Sri Vinay Kotecha vs Deepak Garodia & Anr.

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:

The present appeal arises out of the rejection of a plaint in respect of a suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant for the following reliefs:-

Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the suit was primarily for declaration of the leasehold rights of the plaintiff/appellant on the strength of a registered deed of lease granted for 99 years, with a further renewal clause for an additional period of 99 years, couched in such a language as if to indicate that it was mandatory for the lessor/defendant no. 2 to grant such renewal.

Learned counsel contends that the learned Trial Judge, at the very inception of the suit, rejected the plaint on the ground that the cause of action is illusory and the suit is vexatious, without adverting to the triable and arguable issues raised in the suit.

By placing reliance on different paragraphs of the plaint, in particular paragraph nos. 2 and 4 thereof, it is argued that the plaintiff sought a declaration of his right, title and interest as a lessee of the suit shop room, being shop room no. 6. It is contended that although reliefs (b) and (c) of the plaint pertain to a challenge to a sale deed executed by the defendant no. 2 in favour of the defendant no. 1, even if the Trial Court finally comes to a conclusion that such reliefs may not be granted, the Trial Court could very well have granted the reliefs sought in prayer (a) of the plaint and/or moulded such relief to grant lesser rights to the appellant, on the strength of the lease deed, than sought in the plaint at the final hearing of the suit. Since law does not recognize the partial rejection of a plaint, it is contended that the non-maintainability of some of the reliefs could not entail the rejection of the plaint.

Learned counsel cites Bloom Dekor Limited vs. Subhash Himatlal Desai reported at (1994) 6 SCC 322 where it was elaborated that by “cause of action” it is meant every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court; in other words, a bundle of facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed in the suit.

It is contended that in the present case, it is a matter of trial on evidence as to whether the plaintiff succeeds on the strength of the cause of action pleaded in the plaint. However, read as a whole, it cannot be said at the outset that the suit is barred by any law and/or there is non-disclosure of cause of action.

It is argued by the appellant that in order to decide an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court has to have a complete and meaningful reading of all the paragraphs in the plaint and to rely on the plaint and not go beyond the same.

Thus, it is contended that the learned Trial Judge, instead of awaiting the trial of the suit upon framing of issues, erred in law in rejecting the plaint at the outset.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant further submits that from the cause of action paragraph of the plaint, i.e. paragraph no. 27 thereof, it will be evident that upon the plaintiff having obtained a certified copy of the impugned sale deed executed by the defendant no. 2 in favour of the defendant no. 1, the suit was instituted.

By placing reliance on paragraph no. 12 of the plaint, it is argued that as per the averments made therein, in the last week of May, 2023, the defendants started coming to the suit shop room to disturb the business of the plaintiff with imposition of threats to oust the plaintiff by force. Thus, the cause of action of the suit is inextricably connected with the attempts of the defendants to oust the plaintiff unlawfully from the suit premises, seen from which perspective the plaint is very much maintainable in law.

In reply, learned counsel appearing for the defendant/respondent no. 1 argues that as a lessee, the plaintiff does not have the locus standi to challenge a sale deed executed by the original owner in favour of a transferee, as in the present case. Thus, reliefs (b) and (c) are not maintainable in law.

It is further contended that from the lease deed itself, which has been referred to and filed with the plaint, it will be evident that the tenure of the lease granted in favour of the plaintiff was for 99 years. Thus, the plaint case of perpetual and indefeasible rights in the suit property having been created in favour of the plaintiff by virtue of the same is not tenable on the face of the document itself as well as in law.

Learned counsel argues that a lessee does not have the right to prevent the legitimate owner/lessor from transferring the property in favour of third parties.

Next placing the relevant clauses in the sale deed executed by the defendant/respondent no. 2 in favour of the defendant/respondent no. 1, it is contended that the said clauses in the deed specifically acknowledge and recognize the leasehold rights of the plaintiff and make the sale subject to such leasehold rights. Thus, the cause of action sought to be made out in the plaint is illusory and vexatious, since, by dint of execution of the sale deed per se, no threat was ever issued to the leasehold rights of the plaintiff.

Learned counsel further argues that there is suppression of material facts in that plaint inasmuch as the defendant no. 1 has already instituted an eviction suit which is now pending against the plaintiff.

It is further submitted that the plaintiff has sought to deposit rent in connection with the suit property, thus, admitting his leasehold right, which is sought to be expanded in the present suit.

As such, the suit is palpably vexatious and frivolous and was rightly nipped in the bud by the impugned deemed decree. In support of such contention, learned counsel cites T. Arivandandam vs. T. V. Satyapal and Anr. reported at (1977) 4 SCC 467 where the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, observed that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the court should exercise its power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled, and, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, “to nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X of the Code”.

Learned counsel also cites Anwarali Bepari and Ors. vs. Jamini Lal Roy Choudhury and Ors. reported at 43 C.W.N 797, where a learned Single Judge of this Court was pleased to observe that a lease is the outcome of the rightful separation of ownership and possession, the essential characteristic of a lease being that the subject is occupied and enjoyed, but the corpus of the subject does not disappear by user. Thus, it is argued, a lessee cannot claim ownership in the leasehold property.

