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Judgment
Chadra Reddy, J.—This appeal is preferred by the plaintiff (sic)st the dismissal of his suit by the Subordi(sic) Judge, Kurnool which was laid for recovery of six items of property situated in Markapur and for a declaration that they constitute an endowment to the temple and for setting aside in order of the District Collector dated 18-6-1949 passed in appeal against that of the Deputy Collector, refusing to resume the inams on the ground that they do not fall within the scope of S. 44 (B) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
The plaintiff is the temple of Sri Cheniiakesavaswamy at Markapur represented by the trustee thereof. The suit was brought on the allegation that the lands in dispute were granted to the temple as an endowment, that they were being enjoyed by the Acarya Purusha for rendering service in the temple, and that the holder of the office of Acharya Purusha in or about the year 1946 alienated them in the favour of the defendants under different documents.
Consequent upon this, the temple moved the Deputy Collector, under S. 44 (B) for resumption of these inams and he recommended, that they should be resumed for the reason that there was cessation of services in the temple. But the District Collector did not accept this recommendation on the ground that the inams were not liable to be resumed, being a personal grant to one of the Acharya Purusha and therefore would not come within the ambit of S. 44 (B) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
The main defence to the suit was that the grant was not to the temple but was a personal inam given to one Venkatakrishnamacharyulu, an ancestor of the alienor of these lands. We are not concerned with the other pleas as they were given up at the time of the trial of the suit
The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit holding that the lands in suit were not endowments to the temple and the temple had therefore no interest therein.
In support of this appeal brought by the plaintiff, it is contended by Mr. Rajeswara Rao that the finding of the Judge that the grant was not to the temple is untenable in view of the entries in the inam fair register, Ex. A-2.
According to the learned counsel, the classification of this inam as a devadayam furnishes clinching evidence of the grant being to the institution.
In support of this proposition, reliance is placed by Mr. Rajeswara Rao on Muhammad Jafar v. Muhammad Ibrahim, ILR 24 Mad 243 (A) Pir Pacha Saheb and Another Vs. Mohammad Ruhimuddin Sahib and Others, and also Sikkandar Rowthu v. Secy, of State, 5 Mad LW 402: (AIR 1918 Mad 1155) (C). These rulings do not render any assistance to the appellant. In the first of the cases, it was ruled that the inam, from which the expenses of a mosque were defrayed, was described as a devadayam showed that the mosque was a public one, and not the private property of any individual.
In the second case, it was observed that the use of this word ''devadayam'' was a strong piece of evidence that it was a public endowment. The third one also is to a like effect. It is seen that in none of the cases has it been laid down that the classification of the inam as devadayam can only lead to the inference that it was a grant to the institution.
The description of an Inam as a devadayam is not inconsistent with its being a service inam It only indicates that it was an inam granted for the performance of religious service. In Vadlamannaty Bala Tripura Sundaramma Vs. Secretary of State and Others, it was decided that the word ''devadayam'' in the inam title deed would not conclusively establish that the grant was in favour of the temple and it is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in deciding whether the grant was to the temple or to a temple servant.
That case contains an exhaustive review of the case-law on the topic. We are in entire agreement with the doctrine of Vadlamannaty Bala Tripura Sundaramma Vs. Secretary of State and Others, We are also unable to accede to the argument of Mr. Rajeswara Rao that there is any conflict between this case and the line of cases noticed in the beginning.
As already remarked, the three aases referred to above beginning from ILR 24 Mad 243 (A), are only an authority for the proposition that the classification of an inam as devadayam is indicative that the institution which derived benefit from the inam was a public institution and does not touch the problem like the one posed in 27 Mad LW 101: Vadlamannaty Bala Tripura Sundaramma Vs. Secretary of State and Others, or the one for solution in the case on hand. In these circumstances, there is no* question of having the conflict resolved by referring the matter to a Full Bench.
We also feel that there is no substance in the contention that 27 Mad LW 101: Vadlamannaty Bala Tripura Sundaramma Vs. Secretary of State and Others, was overruled by the Supreme Court in Buddu Satyanarayana and Others Vs. Konduru Venkatapayya and Others, . There are no observations in that case which can lend any support to the contention that the word ''devadayam'' conclusively shows that the grant was to the temple.
Their Lordships merely referred to the classification of the inam in question as ''devadayam'' along with all the other entries in that particular extract from the inam B register and negatived the contention advanced on behalf of the archakas that a presumption of origin in some lawful title should be raised in that case. On a construction of the various entries in the extract from the inam B register, the Supreme Court thought that the inam grant was made in favour of the temple by the grantor and there was no scope for the argument that the possession of the archakas was traceable to lawful origin or to a lost grant.
Thus, Buddu Satyanarayana and Others Vs. Konduru Venkatapayya and Others, does not lay down any proposition contrary to that contained in 27 Mad LW 101: Vadlamannaty Bala Tripura Sundaramma Vs. Secretary of State and Others, . It holds the field and its authority is not in any way shaken by Buddu Satyanarayana and Others Vs. Konduru Venkatapayya and Others, Therefore, the circumstance relied on by the appellant does not by itself establish that the inam was given to the temple.
