Sri Krishna Salt Works vs State of A.P.

B.S.A. Swamy, J.—The appellant in LPA No.258 of 1990 filed this application seeking to review the judgment passed by this Court, dated 23.11.1995.

It is stated in the affidavit that basing on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Oduru Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy, , the learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the appeal in AS No.323 of 1980, Instead of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, , wherein a contrary view was taken by the Supreme Court. Since it is an error apparent on the face of the record, the learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks to review the order passed by this Court.

The facts of this case are that the review petitioner filed an application before the Settlement Officer seeking to issue ryotwari patta to him u/s 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short the Act) and the same was dismissed by the Settlement Officer by holding that the land for which the petitioner is claiming ryotwari patta is a poramboke land and not a ryoti land. The view taken by the Settlement Officer was found favour with the authorities, who were entrusted with the adjudication of disputes under the Act. In those circumstances, the petitioner filed a suit in OS No.36 of 1977 on the file of the Principal Sub-Court, Visakhapatnam, seeking declaration that the land, which is in possession of the petitioner is not a communal poramboke but a ryoti land and also for a consequential direction to the respondents to issue ryotwari patta to him. Subsequently the suit was transferred to the District Court, Visakhapatnam and the same was re-numbered as OS No. 8 of 1979. The civil Court by its order, dated 6.2.1980 dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree in the said suit, the petitioner filed an appeal in AS No.323 of 1980 before this Court. A learned single Judge of this Court by order, dated 23.6.1987 dismissed the appeal by passing one line order to the following effect:

"In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the point raised in this appeal is no longer res integra. The appeal is dismissed. No costs."

The judgment of the Supreme Court referred to earlier (supra) by the learned single Judge was to the effect that when a special procedure is provided for adjudication of the disputes under a special enactment, the Civil Court''s jurisdiction is taken away in express terms. Subsequently, a review application was filed in CMP No. 3374 of 1989 before the learned single Judge by stating that the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to earlier in State of Tamil Nadu v. Samigal Madam (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Court at the time of disposal of the appeal. Hence, the judgment needs review. But the learned single Judge dismissed the review application also by holding that that above judgment was not holding the field and any change in the legal position subsequent to the disposal of the appeal cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record. His Lordship further held that failure to bring to the notice of the correct legal position is not a manifest error apparent on the face of the record. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner carried the matter before the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 258 of 1990 and the same was also dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by order, dated 23.11.1995 holding that the judgment relied on by the petitioner (supra) is subsequent to the judgment passed by this Court in AS No.328 of 1980. Now, this review application is filed stating that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Richpal Singh ''s case is much prior to the judgment of this Court. Hence, the judgment needs review.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench of this Court erred in holding that the judgment in Richpal Singh''s case is not acting there at the time of disposal of AS No.328 of 1980 on 23-6-1987.

The Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam (supra) in paragraphs 11 and 14 held as follows:

"It will be seen that elaborate provisions have been made in the enactment to carry out the main objective and other purposes of the Act and Sections 4 to 8 deal with constituting authorities like Tribunals and Board of Revenue and appointing various officers such as a Director of Settlement, Settlement Officers and Managers of Estates etc., to carry out functions and duties assigned to them under the Act. It will be pertinent to observe that in between the provisions dealing with grant of Ryotwari Patta to a Ryot (Section 11) and the grant thereof to a landholder (Sections 12 to 15) there is a difference of vital significance; whereas in the case of an application for a Ryotwari Patta by a landholder under Sections 12, 13 or 14. Section 15 in terms enjoins a duty upon the Settlement Officer to examine the nature and character of the land and history thereof and then decide whether the claim of the landholders should be allowed or not, in the case of an application for a ryotwari patta by a ryot u/s 11 there is no similar express provision for any inquiry into the nature or character of the land before granting or refusing to grant of such patta to the applicant. Even if Section 11 is read with the proviso to Clause (d) of Section 3, whereunder some inquiry is contemplated before granting Ryotwari Patta to a ryot there is no provision directing an inquiry for the ascertainment of the character of the land, namely, whether it is ryoti land or communal land and the Settlement Officer''s decision on this aspect will be incidental to and impliedly rendered only for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant the Ryotwari Patta. There is also this further difference that the Settlement Officer''s decision on the nature or character of the land u/s 15 is subject to a regular appeal to the Tribunal under Sub-section (2) thereof while the Settlement Officer''s decision to grant or refuse to grant a Patta to a ryot u/s 11 is subject to be revised by the Director of Settlement u/s 5(2) as also by the Board of Revenue u/s 7(c) and the relevant Rules in that behalf and the decision of the Director of Settlement in revision is further revisable by the Board of Revenue u/s 7(d) of the Act. Then comes Section 64-C which accords finality to the orders passed by the Government or other authorities under the Act which we have earlier quoted in extenso.