It is further submitted that the main purpose of filing the present suit is to challenge the sale deed executed by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the respondent no. 1, on the strength of the perceived indefeasible and perpetual rights in the suit property allegedly acquired by the plaintiff through the limited lease granted by the defendant no. 2.

Thus, ex facie, the claim of title of the plaintiff to the suit property is not maintainable in law.

In view of the short questions involved, we take up the appeal itself for disposal along with the application.

Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, we come to the conclusions narrated below:

Learned counsel for the parties rightly argue that in order to adjudicate an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, the Court has to read the plaint in its entirety, meaningfully and not in a cursory manner.

It is also well-settled that while construing the plaint so, the Court can also look into the documents referred to or relied on in the plaint and/or filed therewith. In the present case, the plaintiff referred to and filed along with the plaint the lease deed, on the strength of which the plaintiff seeks declaration of his title to the suit property, as well as the sale deed executed by respondent no. 2 in favour of the respondent no. 1, which has been assailed in the suit.

As rightly contended by learned counsel for the respondent no. 1, the sale deed specifically acknowledges the leasehold rights of the lessee/plaintiff/appellant herein. Thus, even from the documents relied on in the plaint, it is evident that the plaintiff could not have any cause of action of the plaintiff’s leasehold rights being threatened merely by execution of such sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 1.

On a closer scrutiny of the plaint, we further find that the plinth of the cause of action as pleaded in the plaint is not the alleged threat to the possession of the plaintiff by the defendants/respondent no. 1, as pleaded in paragraph no. 12 of the plaint. We say so because in the cause of action paragraph i.e. paragraph no. 27, there is not a single whisper of the incident which allegedly took place in the month of May, 2023, when the defendant no. 1 allegedly sought to disturb the business of the plaintiff at the suit property. Paragraph no. 27, conspicuously, speaks only about the execution of the sale deed by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the respondent no. 1 as well as the plaintiff having obtained a certified copy of the self-same deed, as the cause of action of the suit. Thus, the crux and plinth of the plaint is that the plaintiff has assailed the transfer of title by the original owner/defendant no. 2 in favour of defendant no. 1 on the premise that the plaintiff has acquired indefeasible and perpetual right, title and interest in the suit property by dint of the registered lease deed of 99 years executed in his favour by the original owner.

Moreover, a composite reading of paragraph nos. 14 and 25 of the plaint clearly shows that in the perception of the plaintiff, as pleaded in the plaint, the plaintiff/appellant has acquired perpetual right, title and interest in the suit property by virtue of the said deed of lease and assails the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent no. 1 on the premise that the defendant/respondent no. 2 “ceased to be capable of further transfer of the same property during the continuance of Deed of Lease”.

Hence, the cause of action for the challenge to the sale deed is intricately and inextricably connected with that for seeking the declaration on the strength of the lease deed in prayer (a) of the plaint. Thus, prayer (a) cannot be disassociated from the other prayers challenging the sale deed executed in favour of respondent no. 1, that is, prayers (b) and (c), for the purpose of coming to a conclusion that the plaint cannot be partially rejected. In the present case, the very premise on which prayer (a) has been sought is also the plinth of the reliefs sought in prayers (b) and (c). Thus, the reliefs are not disconnected with each other but stem from the plaint case that perpetual and indefeasible title in the suit property has been conferred in favour of the plaintiff/appellant by dint of the lease deed executed in his favour, which is an evident effort to artificially expand the leasehold right given by such lease deed beyond its ambit.

From the lease deed, it would be evident that the tenure of the lease was for 99 years. At best, it can be argued that a further right of renewal was given to the plaintiff for an additional period of 99 years. Still then, the total tenure of the lease, upon renewal, would be limited in time and not perpetual. The right, thus, claimed by the plaintiff/appellant in the plaint is palpably contrary to the entire scheme of the Transfer of Property Act, as rightly held by the learned Trial Judge, as well as beyond the lease deed relied on by the plaintiff himself.

In such view of the matter, it is clear that even without taking into account the eviction suit pending at the behest of the respondent no. 1 (which is not pleaded in the plaint), there cannot be any manner of doubt that the premise of the cause of action disclosed in the plaint does not confer any clear right to sue in favour of the plaintiff insofar as the reliefs sought are concerned. Moreover, the basis of the claim of title to the suit property as disclosed in the plaint is contrary to law. Hence, the plaint was liable to be rejected both under Clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Insofar as the proposition laid down in T. Arivandandam vs. T. V. Satyapal and Anr. (supra) is concerned, the same is squarely applicable to the present case, since the plaint of the appellant was a product of clever drafting intended to create an illusion of a cause of action whereas no real cause of action has been disclosed and, was, thus, vexatious and meritless and ought to be nipped in the bud, as rightly done by the learned Trial Judge.

In view of the above findings, we do not find any merit in the appeal.

Accordingly, FA 65 of 2026 is dismissed on contest, thereby affirming the impugned judgment and deemed decree dated January 8, 2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Fourth Court at Alipore, District – Sought 24 Parganas in Title Suit no. 853 of 2023.

CAN 1 of 2026 is consequentially disposed of as well.

There will be no order as to costs.

Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of requisite formalities.