Sri K.Eshwar vs The State Of Karnataka & Anr.

Intervening circumstance is that, the petitioner in terms of an order of the concerned Court of Sessions has been acquitted of the allegations in terms of the order dated 04.05.2019, which was also brought to the notice of the Tribunal, which declined to accept the fact that both the allegations stood on identical terms and would become applicable to the case in a departmental inquiry as well.

The learned counsel submits that the Lokayuktha has not preferred any appeal against the said order of acquittal, which is now 7 years old and the petitioner has retired from service. His terminal benefits are not settled on the score of the penalty that is imposed against him.

Further, prosecution is relying upon the voice recorder and also evidence of the person who allegedly identified the voice of accused No.1 i.e. PW. 12. Also the prosecution is relying upon the alleged transcript of trap CD (Mo.7) which is kept as per Ex.P.31. After close scrutiny of Ex.P.31, the alleged conversation and discussions between accused No.1 and PW.1 (allegedly contained in Mo.7), there is no consistency. There is no whisper in Ex.P.31 that accused No.1 has directed to accused No.2 to receive bribe amount of Rs.4,000/-. Similarly, there is no conversation in Ex.P.31 stating that accused No.1 has directed to PW.1 to hand over the amount to accused No.2. But, only one stray sentence about what accused No.1 directed to accused No.2 is indicated in column 8 of Ex.P.32 as ‘PÀÆvÀPÀ½æÃ, ¯Éà PÉÆAqÀAiÀÄå ZÉÃgï vÀUÁ’ Even if court is going to believe that Mo.7 (CD) is containing the text of voice conversation as indicated in Ex.P.31, it would not ensure that accused No. 1 has directed to accused No.2 to receive bribe from PW.1 or there is no conversation in Ex P.31 showing that accused No.1 has directed PW.1 to hand over bribe of Rs.4,000/- in the hands of accused No 2. Therefore, the said contradictory nature of evidence, i.e. Mo.7 and Ex.P.31 would not avail any help to the prosecution to prove that it is at the demand by accused No.1, PW.1 has forced to give bribe amount in the hands of accused No.2, as per the advice of accused No. 1. Therefore, the said evidence is not free from doubt.

Prosecution is relying upon the evidence of PW.18 (H. Thippaiah) to prove that at the time of demanding and accepting the bribe during trap mahazar on 3.7.2012, he was present and eyewitness to the incident. But, his evidence is falsifying the story of prosecution instead of supporting it, for the reason that he turned hostile to the case of prosecution. Even after cross examining by learned Spl. Public Prosecutor, nothing is elicited from the evidence of PW.18 to believe that on 3.7.2012 accused No.1 has demanded bribe of Rs.4,000/-and he directed to PW.1 to hand over the bribe to accused No.2 Another more evidence upon which prosecution relying is that Mo.7 sound is that of accused No. 1 and which is recorded while he was demanding and accepting the bribe in his home office from PW. 1. To prove this fact of voice is of accused No.1, prosecution has examined the Sheristedar of Taluk Office (PW.12). In the cross-examination on the side of advocate of accused No.2, PW 12 specifically come up with a story that there is no clarity in the voice of Mo.7. Therefore, its correct transcript is not in Ex.P.31. Similarly, in chief examination itself PW.1 denies the contents of Exs.P.31 and 32. Then, learned Special Prosecutor treated him as hostile. Because, in chief examination he states that voice recorded in C.D may be belonging to accused No.1, thus he is not certain about the voice contained in Mo.7 is exactly that of accused No. 1. Moreover, this PW.12 is not an expert person in identifying the voice stored in any electronic instrument. As per the case law of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, above cited Court has to insist for expert opinion of the analyst of the sound. In this case, I.O did not endeavor to get opinion of the expert after testing and verifying the admitted sound of PW.1 and sound contained in Mo.7. As held by me in earlier part of this judgment, Mo.7 is not an original device in which the conversation was recorded at the alleged time of discussion between accused No.1 and PW.1. Because, admittedly, it is uploaded and downloaded with another device laptop and stored in Mo.7. If that be so, the compliance of provisions of section of 65(B) of Indian Evidence Act is mandatory. So, affidavit containing the name of person who kept the device, its registration number and I.P number of the device, the name of the person who uploaded and downloaded in regular course of transaction is not at all produced on record. So, the very foundation of marking article Mo.7 in the evidence is against to the well recognized procedure to be followed while admitting electronic evidence. Thus, this Court could not rely only on the self-convenient evidence of PW.22 stating that Mo.7 is containing original voice recorded in voice recorder allegedly provided to PW.1. Why the original voice recorder is not displayed and tendered during trial in the Court? This unanswered question is also throwing doubt in the story of PW.22. Therefore, the evidence of PW.1 and 2, electronic device marked as Mo.7 and Ex.P.31 etc., is not free from doubt to prove the story that there was discussion between accused No.1 and PW.1 in the home office of accused No. 1 for requesting to reduce the bribe amount, but accused No.1 has not conceded and he directed accused No.2 to receive the bribe and then accused No.2 received the bribe from PW.1 Therefore, presumption U/s 20 would not come into play. Because, there is no sufficient evidence to prove that there was demand, direction, insistence by accused No.1 before transfer of amount of Rs.4,000/- to accused No.2 from PW.1 Therefore, point No. 1 and 2 raised for consideration by me are held in the negative.

