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Judgment
Narendra Kumar Vyas, J
This batch of writ appeals are preferred against the order dated 26.05.2020, passed in WPC No.152 of 2020 and the order dated 4.12.2020 passed
in Review Petition No.146 of 2020 and other connected cases.
In WPC Nos. 1580 of 2021, 2041 of 2021 and 4805 of 2021, challenge is mounted to the Notifications dated 23.01.2020 and 29.07.2020, whereas, in
WPC Nos. 83 of 2021 and 2474 of 2021, challenge is made only to the Notification dated 29.07.2020.
The State Government had framed rules styled as “Loknayak Jaiprakash Narayan (MISA/D.I.R. Rajnaitik Ya Samajik Karno Se Nirudha
Vyakti) Samman Nidhi Niyam, 2008†(for short, ‘Niyam, 2008’) under which monetary allowance is granted to the persons who had
undergone detention during the emergency period of 1975 â€" 1977.
While benefit of the aforesaid Niyam, 2008 was being granted ever since the Niyam, 2008 was brought into force, the State/respondents stopped
release of allowance from January, 2019 onwards in view of an order dated 28.01.2019 issued by the General Administration Department,
Government of Chhattisgarh.
Such stoppage of allowance gave rise to filing of a number of writ petitions. Challenge therein, primarily, was to the aforesaid order dated
28.01.2019 and in few cases, appropriate directions were sought for to the respondents to make payment of monetary allowance which were paid till
January, 2019.
While the writ petitions were pending disposal, by Notification dated 23.01.2020, the State Government repealed the Niyam, 2008 with effect from
23.01.2020. However, the said Notification dated 23.01.2020 was not assailed either by amending the writ petitions or by independently assailing the
same before disposal of the writ petitions, by order dated 26.05.2020.
The learned Single Judge, in that view of the matter, confined adjudication of the proceedings only to the extent as to whether the respondents in the
writ petitions could have stopped the payment of allowance by order dated 28.01.2019 and as to whether the petitioners would be entitled to the
allowance from the date it has been stopped till the Niyam, 2008 was repealed by Notification dated 23.01.2020.
The learned Single Judge, on perusal of the order dated 28. 01.2019, opined that the said order did not intend to stop the payment to the
‘democratic fighters’, but the same was issued to make the process of payment of ‘Samman Nidhi ’ in the financial year more effective,
smooth and transparent and it is with that objective, the said order was passed.
On consideration of the materials on record, the learned Single Judge held that no scrutiny or further enquiry was made with regard to any of the
petitioners and on the contrary, the Niyam, 2008 was repealed by Notification dated 23.01.2020. The learned Single Judge held that the order dated
28.01.2019 by which the State Government decided to withhold the monthly pension to the writ petitioners is not sustainable in law and accordingly,
directed that payments for the period from January, 2019 to 23.01.2020 be made to each of the petitioners within a period of 90 days from the date of
receipt of the order.
Initially, against the said order dated 26.05.2020 in respect of WPC No. 88 of 2020, a writ appeal was filed being W.A. No. 333 of 2020. The said
writ appeal was disposed of on 24.08.2020 on permission being sought to withdraw the appeal by the learned Advocate General without prejudice to
the rights and contentions of the Government to initiate appropriate proceedings before the learned Single Judge.
A perusal of the order dated 24.08.2020 would go to show that the contentions were advanced by the learned Advocate General that a
clarificatory order was issued on 29.07.2020 providing that the Niyam, 2008 stood repealed from January, 2019 itself. Pursuant to withdrawal of the
writ appeal, Review Petition No. 146 of 2020 was preferred, which came to be dismissed by order dated 04.12.2020.
As noted earlier, these Notifications dated 23.01.2020 and 29. 07.2020 are the subject matters of challenge in WPC Nos. 1580 of 2021, 2041 of
2021 and 4805 of 2021 and Notification dated 29.07.2020 is challenged in WPC Nos. 83 of 2021 and 2474 of 2021.
