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Judgment
This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.PC, seeking quashment of the CR Case No. 3364C/2014, pending before the learned
Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kamrup (M), Guwahati.
I have perused the petition as well as the annexures furnished therewith including the copy of the complaint, referred to above.
The present respondent No. 2, as complainant, filed the aforesaid complaint case alleging the commission of offence by the present accused-
petitioner as well as the other accused persons, named in the aforesaid complaint, under Sections 499/500 IPC for causing defamation to him.
The fact, as alleged, is that the respondent No. 2/complainant is a sports person and record holder in many events and his name has been
included in the India Book of Records, Asia Book of Records and is also qualified for the Guinness Book of Records 1st Addition 2011, Limca
Book of Records 2011 and also included his name in Assist World Records and World Record University and Kriya Ratna Award 2012. The
present accused-petitioner and his coaccused in the complaint Mr. Anil Mahanta held a press meet on 25.1.2013 at Jorhat Press Club and both of
them made some defamatory statements against the complainant/respondent in their such statements in the press meet that the present
respondent/complainant achieved various awards including Guinness Book of Records, Limca Book of Records, India Book of Records, Assist
World Records and Asia Book of Records by playing fraud and these records were purchased by him paying money, and his doctorate degree,
conferred by World Record University, UK, was also purchased. The said press meet was widely covered by the electronic media of Assam as
well as print media of Assam and was also published in the Assamese Newspaper Dainik Janambhumi. It is alleged in the complaint that accused
No. 3 of the complaint, Smt. Anindita Tamuli, also held a press meet at Upasana Palace in Guwahati on 29.1.2014 which was published in print
media defaming the complainant/respondent saying that anybody can purchase records, if paid for that. This press meet was also widely covered
by the vernacular newspapers of the state of Assam.
I have heard Mr. AK Purkayastha, learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, Mr. BJ Dutta, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing
for the State respondent No. 1 as well as Mr. J Roy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2.
The learned counsel for the accused-petitioner has submitted that the complaint, referred to above, be quashed on the ground that:-
i. The press meet involved in this case, making the alleged imputations, was held at Jorhat and therefore, the Court at Guwahati has no jurisdiction.
ii. The news item published following the press meet, referred to above, is covered by the Right to Freedom of Speech guaranteed under Article
19 of the Constitution of India and that the defamatory imputation alleged in the instant case does not attract an offence under Section 499 of the
IPC.
iii. On the same facts, the present respondent No. 2/complainant instituted a civil suit, being TS No. 109/2014, before the learned Civil Judge No.
2, Kamrup (Metro) claiming damages for defaming the complainant/respondent No. 2 by the imputations mentioned in the complaint petition and
said Civil Suit was disposed of vide judgment dated 03.01.2018. The suit was dismissed without cost. The suit proceeded ex-parte against the
present petitioner who was defendant No. 2 in the Civil Suit. The learned counsel for the accused-petitioner has submitted that the finding of the
learned Civil Court is binding upon the criminal court, and therefore, the criminal case needs to be quashed.
iv. The learned counsel for the accused-petitioner has urged upon this Court to quash the complaint also on the ground that the press meet held at
Jorhat in which the defamatory imputations were allegedly made in respect of the complaint/respondent No. 2 was not made by the present
accused-petitioner as is evident from the newspaper report furnished with the petition itself.
On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2/complainant has submitted that:-
i. Quashment of the complaint has been sought for inspite of the fact that the order taking cognizance on the aforesaid complaint has not been put
to challenge and even there is no statement in the petition that cognizance has been taken by the learned trial court on the offences alleged in the
complaint.
ii. Whether there is jurisdiction of the Court at Guwahati is a question of fact to be decided by the learned trial court since the offence allegedly
committed by the accused-petitioner was published in two vernacular newspapers from Jorhat having circulation in the entire State of Assam and
therefore the learned trial court has jurisdiction. According to him, the Court at Guwahati has jurisdiction.
iii. That although there is a Civil Suit filed by the respondent No. 2/complainant on the same facts which was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge
yet the decision of the said Civil Suit is not a bar in a criminal proceeding. As regard the submission of the learned counsel for the accused-
petitioner that the present accused-petitioner did not make the alleged defamatory imputations in an aforesaid press meet and it was made by
another co-accused in the complaint petition is a question of fact needs to be decided in trial.
In the background of the facts, mentioned above, and the rival submissions made by respective counsel for the parties, as indicated above, this
Court proceeds to dispose of this petition on merit by way of this judgment although the matter was listed at the admission stage for the reason that
both the parties have argued at length in respect of their respective claims and as both the parties agreed to a judgment on merit.