Point No.3: In the complaint, trap panchanama and statement U/S.161 Cr.P.C. of PWs.1 and 2, it is not at all case of the prosecution that there was demand by accused No.2 for performing the duty through accused No.1 regarding change of mutation of landed property. Even there is no any whisper regarding responsibility and duty of accused No.2 in respect of performing government duty towards complainant. From the evidence on record and depositions of P.Ws. 1, 2 and PW.22 it would not reveal that accused No.2 had knowledge about accused No.1 is demanding bribe from P.W.1 for the purpose of effecting mutation of landed property of his mother. Therefore, absolutely there is no any motive or intention in the mind of accused No.2 to receive the bribe from P.W.1 for the purpose of change of mutation through accused No.1 in respect of landed property pertaining to the mother of the complainant.

Further story of the prosecution is that knowingly, intentionally and at the instance of accused No.1, accused No.2 had received the bribe from hands of P.W.1. As pointed out by me in the above para of the judgment (points No.1 and 2), absolutely there is no any evidence to the sufficient extent to prove that accused No.2 had demanded in the negotiation with PW.1 before the time of trap panchanama or if accused No.2 had common intention with accused No.1 to receive the bribe from P.W.1 by acting as his agent. Nothing is stated by P.Ws. 1 and 2 that accused No.2 also had knowledge and party to the demand and acceptance along with accused No.1. So, it is settled law that in criminal trial accused need not prove his case to the hilt as it is required on the part of the prosecution. But, if the accused is able to probablise and to raise a doubt in the case of the prosecution, such doubt, which is not fanciful, but would be a reasonable doubt emerging from evidence on record, in such a situation, it would be safe to give benefit of doubt to the accused rather than convicting him. This view is made clear in case law of Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in "2012 (4) KCCR 2534 (Sri T.P.Basavaraju Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Bangalore)." The said principle is exactly applicable to the facts, evidence and circumstances in this case. Because, absolutely there is no evidence beyond reasonable doubt to prove that prior to acceptance of the money from P.W.1. accused No.2 had connivance and common intention with accused No.1 for receiving the bribe amount for the purpose of accused No.1 performing government duty of change of mutation to landed property. Therefore, the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 could not be sufficient to prove mens-rea or intention on the part of accused No.2 for committing the offences U/Ss.7 & 13 of Probation of Corruption Act, 1988.

Learned Spl. Public Prosecutor demonstrates before me that when there is test of chemical solution conducted to the hands of accused No.2 and it turned into pink, hence there is presumption U/S.20 that accused No.2 has received bribe. Whereas another story stated in the complaint and trap mahazar is that when P.W.22 entered inside the house of accused No.1, the currency notes (Mo. 1) were fallen on the floor and not in the hands of accused No.2. In the case law of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in "2000 CrL.L.J. 2273, (Smt. M.B. Hemke ..vs.. State of Maharastra)," it is held that

Therefore, in this case on the basis of probabilities, it may be inferred that without knowledge of accused No.2 about anything regarding work of P.W.1 pending with accused No.1, P.W.1 ventured to touch the currency notes through hands of accused No.2. Therefore, mere turning the hands of accused No.2 to pink colour in process of chemical test alone would not be sufficient to raise the presumption against accused No.2, holding that he has received amount (Mo.1) towards bribe.