Thirdly, having regard to the principle stated by this Court while enunciating the first proposition in Dhulabhai''s case it is clear that even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal the civil Court''s jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Court would normally do in a suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the special tribunal one will have to see whether such Special Tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which Civil Court would normally grant in a suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of civil Court''s jurisdiction. Now take the case of an applicant who has applied for a ryotwari patta u/s 11 staking his claim thereto on the basis of his long and uninterrupted possession of the ryoti land but the Settlement Officer on materials before him is not satisfied that the land in question is ryot land; in that case he will refuse the patta to the applicant. But can he, even after the refusal of the patta, protect the applicant''s long and uninterrupted possession against the Government''s interference? Obviously, he cannot, for it lies within his power and jurisdiction merely to grant or refuse to grant the patta on the basis of material placed before him. But such a person even after the refusal of the ryotwari patta would be entitled to protect his possessory title and long enjoyment of the land and seek an injunction preventing Government''s interference otherwise than in due course of law and surely before granting such relief the civil Court may have to adjudicate upon the real nature or character of the land if the same is put in issue. In other words since the Settlement Officer has no power to do what civil Court would normally do in a suit is difficult to imply ouster of civil Court''s jurisdiction simply because finality has been accorded to the Settlement Officer''s order u/s 64-C of the Act".

From the above it is seen that while the Settlement Officer who is expected to decide the nature of the land u/s 15 of the Act while considering the application of the land holder for grant of ryotwari patta, such an obligation is not cast on the Settlement Officer while considering the possession of the property for grant of ryotwari patta. Hence, the Honourable Supreme Court held that the Civil Court is having jurisdiction to decide the nature of the land even after exhausting the remedies.

Admittedly, this being an application filed u/s 11 of the Act, the Settlement Officer is not under an obligation to consider the nature or character of the land u/s 15 of the Act.''

The next question to be considered is whether the judgment referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is (supra) is posterior to the judgment of this Court in AS No.323 of 1980 or anterior to the judgment.

It is true that the judgment that was referred to by the petitioner was reported in 1986. But from the cause title it is seen that the above judgment was rendered on 1.5.1985 i.e., nearly one year prior to the judgment of this Court in AS No.323 of 1980 on 23-6-1987.

Now the question to be decided is whether non-citing of a judgment binding decision which is the law of the land under Article 41 of the Constitution of India by a learned Counsel gives raise to an application seeking review of the judgment on the ground that there is an error apparent on the face of the record.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Full Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court reported in The Nalagarh Dehati Co-operative Transport Society Ltd., Nalagarh Vs. Beli Ram etc., wherein their Lordships considered the words apparent on the face of the record and also the result that is followed, if the learned Counsel fails to produce the decision of the Supreme Court constitute a mistake or not. The learned Judges answered this question in paragraphs 15 and 16 to the following effect :

''The second part of the question relates to a situation where a Court has failed to notice an existing contrary decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court on a point covered by its judgment. Now the failure to notice a decision on a question of law of the Supreme Court, which is the law of the land under Article 141 of the Constitution is not the same thing as failure to notice a binding decision of the High Court. So we would divide the question into two parts (a) failure to notice a decision of the Supreme Court (b) failure to notice a binding decision of the High Court.

Failure to notice an existing decision of the Supreme Court on a question of law results in not applying the law which should have been applied. Therefore, a contrary decision given on such a question would amount to a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. The error would be obvious and no elaborate reasoning would be necessary to find it".

Their Lordships of the Himachal Pradesh High Court also relied on a judgment of the High Court of Mysore reported in The Selection Committee for Admission to the Medical and Dental College, Bangalore v. M.P. Nagaraj AIR 1972 Mys. 44, wherein the effect of Article 141 of the Constitution of India was considered in para 17 to the following effect:

"Article 141 of the Constitution provides that the law declared by the Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. Hence, where there is a decision of the Supreme Court bearing on a point and where a Court has taken a view on that point, which is not consistent with tile law laid down by the Supreme Court, it needs no elaborate argument to point to the error and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about such error".

