High CourtsDivision Bench(1925) 11 MAD CK 0003

Sri Rajah Satrucharla Gangaraju Bahadur Garu and Others vs Sir Sri Sri Ramachandra Deo Garu, Rajah of Jahpore and Another

Madras High Court · Decided on 25 November 1925 · Citation: AIR 1926 Mad 797 : 96 Ind. Cas. 194 : (1926) 23 LW 650

HON’BLE JUDGES
Wallace, J · Devadoss, J

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

16 paragraphs · 348 words
1.

This is an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge directing the appointment of a Receiver in respect of the Pedda Merangi estate. The

plaintiff has obtained a mortgage-decree for a very large amount against the appellant. It is said that the personal remedy is outstanding but No.

personal decree has yet been passed against the appellant. The allegation of the plaintiff is that the mortgaged property would not fetch even half

the amount of the decree. Granting for arguments'' sake that it is so, we do not see any reason why the Court should appoint a Receiver for

property which is not the subject-matter of the suit. The appellant succeeded as reversioner to the estate of a certain minor and the Pedda Merangi

estate descended to him from the minor after the mortgage suit was filed. In these circumstances, we do not see any justification for the

appointment of a Receiver for Pedda Merangi estate and for depriving the appellant of the possession of that estate.

2.

When there is no personal decree against the appellant and when there is no reasonable chance of a personal decree being passed against him in

the near future, we do not see why the appellant should be deprived of the possession of the estate which is not in any way connected with the

property in the suit.

3.

We, therefore, set aside the order appointing a Receiver, but to prevent the appellant from alienating the property in order to defeat any

personal decree that may be obtained by the plaintiff against him, we direct that he should be restrained by an injunction from alienating the whole

or any portion of the Pedda Merartgi estate.

4.

There was a conditional attachment pending the disposal of the Receiver application. If the attachment has lapsed, it will be open to the plaintiff

to apply to the lower Court to attach the property and the Subordinate Judge will dispose of such an application on its merits.

5.

The appellant will have his costs of the appeal here and in the lower Court.