In Suraj Mal V. State (Delhi Admn.) [1979 (4) SCC 725]: (AIR 1979 SC 1408) the Hon'ble Supreme Court took the view that (at SCC p.727, para2) mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe."

The above principle is aptly applicable to the facts and evidence involved in the present case. Circumstances under which money is recovered in the home office of accused No.1 and mere touching of the money by accused No.2 in the incident would not be sufficient and substantial evidence to convict him for charges framed. Because, there is no cogent evidence to believe that accused No.2 had accepted the amount with knowledge, intention or voluntarily knowing that it is towards bribe amount to be paid to accused No.1 for discharging the government duty towards P.W.1. Thus, the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove the charges levelled against accused No.2. Hence, Point No.3 is held in the negative.

33 Point No.4: For the above stated reasons and discussions on Points No.1 to 3, I proceed to pass the following:

The Court clearly holds that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. It does not render the acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt, but holds that there is no cogent evidence to believe that accused No.2 had accepted the amount with knowledge, intention or voluntarily knowing that it was towards the bribe amount to be paid to accused No.1. Thus, the evidence was not sufficient to prove the allegations against any of the accused. Therefore, accused Nos.1 and 2 stood acquitted.

Pursuant to the said recommendation, a second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, which reads as follows:

The petitioner submits his detailed reply and the reply did not find favour with the government and the government imposed the said penalty as was recommended by the Lokayukta. The said order of penalty dated 23.07.2019, reads as follows:

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PÀ£ÁðlPÀ gÁdå¥Á®gÀ DeÁÕ£ÀĸÁgÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ CªÀgÀ ºÉ¸Àj£À°è, ¸À»/-(«.£ÁUÉñÀ gÁªï) ¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ C¢üãÀ PÁAiÀÄðzÀ²ð, PÀAzÁAiÀÄ E¯ÁSÉ (¸ÉêÉUÀ¼ÀÄ-2) (Emphasis added at each instance) The petitioner then calls the afore-quoted order in question before the Tribunal. The Tribunal though notices the acquittal of the petitioner by the criminal Court declines to interfere with the order on the score that in a departmental enquiry, the petitioner is held guilty on probabilities being preponderant and in the criminal trial may be on beyond all reasonable doubt. Therefore, the two are different and therefore, the petition stood dismissed.

The Apex Court in the case of KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LIMITED v. C. NAGARAJU^{33.2019 SCC OnLine SC 1192} has held as follows:

The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF KARNATAKA v. UMESH^{44.2022 SCC OnLine SC 345} holds as follows:

The Apex Court in the case of DIRECTOR MARKETING OF AGRICULTURAL v. D.KHASIM SAHEB^{55.SLP © No.22224/2023 decided on 13-02-2025}, has held as follows:

CASES WHERE THE APEX COURT HAS OBLITERATED DEPARTMENTAL PROCEEDINGS ON ACCOUNT OF ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL CASES:

The Apex Court in the case of RAM LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN^{66.(2024) 1 SCC 175} holds as follows:

In the operative part of the enquiry report under the head, “conclusions”, there is no reference to the 8th class marksheet, (which was part of the enclosed documents sent by Constable Raj Singh with the charge-sheet) or to Ext. D-3 (the original 8th class marksheet) exhibited by the defence. There is also no reference to the statement of Raj Singh PW 5 in the enquiry, who had acknowledged that there was no alteration in the marksheet of the 8th class. What is referred to in the chart of exhibits are letter of Jagdish Chand (Ext. P-1); the duplicate marksheet of 8th class issued by Jagdish Chand (Ext. P-2); the statement of Shravan Lal (Ext. P-3); 10th class marksheet of Secondary Education Board Rajasthan, Ajmer (Ext. P-4); preliminary enquiry dated 16-10-2002 by Circle Officer, Kishangarh (Ext. P-5); FIR No. 183/2000 (Ext. P-6); application submitted by Ram Lal for recruitment to the post of Constable (Ext. P-7); letter of appointment dated 8-11-1991 (Ext. P-8); verification letter filed by Ramlal (Ext. P-9); appointment order dated 16-12-1991 (Ext. P-10); letter of Government School Tiloniya (Ext. P-11); and charge-sheet dated 24-4-2003 (Ext. P-12).

