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Judgment
PADMANABHAN, J. :
In all the writ petitions, the co-operative society is the petitioner.
In the first batch of writ petitions, the petitioner prays for the issue of writ of declaration to declare that the petitioner is not a finance company
within the meaning of S. 2(5B)(va) of the Interest-tax Act, 1974 (Central Act 45 of 1974).
In the second batch of writ petitions, the petitioner co-operative society contended that S. 2(5A)(i) of the Interest Act is not applicable to the
respective societies.
In the remaining cases, the petitioner co-operative society contended that S. 2(5B)(va) of the Interest Act was not applicable to the petitioner
co-operative society and on that basis, the petitioner seeks for the issue of writ of certiorari to quash the notice issued by the first respondent.
The Interest Act, 1974 (Central Act 45 of 1974) came into force w.e.f. 31st December, 1974. In all the writ petitions, the ITO issued a notice
either calling upon the petitioner-society to furnish certain information and details of interest-tax return, if any, filed by the respective societies for
the asst. yrs. 1992-93 and 1993-94, such as date of furnishing the said return and copy of the computation statement and other details. Few of the
writ petitions have been filed challenging the said notice calling upon the petitioner-society to furnish details.
In few of the writ petitions, the ITO proposed to assess interest for the period from 1st October, 1991 to 31st March, 1992 (asst. yr. 1992-93)
and called upon the petitioner to file return within 30 days from the date of service of notice.
In some other writ petitions, the AO issued a notice to the writ petitioner to the effect that he had reason to believe that chargeable interest
assessable under the provisions of the Interest-tax Act, 1974 for the asst. yr. 1992-93 has escaped assessment within the meaning of s. 10 of the
Interest-tax Act, 1974, and, therefore, he called upon the petitioner to file return within 30 days.
In respect of other cases, the ITO called upon the petitioner-society to furnish full details besides forwarding it with model working statement
and by way of clarification.
After receipt of such communications, the writ petitioners have come before this Court challenging the action of the ITO mainly contending that
the entire action is without jurisdiction, that the co-operative societies not being banking companies are not liable to pay interest and that the action
of the respondent is arbitrary, barred by limitation and without jurisdiction.
In all the writ petitions, interim stay has been granted by this Court.
The respondent ITO had filed counters in WP Nos. 3067, 3068, 3759, 5228, 5108, 5612, 5613, 6043 and 8929 of 1997.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-Revenue mainly contended that the writ petitions are premature and they are liable to be
dismissed in limine, besides contending that the action taken by the respondent is well within his jurisdiction and that the petitioner-co-operative
society is liable to pay interest-tax, for the period from 1st October, 1991 to 31st March, 1992 and interest is leviable and payable by the
petitioner-society.
Common arguments were advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. Mr. N. Krishna Mitra, Mr. V. Karthic, Mr. Kovi
Ramalingam, Mr. K. V. Ananthakrishnan, Mr. A. B. Sampathkumar, Mr. R. Malaichamy, Mr. H. Naziruddeen and Mr. K. Shanmugakani, argued
for the respective writ petitioners and Mr. S. V. Subramaniam, senior counsel, appeared and argued for the respondent in all the writ petitions.
The main contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in all the writ petitions are : (1) The provisions of the Interest Act has no
application to the co-operative society as the co-operative societies are not banking companies :
(2) The action of the respondent is without jurisdiction and authority of law; and
(3) In any event, the action taken by the respondent is barred by limitation.
On the other hand, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-Revenue contended that for the particular period for which the
respondent had called for particulars or issued notice, the co-operative societies engaged in carrying on business on banking and or providing
credit facility to the farmers or village artisans, are liable to pay interest in terms of the provisions of the Interest Act and the action taken by the
respondent is well within the authority. Learned senior counsel further contended that the petitioner in each of the writ petitions had come before
this Court against a notice calling upon them to furnish particulars or calling upon them to file returns and that the respondent is competent to decide
the question and statutory appeal is provided for in terms of the provisions of the Interest Act, and that the writ petitions are premature and they
are not maintainable. Learned senior counsel further contended that the action taken by the respondent is not barred.
