State of Gujarat vs Gokuldas Balmukundas Pujari and Others

Paresh Upadhyay, J.—The State of Gujarat has in this Second Appeal challenged the concurrent finding of both the Courts below that the original plaintiffs being the government employees, are entitled to get the benefits, as available to other government employees. While admitting this appeal on 27.09.2000, this Court had not formulated any substantial question(s) of law separately and therefore, the substantial questions of law as indicated in the memo of appeal by the appellant, are quoted as under:

A. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the plaintiffs prove that they are Government servants entitled to receive pay, salary and other benefits as are available to Government servants?

B. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, when the plaintiffs are included in Religious Charity list, whether they are entitled to any other benefits available to the Government servants as persons included in the Religious Charity list are paid from the grant released by the Government quarterly or yearly?

C. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, when the temples are registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 and they are managed by the Committee appointed by the Government, whether they are entitled to the pay and allowances of the Government servants?

The relevant facts are to the effect that the present respondents had moved the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Rajkot by filing Regular Civil Suit No. 259 of 1987 for declaration that, they are entitled and therefore, be extended the benefits, as are given to other Government employees, since they all were appointed by the State at the relevant time. The plaintiffs, original eight in number, were initially appointed as ''Pujaris'' (Priests) by the Morbi State. After independence, the said Morbi State was part of Saurashtra State, which subsequently became part of State of Gujarat. From the facts which are recorded by both the Courts below extensively, it transpires that, some of the original plaintiffs were appointed prior to the year 1947 by the Morbi State and some of the plaintiffs were appointed as Pujaris (Priests) after the year 1950 by the concerned Prant Officer and Deputy Collector, Morbi. Thus, there was no dispute on the point that, all the plaintiffs were appointed by the State. Under these circumstances, there was no reason not to consider them as State employees for any purpose. Since these persons, the original plaintiffs, were not being extended the benefits like pay-scale, etc., as were given to the other State employees, they had moved the Civil Court, and the Civil Court, after taking into consideration overwhelming material on record found that, they could not have been denied the benefits as were available to the other State employees. Though there is ample material on record, it would suffice to make a reference to a documentary evidence at Exh. 66, which is a letter written to the Government of Gujarat by the Collector, Rajkot, under whose jurisdiction the area of Morbi fell at the relevant time. In the said document, which is a government document, details are given about the date of appointment of each plaintiff, which ranges from the year 1944 to 1954. It is also borne out from the record that, all Pujaris were being transferred by the State from one place to another. It has also come on record that the Pujari who attains the age of 60 years, was made to retire. Even the service book of the plaintiffs have come on record. On this basis, the trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. Since they were State employees, State was ordered that they be paid benefits as are being given to the other State employees. The plaintiffs had asked for the benefits treating them to be Class-III employees, however the trial Court accepted their claim only to the extent of Class-IV employees.

Under these circumstances, the original plaintiffs as well as the State, both preferred separate appeals before the first Appellate Court (the District Court, Rajkot). The original plaintiffs had preferred Civil Appeal No. 53 of 1994 to the extent that the trial Court was in error in not accepting the claim of the plaintiffs as Class-III employees. The State had filed Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1995 contending that, the plaintiffs ought not to have been treated as Government employees at all. Both the appeals came to be dismissed vide common judgment and order dated 15.10.1998 by the first Appellate Court.

The original plaintiffs have accepted the rejection of their first appeal. Thus, it is an accepted position atleast by the original plaintiffs to the extent that they are Government employees, but they are Class-IV employees.

State has challenged the judgment and order of the first Appellate Court in this second appeal, with the above quoted questions, which in my view, are more the questions of fact, less the questions of law, much less substantial questions of law. In my view, the only question for determination by the trial Court was whether the plaintiffs prove that they are government servants, and if yes, whether they are entitled to the benefits available to government servants. The trial Court rightly formulated this point for determination and on the basis of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion and recorded finding in affirmative qua the issue it had framed. The first Appellate Court has also gone into, in detail, in this question and has confirmed the finding recorded by the trial Court. I see no reason to interfere with the same. However, since the appeal is admitted by this Court vide order dated 27.09.2000, with a view to see that no injustice is caused to the appellant State, this Court has gone through even the record and proceedings and this Court finds that there is no error in the finding of the trial Court as confirmed by the first Appellate Court.

6.1. In above factual background, if the questions as put forward by the appellate State for consideration are looked at, the first one is as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the plaintiffs prove that they are Government servants and entitled to receive pay, salary and other benefits as are available to Government servants, is, as stated above, was a question of fact, which is already answered by both the Courts below in affirmative. There was ample material to hold so, and there is no material on record, to the contrary.

6.2. The second question put forward is as to whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, when the plaintiffs are included in Religious Charity list, whether they are entitled to any other benefits available to the Government servants, as persons included in the Religious Charity list are paid from the grant released by the Government quarterly or yearly. This would also not be a substantial question of law in this factual background, since there is material on record, including service books of the plaintiffs and letter of the Collector Exh. 66, which is discussed above, proving the fact that they were appointed by the State, not only prior to the year 1947 but even after the year 1950, by the concerned Deputy Collector. This question also needs to be answered against the State.

6.3. The third question put forward is as to whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, when the temples are registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 and they are managed by the Committee appointed by the Government, whether they are entitled to the pay and allowances of the Government servants. This question in this fact situation would be academic, since the appointments of the many plaintiffs was even prior to the Act of the year 1950, which is sought to be pressed into service. Further, even those, who were appointed subsequently, are similarly situated to the appointees of earlier years, is not in dispute, so far the determination of point at issue was concerned. Thus, even on this count, the State cannot succeed in this appeal. Thus, in totality, on no question, the judgment and order of the Courts below need to be interfered with.

For the reasons recorded above, this second appeal is dismissed. The orders of the courts below are upheld. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Court.