It is very clear that relevant and material evidence being, the deposition of PW 5/Raj Singh; the marksheet of 8th class of the appellant (enclosed to the charge-sheet) and the original marksheet independently marked as Ext. D-3 by the defence have been completely left out in the discussion and consideration. Inference has been drawn about the proof of the charges by ignoring crucial, relevant and material evidence which had come on record. The evidence of PW 5 Raj Singh and the marksheet enclosed in the documents annexed to the charge-sheet and the original marksheet marked as Ext. D-3, were materials having a direct bearing on the charge. The disciplinary authority has merely reiterated the reasoning in the enquiry report. Equally so are the findings of the appellate authority. It is well settled that if the findings of the disciplinary authorities are arrived at after ignoring the relevant material the court in judicial review can interfere. It is only to satisfy ourselves to this extent, that we have scrutinised the material to see as to what was reflected in the record. We are satisfied that the disciplinary proceedings are vitiated and deserve to be quashed.

In this scenario, we are inclined to accept the explanation given by the appellant that overwriting in the application form was only due to correction of an inadvertent error. As long as the original 8th standard marksheet reflected his date of birth as 21-4-1972 and there is no correction or manipulation in that document, the appellant cannot be penalised.

With this above background, if we examine the criminal proceedings the following factual position emerges. The very same witnesses, who were examined in the departmental enquiry were examined in the criminal trial. Jagdish Chandra, Bhawani Singh, Shravan Lal, Raj Singh and Karan Sharma were examined as PW 2, PW 3, PW 6, PW 9 and PW 13 respectively at the criminal trial. Apart from them, eight other witnesses were also examined. The gravamen of the charge in the criminal case was that the appellant had submitted an application for recruitment along with his marksheet and he, by making alteration in his date of birth to reflect the same as 24-4-1972 in place of 21-4-1974, and obtained recruitment to the post of Constable.

Though the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 420IPC, the appellate court recorded the following crucial findings while acquitting the appellant:

(emphasis supplied)

What is important to notice is that the Appellate Judge has clearly recorded that in the document Ext. P-3 — original marksheet of the 8th standard, the date of birth was clearly shown as 21-4-1972 and the other documents produced by the prosecution were either letters or a duplicate marksheet. No doubt, the Appellate Judge says that it becomes doubtful whether the date of birth was 21-4-1974 and that the accused was entitled to receive its benefit. However, what we are supposed to see is the substance of the judgment. A reading of the entire judgment clearly indicates that the appellant was acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and after noticing that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge (see S. Samuthiram [State of T.N. v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566: (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] ).

Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used.”

The Apex Court in the afore-narrated cases holds where the criminal and departmental proceedings rest on substantially the same chargers, witnesses, evidence and circumstances, and the criminal Court has fully considered the evidence and found the prosecution case to have failed, the findings in the disciplinary proceedings can be interfered with, if not interfered, it would become unjust, unfair and oppressive. The Apex Court also holds that expressions like ‘benefit of doubt’ and ‘honourably acquitted’, used in the judgments are not to be understood as magical incantations and the Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not to be swayed away in the form used.

The Apex Court later in the case of MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR^{77.2025 SCC OnLine SC 890} has held as follows:

The Apex Court again reiterates that the acquittal in a criminal case cannot automatically entitle the accused to have the order in the departmental enquiry to be set aside. If the charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical, the Court should not hesitate to quash the order of dismissal. This judgment is rendered on 23-04-2025 and the judgment in KHASIM SAHEB (supra) is rendered on 13-02-2025.

A Division Bench of this Court also considers an identical issue in the case of SRI CHIDANANDA v. THE UPALOKAYUKTA^{88.Writ Appeal No.1168 of 2025, decided on 30-06-2026} and holds as follows:

(emphasis in original and supplied ) These principles have been reiterated in subsequent decisions of this Court including State of Rajasthan v. B.K.Meena [(1996) 6 SCC 417]; Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh [(2004) 8 SCC 200; Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(2005) 7 SCC 764] and CISF v. Abrar Ali [(2017) 4 SCC 507].

In Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd.v. C. Nagaraju [(2019) 10 SCC 367], this Court has held: (SCC p. 371, para 9)

The Court also held that: (C. Nagaraju case

[Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju, (2019) 10 SCC 367], SCC p. 372, para 13)

In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not reappreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether:

the rules of natural justice have been complied with;

the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence;

the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and

whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and

the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct.

However, none of the above tests for attracting the interference of the High Court were attracted in the present case. The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal having exercised the power of judicial review found no reason to interfere with the award of punishment of compulsory retirement. The Division Bench of the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 and trenched upon a domain which falls within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer. The enquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The findings of the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority are sustainable with reference to the evidence which was adduced during the enquiry. The acquittal of the respondent in the course of the criminal trial did not impinge upon the authority of the disciplinary authority or the finding of misconduct in the disciplinary proceeding.

For these reasons, we allow the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court of Karnataka at the Kalaburagi Bench dated 29-11-2017 in Umesh v. State of Karnataka [2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4973]. The petition instituted by the respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution shall stand dismissed. The finding of misconduct and the punishment of compulsory retirement are restored."

The Apex Court in Umesh (supra) observed that the recovery of tainted money established in the departmental enquiry may, by itself, be sufficient to sustain the finding of misconduct, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee in the criminal case. The Apex Court held that in the exercise of judicial review, the court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The Court does not re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the findings of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of the disciplinary enquiry and the Court in exercise of the judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether:

the rules of natural justice have been complied with;

the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence;

the statutory rules governing the conduct of disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and

whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and

the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct.

Similarly in Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited vs C. Nagaraju and Another reported in (2019) 10 SCC 367, the Supreme Court observed that the acquittal by Criminal Court does not automatically invalidate or bar disciplinary proceedings on the same allegations. The disciplinary authority is not bound by a criminal acquittal, where the evidence produced in the departmental enquiry is different from that produced at the criminal trial, since two proceedings differ in objective, procedure and standard of proof, (proof beyond reasonable doubt versus preponderance of probabilities). It was held that M. Paul Anthony vs Bharat Gold Mines Limited reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 and G.M.Tank (supra) - permitting the departmental action to be set aside on the strength of the acquittal - is attracted only where the evidence in both proceedings is identical and the Criminal Court has recorded an honourable acquittal on merits by wholly disbelieving the prosecution case.

In Union of India and Others vs Gyan Chand Chattar reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78 which also was taken note by the Supreme Court in Umesh's case, wherein it was held that the departmental enquiry must be founded on specific, definite and clear charges supported by proper evidence; findings cannot rest on vague charges, hearsay conjecture or surmise. There is a distinction between suspicion and proof. Charges involving corruption, given their quasi-criminal character and civil/criminal consequences, must be proved "to the hilt". While corruption, once proved, warrants no sympathy and permits no punishment short of dismissal, an enquiry that fails to establish the charge with real evidence cannot sustain a major penalty.

In the instant case, the appellant cannot derive any benefit from the exception carved out by the Supreme Court in G.M Tank, Ram Lal and the other subsequent decisions. The acquittal recorded by the Criminal Court was not founded upon a categorical finding that the prosecution case of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification was false. On the contrary, the acquittal rested on the benefit of doubt arising from certain contradictions in the trap evidence and the loan defence having been held probable, and not upon any categorical finding that the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification was false. In particular, weight was given to the admissions elicited from PW1 during his cross examination wherein he admitted that he had borrowed Rs.1,500 from the appellant and that the amount paid on the date of trap was towards the repayment of the said hand loan. On that basis the Criminal Court extended the benefit of doubt to the accused.

The departmental enquiry, however, after considering the very same admissions, expressly rejected them. The enquiry officer held that the complainant's evidence in examination-in-chief and the complaint - Ex. P1 consistently established the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, that the admissions made during cross-examination were an afterthought and appeared to have been made for extraneous reasons, and the defence of repayment of a hand loan was inherently improbable and unsupported by any independent material.