This Court is not going to decide the individual cases or the liability of the petitioner society in these writ petitions and this Court has to confine
itself only to the common issues.
In terms of sub-s. (2) of s. 4 which is the charging section in respect of credit institutions other than the scheduled banks, interest shall be
charged on every credit institution for every assessment year.
Sub-s. (2) of s. 4 reads thus :
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1) but subject to the other provisions of this Act, there shall be charged on every credit institution
for every assessment year commencing on and from the 1st day of April, 1992, interest-tax in respect of its chargeable interest of the previous year
at the rate of three per cent. of such chargeable interest.
It is essential to refer to the definition of the term ""credit institution"" as defined in the Act. Sec. 2(5A) defines the term ""credit institution"" thus :
Credit Institution means -
(i) a banking company to which the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949) applies (including any bank or banking institution referred to in s.
51 of that Act - or a co-operative society engaged in carrying on the business of banking not being a co-operative society providing credit facilities
to farmers or village artisans (omitted by the Finance Act, 1992, w.e.f. 1st April, 1993).
(ii) a public financial institution as defined in s. 4A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
(iii) a State financial corporation established under s. 3 or s. 3A or an institution notified under s. 46 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951
(63 of 1951); and
(iv) any other financial company.
This definition of ""credit institution"" was introduced w.e.f. 1st October, 1991. However, by Finance Act, 1992 w.e.f. 1st April, 1993, the following
portion has been deleted from the definition section :
Words ""or a co-operative society engaged in carrying on the business of banking not being a co-operative society providing credit facilities to
farmers or village artisans.
It is vehemently contended that a co-operative society not being a banking company and the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949
not being made applicable, cannot be taken as a credit institution. Learned counsel for the petitioners had obviously overlooked the second limb of
the definition section. The term ""a co-operative society engaged in carrying on the business of banking"" refers to a particular kind of co-operative
society and it need not necessarily be a banking company or a company to which the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 are made
applicable. It is true that with respect to the co-operative, provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 had not been made applicable and they
are not banks. But the specific portion namely second limb of the section has to be given its meaning, which would definitely mean that a co-
operative society engaged in or carrying on the business of banking, falls within the definition of credit institution. The attempt on the part of the
learned counsel for the petitioners to read the second limb of the definition section, as if it is subject to the first limb of the provision, cannot be
appreciated and it cannot be sustained. The terms contained in the definition section with respect to co-operative society has to be given full textual
meaning and it has got a special significance and meaning. It is also to be pointed out that certain varieties of co-operative societies, which provide
credit facilities to farmers or to the village artisans, have been excluded from the definition of credit institution. This Court is definite that a co-
operative society which undertakes business of banking, such as lending money to its members or accepting deposits or raising loan from the
financial banking or institution and advancing the same to its members, is definitely engaged in the business of banking. Such co-operative societies
will definitely fall within the definition of ""credit institution"". In respect of such credit institutions, in sub-s. (2) of s. 4, charging has been placed. As
such, the petitioner co-operative society, in each of the writ petitions, cannot contend that it is not a credit institution falling within the meaning of s.
2(5A) of the Interest Act, 1974.
There is certainly an attempt to contend that some of the co-operative societies are not carrying on banking business. In other words, it was
suggested that a particular society is not engaged in advancing loan or accepting deposits and no part of the business could be termed as ""business
or banking"". Such individual cases cannot be gone into in these writ petitions and it is for the respective petitioner to raise objection before the
respondent and contend that they have neither collected interest nor have paid interest on loan nor they have carried on banking business.
It is next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in terms of s. 10, action should have been taken within four years of the end
of the assessment year and in the present case, action not having been taken, the entire action is barred by limitation and without jurisdiction. On
the other hand, senior counsel for the Revenue contended that action is not barred by limitation. In this respect, s. 10 has been considered.
