material circumstance supported the prosecution case; however, the Trial Court failed to properly consider the same.

It is submitted that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence of Jayeshbhai Dhansukhbhai, in its true and proper perspective. It is submitted that the witness clearly stated that, when he had gone to the house of respondents accused to give an invitation card for the marriage of Nisha, he found the deceased to be under tension. It is submitted that this material circumstance goes to the root of the case and clearly supports the prosecution case that the deceased was subjected to physical and mental harassment by respondents accused. However, the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate this important piece of evidence.

It is submitted that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the Post-Mortem Note at Exh. 20 in its true and proper perspective. It is submitted that, as per the Post-Mortem Note, the cause of death was recorded as "Asphyxia as a result of pressure over the neck by ligature associated with head injury." It is further submitted that, in his examination-in-chief, the Doctor admitted that injuries Nos. 2 to 6 were possible if the deceased had been subjected to physical cruelty shortly before her death. He further admitted that injury No. 6 was possible if another person had caused nail injuries and that injury No. 19 was possible by causing hurt with a hard and blunt object. These material admissions of the Doctor were directly relevant to the prosecution case regarding physical cruelty and assault upon the deceased. However, the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate this material medical evidence while passing the impugned judgment.

It is submitted that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that PW-1 Dr. Gaurang Somabhai Solanki, examined at Exh. 19, specifically admitted in paragraph 8 of his cross-examination that injury No. 1 mentioned in Column No. 19 of the Post-Mortem Note was possible if a person attempted to save herself after being hanged and, in the process, the left side of her head struck against a wall. It is further submitted that, upon perusal of the Scene Panchnama, it is clear that the bathroom measured approximately 3 x 3 feet and was 6.5 feet in height. In such circumstances, the possibility of sustaining such a head injury while attempting to commit suicide requires careful consideration. It is submitted that this circumstance also lends support to the prosecution case that the deceased had been subjected to physical cruelty and assault before her death, which ultimately compelled her to commit suicide. However, the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate this material aspect of the evidence.

It is submitted that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the ingredients of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act were also attracted in the present case. It is submitted that the marriage between the deceased and respondent No. 2 had subsisted for only about one and a half years. It is further submitted that the evidence on record establishes that, within about one month of the marriage, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 started subjecting the deceased to mental and physical cruelty. Further, immediately prior to her death, the deceased had sustained several injuries, which corroborate the prosecution case regarding physical and mental cruelty. Thus, the statutory requirements for invoking the presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act were satisfied. However, the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate this material aspect of the case, resulting in a serious miscarriage of justice.

Ms. Archana Acharya, learned counsel for the appellant-original complainant in Criminal Appeal No.1359 of 2012 has submitted following written submissions, which are taken on record:-

It is submitted that the judgment and order of acquittal is contrary to the provisions of law, facts and evidence in the case and as such, deserves to be set aside and that the respondent nos. 2 and 3 ought to have been convicted for the offences punishable u/s. 306, 498(A) r/w. 114 of IPC.

It is submitted that the appreciation of facts, evidence and circumstances of the case as well as established principles of law as per the judgment and order dated 13.03.2012 is neither reasonable, nor true and it is against the provisions of law, which has ended in miscarriage of justice and therefore, the order of Acquittal deserves to be set aside.

It is submitted that the oral evidence of Parbhubhai Laxmanbhai Patel at Exh. 53 and Padmaben Parbhubhai Patel at Exh. 57 i.e. the parents of deceased and of Nareshbhai Chhotubhai Patel at Exh. 58 clearly the case of the prosecution and suggest that that there was continuous physical and mental torture meted out by respondent nos. 2 and 3 on the deceased.

It is submitted that the witness namely Dharmeshbhai Bhagwanbhai Patel at Exh. 63 clearly stated in his deposition that when he had gone to the house of respondent no.2 and 3, he found their behaviour to be abnormal. That witness namely Jayeshbhai Dhansukabhai at Exh. 66 has clearly stated in his deposition that when he had gone to the house of respondent no.2 and 3 to give the invitation card of marriage of Nisha, he found the deceased to be under tension. This minute aspect go to the root of the case and clearly suggest that there was physical and mental harassment by respondent nos. 2 and 3 on deceased.

