State vs Muthu and Adinarayanan

Maheswaran, J.—The State has preferred this appeal against the judgment of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tirunelveli, acquitting the

respondents who have been charged for offence a under Ss. 7 (i) and 16(1)(a)(i) read with S. 2 (ia) and (m) of the Prevention of Food

Adulteration Act and Rr. 44 (a) and 47 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules in C.C. No. 188 of 1982 on his file.

The Food Inspector, Tirunelveli Municipality, purchased 900 grams of ice candy from accused Muthu for Rs. 2. 40 for analysis. The sample

was taken from Vinayaga Ice Company at No. 5, Cheranmadevi Road, Pettai. The Food Inspector divided the sample into three equal parts. He

sealed the sample in three clean bottles in accordance with the rules and sent one bottle to the Analyst. The report of the Analyst showed that the

sample contained ISO parts of saccharin per million parts. After obtaining the opinion of the Analyst, the Food Inspector laid a complaint.

In accordance with clause A. 07.04.01 of Appendix B to Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, ice candy or under whatever name it is

sold, shall not contain any artificial sweetener. As the ice candy sold by the accused contained sweetener which is saccharin, the offence is clearly

made out. But then, it is contended for the respondent-accused that in this case the Food Inspector is not competent to lay the complaint. As this is

a question which goes to the rest of the matter, I allowed it to be taken. It is pointed out that the Government Order referred to in the complaint,

namely, G.O. No. 1861, Health, dated 6th June, 1956 published at page 350 of Part I-A of Fort St. George Gazette dated 20th June, 1956

authorising Food Inspectors to institute prosecution for offences under the Act is relatable only to Food Inspectors who are already in service, but

not to Food Inspectors to be appointed at a future date. On this aspect or the question, there is no evidence at all. Mr. Shanmugavelayutham,

Learned Counsel for the respondent, says that on the date of deposing in Court, P.W. 2, the Food Inspector is aged about 41 years and he could

not have been appointed prior to the G.O. issued in 1956. Bat then there is no clinching proof as regards the date of appointment of the Food

Inspector. In Abdulla Haji and Another Vs. Food Inspector, Muliyar Panchayath, , a learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court took the view

that any authorisation given under the notification was only in favour of the existing Food Inspectors and not in favour of the Food Inspectors to be

appointed in future under the Act. I am in perfect agreement with this observation. But as the question whether the Food Inspector in this case was

appointed after the notification is a matter of evidence. I am of the view that the matter has to go back for consideration by the trial Court There

are no merits in the other contention that the attestors were not examined as the evidence of P.W. 1 is sufficient to show that the sample was taken

in Vinayaga Company itself.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of acquittal is set aside and the matter is remitted to the trial Court for a de novo trial on the question as to

whether P.W. 2, the Food Inspector in this case, is competent to lay a complaint. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.