Mr. Satish Chandra Verma, learned Advocate General submitted that the Niyam, 2008 was not in accordance with Maintenance of Internal
Security Act, 1971 (for short, ‘MISA Act, 1971’) or Defence of India Act, 1971 and accordingly, the payment of allowance was put on hold till
final decision was taken and thereafter on due consideration, Niyam, 2008 had been repealed. It is submitted that it is the sole discretion of the State
Government to run any scheme or to stop the same and the writ petitioners do not have any statutory right to claim allowance. Learned Advocate
General submits that the Notification dated 29.07.2020 was merely a clarificatory notification making it clear that Niyam, 2008 would stand repealed
with effect from January, 2019, when it was decided to stop payment of allowance to the writ petitioners. Learned Advocate General submits that the
Niyam, 2008 was made by way of executive instructions and on evaluation of the entire policy, it was found that there was no public interest involved
in making the Niyam, 2008 and therefore, decision was taken to repeal the same. Learned Advocate General submits that payment of allowance to
the writ petitioners for the reason of being detained under MISA Act, 1971 or Defence of India Act, 1971 amounts to frustrating the purpose and
purport of the aforesaid statues. That apart, MISA Act, 1971 does not contain any provision for framing rules such as the Niyam, 2008. It is
contended that any benefit granted on the strength of the executive instruction can be taken away by issuing another executive instruction, which is
precisely what was done in the instant case and the learned Single Judge failed to consider these aspects of the matter. In substance, it is submitted
that there was no public interest involved in framing the Niyam, 2008 and as grant of such allowance had caused financial burden to the State
Government, the State Government decided to repeal the Niyam, 2008.
It is further contended that on going through the Niyam, 2008, it is clear that there is no such public interest involved in making the Niyam, 2008. It
has been framed to give benefit to a particular class ignoring the interest of public at large and therefore, the State authorities had no option but to stop
the benefits under aforesaid policy vide order dated 28.01.2019 and thereafter, it has been cancelled vide Notification dated 23.01.2020. Later on,
repeal was given retrospective effect from January, 2019 vide Notification dated 29.07.2020. The benefits which have been given through executive
instruction to the writ petitioners can be stopped by the State Government at any time by way of another executive instructions, which was done by
the State under its powers. Thus, the writ petitioners cannot challenge the powers and authority of the State Government.
Learned Advocate General, while justifying the action on the part of the State to repeal the Niyam, 2008, submits that the scheme was in violation
of the MISA Act, 1971 and since the State has legislative power to enact the Samman Nidhi, therefore, the repealing of the Niyam, 2008 is well within
the competence of the State. It is further contended that the MISA Act, 1971 was enacted by the Central Government to provide for detention in
certain cases for the purpose of maintenance of internal security and matters connected therewith.
Learned Advocate General, while praying for quashing of the order passed in batch of writ petitions, refers to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & another v. Status Spinning Mills Limited & another, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 353, and submits that
a clarificatory order can be given retrospective effect as it can throw light on substantive provision by principle of contermporanea expositio, with
particular reference to paragraph 29 of the judgment wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“29. The clarification issued by the State during pendency of the appeals should have, therefore, been considered by the High Court in its proper
perspective. If it is clarificatory in nature, it could be given a retrospective operation. Such a question, however, should have been posed and
answered. Furthermore, the letter dated 1.08.1997 was issued as some confusion arose. When a subordinate legislation is made by the State
Government, it must be done in terms of the constitutional provision. An executive order is also issued keeping in view the rules and executive
business. It may not have the force of law but the same may come within the purview of the well-known principle of contemporaneous expositio.
Rules of executive construction are also relevant.â€
He further submits that it is well within the competence of the Government to issue the clarificatory notification and at the same time, there is no
vested right of the petitioners to claim benefit of the Niyam, 2008, which is even evident from the pleadings and from Notification dated 23.01.2020 by
which the Niyam, 2008 has been repealed.
The Learned Advocate General refers to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Reepak Kansal v. Union of India & others,
[Writ Petition (Civil) No. 554 of 2021 with 539 of 2021, decided on 30. 06.2021)], reported in AIR 2021 SC 3198, whereby the scope of judicial review
with respect to the policy matters have been examined.