It is further submitted that the examination-in-chief of Dr. Gaurang Somabhai Solanki at Exh. 19 clearly admitted the following injuries on the deceased:-

The above injuries are found to be ante-mortem in nature and fresh. This witness has further admitted the following internal injuries:-

It is furthered that the postmortem note at Exh. 20 clearly states that the cause of death "Asphyxia as a result of pressure over the neck by ligature associated with head injury". Even in the examination-in-chief, the doctor has admitted that the injuries nos, 2 to 6 are possible only if the deceased was subjected to physical cruelty soon before her death and that injury no.6 is possible only if the other person causes nail injuries. The Doctor has also admitted that injury no.19 is possible by causing hurt with hard and blunt object. However, this material aspect has not been properly considered thoroughly.

It is submitted that the deceased was subjected to physical cruelty soon before her death. This fact is corroborated by Postmortem report and evidence of Dr. Gaurang Somabhai Solanki at Exh. 19. It is also submitted that Dr. Gaurang Somabhai Solanki has specifically admitted in para 5 of his cross- examination that injury no.2 i.e. injury of scratches are possible due to displacement of ligature. He has also admitted that injury no.2 is possible by scrubbing with any article. If this fact is read along with the physical situation, it is clear that there is abrasion of size 1.5 cm x 1.5 cm over below chin. When the dead body was removed down, there was wall behind the dead body. Therefore, this injury no.2 is not possible after the deceased hanged herself and died. Therefore, it is clear that this injury no.2 is also caused soon before the death of deceased.

It is submitted that Dr. Gaurang Somabhai Solanki at Exh. 19 has specifically admitted in para 6 of his cross-examination that injury no.6 is possible by khanjwalvathi, whereas injury no.4 is possible upon rubbing any rough article, while injury no.5 is possible upon slipping of stares while climbing. This witness has clearly refused that injury no.6 is possible by scratching through nails. Therefore, it is clear that this injury no.6 is caused soon before the death of deceased.

It is submitted that Dr. Gaurang Somabhai Solanki at Exh. 19 has specifically admitted in para 8 of his cross-examination that injury no.1 of column no. 19 of PM note is possible if any person tries to save herself after she is hanged and if the left side head dashes with the wall. However, upon perusal of panchnama of scene of offence, it is clear that the size of bath room is 3x3 foot and height is 6.5 foot. If any person tried to commit suicide in this situation, then, there are no possibilities of receiving this kind of head injury. This fact also corroborates the case of the appellant that the deceased was subjected to cruelty before her death which compelled her to commit suicide. That it is also stated in his cross- examination, the injury no. 2 to 6 is not possible if any person tries to commit suicide. Therefore, it is undoubtedly established that the deceased was subjected to compel the deceased to commit suicide. cruelty before her death.

It is furthered that the deceased was having 6 months child and no mother would commit suicide by leaving the 6 months child at the mercy of others, more so when the deceased was going to attend the marriage of cousin sister Nisha.

It is also submitted that the circumstantial evidence in the case suggest that the conduct of accused before and after the death of deceased smacks malafides. On the date of incident, the respondent no.2 informed the appellant to come at his house as the deceased was not coming out of the bathroom even though more than an hour had passed and after the appellant comes, the respondent no.2 will try to open the door. However, it is pertinent to note that before the appellant could reach and before the respondent no.2 informed the appellant, he had already made a call to the fire brigade and police. Before the appellant could reach, the fire brigade had broke the door and brought the deceased outside. At that time, she was alive. If the respondent nos. 2 and 3 had opened the door immediately without wasting time in making calls to fire brigade, police and the appellant, the deceased could have been survived. Though the respondent nos. 2 and 3 were personally present at the hospital, they did not inform the appellant about the above facts of calling fire brigade and police for removing the appellant, this is a case of circumstantial evidence and this material circumstance ought to be considered.

It is submitted that it is pertinent to note the conduct of the respondent nos. 2 and 3 as the respondent nos. 2 and 3 have not attended the funeral ceremony of deceased after the death of deceased. This conduct on the part of respondent nos. 2 and 3 also creates doubt.