While arriving at the above conclusion their Lordships referred to various Judgments of the Supreme Court as well as other High Courts. Ultimately, their Lordships held in paragraph 24 of (supra) to the following effect:

"The result is that we will answer the first part of the question in the negative, that is, a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court or a larger Bench of the same Court rendering a decision taking a different or contrary view on a point covered by the said judgment, does not amount to a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. The answer to the second part of the question is that failure of the Court to take into consideration an existing decision of the Supreme Court taking a different or contrary view on a point covered by its judgment would amount to a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. But a failure to take into consideration a decision of the High Court would not amount to any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record."

The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Hemlata Panda and Others Vs. Sukuri Dibya and Others, , and Director of Settlements, Andhra Pradesh v. M.R. Apparao 2000 (2) SCC 584.

As per Section 39 of the Andhra Pradesh Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 the Director of Settlements is expected to determine the interim compensation payable to the landholders as well as the persons interested and pay the same to them every year before deciding the final compensation payable to them. On 6.11.1970, Ordinance 6 of 1970 was promulgated to restrict the interim payments payable to the estate-holder, till the determination by the Director of Settlement. Subsequently it was replaced by Act 3/1971 by amending Sections 41, 44, 50 and 54 of the Estates Abolition Act with retrospective effect. Questioning the validity of the Act, the respondents filed a writ petition before this Court and the same was allowed by this Court and the Act was struck down. The writ appeal filed by the Government also met with the same fate. Thereafter, the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkatagiri''s case was assailed by the Government before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.398 and 1385 of 1972 and the Honourable Supreme Court was pleased to uphold the validity of the amending Act. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeals on 6.2.1986. On the basis of the said judgment, the interim compensation payable to the respondents was not paid by the Government. Questioning the action of the Government, the petitioners approached this Court by filing WP Nos. 3293 and 3294 of 1975 contending that the Government is not justified in denying the interim payments to them. The contention of the respondents was accepted by this Court in WA No. 511 of 1993 by holding that the rights accrued in favour of the respondents to receive the interim payments u/s 39 of the Act has already become final as the earlier judgment of the High Court not being assailed, the decision of the Supreme Court in Venkatagiri ''s case would not have taken away that right and therefore the respondent was entitled to receive interim payment. Reversing that judgment the teamed Judges of the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 9 of the judgment to the following effect:

"It would be difficult to contend that the law laid down in the judgment would bind only Hansa Corporation, who has approached the Supreme Court and not the other petitioners against whom the State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal. According to the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Shenoy and Co., Represented by its Partner, Bele Srinivasa Rao Street, Bangalore and Others Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore and Others, , to do so, would be to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. The Court further held that if the law which was declared invalid by the High Court is held constitutionally valid, effective and binding by the Supreme Court, then the mandamus forbearing the authorities from enforcing its provisions would become ineffective and the authorities cannot be compelled to perform a negative duty. The declaration of the law is binding on everyone and it would, therefore be futile to contend that the mandamus would still survive in favour of those parties against whom appeals were not filed."

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to the judgment of a Division Bench In Shenoy and Co., Represented by its Partner, Bele Srinivasa Rao Street, Bangalore and Others Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore and Others, , wherein it was held as follows:

"In our considered opinion, the ratio in the aforesaid case fully applies to the case in hand, particularly, when the Court is examining the question whether while issuing a mandamus, the earlier judgment notwithstanding having been held to be invalid, can still be held to be operative".

At another place their Lordships observed "that the moment the earlier judgment of the High Court is reversed by the Supreme Court, that becomes law of the land, binding on all parties".