Learned Advocate General for the State submits that the subsequent Notification dated 29.07.2020 would not amount to nullifying the judgment
passed by learned Single Judge as it is a clarificatory order which is permissible under the law and in support thereof, he refers to the judgment passed
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Cheviti Venkanna Yadav v. State of Telangana & other, reported in (2017) 1 SCC 283.
The learned Advocate General also submits that since the Niyam, 2008 has already been repealed, the learned Single Judge should not have
granted the benefit to the writ petitioners in the writ petitions out of which the appeals arise from January, 2019 and therefore, the writ appeals filed by
the State deserve to be allowed, and the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are liable to be dismissed.
Mr. Upendra Nath Awasthy, learned senior counsel, who has led the arguments on behalf of the recipients of ‘Samman Nidhi’, has
supported the reasoning assigned by the learned Single Judge in directing payment for the period from January, 2019 to 23.01.2020. It is submitted that
‘Samman Nidhi’ was withheld by the State Government without any reasonable justification as the payments were made after due verification
by the competent committee consisting of In-charge Minister (Chairman), District Magistrate (Member Secretary), Superintendent of Police
(Member) & Jail Superintendent (Member) and as such, the same was arbitrary and colourable exercise of power. Though ostensible reason for
issuing the order dated 28.01.2019 was for undertaking an exercise for effective and smooth disbursement of allowance, no further action was taken
such as scrutinizing or streamlining the process and later on Niyam, 2008 was repealed by Notification dated 23.01.2020. It is submitted that
Notification dated 29.07.2020, by which repeal of the Niyam, 2008 was given retrospective effect from 28.01.2019, is not sustainable in law and the
said Notification was issued only to frustrate the order of this Court and on political considerations, without there being any reasonable basis for
nullifying the Niyam, 2008.
It has been further contended by Mr. Awasthy, learned senior counsel and Mr. Mahendra Dubey, learned counsel for the writ petitioners that the
order dated 23.01.2020 has been issued after passing of the interim order by this Court on 14.01.2020 by which this Court has directed for payment of
Samman Nidhi. Thereafter, the order dated 29.07.2020 was issued, and therefore, it is crystal clear that the order has been issued to nullify the order
passed by the learned Single Judge. It has been further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the State has not placed any material
on record before this Court as to what deliberation and discussion have been carried out by the State to cancel the Niyam, 2008 and benefit granted to
the petitioners have been withdrawn without any rhyme or reason. It is incumbent on the part of the State to place on record the decision making
process to cancel the Niyam, 2008 vide its Notification dated 23.01.2020 and subsequent Notification dated 29.07.2020 giving retrospective effect
from January, 2019. In absence of any material being placed on record by the State, it may be held that without deliberation and with malafide
intention, the impugned Notifications have been issued, he submits.
Mr. Awasthy, learned counsel for the petitioners places reliance upon the judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Govt. of India v.
George Philip, reported in AIR 2007 SC 705 and the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi
Kassab Jamat & others, reported in AIR 2006 SC 212.
He also refers to the judgment passed by Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in Uttar Pradesh Loktantra Rakshak Senani Kalyan Samiti Sitapur
v. State of Uttar Pradesh, passed in Writ Petitions No. 11590 of 2010 connected with Nos. 4200 (MB) of 2010 and 4205 (MB) of 2010, the judgment
rendered by High Court of Rajasthan in Shanti Lal Jain & another v. State of Rajasthan & another, passed in D.B. Civil Writ Petition (P.I.L.) No.
5785/2015 and the judgment rendered by High Court of Patna in Ravishankar Kumar Akela v. State of Bihar passed in CWJ No. 7472 of 2009 and
prays for dismissal of the writ appeals.
The other learned counsel had adopted the arguments of Mr. Upendra Nath Awasthy.
We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials placed on record.
Taking note of the aforesaid factual matrix, the points emerged for determination by this Court are: (i) Whether by the subsequent notification
dated 29.07.2020 Niyam, 2008 could have repealed retrospectively from January, 2019 and whether the same would amount to nullifying the order
passed by learned Single Judge dated 26.05.2020? (ii) Whether the State was justified in repealing the Niyam, 2008 without assigning any reason and
whether this Court can interfere in policy matter?
