State Bank of India vs Akilandam and Others

Pratap Singh, J.—These civil revision petitions are directed against the orders passed in I.A. No. 2365 of 1986 in O.S. No. 319 of 1984

I.A.S.R. No. 1631 of 1986 in O.S. No. 319 of 1984 and I.A. No. 518 of 1988 in C.M.A.S.R. No. 9988 of 1988 respectively.

The short facts are the revision petition has filed a suit against one Mookkan on the foot of a promissory note. The said Mookkan died on

18.2.1986. Counsel for the said defendant filed a memo on 23.6.1986 informing the fact that the sole defendant had died. The revision petitioner

filed LA5R. No. 2076 of 1986 on 19.8.1986 to implead the legal representatives of the deceased Mookkan. Since that application was filed

beyond the time-limit, without any application to condone the delay, that was rejected on 8.9.1986. There after on 20.10.1986, the revision

petitioner filed I.A. No. 2365 of 1986 u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 154 days. That was resisted by the respondents herein.

After enquiry, the court below has dismissed the petition and consequently dismissed the petitions filed by the revision petitioner to implead the

legal representatives and to set aside the abatement. Aggrieved by the said orders, the revision petitioner has come up with the above revision

petitions.

Mr. R. Sekar, learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would submit that the revision petitioner in all the cases is a Bank and that

the Apex Court has laid down that each and every day of delay need not be explained and in the interest of justice the court below ought to have

condoned the delay. I have heard Mr. Swaminathan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent on the above aspects. I have carefully

considered the submissions made by the rival counsels. Even though the sole defendant died on 18.2.86, I.A.SR. No. 2076 of 1986 was filed to

implead the legal representatives of the deceased defendant only on 19.8.1986 on the ground that the revision petitioner came to know of the

death of the defendant only on 23.6.1986. The court below rejected it on 8.9.1986. Thereafter on 20.10.1986 an application in I.A. No. 2365 of

1986 was filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. The delay in between 8.9.1986 and 20.10.1986 is to be explained by the revision petitioner. Even

assuming that the period earlier to 8.9.1986 was validly explained, in the affidavit filed in support of the application, I am unable to find any

explanation whatsoever, for the delay in between the period 8.9.1986 and 20.10.1986. It is merely stated that the delay is neither wilful nor

wanton and it was beyond the control. So far as the period from 8.9.1986 to 20.10.1986 is concerned, except the allegation that the delay is

neither wilful nor wanton, no other ground whatsoever has been stated. Such a vague ground cannot be accepted by any court of law. The

proposition that each and every day of delay need not be explained is correct. But that cannot be construed to put a seal of approval for total

absence of any explanation whatsoever for considerable period. In these circumstances, I am unable to take any exception to the orders of the

court below in rejecting the petitions and they are not liable to be interfered with. Consequently C.R.P. No. 904 of 1988 fails and shall stand

dismissed. Two other revisions C.R.P. Nos. 1739 of 1989 and 416 of 1990 are filed in respect of orders which are consequential to the order

impugned in C.R.P. No. 904 of 1988. Consequently, they also fail and shall stand dismissed. No costs.