In other words, the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkatagiri''s case, holding the amendment Act to be constitutionally invalid, on being reversed by the Supreme Court holding the extract from the judgment should be shown distinctly that the said amendment is constitutionally valid, the said dictum would be valid throughout the country and for all persons, including the respondents, even though the judgment in their favour had not been assailed. It would in fact lead to an anomalous situation, if in the case of the respondents, the earlier conclusion that the amendment act is constitutionally invalid is allowed to operate notwithstanding the reversal of that conclusion in Venkatagiri ''s case and only in Venkatagiri''s case or where the parties have never approached the Court to hold that the same is constitutionally valid. This being the position, notwithstanding the enunciation of the principles of res judicata and its applicability to the litigation between the parties at different stages, it is difficult for us to sustain the argument of Mr. Rao that an indefeasible right has accrued to the respondents on the basis of the judgment in their favour which had not been challenged and that right could be enforced by issuance of a fresh mandamus. On the other hand, to have the uniformity of the law and to have universal application of the law laid down by this Court in Venkatagiri''s case, it would be reasonable to hold that the so-called direction in favour of the respondents became futile inasmuch as the direction was on the basis that the amendment Act is constitutionally invalid. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that no indefeasible right on the respondents could be said to have accrued on account of the earlier judgment in their favour notwithstanding the reversal of the Judgment of the High Court in Venkatagiri''s case." From the above it is seen that the law laid down by the Supreme Court and it is binding throughout out the territory of India and it is highly essential to maintain universal application of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Hence, I have no hesitation to hold that when once the Supreme Court declares the law of the land, it is binding on this Court. It is true that unfortunately the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Samigal Madam (supra) way back on 1.5.1985 was not brought to the notice of this Court and the learned Judge relying on an earlier judgment, dismissed the appeal without going into the merits of the case in one line order.

The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition placed strong reliance on the- order passed by the learned single Judge in the review application. He relied on the reasoning given by the learned single Judge while dismissing the review application by stating that failure to bring to the notice of the Court a decision rendered by the Supreme Court is not a manifest error apparent on the face of the record. The learned Single Judge reiterated this rule in Supreme Court in a case reported in Dokka Samuel Vs. Dr Jacob Lazarus Chelly, . But the learned Judges of the Himachal Pradesh clearly pointed out the distinction between the failure to notice binding decision of the Supreme Court and failure to notice a binding decision of the High Court. In this case it is not a mere failure to bring to the notice of the Court a decision rendered by the Supreme Court, but a decision which directly had a bearing on the issue. Hence, we too have no doubt to hold that a manifest error has taken place while dismissing the appeal as well as the review application.

The learned Government Pleader also brought to our notice a judgment rendered in Vemuri Venkataratnam v. Kancherla Manikyam 1966 ALT 216, wherein a similar view was taken by his Lordship Justice Sharfuddin Ahmed. Since we are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court, we need not refer to this judgment.

The learned Government Pleader also placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat Vs. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu and Others, , wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in paragraph 4.07 to the following effect:

"The glimpse of the object of the Inams Act, schemes, scope and operation thereof clearly manifest that Inams Act is a self contained code, expressly provided rights and liabilities'' prescribed procedure ''remedies'' of appeal and revision, excluded the jurisdiction of the civil court, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, given primacy of Inams Act though inconsistent with any law or instrument having force of law. The jurisdictional findings are an integral scheme to grant or refuse ryotwari patta u/s 3, read with Section 7 and not collateral findings. It was subject to appeal and revision and certiorari under Article 226. The decision of the Revenue Tribunal, are final and conclusive between the parties or persons claiming right, title or interest through them. The trick of pleadings and the camouflage of the reliefs are not decisive but the substance or the effect on the order of the tribunal under the Inams Act are decisive. The civil suit except on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or collusion of the parties is not maintainable. The necessary conclusion would be that the civil suit is not maintainable when the decree directly nullifies the ryotwari patta granted u/s 3 of the Inams Act".

Admittedly this case arises under Inams Abolition Act and whereas the judgment under reference is directly on the issue. Further, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above judgment under reference clearly pointed out that u/s 11 of the Act, the Settlement Officer or the authorities created under the statute to administer the Act are not empowered to decide the nature or character of the land and it has to be decided only by the civil court. It is not the case of the learned Government Pleader that a similar provision was considered by the Supreme Court. Hence, we are inclined to follow the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of Tamilnadu v. V. Ramalinga Samigal Madam (supra) and then this judgment.

For all these reasons we do not find any merit in that contention of the learned Government Pleader.

Accordingly, the order of the learned single Judge dismissing the Review CMP No.3374 of 1989, dated 3-7-1987 as confirmed in LPA No.258 of 1990 are set aside and the Review Application No. 4032 of 1996 in LPA No.258 of 1990 was allowed. Accordingly, since the Review Application is allowed the matter has to be remitted back to the learned single Judge to decide the nature or character of the land i.e., whether it is a ryotwari land or a village poramboke as opined by the Governmental authorities while considering the issue of grant of ryotwari patta to the person who is in possession of the property.