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Judgment
Thangamani, J.—Revision petitioner Hanuman Vahana Panchaparva Kattalai of Sri Venkatachalapathi Perumal Temple, Pulivalam has
leased out the suit property to the respondent for a period of 5 years under a registered lease deed dated 3.3.1987. The lease was determined by
efflux of time, after issuance of notice u/s 106, C.P.C. the kattalai instituted O.S. No. 93 of 1992 in the Court of District Munsiff of Tiruvarur for
recovery of possession and arrears of rent. It appears that on 2.3.1992 the Executive Officer of the temple issued a notice to the parties herein
through his lawyer setting up titles to the suit property in favour of the temple. The temple has also attacked the lease deed between the parties as
unauthorised. So the present revision petitioner came forward with O.S. No. 74 of 1992 in the Court of Subordinate Judge of Nagapattinam for a
permanent injunction restraining the respondent from running a touring cinema theatre in the suit property till he is evicted under due process of law
alleging that the respondent in collusion with the Executive Officer of the temple is arranging to commence exhibition of cine films in the touring
cinema theatre constructed by him in the suit property. The revision petitioner has also moved for a temporary injunction in I.A. No. 346 of 1992
and obtained an order directing the respondent not to exhibit cine film in the theatre located in the site till the disposal of the suit. The respondent
took up the matter in appeal before learned District Judge of Nagapattinam in C.M.A. No. 42 of 1992. The appellate court allowed the appeal,
set aside the order of learned District Munsif in I.A. No. 346 of 1992 and dismissed the same without costs. And the plaintiff challenges the said
order in this revision petition.
Learned Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that on the expiry of the lease on 3.3.1992 the possession of the respondent is not lawful.
Since he has expressed his unequivocal intention of not continuing the lease after the period of tenancy is over, the respondent cannot be construed
as a tenant by sufference also. From 4.3.1992 the respondent is not entitled to run the theatre. Under Cinematograph Act unless the respondent
proves that he is in lawful possession of the site, he will not be entitled to get licence in his favour, and in support of his claim he has placed reliance
of Rule 13 of the Rules under Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Act 9 of 1955 which reads that if the applicant for the licence is not the owner of
the site, he shall to the satisfaction of the licensing authority, produce documentary evidence to show that he is in lawful possession of the site,
building and equipment. Since the respondent herein cannot be said to be in lawful possession of the site, he is not entitled to run cinema theatre
there. He has also drawn the attention of the court to the decision of the Supreme Court in M.C. Chockalingam and Others Vs. V.
Manickavasagam and Others, . There it has been held that in the context of Rule 13of Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1957a tenant on the
expiry of the lease cannot be said to continue in ''lawful possession'' of the property against the wishes of the landlord if such a possession is not
otherwise statutorily protected under the law against even lawful eviction through court process, such as under the Rent Control Act. It is significant
to note that the principal question that cause up for decision in the case cited is whether a tenant who is not a statutory tenant is entitled to claim to
be in lawful possession of the premises on determination of the tenancy, on expiry of the lease in interpreting the above said Rule 13.
Whereas the short question in controversy here is whether the landlord has say right to prevent the tenant from running a touring cinema theatre
in the suit property after the expiry of the initial period of lease and tenant continues to hold over. In the case on hand the affidavit in support of the
injunction application nowhere states that the respondent was already running a cinema theatre there. The bold statement therein is that as the
tenant is in permissive occupation, he has no right to run the touring cinema theatre in the suit properly. And in para 10 of the plaint the specific
averment is that the tenant has made arrangement from 11.3.1992 to commence the exhibition of cine films in the cinema touring theatre in the suit
property on and from 13.4.1992. This is deliberate suppression on the part of the revision petitioner that the purpose of the lease was to run a
cinema theatre and in fact a touring cinema theatre was being run there since the inception of the lease. This factor itself is sufficient to negative the
plea of the revision petitioner since injunction is an equitable remedy and it cannot be granted in favour of a person who indulges in suppression of
material facts.
Further, there is no dispute now that the purpose of the lease is to run a touring cinema in the demised land. Pursuant to the same is a theatre
was constructed thereon with considerable cost and it was being run and as it has been held in The Union of India v. Andhra Bank 89 L.W. 473,
when a tenant holds over, in the sense ''continues in possession of the demised premises'' after the determination of the lease by the landlord, it is
permissible to infer assent thereto on the part of the landlord, by reason of his acceptance of rent. In other respects, there should be reasonable,
but acceptable proof that the landlord has otherwise assented to the tenants continuing in possession after the termination. In all such cases, the act
of the tenant is described as tenant holding over. By such continuance in possession after determination, the person in occupation is called a tenant
at sufference. If such possession is atrributable to the consent of the landlord given either expressly or by necessary implication, then he is called a
tenant holding over or a tenant at will. But, if in a given situation, such consent is not proved, then he is called a tenant by sufference. The essential
principle, appears to be that if the landlord consents to such continuance of the tenant in the premises after the determination of the lease, he would
be a tenant holding over, but, in the absence of any such consent, he would be deemed to be a tenant by sufference. But, in no case he can be
characterised as a trepasser. While so, there is no substance in the claim of the revision petitioner that until the tenant is evicted under due process
of law, he should not be permitted to put the land to the use for which it was demised.
We may also note that in Manickavasagam v. The Board of Revenue 86 L.W. 661, a Division Bench of this Court has stated that it cannot be
laid down as a general proposition that once there was a demand by the landlord for possession from the tenant whose lease had expired by efflux
of time, the continued possession in the hands of the erstwhile tenant would be unlawful or that he would be considered as a trepasser. The
continued possession in the hands of such a tenant is protected by law. Such possession is quite good against the entire world except the landlord
himself. The landlord will be entitled to evict him by the appropriate proceedings. Until then, the erstwhile tenant cannot be regarded as being in
unlawful possession. His possession is wrongful, but not unlawful. It is wrongful, because the erstwhile tenant continues in possession beyond
expiry of the period fixed in the lease. It is not unlawful, because the landlord cannot lake the law into his own hands and evict him. He can evict
him only by proper procedure and that being the case, it cannot be said that the erstwhile tenant is in unlawful possession. Therefore, for the
purpose of the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955 particularly Rule 13 of the Rules, merely because the lease period have expired, the tenant
who overstays cannot be considered to be in unlawful possession. In other words, even in such a situation, Rule 13 is satisfied and such a tenant
will be entitled to a renewal. So, I find no merit in this civil revision petition.
In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs.