State Bank of India vs K.V. Ramamurthy

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, C.J.—The respondent was born on 24.4.1935. He was appointed as a temporary Watchman by the appellants on 8.10.1967, but he stopped attending work with effect from 1.3.1976. The respondent was again appointed as an Armed Guard on 26.10.1983 and his services were confirmed on 26.4.1984. It is the case of the appellants that the retirement age was 58 years and the respondent thus retired on 30.4.1993 on completing 58 years of age. He was, however, granted an extension of two years upto the age of 60 years and thus finally retired on 30.4.1995.

The respondent, despite his claim, was not granted pension and his representation dated 19.5.1998, was rejected vide communication dated 2.6.1998, which resulted in filing of W.P. No. 19838/1998. This writ petition was allowed on 27.8.2003, by the impugned order. The impugned order is predicated on a reasoning that since the respondent had the qualifying service of 10 years on the date of his retirement i.e., 30.4.1995, he was eligible for pension.

The present appeal has had a checkered history as it was dismissed for non-prosecution on 28.6.2007, and the endeavour made by the appellants to seek restoration of the appeal on 18.4.2011, after a delay of 1298 days, did not succeed. The appellants thereafter, approached the Hon''ble Supreme Court and Civil Appeal No. 6240 of 2013 was allowed subject to payment of Rs. 1 lakh in favour of the respondent towards costs. This cost since stands paid and thus we have to consider the appeal on merits.

Learned Counsel for the appellants has urged before us that at each of the relevant stages, the respondent was over-aged to be admitted to the pension fund. The respondent was advised on 27.4.1984 itself that he could not be admitted to the pension fund as he was aged above 35 years on the date of his confirmation, which was the maximum age at which a person could be admitted to the pension fund (respondent was 49 years of age). The relevant Rule 8(c) was, however, amended and the maximum age was increased to 38 years with effect from 1.7.1987; but, the respondent was 52 years of age at that time. The further amendment to the Rule increased the age to 48 years with effect from 1.11.1993, when the respondent was 58 years and 6 months old. This is the reason why the respondent was never admitted to the pension fund and thus, even if he had minimum qualifying service of 10 years, he could not be granted pension.

The second limb of submission is based on the fact that the impugned order has proceeded on the basis as if the retirement age of the respondent was 60 years. This is stated to be an incorrect premise as the retirement age of the workman was 58 years as per the settlement of 31.3.1967 and was increased to 60 years vide settlement dated 15.9.1998. A circular on the basis of settlement under Section 18(1) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, dated 15.9.1998, was issued on 20.3.1999. The respondent, however, retired much prior to that on 30.4.1993. His extension also came to an end on 30.4.1995. Thus, the relevant age of retirement was 58 years by which date, he had not completed 10 years of service. Not only that, even if the time period of additional two years service was taken into account, this was not to be counted for pension as per circular dated 20.3.1999, though that aspect would be purely academic in the present case, since the retirement age was increased only as per the settlement of 15.9.1998, much after even the respondent attaining the age of 60 years.

We are in agreement with the submission made by the learned Counsel for appellants on both counts. The respondent was fully conscious throughout of his being not admitted to the pension fund on account of his being over-aged. In fact, this was right from the inception on 27.4.1984. It also emerges that the retirement age of the respondent was actually 58 years when he attained the age of superannuation on 30.4.1993, but he was granted an extension of two years. Even on completion of the extension period on 30.4.1995, his retirement age was still 58 years. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the respondent is not entitled to the relief and the impugned order cannot be sustained and is set aside.

Our sympathy for the respondent unfortunately cannot be translated to any relief and we are informed by the learned Counsel for appellants that there is no provision for relaxation of the Rules. Thus, the only benefit the respondent had is of the costs paid to him by the appellants.

The writ appeal is partly allowed. No costs.