There are no other circumstances which can be called in aid by the appellant to support his theory. On the other hand, it appears that the inam was granted to the Acharya Purushas of the temple and it was confirmed to the then office-holder, Venkatakrishnamacharyulu, overruling the recommendation of the Deputy Collector that the inam should revert to those who actually fill the office and should not be confirmed to the holder of the office who was dismissed.
We may also here refer to the circumstance as disclosed by Ex. A-2 that it was entered as Bhatavrithi in the survey account and in the anamath chitta of Fasli 1220. In these circumstances, there is no foundation for the claim of the plaintiff that the lands constitute endowment to the temple.
It was next urged by Mr. Rajeswara R(sic) that even if it were not an inam granted to t temple it could be resumed under S. 44 (B) the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments A This argument is based on a judgment of Bench of the Madras High Court in N. Adinarayana Chetty Vs. T.T.K.K. Appan Srirangachariar and Others, 1 passage pressed into service by Mr. Rajeswara Rao occurs at page 222:
We find the same view was taken of t very grant in Sriranga Chariar v. Pranathart hara Chariar, 1915 Mad WN 531: (AIR 1916 M 331) (G), a case to which the present part were admitted parties, the present plaintiff be the plaintiff and the present defendant be one of the defendants. That was no doubt suit instituted under S. 92, C. P. C, but it re(sic)ed to this very Acharya Purusha office in same devasthanam and the grant that was co(sic)dered in that case was the very grant which now relied on.
It was held in that case by Sir John Wa(sic) C. J. and Srinivasa Ayyangar J., that the la(sic) in question which were granted as inam for support of officers performing services such that of Acharya Purusha, though liable to resumed for the non-performance of the sen are not held by the grantees on trust for temple in which the services are to be performed and that the mere fact that the grantee sj(sic)a portion of the income derived from the gr(sic) for performing certain festivals in the ten does not show that the original grant was m for the benefit of the grantee as well as of temple.
We are unable to see how this passage in way advances the case of the appellant or it holds any analogy to the instant case, learned Judge extracted a passage from another judgment wherein it was merely observed the inam was for the support of the officers forming services and they did not hold it trust for the temple though liable to be resu(sic) for non-performance. The question had fallen for decision whether it could be resu(sic) under S. 44 (B).
Further, the grant there was subject to performance of service in the temple. In case, it was found to be a personal grant this could not be to the holder of the offic(sic) the Acharya Purusha and Mr. Rajeswara could not attack this in view of the fact th was confirmed to Venkatakrishnamacharyulu the remarks made by the Special Assistant w(sic) were approved by the Commissioner.
The question therefore, is whether a sonal grant to an office-holder is liable to b(sic)sumed under S. 44-B of the Madras Hindu (sic)gious Endowments Act. The relevant portion S. 44-B reads:
Any exchange, gift, sale or mortgage, any lease for a term exceeding five years o: whole or any portion of any inam grante(sic) the support or maintenance of a math or (sic)ple or for the performance of a charity or vice, connected therewith and made, confirm recognised by the British Government, sha(sic) null and void.
(a) The Collector may on his own m(sic) or on the application of the Trustee of the or temple or of the Assistant Commissioner the Board or of any person having interest the math or Temple who has obtained the sent of such trustee, Assistant Commission Board by order resume the whole or any any such inam, on one or more of the following grounds, namely is seen from this section that it is only an (sic)am granted for the support of maintenance of (sic)math or a temple or for the performance of a (sic)arity or service connected therewith that could (sic)ll under that section and it can have no application to a case of grant burdened with service.
This view of ours is in consonance with the principle enunciated in Hanumantha Rao v. (sic)engalvarayudu, 1954-2 Mad LJ 81: (AIR 1954 (sic)dhra 25) (H), to which one of us was a party, (sic)d also P.V. Bheemasena Rao and Another Vs. Sirgiri Peda Yella Reddi and Others, In these circumstances, it could not be said that the District Collector was in error in refusing to take (sic)ion under S. 44-B of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
It was lastly maintained by Mr. Rajendara Rao that in any event this would not pre(sic)de the Government from resuming the inam (sic)d regretting it to the holder of the office. We not think that that question arises for consideration here, and that is for the Government consider. We leave that question open.
In the result, the judgment and decree the trial court are affirmed and the appeal missed with costs.
C. M. P. No. 9246 of 1954: When the (sic)gment was about to be delivered, Mr. Rajendra Rao drew our attention to a petition filed his client for admission of additional evidence, (sic)e document sought to be admitted is a copy the judgment rendered by the District Munsif O. S. No. 2 of 1896 in a suit filed by the Acharya Purusha who was newly appointed in (sic)tment of the lands forming part of the emoluments of the office.
The Munsiff found that it was an Inam bur(sic)fed with service and as such the plaintiff could over the lands in dispute then. We are not (sic)isfied that there are any grounds for admitted the document in evidence at this late stage it does not fall under O. 41, R. 27, C. P. C. (sic)ther, apart from the question whether it is (sic)nissible in evidence, this document does not (sic)ablish that it is a grant made to the temple contended by Mr. Rajeswara Rao.The petition for admission of documents is therefore dismissed No costs.