The learned counsel for the accused-petitioner with regard to his submission at Sl. No. i, referred to above, has referred to the provisions of
Section 177 of the Cr.PC as well as the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) vs. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee, reported in (1997) S5 SCC 30. On consideration of his such submission and the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent
No. 2/complainant on this count. The word ?ordinarily'' used in the provision of Section 177 of the Cr.PC is itself conveys the meaning that this is
the general rule and as such there may be exception. The newspaper reports, in the instant case, were read all over the State and therefore, if the
complainant/respondent No. 2 was defamed, he was defamed before all the readers of the said newspapers spreading over the State. Any Court
has jurisdiction if the cause of action has taken place within its territorial limit and cause of action consists of bundle of facts. In the instant case, the
defamation allegedly caused in the esteem of the public/readers of the said newspaper with alleged false imputation. It has also been specifically
averred in the complaint that the name and fame of the complainant has been lowered down in the eye of the society all over the State of Assam
and outside. The newspapers which published the news are having circulation at Guwahati also is not disputed at the bar. Therefore, the
consequence of the alleged defamatory news item ensued at Guwahati also. Therefore, cause of action arose in the instant case at Guwahati also.
Therefore, provisions of Section 179 of the Cr.PC confers jurisdiction upon the Courts at Guwahati to try the case. In the considered view of this
Court, so far the territorial jurisdiction is concerned, the present case is governed by Section 179 of the Cr.PC. Therefore, this Court holds that the
Courts at Guwahati has jurisdiction to try the case.
In respect of the 2nd argument of the learned counsel for the accusedpetitioner, he has referred to the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court
in the case of S Khushboo vs. Kanniammal and Anr., reported in (2010) 5 SCC 600. The defamatory imputations alleged to have been made in
the press meet conveyed jointly by the present accused-petitioner and another accused (the other accused is not before this Court in this petition),
in the considered view of this Court, the facts of the case, referred to above, and the fact of the instant case is completely different and therefore,
taking the ratio laid down in the case of Ambica Quarry Works etc Vs. State of Gujrat and others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1073, this is not
found applicable in the instant case. In Ambica Quarry Works (supra), the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that"".............the ratio of any decision
must be understood in the background of facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually
decides, and not what logically follows from it.
With respect to the 3rd argument canvassed by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the
case of KG Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and Anr., reported in (2002) 8 SCC 87 has been relied upon. In respect of the rival submission
made by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2/complainant to the effect that the decision of the Civil Suit, referred to above, is not a bar in
respect of the complaint, involved in this case, he has also relied upon the same decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court, as referred to by the
learned counsel for the accused-petitioner. Para 30 of the decision rendered by he Hon''ble Supreme Court in KG Premshanker (supra) reads as
follows:-
What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is (1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided under
Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of res-judicata may apply; (3) in a criminal
case, Section 300 Cr.P.C. makes provision that once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same
offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause,
judgment of the civil Court would be relevant if conditions of any of the Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the
same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of what
is stated therein.
The above decision, referred to by the learned counsel for both the sides, in the considered view of this Court is applicable in the favour of the
respondent No. 2 instead of the accused-petitioner. The decision of the Civil Court, indicated above, can be relevant fact if conditions of any of
the Sections 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act is satisfied but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except provided in Section 41
of the Indian Evidence Act.
Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that ""a final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate,
matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any
person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant
when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant. Such judgment, order or decree is
conclusive proof."" But, the instant case is not covered by Section 41 of the said Act is not in dispute at the bar. Therefore, the argument on this
count canvassed, before this Court by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioner fails.
The learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, as indicated above, submitted that the alleged defamatory imputations in the press meet was
not made by the present accusedpetitioner and the newspaper reports, annexed with the petition, and relied upon by the respondent No. 2 did not
name the present accused-petitioner as the person who had made the alleged defamatory statement. This is a question of fact to be decided by the
learned trial court in view of the fact that the defamatory statement alleged to have been made in a joint press conference by the present accused-
petitioner as well as by another co-accused named in the newspaper report. On the other hand, if the complaint against the accused-petitioner is
quashed on this ground then it will prejudice the co-accused of the complaint in question, who is not before this Court, and therefore, the complaint
cannot be quashed on this ground.
In view of the above discussions and the decision rendered therein, in the considered view of this Court, this is not a fit case where this Court
should invoke its power under Section 482 of the Cr.PC to quash the proceeding as the trial of the case, in the considered view of this Court,
would not be an abuse of the process of the Court.
Accordingly, this criminal petition stands dismissed.