Consequently, the enquiry officer concluded that the amount received by the appellant constituted an illegal gratification with respect to the three pending applications. The enquiry findings are also supported by evidence relating to the trap proceedings. The complainant lodged a complaint before the Lokayukta alleging demand of Rs.1,500 as an illegal gratification. Pursuant thereto, the Lokayukta Police secured two independent panch witnesses, conducted the pre-trap formality by smearing three currency notes of Rs.500 each with phenolphthalein powder. The Lokayukta Police prepared the entrustment mahazar and entrusted the complainant to hand over the tainted currency only upon demand. The shadow witness accompanied the complainant. After the pre-arranged signal was given, the Lokayukta Police entered the office, recovered the tainted currency from the right pocket of the appellant’s trousers, conducted the hand wash test which turned pink, and seized the relevant records. The chemical examination report confirmed the presence of phenolphthalein on the hand washes, the recovered currency notes and trousers worn by the appellant. These circumstances were accepted by the enquiry officer as corroborative to the complainant's version and sufficient to establish misconduct on preponderance of probabilities."

The Division Bench holds that if the criminal Court records clear acquittal on merits after completely disbelieving the prosecution case, it would be unjust and unfair to sustain the disciplinary punishment. It now becomes germane to notice what the other High Courts have held in identical circumstances.

The High Court of Calcutta in a judgment rendered on 19-05-2025 in the case of ASIM KUMAR PAUL v. UNION OF INDIA^{99.WP.CT 75 OF 2010} has held as follows:

Keeping in mind the proposition of law as decided in the case of MaharanaPratap Singh (Supra), if we look to the factual aspects as involved in the instant writ petition, it appears to us that the charges as framed against the delinquent in the enquiry proceeding are almost similar to the charges as framed in the criminal proceeding and the evidence and the witnesses and the circumstances of both the enquiry proceeding and criminal proceeding are either identical or substantially similar. We have also noticed that apart from the charge of mala fide and fraudulent act of the delinquent thereby attracting contravention of the Rule 3(1) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the said Rule, no other independent charge was framed in the said disciplinary proceeding alleging culpable negligence on the part of the writ petitioner in discharging his duty. It thus appears to us that on account of passing of the judgment of acquittal in the aforementioned criminal appeal the findings of the enquiry authority, appellate authority as well as the revisional authority cannot be allowed to stand."

The High Court of Orissa in the case of ABHAY BEHERA v. STATE OF ODISHA^{1010.W.P.(C) No.11239 decided on 12-05-2026} has held as follows:

Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-47 & 50 of the decision in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh has held as follows:-

This Court in Para-20 of the decision in the case of Banshidhar Bariki has held as follows:-

Reliance was also placed to a decision of this Court passed on 18.09.2025 in W.P.(C) No.27964 of 2024.

It is accordingly contended that the proceeding initiated in Gajapati District Proceeding No.14 of 2012 be quashed.

Mr. S. Das, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the State on the other hand contended that since the proceeding is at the stage of the 2nd show cause if some time will be allowed the proceeding will be finalized in accordance with law.

It is also contended that since the factum of proof so required to be followed in a departmental proceeding is different from criminal proceeding, the order of acquittal passed in the criminal proceeding has got no binding effect with regard to conduct of the disciplinary proceeding.

It is accordingly contended that if two months’ time will be allowed the proceeding will be disposed of.

Having heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties and considering the submissions made, this Court finds that the proceeding in question was initiated against the Petitioner vide Gajapati District Proceeding No.14 of 2012 inter alia with the following charges:-

It is also found that Petitioner faced the criminal proceeding in Berhampur Vigilance P.S. Case No.51, dtd. 30.11.2010 corresponding to GR Case No.53 of 2010 (V) in the file of learned Special Judge, (Vigilance), Berhampur. In the said vigilance proceeding Petitioner was acquitted of the charges vide judgment dtd.30.01.2014 under Annexure-1.

Since the charges in both the proceeding are same and Petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal proceeding vide judgment under Annexure-1, placing reliance on the decisions as cited (supra), this Court is of the view that further continuance of the disciplinary proceeding is not to the interest of the Petitioner and will be an abuse of the process of Court. Not only that on the face of the submission of the enquiry report since 31.02.2014, the proceeding is yet to be disposed of."

The High Court of Patna in the case of SUSHIL KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF BIHAR¹¹ has held as follows:

".... .... ....

