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Judgment
V. Jagannathan, J.—In this writ petition, the Petitioner seeks quashing of the preliminary notification dated 28.3.2007 issued u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and also the final, notification dated 12.8.2010 and the aforesaid prayers are made by the Petitioner in the context of the following facts.
The 2nd Respondent Dy. Commissioner, Mangalore issued the notification dated 28.3.07 for acquiring Sy. No. 477/2 measuring 4 acres 90 cents belonging to the Petitioner and also other adjoining lands situated in Sulliya Taluk and response to the notice issued to him, the Petitioner filed his objections and thereafter the Notification date 6.10.07 was issued u/s 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and before publication of Final Notification could be issued, the Petitioner approached this Court in writ petition and the matter then went up before the writ appeal court in W.A. No. 3275/09 and the Division Bench directed the 2nd Respondent to afford an opportunity to the Petitioner and after completion of hearing on the objections raised by the Petitioner, the Dy. Commissioner was directed to submit the report to the Government on or before 15.3.2010.
The Petitioner appeared before the Dy. Commissioner and once again filed his objections and the same was rejected by the 2nd Respondent summarily according to the petittioner and final notification came to be issued on 12.8.10.
Learned Counsel Sri. S. Subhash for the Petitioner referring to the aforesaid events, submitted that the notifications impugned are liable to be quashed on three main grounds. The first one is that, no enquiry was held and objections filed by the Petitioner were not considered and no reasons were given for rejecting the objections also. It is then contended that, the final notification issued on 12.8.2010 is beyond the period of limitation and as such, in view of the Apex Court decision reported in Padmasundara Rao and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, , the final notification is liable to be quashed as it was issued long after the limitation period was over.
Learned Addl. Advocate General Sri. K.M. Nataraj fairly submitted that the question of limitation has been resolved by the Apex Court in Padma Sundara Rao''s case and therefore, if this Court is inclined to allow the writ petition, then liberty be given to the 2nd Respondent to proceed afresh in the matter. Same submission is also made by the learned Counsel appearing for the other parties as well.
Having thus heard both sides and dispute is not being there between the patties with regard to the dates of issuance of preliminary notification and final notification, in view of the final notification having been issued on 12.8.2010, long after the preliminary notification issued in the year 2007, the final notification issued therefore cannot be sustained in law as it is issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the first proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In this connection, the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Padmasundara Rao and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, will have to be kept in view.
The Apex Court in the said case has observed that, where declaration u/s 6 is quashed by the court, fresh declaration must be issued within the same limitation period under the first proviso and that period cannot be construed to commence from the date of receipt of the order of the court. The further observations made by the Apex Court, are as under:
Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiah case the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court''s order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted, it would mean that a case can be covered by not only Clause (i) and/or Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. If the legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration u/s 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation.
In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court and in the instant ease, there being no doubt as to the final notification having been issued long after the period of limitation prescribed in law, the Petitioner has made out a case for this Court to quash the notifications under challenge.
In view of the first Petitioner making out a case for quashing of the notifications as the final notification was barred by time, it is not necessary to consider into other grounds raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Hence, the following order is passed.
Writ petition is allowed. Impugned notifications at Annexures ''B'' and ''R'' are quashed. The 2nd Respondent is at liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law.