Sri Lakshmi Saraswathy Motor Service (Firm) Gudiyatham vs The State of Tamil Nadu and others

Nainar Sundaram, J.—These writ petitions mainly challenge the validity of the final Inter-State Agreement dated 3-6-1975 comprised in G.

O. Ms. No. 1000/- Home Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, dated 3-6-1975 and published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, Part

II, S. 2 dated 4-6-1975 in so far as the petitioner is concerned. Amongst the other grounds of attack, what is being primarily urged is that the

petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to be heard in person, as contemplated under S. 63(3-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter

referred to as the Act, which governed the situation at the relevant point of time; and this violated the principles of natural justice. The factual

position with regard to non-hearing of persons like the petitioner is not in dispute, and the respondents have not filed any counter, offering any

stand or explanation over this contention. Section 63(3-A) of the Act read as follows:--

Every proposal to enter into an agreement between the States referred to in the proviso to sub-section (3) and every proposal in such agreement

to fix the number of permits which is proposed to be granted or countersigned in respect of each route or area, shall be published by each of the

State Government concerned in the official Gazette together with a notice of the dale before which representation in connection therewith may be

submitted, and the date not being less than thirty days from the date of such publication on which, and the authority by which, and the time and

place at which, the proposal and any representations received in connection therewith will be considered;

Provided that no person, association or authority, other than those mentioned here-under, shall have a right to make such representation, namely:--

(i) any person already providing passenger or goods transport facilities by any means in the proposed area or along or near the proposed route.

(ii) any association representing persons interest in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf of the State Government;

(iii) any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed area or route lies.

It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the provision contemplated providing an audience to persons like the petitioner and in the present

cases the petitioner could not be stated to have had been aggrieved by the Draft Agreement and the petitioners is aggrieved only by the Final

Agreement where there has been a significant omission of the concerned route itself and viewed from this angle the failure to afford an opportunity

of a personal hearing must be held to have vitiated the Final Agreement as per the impugned Government order.

When we look into the language of S. 63(3-A) of the Act, we are led to conviction that the provision contemplated an oral hearing of personal

audience to the parties who are likely to be affected by the ultimate decision. The provision laid down that a notice shall also be published giving

the date, not being less than thirty days from the date of such publication, before which representations in connection with the Draft Agreement

may be submitted. The notice should further say the authority by which, and the time and place at which the proposal and any representation

received in connection therewith will be considered, on the date. It is not in dispute that the notice issued did not comply with the requirements of

S. 63(3-A) of the Act. The provision contemplated consideration of the proposal and if there should be an alteration, lack of opportunity to be

heard not afforded to parties like the petitioner vitiates the proceedings. A similar question came up before Padmanabhan, J. in K. Ramachandra

Naidu and others v. The State of Tamil Nadu rep., by its Secretary, Home Department and others (W. P. Nos. 4702, 6585 and 6586 of 1979,

802 and 6894 of 1980, order dated 13-10-1982) and the learned single Judge was obliged to countenance this grievance of the parties before him

and struck down the very same impugned Government order. We have not been persuaded to view the question from a different angle. Sustaining

this point taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we allow these writ petitions to the extent of quashing the impugned Government order as

prayed for in the writ petitions. It must be noted that the prayer in the writ petitions is two-fold. The first part sets forth the attack on the impugned

government order and the second part seeks a direction to include the concerned route in the inter-State Agreement. With regard to the second

part of the prayer, it is the admitted position that already two orders have been made by this Court and we are told that the matter is under

consideration by the State. We do not think it necessary and proper to give a further direction, in super-imposition of the directions and orders

already given. Furthermore, we find that the purpose of the petitioner seems to have been served with reference to the tax liability which is the

ultimate problem by the quashing of the impugned Government order. Hence, the writ petitions are allowed to the above extent. No costs.

Petition allowed.