Nonetheless, this Court is cognizant of the settled position of law that mere acquittal in a criminal trial does not, ipso facto, entitle a delinquent employee to reinstatement, since the standard of proof and the nature of enquiry in a departmental proceeding are materially different from those governing a criminal trial. However, by appreciating the material facts and circumstances of the given case at hand, it is imperative to adduce the governing principles of law by way of the following judicial pronouncements.

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Answering the said question, and reaffirming the ratio in G.M. Tank (supra), the Supreme Court held, in substance, that while a mere acquittal in a criminal case does not by itself entitle an employee to have his dismissal set aside, where the charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances in the departmental and criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, upholding a contrary finding of guilt in the departmental enquiry would be unjust, unfair and oppressive.

The Court further held that expressions such as "benefit of doubt" and "honourable acquittal" are not to be treated as mere formalities or labels — the duty of the Court is to look to the substance of the judgment of acquittal, and not merely to the terminology employed therein.

¹¹ CWJC No.11480 of 2017 decided on 03-09-2026 The Supreme Court also held that failure on the part of the State to produce the complete departmental enquiry file, when specifically called upon to do so, attracts an adverse inference under Section 114 (g), of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

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In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the governing principles of law enunciated hereinabove, this Court finds it appropriate to hold that the enquiry purportedly conducted afresh, pursuant to the order dated 23.10.2006 (Annexure-3), was not, in substance, a fresh enquiry, but a mere continuation, in form, of the earlier vitiated proceeding, inasmuch as, no witness was examined afresh and the petitioner was denied any real opportunity of cross-examination.

Further, the departmental proceeding and the criminal prosecution arose out of the same occurrence and were founded on substantially overlapping factual allegations.

It is needless to state that the petitioner was acquitted in Sessions Trial No. 28 of 1999 by judgment dated 09.08.2016. The said acquittal, arising out of the same occurrence, is a relevant circumstance to be taken into account while examining the sustainability of the departmental action.

Having regard to the fact that the departmental proceeding and the criminal prosecution arose of the same occurrence, and, more importantly, that the fresh departmental enquiry was conducted without independently recording the evidence of the departmental witnesses and without according the Petitioner an effective opportunity of cross-examination, the impugned departmental actions cannot be sustained in law."

(Emphasis supplied at each instance) In RAM LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN the Apex Court held that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically nullify disciplinary proceedings. An exception arises where the charges, evidence, witnesses and surrounding circumstances in the criminal trial and departmental enquiry are identical or substantially the same. If, after considering the entire prosecution evidence, the criminal Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the charge, the Court exercising judicial review may interfere with the disciplinary punishment where allowing it to stand would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. On facts, the disciplinary authority had ignored crucial evidence, including the original mark sheet and the Investigating Officer's evidence showing that there was no alteration in it. The departmental findings were therefore vitiated. Significantly, the Court held that expressions such as “benefit of doubt” and “honourably acquitted” are not magic incantations; the substance of the judgment of acquittal, rather than the terminology employed, must determine its effect.

In MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR, the Apex Court reiterated RAM LAL and G.M. TANK. While criminal acquittal ordinarily does not result in automatic setting aside of a dismissal imposed departmentally, the position changes where the charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are identical or substantially similar. In that situation, sustaining a contrary departmental finding may become unjust, unfair and oppressive. The Court found a close similarity between the principal departmental charge and the criminal accusation. The informant and another material witness had failed to identify the appellant in the criminal trial, resulting in an acquittal that was not merely technical. Similar evidentiary infirmities existed in the departmental enquiry. The non-production of the departmental file also justified an adverse inference. Consequently, the finding of guilt on charge No.1 was held unsustainable.

In SRI CHIDANANDA v. THE UPALOKAYUKTA, the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court recognised the limited exception carved out in G.M. TANK, RAM LAL and MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH: where the criminal trial and departmental enquiry rest upon identical or substantially similar charges, witnesses, evidence and circumstances, and the criminal Court acquits the employee on merits after disbelieving the prosecution case, continuation of the departmental punishment may become unjust and oppressive, particularly when the enquiry contains no additional or independent evidence. At the same time, relying on STATE OF KARNATAKA V. UMESH, the Court emphasised that departmental proceedings are ordinarily independent and misconduct is tested on the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

On the facts considered by the Division Bench, however, the exception was held inapplicable: the criminal acquittal arose from contradictions in the trap evidence and a probable hand-loan defence, whereas the enquiry officer independently evaluated the material and relied upon the trap proceedings, recovery of tainted currency and phenolphthalein evidence.

