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Judgment
This RSA is filed by the defendant challenging the judgment and decree dt.22.8.2025 of the Addl. District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala confirming the judgment and decree dt.17.11.2022 in T.S. No.69 of 2018 of the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), West Tripura, Agartala.
The respondent/plaintiff had filed the suit against the appellant to declare that she has an easementary right to move along the suit path way perpetually having acquired the said right under Section 12 of the Indian Easement Act,1882; and for a perpetual injunction restraining the appellant from raising any blockade/closure or obstruction on the suit path preventing the respondent and her family members from moving along the said path to and from her house to the main Government road as shown in the Regd. deed No.1-8453 of 2006 executed by Prasenjit Roy and Sarajit Roy in favour of Shibupada Ghosh and regd. deed No.1-5150 of 2007 executed by Shibupada Ghosh in her favour.
The trial court decreed the suit and the lower appellate court confirmed the trial court judgment.
The counsel for the appellant raised only one contention i.e., that the Indian Easements Act, 1882 has no application in the State of Tripura and so the judgments of both Courts are erroneous.
The trial court as well as the lower appellate court relied on the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in Umesh Chandra Goswami vs. Pachu Gopal Barua and others1 where the Gauhati High Court held that though the Easements Act, 1882 is not applicable in the State of Assam, the principles underlying the said Act would apply as also in accordance with principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
Counsel for the appellant contended that the said judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court in Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami2. In that case, the main submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant (respondent herein) in the High Court was that the defendant could not have been asked to vacate the premises inasmuch as the licence granted to him had become irrevocable in view of the provisions of Section 60(b) of the Easements Act because the appellant acting upon the licence had constructed structures of a permanent character on the suit land by spending money on it, thereby satisfying all the requirements of the said section. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the Second Appeal noticed that the Easements Act,1882 had no application to the State of Assam, but went on to opine that the defendant was protected by Section 60(b) of the Act which “operates” in this case. The Supreme court found fault with the decision of the High Court and held:
“12.Once it was found that the Easements Act had no application to the State of Assam, the question of “clearing the way for Section 60(b) of the Act to operate” cannot at all arise. Of course, the principles of “justice, equity and good conscience” on which Section 60(b) of the Easements Act rests may apply in the facts and circumstances of a given case but that is not to say that though the Easements Act does not apply, provisions of Section 60(b) of the Easements Act still “operate”. Since the legislature did not intend the Act to apply to Assam, the learned Single Judge could not have defeated that intendment by holding that “the defendant of the present case was protected by Section 60(b) of the Act”. It is not permissible to extend the provisions of an Act, made not applicable by the legislature to a State, by a judicial order as it amounts to enacting legislation by the High Court, a power not vested in the judiciary.” (emphasis supplied)
Thus even the Supreme Court held that though the Easements Act, 1882 may not apply, the principles of justice, equity and good conscience underlying it may apply.
In fact in AIR 1941 Cal 289(290) and in AIR 1979 Cal 97 (DB) and in other decisions, it was held that where the Easements Act,1882 does not apply, principles underlying the Act can be applied as principles of equity, justice and good conscience.
If one were to peruse the “Statement of Objects and Reasons” of the said statute, it is stated therein that “The Bill attempts to state, clearly and compactly, the rules relating to easements, that is to say, the rights which a man sometimes has over one piece of immovable property by reason of his ownership of another…. The Bill is mainly based on the law of England, which being just, equitable and almost free from local peculiarities, has, in many cases, been held to regulate the subject in this country” .
So merely because the Easements Act,1882 does not apply in the State of Tripura, it cannot be said that principles underlying the said law originating from justice, equity and good conscience, cannot be applied.
Both the trial court and the lower appellate court after appreciating the evidence on record held that the respondent has an easementary right to move along the suit path way and is entitled for a perpetual injunction restraining the appellant from raising any blockade/ closure or obstruction on the suit path preventing the respondent and her family members from moving along the said path to and from her house to the main Government road as shown in the Regd. deed No.1-8453 of 2006 executed by Prasenjit Roy and Sarajit Roy in favour of Shibupada Ghosh and regd. deed No.1-5150 of 2007 executed by Shibupada Ghosh in her favour.
The trial court held that by deed no.I-8453 dt.21.7.2006, Prasenjit Roy and Sarajit Roy sold land measuring 0.030 acres to Shibupada Ghosh; that in that deed there is mention of a path of 5’ breadth starting from eastern portion of the said land; this path merges with the 5’ breadth path provided by their uncle Pabitra Chandra Roy; that this path finally extends towards south and meets a lane 9’ breadth which ultimately connects the Govt. Main Road.
The trial court held that this path was provisioned as there is no other means of direct or indirect access to their respective lands from the lane of 9’ breadth which meets the Govt. Road.
Later the respondent purchased land vide regd. sale deed no.I-5150 dt.13.7.2007 from Shibupada Ghosh and at that time this path existed.
It also held that the appellant could not establish that the respondent was using any other pathway for access to her earlier purchased land which is contiguous to the land she purchased subsequently. It held that there is an easement of necessity implied.
The lower appellate court also confirmed this finding.
These findings are based on appreciation of evidence and cannot be said to be perverse.
Therefore, I find no merit in the RSA. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.