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Judgment
A.K. Ganguly, C.J.—Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. This appeal has been filed by the Government of Puducherry, represented
by the Inspector of Police, Ariankuppam Circle, Puducherry, impugning an order dated 27.2.2008 passed by a learned Judge of this Court on a
petition filed by the respondent. In the said petition, the respondent challenged an order dated 27.11.2007 passed by the appellant refusing his
prayer to hold a public meeting.
It is, no doubt, true that the right to hold a public meeting is a Fundamental Right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India,
viz. all citizens shall have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. In Himat Lal K. Shah Vs. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad and
Another, , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the question of a citizen''s right to hold a meeting on a public street subject to the
control of the appropriate authority and in paragraph 31 at page 95 of the said judgment, Chief Justice Sikri (as his lordship then was), speaking
for the majority, held that even before the Constitution, citizens had a right to hold meeting on the public street subject to the control of the
appropriate authority regarding the place and the kind of the meeting and subject to consideration of public order. After the Constitution, the said
Fundamental Right to hold a meeting under Article 19(1)(b) has been made subject to reasonable restrictions which are imposed under Article
19(3). Those reasonable restrictions can be imposed on the ground of sovereignty and integrity of India and also public order, on the basis of any
valid law.
The learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the respondent organisation is seeking to hold a meeting in
support of a banned organisation, viz. the L.T.T.E. Therefore, if permission is granted to hold the meeting, it would amount to diluting the ban
which is already there on the said organisation. The learned single Judge, of course, considered these aspects and passed an order in paragraph 12
with the following direction:
In view of the same, the impugned order of the respondent dated 27.11.2007 is set aside with a direction to the respondent to consider the fresh
claim of the petitioner to convene a public meeting and to pass appropriate orders permitting the petitioner to convene the meeting, however, with
reasonable restrictions as per law, especially regarding speaking about any banned organisation. In the event of the petitioner making any
application, the respondent shall consider the same and pass appropriate orders in the light of the above observations, within a period of 10 days
thereafter. Consequently, the connected M.P. is closed.
We are of the view that by the said order, the learned Judge, while disposing of the petition by directing the appellant to consider the respondent''s
application for holding a meeting, also directed the appellant to permit the respondent to convene the meeting
We are of the view that such direction may not be consistent with the facts and the legal position here. The case of the appellant is that if the
appellant permits holding of such a meeting in support of a banned organisation, the same will be derogatory to the concept of maintenance of
public order and in the name of public order, the appellant can restrict the holding of such a meeting. It is well known that under our Constitutional
framework, both the rights and restrictions are imposed under the same Article in order to balance the exercise of Fundamental Right and the
maintenance of social security and proper maintenance of law and order, including public order. It is, at the same time, true that on considerations
of public order, the Government''s primacy should be accepted unless the Government''s view it is patently perverse. In the instant case, we do not
find any perversity in the attitude of the appellant. We, therefore, direct the respondent to make a fresh representation stating therein the object of
its holding the meeting and in the said representation, the respondent must make it clear whether it is seeking to support the cause of any banned
organisation. The said representation must be made by a responsible person on behalf of the respondent organisation. We make it clear that if the
respondent organisation is not a registered one, it will not be entitled to make any representation for holding the meeting. But, if it is a registered
organisation, it is only then that it can make a representation, and the person making the representation must disclose his link with the registered
organisation. If such a representation is made in detail, the appellant will examine the same and on examination of the same, if the appellant finds
that the granting of the permission to hold the meeting will not in any way affect public order, it can grant the said permission with reasons. If, at the
same time, he does not grant the permission, he shall also pass a speaking order to that effect. Such an order may be passed by the appellant
within a period of four weeks from the date he receives the representation from the respondent. But, we have made it very clear that unless a
representation is made on behalf of a registered organisation, the permission can be refused.
The order passed by the learned single Judge dated 27.2.2008 is modified to the above extent. The writ appeal is disposed of accordingly.
There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, M.P. No. 4 of 2008 is closed.