Before adverting to the points raised in the appeal as well as in the writ petition, it is necessary for this Court to extract the Gazette notifications
dated 23.01.2020 & 29.07.2020, which are extracted below:-
The record would show that earlier, the Samman Nidhi was withheld subject to scrutiny or verification with regard to entitlement of the candidate,
but the State has not placed any material on record objecting the entitlement of writ petitioners to get Samman Nidhi, but it has been cancelled during
pendency of the writ petitions vide order dated 23.01.2020 and thereafter, vide Notification dated 29.07.2020 has repealed the Niyam, 2008. This
would clearly establish that the subsequent Notification dated 29.07.2020 is nothing but an attempt to nullify the order passed by learned Single Judge
dated 26.05.2020, which was issued in favour of the writ petitioners and therefore, the Notification dated 29.07.2020 cannot remove the defects
pointed out by the learned Single Judge in its judgment. By the impugned Notification, the appellants have attempted to discard the judgment passed by
learned Single Judge and to defeat the right which has accrued to the writ petitioners on the basis of the order of learned Single Judge. By the
impugned Notification, the State has taken away either directly or indirectly the right accrued in favour of the writ petitioners, which is nothing but
amounting to nullify the order of learned Single Judge. It is a well-settled legal position that the legislature cannot declare any decision of a Court of
law to be void or of no effect. It is also well-settled that it can remove the defects of law pointed out by the Court and Court decision must always be
binding unless the condition on which it is based is so fundamentally altered that the decision could not be given effect to in such an altered
circumstance.
Perusal of the judgment passed by learned Single Judge dated 26.05.2020 goes to show that the learned Single Judge, in paragraph 18 of the
judgment has observed that a plain reading of the order dated 28.01.2019 would reveal that the intention of the State Government was never to stop
the payment being made to the writ petitioners and that it intended to get the scheme and the claimants scrutinized so as to ensure more effective and
transparent implementation and also to ensure that the amount under the said scheme does not fall in the hands of persons, who are not otherwise
entitled for the same under the rules. The appellants vide Notification dated 29.07.2020 have given retrospective effect to Notification dated
23.01.2020 by which the scheme has been cancelled w.e.f. January, 2019. This clearly amounts to nullifying the order of the learned Single Judge
passed on 26.05.2020 and the same does not amount to clarification of the order dated 23.01.2020.
It is a well-settled proposition of law that the clarification means to clarify the things, if there is any ambiguity. In the Notification dated 23.01.2020,
there was no ambiguity and it is well-settled interpretation of statutes that notification will be given effect to from the date it is made effective. In the
present case, Notification was issued on 23.01.2020. Therefore, it will be effective from 23.01.2020. Thus, by subsequent Notification dated
29.07.2020, it has been given retrospective effect from 28.01.2019, which amounts to nullifying the order passed by learned Single Judge of this Court.
Therefore, giving retrospectivity by the Notification dated 29.07.2020 is against the judgment rendered by this Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Medical Council of India v. State of Kerala & others, reported in (2019) 13 SCC 185 , observed as under:-“27. The Court has also observed in
Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, In re [(1993) Supp. (1) SCC 96 (2)] (supra) that if the exercise of the power of judicial review can be set at naught
by the State Government by overriding the decision given against it, it would sound the death knell of the rule of law. The rule of law would be
meaningless as it would be open to the State Government to defy the law and yet get away with it.
126.5. The doctrine of separation of powers applies to the final judgments of the courts. The legislature cannot declare any decision of a court of law
to be void or of no effect. It can, however, pass an amending Act to remedy the defects pointed out by a court of law or on coming to know of it
aliunde. In other words, a court's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision
could not have been given in the altered circumstances.
126.6. If the legislature has the power over the subject-matter and competence to make a validating law, it can at any time make such a validating law
and make it retrospective. The validity of a validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the legislature possesses the competence which it claims
over the subject-matter and whether in making the validation law it removes the defect which the courts had found in the existing law.
126.7. The law enacted by the legislature may apparently seem to be within its competence but yet in substance, if it is shown as an attempt to
interfere with the judicial process, such law may be invalidated being in breach of doctrine of separation of powers. In such situation, the legal effect
of the law on a judgment or a judicial proceeding must be examined closely, having regard to legislative prescription or direction. The questions to be
asked are:
(i) Does the legislative prescription or legislative direction interfere with the judicial functions?