It is further submitted that the present case clearly attracts all the ingredients of Section 306 of IPC and that there is sufficient evidence to show that there was physical and mental cruelty meted out by respondent nos, 2 and 3 on the deceased in the form of evidence of Witness No. 2 (Rakesh Parbhubhai), Witness No. 4 (Dayabhai Dalpatsinh Vasiya), witness no. 5 (Parbhubhai Laxmanbhai Patel), Witness no.6 (Padmaben Parbhubhai Patel) and witness no. 7 (Nareshbhai Chhotubhai Patel) Therefore, the ingredients of Sec. 498(A) of IPC are clearly made out against the respondent nos. 2 and 3-accused.

It is furthered that as per Sec. 106 of Indian Evidence Act, it is the burden of a person to prove the facts specially within his knowledge. The deceased has committed suicide at her in-laws house. The accused were present at the time and place of incidence. Before the death of deceased, the deceased has received injury nos. 2 to 6. However, though the respondent nos. 2 and 3 had special knowledge about the same, they have not declared as required u/s. 106 of Indian Evidence Act.

It is further submitted that the ingredients of Section 113 of the Indian Evidence Act are also satisfied in the instant case as much as the marriage span of deceased and the Respondent No. 2 was of only one and half years and there should be cruelty as prescribed under Section 498(A) of IPC. That in the present case, after one month of marriage itself, the respondent no. 2 and 3 started treating the deceased with mental and physical cruelty. Even before the deceased committed suicide, there are number of injuries, which suggests that there was physical and mental cruelty to the deceased. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act are attracted.

It is further submitted that the ingredients of Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act are also satisfied in the instant case as much as before the appellant could reach and before the respondent no. 2 informed the appellant, the respondent no. 2 and 3 had already made call to the fire brigade and police. Before the appellant could reach, the fire brigade had broke open the door and had brought the deceased outside. At that time, she was alive. If the respondent no. 2 and 3 had opened the door immediately without wasting time in making calls to the fire brigade, police and the appellant, the deceased could have survived. Though the respondent nos. 2 and 3 were personally present at the hospital, they did not inform the appellant about the above facts of calling the fire brigade and police for removing the deceased. This is a case of circumstantial evidence and the same ought to be considered.

It is submitted that the following judgments support the case of the appellant:

It is submitted that the order impugned is absolutely illegal, unjust, improper, perverse, contrary to the material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous and demonstrably unsustainable and therefore, the same deserves to be interfered with by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal dated 13.03.2012 passed by the Ld. Sessions Judge, Surat in Sessions Case No. 77 of 2007 and the respondent nos. 2 and 3 maybe convicted in accordance with law, in the interests of justice.

On the other hand, Mr. Hardik Shah, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-accused in both the appeals, has submitted that the prosecution witnesses have failed to prove the charges against the respondents-accused with regard to the cruelty and harassment allegedly caused to the deceased and that, on account thereof, the deceased committed suicide. He has submitted that since the prosecution has failed to establish these facts beyond reasonable doubt, the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. He has further submitted that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court. Therefore, both the appeals filed by the State as well as the original complainant deserve to be dismissed.

Learned counsel for the respondents-accused has further submitted that the present case is one of suicidal death, as the deceased, Manishaben, committed suicide by hanging herself in the toilet. He submitted that this fact has been established through the evidence of an independent witness, namely, PW-10, Jashvantbhai Chunilalbhai Patel, Exhibit 65, who was serving in the Fire Brigade Department. He had received a call from the concerned Police Station informing him that a lady was trapped inside a toilet at the house. Upon receiving the said message, he immediately reached the spot and found that the door of the toilet was closed from inside and could not be opened even by pushing it. Therefore, with the help of a crowbar, the door was broken open and the deceased was brought out of the toilet. At that time, she was unconscious but still alive. Therefore, she was immediately taken to the nearest hospital, where she was declared dead.