In STATE OF KARNATAKA v. UMESH, it states the general rule on the other side of the spectrum. Criminal and departmental proceedings operate in different fields, with different purposes and standards of proof. An acquittal therefore does not, by itself, disturb a departmental finding. Judicial review is not an appeal on facts, and the High Court cannot reappreciate departmental evidence merely because another view is possible. Its scrutiny is essentially confined to whether natural justice was followed, whether there was some evidence, whether the governing rules were observed, whether the findings suffer from perversity and whether the punishment is disproportionate. On the facts, the Apex Court restored the punishment of compulsory retirement, because the departmental findings were supported by evidence notwithstanding the criminal acquittal.

In KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LTD. v. C. NAGARAJU, the Apex Court held that an acquittal by a criminal Court neither bars nor automatically invalidates departmental proceedings. The two proceedings differ in object, procedure, rules of evidence and standard of proof. More importantly, where the evidence produced in the departmental enquiry is different from that considered in the criminal trial, the disciplinary authority is not bound by the acquittal. The G.M. TANK/M. PAUL ANTHONY principle is attracted only in the exceptional situation, where the evidentiary foundation of both proceedings is substantially identical and the prosecution case has failed on merits.

In UNION OF INDIA V. GYAN CHAND CHATTAR, the Apex Court emphasised that a departmental enquiry must proceed upon specific and definite charges and relevant evidence. Findings cannot rest upon conjecture, surmise or mere suspicion. The enquiry must be fair and objective, and material evidence cannot be ignored. Although certain observations in the case referred to corruption charges being required to be proved “to the hilt”, UMESH subsequently explained that those observations were not the ratio of GYAN CHAND CHATTAR. The controlling test remains whether there was relevant material supporting the finding and whether principles of natural justice were complied with.

In ASIM KUMAR PAUL v. UNION OF INDIA, following MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH, the Calcutta High Court found that the charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances in the departmental and criminal proceedings were identical or substantially similar. There was no separate or independent departmental charge capable of surviving the criminal acquittal. Consequently, once the criminal appeal resulted in acquittal, the findings of the enquiry authority, appellate authority and revisional authority founded upon the same material could not be permitted to stand.

In ABHAY BEHERA v. STATE OF ODISHA, the Orissa High Court applied MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH to a departmental proceeding arising from allegations of disproportionate assets. The petitioner had already been acquitted in the corresponding vigilance prosecution. Since the charges in both proceedings were found to be the same, the Court held that further continuation of the disciplinary proceeding would not serve the petitioner's interest and would amount to an abuse of process, particularly when the proceeding had remained pending for an extraordinary period despite submission of the enquiry report.

In SUSHIL KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR, the Patna High Court reiterated that mere criminal acquittal does not ipso facto confer a right to reinstatement because departmental and criminal proceedings employ different standards of proof. Applying G.M. TANK, RAM LAL and MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH, however, it held that where both proceedings arise from the same occurrence and substantially overlapping allegations, the acquittal becomes a material circumstance in examining the sustainability of departmental action. The case had an additional infirmity: the purported fresh departmental enquiry was not genuinely fresh, since witnesses were not examined afresh and the employee was denied an effective opportunity of cross-examination. The departmental action was therefore held unsustainable.

The Writ Petition is allowed.

The order dated 28-09-2022, passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, is hereby quashed. Consequently, the order dated 23-07-2019, imposing penalty upon the petitioner, also stands quashed.

The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential service and retiral benefits flowing from the quashment of the order dated 23-07-2019. The period between the date of compulsory retirement and the date on which the petitioner would have attained the age of superannuation shall be reckoned as service for the purpose of computation of qualifying service and all consequential retiral benefits. The petitioner shall, however, not be entitled to arrears of salary for the said period.

Consequently, Application No.10346 of 2019, preferred by the petitioner before the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, stands allowed.

The respondents shall calculate and disburse all consequential monetary and retiral benefits flowing from this order within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

Ordered accordingly.