However, it is not at this stage at which this Court would decide the issue finally as it is always open to raise such objection before the respondent
and thereafter agitate the issue by way of appeal and further proceedings. Prima facie, for the purpose of the present writ petitions, it would be
sufficient to point out that the action of the respondent cannot be said to be barred by limitation. In cases falling under cl. (a) of s. 10 the assessing
authority may, at any time, and in cases falling under cl. (b) of s. 10, at any time within four years of the end of that assessment year, serve on the
assessee a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be necessary under s. 10. If it is to be construed that the action taken falls
under cl. (a) of s. 10, in that event, the respondent could take action at any time and even if it is to be construed that action taken falls under cl. (b)
of s. 10, the respondent could take action within 4 years of the end of that assessment year. In the present case, four years have not elapsed and
immediately after the issue of notice, the petitioners in all the writ petitions, have rushed to this Court and obtained an order of stay of all further
proceedings. This, prima facie, this Court is of the view that the action taken by the respondent by issue of notice either calling for particulars or
filing of returns or for details or a notice under s. 10, is not barred by limitation.
Incidentally it has been contended that accepting deposit or raising loan from the financial bank and advancing the same to the members of the
society, would not amount to the petitioner-society carrying on business or banking. Such a contention cannot be accepted. Accepting for the
purpose of lending or investment of deposits of money from the public repayable on demand or otherwise, is definitely a banking business.
In the case of Additional Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. U.P. Co-operative Cane Union, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court
had occasion to consider an activity of a co-operative society with reference to the exemption of its income in terms of s. 81 of the IT Act. A
particular co-operative society, in that case, had engaged itself in the business of providing credit facility. In that context the Division Bench held
thus :
A person or a society may not be a banker in that wide sense yet he may be providing credit facilities which is a part of a banking business. The
expression ""providing credit facility"" thus takes its colour from the activity of banking. In order that a banking or providing of credit facility may
constitute a business, it is necessary that these activities must be the chief source of income. A person who advances loans or supplies goods on
credit in connection with and in the course of some other business of manufacture or purchase or sale of goods, etc., cannot be said to be carrying
on the business of banking or providing credit facilities.
It is not necessary to refer to any other authority, even though the learned counsel for the Revenue relied upon various other pronouncements.
Further, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the Revenue, the present writ petitions are premature, in that, either the notice calling
for details, had been served or a model calculation form had been served, or the petitioner had been called upon to furnish particulars or file
returns. It is always open to the petitioner-society to raise objection before the respondent contending that the petitioner-society had not carried on
business in banking or in that matter, the action of the respondent is barred by limitation. No such objection has been taken. Further, any decision
by the respondent including a decision with respect to jurisdiction aspect of the matter could be agitated by way of further appeal under the
provisions of the Interest Act, 1974. As it is, it cannot be contended that the respondent has acted without authority or jurisdiction. One of the
contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that an alternate remedy is not a bar to the filing of the writ petition. Learned counsel for the
petitioners referred to various decisions. However, this Court is of the view that it is not necessary to refer to those decisions. Each case has to be
decided on the facts of the case and in terms of the provisions of a particular enactment. It cannot be held that a co-operative society is not
carrying on business of banking and advancing loan to its members and it cannot be said that the co-operative society is not a credit institution and
consequently, the petitioners cannot contend that the respondent has no jurisdiction at all to issue notice.
This Court is not setting out the details set out in each writ petition as well as in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent as it is not necessary in
view of the course this Court decided to adopt. This Court is not deciding other objections as the petitioners are given liberty to raise other legal
objections as well as factual objections before the respondent. In the circumstances, this Court holds that the writ petitions are premature and these
writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on this short ground.
In the circumstances, these writ petitions are dismissed and consequently, WMP Nos. 6048, 6284, 6597, 6811, 6844, 7658, 8276, 8512,
8676, 8726, 9234, 9296, 10015, 10034, 10871, 13729 and 14241 are dismissed. The order of interim stay granted in these writ petitions is
vacated.
It is open to the respective petitioner to state their objections to the respondent within one month from today, and in such objection statement,
it is well open to the petitioner to raise all objections including the objections as to jurisdiction, limitation as well as factual dispute while filing
returns. The respondent shall offer necessary opportunity, conduct an enquiry and thereafter pass appropriate orders in terms of the Interest Act,
1974.