Learned counsel for the respondents accused has submitted that, in the aforesaid circumstances, there is no evidence to establish that the deceased was subjected to any mental or physical torture by the respondents-accused. No such evidence has been brought on record or proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

Learned counsel for the respondents-accused has further submitted that none of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the complainant, who is the father of the deceased, or other family members, has deposed before the Trial Court that the accused-husband of the deceased was addicted to or had a habit of consuming liquor. However, despite there being no such evidence, the complainant and his family members, on the basis of distorted and exaggerated facts, filed an application before the competent Court seeking guardianship of the minor son of the accused-husband, being Guardian Application No.74 of 2006.

Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is legal, just, and proper and has been passed after thorough appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record. The Trial Court has assigned cogent, convincing, and well-reasoned findings while acquitting the respondents–accused, and the same does not warrant any interference by this Hon’ble Court.

Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence led by the prosecution suffers from material contradictions, omissions, and inconsistencies, which create serious doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case. The prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients of the alleged offences and has not produced reliable, trustworthy, and corroborative evidence connecting the respondent with the commission of the alleged offence.

It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the presumption of innocence in favour of an accused is further strengthened by an order of acquittal. Unless the findings recorded by the Trial Court are shown to be perverse, illegal, or contrary to the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should be slow in interfering with an order of acquittal.

It is submitted that the appellant has failed to point out any infirmity, illegality, perversity, or misreading of evidence in the impugned judgment and order. The findings recorded by the Trial Court are based upon proper appreciation of the evidence and settled legal principles. The Trial Court has rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the respondents– accused, which is a substantive right flowing from the fundamental principles of criminal law.

In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is submitted that the present appeals are devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court therefore deserves to be confirmed.

In support of his arguments, Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the respondents accused has referred and relied upon the following decisions:-

Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and others vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2024 (12) SCR 439

Gandadhipa Sahu vs. State of Odisha reported in 2026 (0) JX(SC) 566

Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Telangana reported in 2025(3) SCC 735

Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, as well as the submissions advanced by the learned APP, learned counsel for the respondents accused as well as the written submissions of Ms. Acharya, learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1359 of 2012, the issues that arises for consideration before this Court are as under:-

Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal?

Whether the Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, has committed any error of law or fact? Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal suffers from any illegality or perversity?

Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and having considered the issues framed by this Court for determination, it would be appropriate to first examine the facts of the present case. The deceased, Manishaben, married the respondent-accused on 13.02.2005, and after the marriage, she resided with her husband, respondent No. 2 (mother-in-law), and grandmother-in-law. During the said wedlock, the deceased Manishaben became pregnant and, therefore, after completion of the shrimant ceremony, she was brought to her parental home, where she delivered a baby boy on 08.11.2005, namely, Dhruvil. The doctor advised that, since the child was a newborn, he should not be touched by any person other than the mother. After the birth of the child, Manishaben was brought back home from the nursing home. At that time, the respondent-mother-in-law insisted on taking the child in her lap. However, the deceased Manishaben refused to hand over the child to her, on account of which an altercation took place between the respondent-mother-in-law and the complainant and his family members. Since then, the deceased resided at her parental home with the minor baby. Later, at the instance of the respondent-husband, the deceased, Manishaben, along with the minor, went to her matrimonial home. Due to the ill health of the minor, they were immediately taken to a doctor for treatment, where it was revealed that the minor had a congenital defect in his private part and was suffering from coughing and a cold due to congestion. He was advised to take complete rest, prompting Manishaben to insist on staying at her parental home. However, the accused respondents forcefully took the deceased and the minor to their residence. Just two to three days later, the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself in the toilet at the residence of the accused respondents, and the complainant was immediately informed and called.

In the presence of the complainant and his family members, the door was broken open by PW-10, who was serving as a Fire Officer in the Fire Brigade at Surat. He has also admitted in his deposition that the door of the toilet was so strong that it could not be opened by pushing or by applying any external force. Therefore, the door had to be forcibly broken open with the help of a crowbar.

Now, if I examine the evidence of the witnesses, namely, the deposition of Dr. Gaurang Solanki, who conducted the post-mortem examination, it appears that he noticed certain injuries on the body of the deceased. When he was cross-examined by the defence, he admitted that the injury noticed on the body of the deceased could have been caused when a person attempts to strangulate herself and, in the course of writhing or struggling restlessly, she might dash against a wall, thereby sustaining the injury mentioned in the post-mortem note. Therefore, the allegation that the said injury was caused by the respondent-husband to the deceased is ruled out, and the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the said injury was caused by the respondent-husband.