(ii) Is the legislation targeted at the decided case or whether impugned law requires its application to a case already finally decided?
(iii) What are the terms of law; the issues with which it deals and the nature of the judgment that has attained finality? If the answer to Questions (i)
and (ii) is in the affirmative and the consideration of aspects noted in Question (iii) sufficiently establishes that the impugned law interferes with the
judicial functions, the Court may declare the law unconstitutional.â€
It is also apparent that what the State Government has done by way of impugned Ordinance is not only impermissible and beyond legislative
competence it also has the effect of perpetuating illegality and arbitrariness committed by the colleges in question by not following the mandate of law
laid down by the High Court as affirmed by this Court. An effort has been made to cover up the arbitrariness and illegality in an illegal and
impermissible manner for which the State Government had no competence. The provisions made in the Ordinance are otherwise also quite illegal and
arbitrary besides in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers enshrined under Article 50 of the Constitution of India.
From the above stated legal proposition and considering the facts of the case, it is quite clear that the Gazette Notification dated 29.07.2020 is not
clarificatory to the earlier Notification dated 23.01.2020, but an annulment of judgment passed by the Single Bench of this Court on 26.05.2020, which
is not permissible in law and accordingly, the Notification dated 29.07.2020 is liable to be and is hereby quashed.
Point No. (ii)
It is not in dispute that the State has framed the Niyam, 2008 exercising the powers conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution of India and
there is no provision under the law to grant monetary benefit to the writ petitioners, who have suffered during the emergency for the period from 1975
to 1977. However, the State, while repealing the Samman Nidhi, has not placed any material before this Court to show that before taking any final
decision, there was any deliberation or discussion, though it is a policy decision of the State Government.
The judgments cited by Mr. Awasthy, learned senior counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the present case as in Uttar
Pradesh Loktantra Rakshak Senani Kalyan Samiti Sitapur (supra), the benefit was denied by wrong interpretation of the rules and therefore, the
Division Bench quashed the order and directed to grant consequential benefits. The judgment cited in Shanti Lal Jain (supra), is also not applicable as
in that case, PIL was filed challenging granting of benefit to the persons who have suffered during the period of emergency. Therefore, the Division
Bench held that it is a policy decision of the State to grant benefit to them. But in the present case, the whole scheme has been cancelled. Therefore,
the aforesaid judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
In Ravishankar Kumar Akela (supra), the scheme was challenged by the petitioner and the Division Bench, after appreciating the rules, held that it
is a policy decision of the Government and accordingly, dismissed the PIL, whereas in the present case, the State has cancelled the Niyam, 2008 itself.
Therefore, this Court has to examine the validity of the decision taken by the State and as such, the judgment cited by the learned senior counsel for
the petitioners is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
The State Government has not placed on record for consideration of this Court before repealing as to whether there was any deliberation or
discussion for repealing Niyam, 2008 so as to enable the Court to examine the decision making process of the State. In absence of any material, this
Court can very well take note of the fact that the decision making process suffers from non-consideration of relevant material or they have considered
the materials which were irrelevant. This Court can definitely annul the decision taken by the State and can very well direct the State to take a fresh
decision after considering the material or relevant facts for reaching a final conclusion.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa & others, reported in (1975) 2 SCC 649, has held as under:-
“13. The Executive have to reach their decisions by taking into account relevant considerations. They should not refuse to consider relevant matter
nor should they take into account wholly irrelevant or extraneous considerations. They should not misdirect themselves on a point of law. Only such a
decision will be lawful. The Courts have power to see that the Executive acts lawfully. It is no answer to the exercise of that power to say that the
Executive acted bone fide nor that they have bestowed painstaking consideration. They cannot avoid scrutiny by courts by failing to give reason. If
they give reasons and they are not good reasons, the court can direct them to reconsider the matter in the light of relevant matters though the
propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character of these reasons may not be open to judicial scrutiny. Even if the Executive considers it inexpedient to
exercise their powers they should state their reasons and there must be material to show that they have considered all the relevant facts.â€
It is well-settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Court cannot interfere with the policy decision but can certainly interfere with the decision
