State Bank Of Bikaner & Jaipur vs Bhanwar Singh & Anr

This revision petition has been filed by the petitioner State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur against the order dated 17.12.2014 of the State Consumer

Disputes Redressal Commission, Rajasthan (in short ‘the State Commission’) wherein the appeal of the petitioner filed against the order of the

District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Alwar, (in short ‘the District Forum’) passed in Complaint Case No.25 of 2010 has been

dismissed in default.

The brief facts of the case are that loan was taken by the respondents from petitioner/opposite party bank in the year 2000 and it was not repaid till

2008. However, the Government of India announced Loan Waiver Scheme for farmers, then the respondents/complainants applied under this Loan

Waiver Scheme. The opposite party bank initially allowed the waiver for the total outstanding amount, but later on disallowed it by objecting that the

respondents/complainants were not entitled to full waiver and were entitled only to 25% of the outstanding amount provided 75% was paid by them.

The complainants then filed a consumer complaint before the District Forum, which was allowed vide its order dated 06.04.2011.

The opposite party/petitioner herein preferred appeal bearing No.1100 of 2011 before the State Commission and the State Commission dismissed

the appeal on 03.08.2012.

The revision petition was filed by the petitioner/opposite party bank before this Commission and vide order dated 26.08.2013 this Commission set

aside the order of the State Commission and remanded the matter to the State Commission for passing a speaking order.

The State Commission again dismissed the appeal vide its order dated 09.10.2013. The petitioner/opposite party bank again preferred revision

petition No.4849 of 2013 before this Commission and this Commission vide its order dated 13.10.2014 again remanded the matter to the State

Commission for passing a speaking order.

The State Commission vide its impugned order dated 17.12.2014 has dismissed the appeal for non-appearance and non-prosecution.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the present revision petition has been filed with delay and an application for condonation of delay has

been filed for condoning the delay. It was stated that the case of the petitioner bank is very strong on merit as clearly the guidelines of the Waiver

Scheme do not permit the respondents to be eligible for 100% waiver of the loan. It was stated by the learned counsel that the State Commission

issued a notice for 17.12.2014, but did not wait for service of the notice and passed the order dismissing the appeal for non-appearance and non-

prosecution. As no notice was serviced to the petitioner, there was no question of having knowledge of the order dated 17.12.2014 passed by the State

Commission. The petitioner came to know of the order dated 17.12.2014 only on 21.07.2016 when the petitioner received the notice of contempt from

the District Forum. The revision petition has been filed within the time from the date of knowledge of the order. It was requested that keeping the

merits in view, the delay may be condoned and revision petition be allowed.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/complainants stated that the District Forum had passed the order on merits. Moreover, the

State Commission has dismissed the appeal twice on merits. This Commission has allowed revision petition filed by the petitioner and the matter was

remanded to the State Commission for passing fresh and speaking order. The learned counsel further argued that in the second remand order dated

13.10.2014 this Commission has directed both the parties to appear before the State Commission on 21.11.2014. Thus, the petitioner had full

knowledge of the date fixed before the State Commission and even if the petitioner was not able to attend on that date, the petitioner should have

found from the State Commission about the next date of hearing. The impugned order of the State Commission clearly states that none was present on

behalf of the petitioner (appellant before the State Commission) and none was also present on the previous date. Thus, it is clear that inspite of full

knowledge of the date fixed before the State Commission, the petitioner avoided appearing before the State Commission. Thus, there is no force in the

application for condonation of delay and the same should be dismissed.Â

On merits, learned counsel for the respondents stated that both the fora below have given concurrent finding and the scope under the revision

petition is very limited. From this angle also the revision petition needs to be dismissed.

I have given a thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the material on

record. It is true that the matter was remanded to the State Commission twice for passing a speaking order in the matter, but it is also true that when

the matter was remanded second time by this Commission, the parties were asked to appear before the State Commission on 21.11.2014. Clearly the

petitioner must have known this date and the petitioner should have appeared on this date or if he was not able to appear on this date before the State

Commission, the petitioner should have found from the Registry of the State Commission about the next date of hearing in the matter.

Thus, the fact mentioned in the application for condonation of delay that the petitioner came to know of the order dated 17.12.2014 passed by the

State Commission only when the petitioner received notice from the District Forum probably in the execution case, seems questionable. This version

of the petitioner as mentioned in the application for condonation of delay is not explained in the light of the fact that this Commission had asked the

parties to appear before the State Commission on 21.11.2014 while disposing of the revision petition No.4849 of 2013 vide its order dated 13.10.2014.

Special periods of limitation have been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act 1986, for speedy disposal of the consumer disputes as held by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), wherein the Apex

Court has laid down that;

“ It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the

special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the

object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the

orders of the consumer Foras .â€​

Decision of Anshul Aggarwal (Supra) has been reiterated in CicilyKallarackalVs. Vehicle Factory, IV (2012) CPJ 1(SC) 1, wherein Hon’ble

Supreme Court observed ;

“ 4. This Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a matter where the special

Courts/ Tribunals have been constituted in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person aggrieved and Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of

them. Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in such cases the Court must keep in mind the special

period of limitation prescribed under the statute (s).

In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this

Court in place of the period prescribed by the Legislature for filing the special leave petition. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone

the delay.

Hence, in the facts and circumstance of the case as explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these petitions. The same are dismissed

on the ground of delay .â€​

Similarly, in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kailash Devi & Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45 , it has been laid down that ;

“ There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice but

that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be

exercised judicially i.e. one of is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence .â€​

In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, Supreme Court observed ;

“ We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained.

This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his

appeal/petition .â€​

The explanation given by the petitioner with regard to knowledge of the impugned order passed by the State Commission is not acceptable as the

petitioner already knew the date of appearance before the State Commission, which was fixed by this Commission vide order dated 13.10.2014. The

valuable right has accrued in favour of the respondents. That right cannot be brushed aside lightly. Clearly, negligence and inaction are imputable to

the petitioner and the above authoritative judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are fully attributed to the present case. Hence, inordinate delay

of 532 days in filing the revision petition cannot be condoned since no sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner. Accordingly application for

condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the revision petition is also liable to be dismissed.

Accordingly, revision petition No.2755 of 2016 State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Bhanwar Singh & Anr. is dismissed on account of being highly

barred by limitation.