Now, so far as the evidence of PW-1, who is a doctor, is concerned, he has deposed that no injury was noticed on the head of the deceased, either in the nature of a fracture or otherwise. It was alleged that the respondent-husband had physically assaulted the deceased prior to the incident and that, as a result, various injuries were found on her body. However, this allegation is not supported by the evidence of the doctor. On the contrary, in his cross-examination, the doctor has admitted the said fact. The deposition and cross examination of the PW-1 read as under:-

Now, if I look at the evidence of PW-2, who is the complainant and brother of the deceased Manishaben, it appears that he was serving as a teacher at I.T. Nayak Primary School at Surat. He has admitted that the respondent-husband/accused was residing at Rang Avdhoot Society, Part-3, Ramnagar, and that his brother-in-law, being the husband of the deceased, was serving as a clerk at Riverdale School. He has further admitted that the respondent-mother-in-law of the deceased was working as a Police Constable at Ichhapur Police Station and that, most of the time, she was on duty. The respondent-husband/accused, who was serving as a clerk in a school, was also on duty. Therefore, the allegations made against the respondents with regard to ill-treatment, harassment, and cruelty meted out to the deceased Manishaben are not supported by the evidence of the very same witness. Further, in his cross-examination, he has admitted that whenever he or any member of his family visited the house of the deceased Manishaben, they had not noticed any ill-treatment or harassment being caused to her. The deceased had also not made any complaint to them with regard to any ill-treatment or harassment caused to her, and they had not lodged any complaint in that regard.

It is further admitted that, when the deceased was undergoing treatment, she was taken by her mother-in-law to Dr. Sandhyaben and was also admitted to the gynaecologist for the purpose of delivery. After the delivery, she was brought by the complainant to his residence. Even during that period, the deceased had not made any complaint with regard to any ill-treatment or harassment. He has also admitted before the Court that, so far as the alleged instruction regarding not touching the minor child except by the mother is concerned, no such instruction was given by the doctor, either in writing or orally.

Even from his evidence, PW-2 has not stated that the respondent-husband had any habit of consuming liquor. Such a fact was also not stated by the father of the deceased, namely, PW-5, Parbubhai Lakshmanbhai Patel, at Exhibit 53, nor by the mother of the deceased, namely, Padminaben Parbubhai, PW-6, at Exhibit 57. However, such allegations were made in the applications at Exhibits 54 and 55, thereby portraying the accused as persons having such character as mentioned in the said applications. Such careless statements, in the absence of supporting evidence, cannot be relied upon for establishing the allegations against the respondents.

Under such circumstances, if I peruse the evidence of all the three witnesses vis-à-vis the applications at Exhibits 54 and 55, it appears that the appellant-original complainant, after the death of his sister, initiated the proceedings against the present respondents and their family members with a view to take revenge. The proceedings were initiated on the basis of certain distorted facts, which were not even supported by his oral evidence before the Court. Now, if I look at the evidence of all the three witnesses, it clearly reveals that there is not a whisper in their evidence that the respondents had ever harassed or subjected the deceased to any mental or physical torture. The fact that the deceased was not permitted to participate in the engagement ceremony of her cousin by the respondent-husband, due to the condition of their minor son, cannot, by itself, be said to constitute a cause for the deceased Manishaben to commit suicide. Even the other witnesses, who are close family members of the complainant, have not given any positive evidence with regard to any ill-treatment or harassment caused to the deceased by the present respondents.

In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges against the respondents-accused with regard to any ill-treatment or harassment caused to the deceased, as contemplated under Sections 306, 323, 498-A and 107 of the IPC. The allegation regarding the injury allegedly caused by the respondent-husband to the deceased is also not supported by the evidence of the doctor. Further, in his cross-examination, PW-2, the complainant himself, has admitted before the Court that he had not heard from the deceased herself about any ill-treatment or cruelty meted out to her prior to the date of the incident. Therefore, in the absence of such basic and fundamental facts being established by the prosecution, the charges under Sections 306 and 498-A read with Section 107 of the IPC cannot be said to have been proved.