making process, if the Court finds that there is no material or irrelevant material has been considered by the Government while taking decision. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. & another v. Johri Mal, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 714, has held as under:-
“29. In Wade's Administrative Law, 8th edition at pages 33-35, it is stated:
Review, Legality and discretion
The system of judicial review is radically different from the system of appeals. When hearing an appeal the court is concerned with the merits of a
decision: is it correct? When subjecting some administrative act or order to judicial review, the court is concerned with its legality: is it within the limits
of the powers granted? On an appeal the question is 'right or wrong?' On review the question is 'lawful or unlawful?' Rights of appeal are always
statutory. Judicial review, on the other hand, is the exercise of the court's inherent power to determine whether action is lawful or not and to award
suitable relief. For this no statutory authority is necessary: the court is simply performing its ordinary functions in order to enforce the law. The basis
of judicial review, therefore, is common law. This is none the less true because nearly all cases in administrative law arise under some Act of
Parliament. Where the Court quashes an order made by a minister under some Act, it typically uses its common law power to declare that the Act did
not entitle the minister to do what he did and that he was in some way exceeding or abusing his powers. Judicial review thus is a fundamental
mechanism for keeping public authorities within due bounds and for upholding the rule of law. Instead of substituting its own decision for that of some
other body, as happens when on appeal, the court on review is concerned only with the question whether the act or order under attack should be
allowed to stand or not. If the Home Secretary revokes a television licence unlawfully, the court may simply declare that the revocation is null and
void. Should the case be one involving breach of duty rather than excess of power, the question will be whether the public authority should be ordered
to make good a default. Refusal to issue a television licence to someone entitled to have one would be remedied by an order of the court requiring the
issue of the licence. If administrative action is in excess of power (ultra vires), the court has only to quash it or declare it unlawful (these are in effect
the same thing) and then no one need pay any attention to it. The minister or tribunal or other authority has in law done nothing, and must make a fresh
decision.
It is well-settled that while exercising the power of judicial review the Court is more concerned with the decision making process than the merit of
the decision itself. In doing so, it is often argued by the defender of an impugned decision that the Court is not competent to exercise its power when
there are serious disputed questions of facts; when the decision of the Tribunal or the decision of the fact finding body or the arbitrator is given finality
by the statute which governs a given situation or which, by nature of the activity the decision maker's opinion on facts is final. But while examining and
scrutinizing the decision making process it becomes inevitable to also appreciate the facts of a given case as otherwise the decision cannot be tested
under the grounds of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. How far the court of judicial review can re-appreciate the findings of facts
depends on the ground of judicial review. For example, if a decision is challenged as irrational, it would be well-nigh impossible to record a finding
whether a decision is rational or irrational without first evaluating the facts of the case and coming to a plausible conclusion and then testing the
decision of the authority on the touch-stone of the tests laid down by the Court with special reference to a given case. This position is well settled in
Indian administrative law. Therefore, to a limited extent of scrutinizing the decision making process, it is always open to the Court to review the
evaluation of facts by the decision-maker.â€
Thus, this Court can very well reach to a conclusion that the action of the State Government while issuing Notification dated 23.01.2020
(Annexure P/1) and subsequent Notification dated 29. 07.2020 (Annexure P/2) suffers from arbitrariness and without any consideration. Therefore,
the Notification dated 23.01.2020 (Annexure A/1) and subsequent Notification dated 29.07.2020 (Annexure A/2) are liable to be and are hereby set
aside. However, the State is at liberty to take a fresh decision in accordance with law after considering the materials which are relevant for just
decision to decide whether the State intends to continue with the Niyam, 2008 or not.
In view of the above discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the Writ Appeals filed by the State are liable to be dismissed and are
accordingly dismissed. Writ Petitions (C) filed by the petitioners are partly allowed.
Since this Court has set-aside the notification dated 23.01.2020 and subsequent notification dated 29.07.2020, the State Government is directed to
continue payment of Samman Nidhi till a decision is taken in accordance with law as to whether the State intends to continue with Niyam, 2008 or not.