Even the neighbours residing in the vicinity of the deceased, who were independent witnesses, have not supported the case of the prosecution. In such circumstances, it is also relevant to consider the fact that, initially, an Accidental Death Entry No. 22 of 2006 was registered before the Rander Police Station under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. on 15.04.2006. Initially, the deceased was taken to Dr. Vijay Mehta for treatment. Although the prosecution relied upon the fact that she was initially taken to the clinic of Dr. Vijay Mehta, neither was the statement of Dr. Vijay Mehta recorded nor was any documentary evidence collected from him. He was also not examined as a witness by the prosecution to prove the relevant facts. Now, if I look at the evidence of the doctor and peruse the translated portion of his deposition, it becomes clear that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges against the respondents-accused even from such evidence. In the absence of any cogent and clinching evidence, while appreciating the evidence of close relatives, the Court is required to carefully scrutinise their testimony. If such evidence is found to be trustworthy and reliable, the Court can certainly base a conviction upon such evidence. However, in the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the present respondents even from the evidence of the close relatives.

The remaining witnesses were not in day-to-day contact with the deceased or the respondents-accused, and from their evidence, no fact has been brought on record to establish that the respondents had ever caused any harassment or ill-treatment to the deceased so as to provoke, instigate, or abet her to commit the crime in question, as contemplated under Sections 306 and 498-A read with Section 107 of the IPC and Sections 113-A and 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, in the absence of such cogent and clinching evidence, the Trial Court was right and justified in passing the impugned judgment and order. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court, whereby the respondents-accused came to be acquitted of the charges.

If I look at the reasoning recorded by the Trial Court from paragraphs 9 to 18, it appears that, in paragraph 19, the Court has also referred to the evidence of the doctor and thereafter recorded its reasoning in paragraphs 20 and 21 as to why the order of acquittal was required to be passed, based upon the evidence discussed at length by the Trial Court. Thus, the present appeals deserve to be dismissed, and no interference is required to be called for with the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court.

At this stage it is appropriate to refer the provisions of Section 498A, 306 and 107 of the IPC and 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, which are reproduced hereunder :

So far as section 498-A of 306 IPC and 113 of Evidence Act is concerned, it is also appropriate to refer the decision of this Court in cases of State Of Gujarat Versus Ashvinbhai Naginbhai Tandel reported in 2025 (0) GUJHC 20677, State Of Gujarat Versus Bhaveshbhai Manilalbhai Patel reported in 2025 (2) GLR 923, State Of Gujarat Versus Haji Haroon Meman reported in 2026 (0) GUJHC 7002 as well as the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Ramesh Kumar Versus State Of Chhattisgarh reported in 2001 (9) SCC 618 and Ram Pyarey Versus State Of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2025 (6) SCC 820. Even, so far as the statutory presumption under Sections 113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has recently held that before such a presumption can be drawn, there must be at least some cogent material or evidence giving rise to an inference against the accused. In the absence of even the slightest evidence on record from which such an inference can reasonably be drawn against the respondents regarding the commission of the alleged offences, the statutory presumption cannot be invoked.

There is neither direct nor indirect evidence produced by the prosecution to establish that any act or conduct on the part of the present respondent had driven the deceased to such an extent that she was left with no alternative but to take the extreme step of committing suicide. Therefore, under the circumstances, the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. No infirmity, illegality, or perversity is found in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. Hence, the present appeals are devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed.

In these circumstances, the trial Court was justified in concluding that the prosecution had failed to establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, rightly recorded an order of acquittal.

On perusal of the record of the appeals, it transpires that the respondent-accused has established his innocence before the Trial Court and that, after due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and other material placed on record, the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The findings recorded by the Trial Court are just, proper and in accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court.

It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.

Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused are connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged.

The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, more particularly paragraph Nos. 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and another, reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court.

It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:-

Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record. Even the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1359 of 2012 do not come to the aid of the appellant in defending the case.

On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against them. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeals are liable to be dismissed.

In view of the above, both the appeals are devoid of merits and deserve to be dismissed. Resultantly, both the appeals dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings of both the appeals be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.